Autonomy of IGOs

Question 1

IGO autonomy

Answer 1

The ability of IGOs to set their own goals and to act in ways that contradict the interests and policy preferences of member states

Question 2

Perspectives on IGO autonomy

Answer 2

Realist theory
- No autonomy
Marxist theory
- Relative autonomy
Principal-agent theory
- Limited autonomy
Organizational theory
- High autonomy

Question 3

Realist theory on IGO autonomy

Answer 3

• IGOs have no autonomy from the interests and preferences of powerful states
• IGOs serve the interests of powerful states
  – They do as much (or as little) as powerful states want them to do
• IGOs change when the distribution of power among states changes

Question 4

Marxist theory on IGO autonomy

Answer 4

Paul Cammack (2003)
- IGOs have “relative autonomy” from capitalist states
- IGOs promote capitalism as a system, but do not necessarily follow the (monopolistic) preferences of particular capitalist states or corporations
- Cammack’s example:
– World Bank and IMF promote global capitalism by supporting debt sustainability and anti-poverty programs that enable capitalism to survive

Question 5

The governor’s dilemma (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, Zangl)

Answer 5

The question of IGO autonomy is an example of the ‘governor’s dilemma’ at local, national, global levels.
- Fact: Most governance is indirect, implemented through intermediaries.
- Question: How much autonomy should the governor give to the intermediaries?
Don’t want micromanagement, but also don’t want loose cannons
- Dilemma: micromanagement vs loose cannons
— Too much control weakens intermediary competence and risks policy failure.
— Too much intermediary competence risks control failure.

Question 6

Principal-agent theory on IGO autonomy

Answer 6

Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney (2006)
- IGOs have limited autonomy from their member states
- In order to achieve their preferred outcomes, states (“principals”) delegate a limited amount of decision-making authority to IGOs (“agents”) via contracts that empower the IGO to act on behalf of the states while allowing the states to control the IGO

Question 7

The pros of delegating authority to IGOs (principal-agent theory)

Answer 7

Agency gains: How member states can benefit from delegating authority to IGOs:
- Gains from specialization of functions
- Easier decision-making
- Easier resolution of disputes
- Greater credibility of commitments
- Greater policy continuity

Question 8

The cons of delegating authority to IGOs (principal-agent theory)

Answer 8

Agency costs: How member states can lose from delegating authority to IGOs through slack
- Shirking
– IGO minimizes its efforts on behalf of states
- Slippage:
– IGO shifts policy away from states’ preferences, toward its own preferences

Question 9

The challenge of controlling IGOs, conflict of interests (principal-agent theory)

Answer 9

• States want IGOs to be effective and under their control
• IGOs want autonomy from states

Question 10

The challenge of controlling IGOs, how member states (try to) control IGOs (principal-agent theory)

Answer 10

• Limiting the discretion available to IGO
• Monitoring and reporting requirements
• Institutional checks and balances
• Sanctions, especially budget cuts

Question 11

The challenge of controlling IGOs, obstacles to member state control of IGOs (principal-agent theory)

Answer 11

• Disagreements among members states
• Societal interests support IGOs
• IGOs lobby states, seek to change their preferences

Question 12

Organizational theory on IGO autonomy

Answer 12

Michael N. Barnett, and Martha Finnemore (1999)
- IGOs have high autonomy
- IGOs are bureaucracies with independent expertise whose powers and actions often do not fit the interests and preferences of states
- IGOs are not “empty shells or impersonal policy machinery manipulated by other actors”
- IGO action cannot be explained by state-centric theories (realism, rational design, principal-agent)

Question 13

The “pathological” tendencies of IGOs (organizational theory)

Answer 13

Because of their bureaucratic nature, IGOs tend to produce outcomes that are dysfunctional or undesired from the perspective of their member states, why?
- Irrationality of rationalization
– Compartmentalized knowledge -> tunnel vision
—> Actions are tailored to fit rules and standard operating procedures
- Bureaucratic universalism
– The tendency to downplay local variables -> inappropriate policy recommendations
- Cultural contestation
– Divergent norms within bureaucracy (eg. non-interference vs humanitarian action) -> incoherent outputs