ethical thought Flashcards
1
Q
ethical thought (18)
A
(1) meta/normative ethics (general)
(2) cog/non-cog (emotivism) - general
(3) moral realism/moral anti-realism
(4) ethical naturalism (+objective moral laws, natural world)
(5) naturalist types (+meta-ethical statements)
(6) f.h. bradley
(7) challenges to ethical naturalism (+hume)
(8) moore (naturalistic fallacy, open question)
(9) naturalism strengths/weaknesses
(10) meta-ethical approaches/intuitionism
(11) h.a. pritchard
(12) w.d. ross
(13) general moral thinking
(14) intuitionism strengths/weaknesses
(15) emotivism
(16) subjectivism vs emotivism
(17) emotivism strengths/weaknesses
(18) prescriptivism (+hare, strengths/weaknesses)
2
Q
(1) meta/normative ethics (general)
A
- ethical terminology (right, wrong, bad, good)
- meta ethics: study of ethical lang vs normative ethics: describes varying moral codes of behaviours (NL, UT, SE)
3
Q
(2) cog/non-cog (emotivism) - general
A
- ^is meta ethical view> ethical statements don’t assert propositions/express factual claims; can’t be verified
- ES> expressions of opinion; not propositional
4
Q
(3) moral realism/moral anti-realism
A
- MR: facts of right/wrong in actions> cog/realist (2 forms: ethical intuitionism/non-naturalism; ethical naturalism)
- MAR: no obj values; lang not just for stating; MAR non-propositional, non-cog, anti-realist (2 forms: ethical subjectivism; non-cognitivism)
5
Q
(4) ethical naturalism (+objective moral laws, natural world)
A
- obj moral laws exist indep of humans; moral terms understood via analysing natural world; ES cognitivist, can be verified/falsified>verified moral statements become objective moral truths
- epistemology (knowledge via senses/empiricism - hume, locke)>naturalism; EN: morals are objective, determined via empiricism (cognitive/quantitative assessment of propositions before agreeing)
6
Q
(5) naturalist types (+meta-ethical statements)
A
- theological Ns (goodness via G’s will; seen in natural world, e.g. revealed via NL/G’s creation)
- hedonic Ns (goodness as fact of pleasure/happiness e.g. UT; applied ethical reasoning from basis of happy experience/most happy = morally good)
- meta-ethical statements: rooted in scientific/empiricist methods> good can be defined
7
Q
(6) f.h. bradley
A
- 1840 ‘ethical studies’; british idealist; highly polemical works; B>self-realisation by empirical observation of community
- ‘my station and its duties’: community over individuality to self-realise; applied hegel’s dialectical synthesis to UT, Kantian ethics (!!later retreated this view)
- B> true ES can be universally observed; B> aim of morality to cease separateness; via self-sacrifice the self is restored
8
Q
(7) challenges to ethical naturalism (+hume)
A
- hume’s law (is-ought/hume’s guillotine)> famous objectino to EN; can’t take what ‘is’ (fact/descriptive) to what ‘ought’ (duty/normative statement)
- H> ‘ought’ statements fit neither synthetic or analytic, so can’t be fact
- H> feelings/desires provide motivation
- Hume’s Fork: analytic statements/tautologies (deduction, a priori, maths) vs synthetic statements/emprical (a posteriori, sense-exp); moral proposition isn’t either, so can’t be deduced logically/demonstrated empirically
9
Q
(8) moore (naturalistic fallacy, open question)
A
- 1903, ‘principia ethica’; ethical terms indefinable, like colours
- M> ENs have the ‘naturalistic fallacy’; M> can only know ethical terms via intuition
- NFY: good indefinable; some conflate good with what it infl/takes on (e.g. rain (good) indefinable; rain on things (smell/attached to good) = what is ‘empirically’ rain/good)
- M> by attemping good definition via natural properties, we precipitate an open question; defining good is impossible
10
Q
(9) naturalism strengths/weaknesses
A
- S: objective moral laws provided; find morality via society; obj truths found via observation; aids in self-realisation; ethical/non-ethical statements are the same
- W: naturalistic fallacy (moore); EN illogical, is ought-based (hume), can’t v/f (ayer); lacks empiricism; based on humans ignoring selfish nature (baier)
11
Q
(10) meta-ethical approaches/intuitionism
A
- universal/innate intuition to find moral truths; obj moral laws (‘self-evident truths’) exist independent of humans
- obj, cog, realist, a priori, meta-ethic; ethical non-naturalism, non-metaphysical moral realism
- use moral intuition to determine what produces most good (=most moral act)
- > good universal (innate intuition for goodness; ‘sui generis’/unique)
- > good inherently perfect; how we interpret is fallible (e.g. aristotle’s virtue cultivation)
- ross (intuitive awareness/prima facie duties - correct until proven otherwise)
12
Q
(11) h.a. pritchard
A
- 1870; ‘moral mistakes’; intuitionist, dev moore’s work
- ‘ought’ indefinable/underivative/irreducible> intuition lead to what we ‘ought’ to do, duty/deon to do so
- P rejects M’s tel/end goal roots; P>for deon/’ought’ intuition
- P> some have better-developed intuition
13
Q
(12) w.d. ross
A
- 1960; ‘the foundations’; agreed right/ought indefinable like good
- R> some actions inherently right; when rights class, follow most relevant/applicable to context
- deciding on which/how is dependent on mental maturity
- PDFs/prima facie duties (fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence)
14
Q
(13) general moral thinking
A
- intuition not necessary for moral thinking; obj, empirical, a posteriori used to develop morality; intuition innate, but developed by different/superior means
15
Q
(14) intuitionism strengths/weaknesses
A
- S: universal, autonomy, common sense/shared human experience, inherent structure (follow intu at all costs), facilitates subj, rela, indiv; reid, tyler, kant, jamieson
- W: no proof of moral intuition, no intrinstic evidence, social conditioning/religion debunk intuition, no set criteria for value of differing intuition, no plan b for conflicting intuitions; dancy, rachels, ayer, hume, jamieson
- W cases: UK jury study (all perceived ‘honesty’ differently); aquinas (scripture explains good); mackie (arg of queerness); macmahon (intuition just glorified self-interest)
