CPOLS Flashcards
Lawfully observing growing marijuana in a private, fenced backyard does or does not give you the right to go seize it without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent.
Does Not (Section II – B)
Is the following scenario lawful or not: Officer who was trying to locate resident stood on the public side of a side yard gate and raised himself three inches on his tip toes to look over six-foot fence. His observation of a cocked revolver in the side yard did not amount to a search. Suspecting that the resident was home (warm car hood and light on in garage) and knowing that a seven-year-old child lived there, the officer lawfully jumped over the fence to retrieve the gun based on exigent circumstances.
His observations and the entry to seize the revolver were lawful. Section III
In the following scenario may the police seize the pipes? Police, while arresting a suspect at the door to his hotel room pursuant to two arrest warrants, observed in plain view two glass cocaine pipes inside the room.
The officers were entitled to seize the pipes. However, even though the pipes provided probable cause that there were more narcotics or paraphernalia inside the room, a search warrant was needed before the officers could lawfully search the room. Section III - A
Were the officer’s actions legal in the following scenario? Neighbors reported that they had not seen the victim for two weeks, and officers had received two calls expressing concern for the victim. One month earlier they had responded to a domestic disturbance reported at the victim’s apartment. No one had responded to a note from the police asking the victim to call, there was mail in her mailbox, and officers found the front door unlocked after receiving a neighbor’s report that someone had been banging on the door.
Warrantless entries may be appropriate when police are looking for an occupant “reliably reported as missing.” The officers lawfully entered the apartment based on the totality of the circumstances indicating an emergency situation. Section IV- A - 2
May the officers force a warrantless entry in the following scenario? Officer responded to ADW call and found an infant brutally cut and injured. Reliable information indicated the assailant was drunk and had gone home, where he lived with his own young son. After discovering a trail of fresh blood and broken glass at the residence, knocking and announcing at the front and back doors, and observing the lights go out in response.
Yes, the officer could legally force a warrantless entry based on concern for the son. Section IV – A - 2
May officers enter a residence to arrest a misdemeanor DUI suspect who had immediately gone inside after driving and appeared uncooperative in that he attempted to evade contact with the officers who could see and hear him inside the residence and attempted to flee through the back door.
Yes, under specific circumstances. NOTE: The California Supreme Court specifically declined to approve warrantless entries for the apprehension of all misdemeanor DUI suspects. Section IV - D
Was the officer’s search proper in the following scenario? An officer responded to a report of “shots fired” at Apartment 5 of an apartment complex. The officer saw blood leading from the door of Apartment 5 to the laundry room where he discovered the dead victim. A little later, other officers responded and began a search for evidence that might lead to immediate apprehension of the murderer. The officers found contraband and a vehicle registration slip in the name of M. Amaya, Jr.
The search was proper and the evidence was admissible. Section IV - F - 1
In the following scenario, must the officers knock and notice before they entered the bedroom door? Officers executing a search warrant at a residence one morning knocked, announced repeatedly, and were “refused” admittance by the lack of any response within a reasonable period of time even though a woman at the front window had seen them approaching. They opened the unlocked front door, found the woman and detained her in one room, and continued down the hallway to a closed bedroom door. There they knocked, stated “Police, search warrant,” and simultaneously opened the door and entered, without waiting for any “refusal.”
“Having fully complied with section 1531 at the outer door, the officers were under no constitutional or statutory obligation to repeat the knock-notice litany once inside.” Section V – C - 2
Why should you ALWAYS ask for consent to search even when you have other authority for the search?
In case the other grounds for the search (e.g., exigency or warrant) are later ruled insufficient. See examples below:
Example: A homeowner calls in to report a burglary. After entry of the victim’s home, the officers “sense” that the victim may be dealing in narcotics. The officers request and obtain permission to search anywhere in the house. They discover crime-related evidence, which will be admissible on the independent ground of consent. Section VI – A - 1
Example: Officers serve a search warrant and find a lot of evidence. Later, the warrant is ruled defective and all of the evidence is suppressed. A simple request for consent to search prior to showing the resident the warrant might have saved all of the evidence. Section VI – A - 1
Was the officer’s actions in the following scenario lawful? Officers arrested defendant in her motel room, ordered her to lie on the floor, and handcuffed her while they secured the area. One officer lifted the mattress of the only bed in the room, which was approximately three feet from the defendant, and found a stash of narcotics and paraphernalia.
The search under the mattress was a valid search incident to arrest. Section VII
Can an officer make a “pretext” stop
based on a hunch that the vehicle or its occupants were involved in a felony?
Yes. A “pretext” stop is not illegal, but you must have a valid basis for the stop and your actions are consistent with that basis.
During a traffic stop you order the right rear passenger out of the vehicle. Are you justified in your request?
Yes. Your power to order passengers out of a vehicle is justified strictly by officer safety.
In any vehicle detention situation where the driver, upon your request, “fails to produce” the necessary documentation, you have the right to conduct what type of search for the driver’s license/ID and/or the vehicle registration?
You have the right to conduct a “limited search” of any area within the vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.
Smoke is pouring out from under the hood of a parked car with the owner nowhere around, can you enter the vehicle without the owner’s permission?
Yes. The “emergency” exception exists for vehicles, just as it does for premises. You may enter a vehicle to save lives or property.
Why is it important to establish ownership of containers in a vehicle?
Establishing ownership of objects is important because someone who disclaims ownership may lack “standing” in court to raise the issue of an illegal search or seizure.
An officer observed a vehicle with expired registration tabs and a Temporary Operating Permit in the rear window. Is it legal for the officer to make an enforcement stop for expired registration?
No. An officer may not stop a vehicle displaying a temporary operating permit on the sole basis that permits are often forged or invalid. Hunches, rumors, and bare statistics are insufficient.
(T/F) The “community caretaking” exception encompasses the “emergency aid” doctrine providing a basis for a lawful stop of a vehicle.
True. Applying this exception, an officer can stop a vehicle to ensure the safety of its occupants if the objective facts provide a reasonable basis for believing that a person in the vehicle is ill or injured.
An officer searched the passenger compartment of a defendant’s car after learning that the front passenger was on parole. The officer found a syringe and meth in a pair of shoes in the backseat area. Was this search legal?
Yes. It was objectively reasonable for the officer to expect that the parolee could reach back and conceal items in the unclaimed shoes.
Is an officer’s subjective state of mind, motivation, or intent relevant in determining whether an entry or search is lawful under the “community caretaking” exception rule?
No. The officer must have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that aid is required.
A search will be valid as incident to an arrest only if the search and arrest were “________________.”
“Contemporaneous”, meaning they must occur at the same location and at approximately the same time.
Fourth Amendment requirements do not apply to juveniles. (T/F)
False. The usual Fourth Amendment requirements apply: you need reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest.
Does a parent have authority to give consent to search a child’s room?
Generally, yes. Unless the child has “staked out” an area or object as exclusively his or her own.
Example of an exception to this rule. A locked tool box to which the juvenile possesses the only key.
The search of a juvenile in a school must be supported by probable cause. (T/F)
False. In a school setting, reasonable suspicion is sufficient.
The bulk of juvenile law is found in the __________ & __________ Code.
Welfare, Institutions
Juveniles under the age of ___ are presumed incapable of criminal intent.
14
If a juvenile is being held in an adult facility, the following criteria must be met.
a. Juvenile must not come in contact with adult prisoners within the facility.
b. At no time can the juvenile be out of the supervision of the officer in charge of him or her.
If a Juvenile is brought into a lockup facility, the detention cannot exceed ___ hours.
6
If a juvenile has been taken into custody for a suspected DUI offense, the juvenile may be taken into a detention facility for the purposes of administering a _________ _______.
Chemical Test.
Note: The test cannot exceed 2 hours.
A minor (can, cannot) waive his Miranda Rights without his parents or other adult being present and need not expressly waive his rights.
Can.
Note: Peace officers have no obligation to advise a minor that he has a right to contact his parents or adult, or to have them present during questioning.
When a 601 (Status Offender) or 602 (Ward) is going to be held in temporary custody, the arresting officer (shall/may) notify the parents or guardians.
Shall
Juveniles are allowed to make ______ completed phone calls within one hour of being taken into custody.
Two
The only excuse to enter a dwelling without a warrant, as it relates to child crimes, is if there are _________ circumstances that you can articulate based upon specific facts which give rise to PC.
Exigent
Humboldt CHP received a 9-1-1 call that a silver Ford pickup ran the caller off the road on Highway 1. The caller provided the truck’s license number and the location and time of the incident. A Mendocino CHP officer located the truck headed southbound on Highway 1 approximately 18 minutes after the call. It took five minutes for the officer to make a U-turn and stop the truck. The driver was hauling 30 pounds of marijuana in the truck bed.
Even without the officer personally observing indicia of impaired driving, the 9-1-1 call was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that the driver had committed a traffic offense in running another car off the road.
An unidentified 9-1-1 caller reported that a light-skinned African-American male with a bandaged left hand sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked gray Maxima had pulled a gun on the caller after mentioning a gang name. The caller was afraid to give his name because of possible retribution. Two minutes later, the caller, this time identifying himself as “Drew,” called back to report that he had driven by the parked car and saw that it was black, not gray. Within three minutes, officers located a black Maxima parked in the same location with a driver matching the caller’s description. Officers detained the driver and his two passengers and found a revolver under the front passenger seat.
The investigative detention was lawful. The 9-1-1 call was a firsthand report of violent criminal conduct requiring immediate investigation to protect public safety; the call was recorded; the caller, who had given a reason for remaining anonymous, reported immediate and detailed facts; and the police responded within minutes.
An anonymous caller reported a midnight disturbance possibly involving a firearm outside a residence in a known gang area. The caller described the individuals and their clothing and reported that they were headed toward a park known to be frequented by gang members. Days before the call, officers had responded to the same residence and seized two firearms following a shooting.
Officers could detain the persons seen approaching the park and exactly matching the caller’s description. The anonymous report was “every bit as reliable as the report described in Dolly, if not more so.”
A 9-1-1 caller reported four people fighting in the alley behind his residence. He heard someone say a gun was loaded, and both the caller and the dispatcher heard screams. A deputy arrived within three minutes, and the only person in the area was driving out of the alley. The deputy asked if he had seen a fight, but the person just kept driving.
The 9-1-1 call combined with the deputy’s quick response and appellant leaving the scene justified a brief investigatory detention. “The citizen who called for his help would surely hope the officer would do more to secure the safety of his neighborhood than shrug and drive away.”
Officers stopped Durant’s car for failing to signal within 100 feet of a turn, but the stop was not authorized under Vehicle Code §§ 22107 and 22108. One of the officer’s recognized Durant almost immediately as a probationer with a search condition before conducting a patdown search and finding a loaded handgun in Durant’s waistband.
The intervening circumstance of Durant’s probation search condition attenuated the taint of the erroneous vehicle stop because the “search condition supplied legal authorization to search that was completely independent of the circumstances leading to the traffic stop.” The court noted that there was no evidence of any flagrancy or purposefulness to the erroneous traffic stop. The court also noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by suppressing the gun simply because the officer did not recognize Durant immediately before the stop.
Deputies investigating a robbery were on the look out for Marcus Bates, who they knew to be a searchable probationer living in a nearby apartment complex. When they were approaching Bates’ apartment, one deputy saw an African-American male wearing colors similar to the reported suspect walking along the fence to the adjacent mobile home park. Another deputy drove to the entrance of the mobile home park, and within two minutes a car with three occupants approached the exit. The deputy hailed the driver to stop, and the rear passenger identified himself as Marcus Bates–the probationer who was the main suspect in the robbery.
The stop was unlawful, and Bates’ probation search condition did not attenuate an invalid detention. The court did not apply Brendlin because a probation search condition “is a discretionary enforcement tool and therefore a less compelling intervening circumstance than an arrest warrant.” The court also was not “comfortable” applying Durant to the case “as doing so would open the door to random vehicle detentions for the purpose of locating probationers having search conditions.”
California does not have a statute mandating that a detainee identify himself, and that obligation cannot be read into Penal Code section 148. Although you may take whatever steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to ascertain the identity of a person you have lawfully detained, Hiibel does not provide a means of arresting someone for failing or refusing to identify himself.
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a suspect’s failure to identify himself cannot, on its own, justify an arrest: “the use of Section 148 to arrest a person for refusing to identify herself during a lawful Terry stop violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Officers responded to a call that two men in a crowded park had a firearm. A witness who had been threatened pointed out a group of three men. Defendant, who broke away from the group and approached one of the officers, refused to identify himself, refused to keep his hands away from his pockets, was hostile and aggressive, and refused to submit to a patdown search.
The use of handcuffs under these circumstances was a de facto arrest not supported by probable cause. The juvenile’s consent to search, given after he was placed in handcuffs, was invalid.
Officers were told that Turner, a father of a football player in a high school game on campus, had threatened one of the coaches and said he would see him after the game. One coach was warned by a family member that Turner had a gun. When police arrived in the parking lot, Turner broke away from a group and walked off campus. One of the officers working security at the game drew his weapon and directed Turner to put up his hands. A second officer ordered him to the ground, and a third officer held Turner at gunpoint until he was handcuffed. Turner admitted to having a gun in his front pocket.
The officers actions taken to safely determine if Turner was armed were reasonable and appropriate and did not convert the detention into a de facto arrest.
Officers who conducted surveillance for two days as part of the ongoing investigation of a statewide narcotics smuggling ring believed that Celis was concealing drugs or drug proceeds in a previously deflated tire too large for his van. Celis was stopped as he was rolling the tire out the back door of his residence toward his accomplice’s truck. Celis was detained at gunpoint, handcuffed, and ordered to sit on the ground for two minutes while officers searched his residence.
The detention was not converted into an arrest based on the officers’ reasonable use of force and restraint.
Following a high-speed chase (85 mph on surface streets), a school district police officer used his police vehicle to block defendant’s car, then got out and pointed his revolver to detain defendant.
The force used was reasonable to protect the officer and maintain the status quo.
Officers picked up suspect, took him downtown for questioning, and eventually obtained a confession. The officers contended that the suspect was just being “detained” for questioning, but the Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the movement resulted in the arrest of the defendant.
Confession suppressed.
At least three officers woke up a 17 year old in his bedroom at 3:00 a.m., told him they needed “to go and talk,” placed him in handcuffs, took him outside in January without shoes and wearing only boxer shorts, transported him in a patrol car to the crime scene, and then drove him to the Sheriff’s office for questioning.
This was an unlawful arrest. Any confession “obtained by exploitation of” the illegal arrest would have to be suppressed.
A citizen reported and described a suspicious- acting stranger in a residential area where many daytime burglaries had occurred. Later, the same citizen reported that the suspect was “concealing something under his coat.” An officer responded and spotted the suspect with large items in his pockets; a portion of a camera was visible. The officer detained the suspect, told him about the report and started asking questions, which led to the discovery of stolen property.
The detention, although based on “slight” facts, was nevertheless valid, and the 15-20 minutes it took to resolve the matter was reasonable under the circumstances.
Without knocking or saying anything, a man walked into a house where officers were executing a search warrant. He denied living there, but was unable to give a reason for being there. A pat search revealed a large wad of bills ($3100). Although he produced some identification, there was reason to suspect its accuracy.
The court held that it was reasonable to extend the detention for the hour it took to make telephone calls and run checks, to conduct a consent search of the man’s vehicle (where more cash was found), and to consult with each other and other personnel to decide what course of conduct to follow, since their suspicions had been increasing and all their steps were taken diligently in an effort to determine the man’s connection with the drug-dealing residence, i.e., to resolve the original reason for the detention.
Two officers, responding to the scene of a reported early morning burglary, spotted near the scene a lone male who partially matched broadcast descriptions of one of the suspects. They stopped him and asked him where he was coming from, and his answer was later used against him at trial.
His answer was admissible, even though the officers had not advised the suspect of his Miranda rights, because he was only being detained and was not in “custody.”
A patrol officer stopped a minor for riding a bicycle at night without proper lighting in violation of Vehicle Code section 21201. The minor complied with the officer’s requests to step back from the bicycle and take off his backpack. Without the officer first asking, the minor said that he was not on probation, which the officer thought was odd. Concerned that the minor might have a weapon, he said he would be conducting a patsearch, and the minor said that he did not give his consent to search. The officer considered both statements “warning flags.” He found a firearm in the minor’s pocket.
The patdown search was not justified. A refusal of consent to a search cannot be the sole basis for reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed or dangerous.
Officer made a DUI stop at night for erratic driving. The driver provided false identification, admitted he had recently done time for robbery, and wore a bulky jacket that he had trouble keeping his hands out of.
It was legal to order him out, conduct a patdown, and remove what felt like syringes from his jacket pockets.
While on routine patrol, two officers spotted a young man looking into two parked cars in an alley where many complaints of criminal activity–including vehicle tampering–had originated. As the officers drove by slowly, the man tried to stay out of view behind a dumpster. When they approached and spoke to him, he became very nervous, boisterous, angry and antagonistic–“borderline combative.” The man was nearly 6 feet tall and 190 pounds.
The patdown was lawful. The officers were not required “to await an actual assault before assuring themselves that the detainee was not armed with a lethal weapon.”
Officers assigned to a gang detail in a “stronghold” area covered by a gang injunction were citing several gang members for tobacco possession and investigating a recent gang-related shooting when two of the officers saw 14-year-old H.M. sprint through heavy traffic towards them, in violation of Vehicle Code section 21954. The juvenile was sweating profusely and looking behind him as if trying to get away from something, and he appeared confused and nervous. One of the officers knew H.M. to be a gang member. H.M. was detained and pat-searched for officer safety.
The patdown was lawful based on the juvenile’s unusual and suspicious behavior. It was not merely a matter of a minor traffic infraction: a known member of a street gang was running through traffic in a manner that suggested he was fleeing criminal activity in a gang stronghold.
During the patdown of a suspected narcotics user/buyer, an officer felt a small lump in the suspect’s jacket pocket. When he “examined it with his fingers,” it slid and felt like a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane. Accordingly, the officer reached into the pocket a retrieved a small plastic bag containing some crack cocaine.
It was an illegal search for the officer to squeeze, slide, and otherwise manipulate the contents of the jacket pocket because when he did that, he had already concluded that the pocket did not contain a weapon.
During a limited patdown for weapons, a deputy felt a soft object which he squeezed enough to conclude it was plastic with something in it. He reached into the detainee’s pocket and retrieved a baggie with some marijuana and cocaine.
The seizure was unlawful. “Feeling a soft object in a suspect’s pocket during a pat-down, absent unusual circumstances, does not warrant an officer’s intrusion into a suspect’s pocket to retrieve the object.”
An officer responding to a “panhandler” complaint noticed a large bulge in the suspect’s front waistband. For officer safety, he pat-searched the suspect, concluded that the object was a bottle, and withdrew it.
The officer had the right to feel and retrieve the bottle (a full fifth of brandy) as it was a potentially dangerous weapon.
After observing somewhat suspicious conduct by a would-be passenger at an airport, the undercover officer asked the suspect if she would mind answering some questions. Suspect said she did not want to miss her flight (leaving shortly), so they walked along together. The officer obtained information that eventually led to the discovery of narcotics at the destination airport.
The court found no detention, only a consensual encounter.
Officers saw two men walk away from each other in an alley in an area with a lot of drug trafficking. They believed the men would have met each other if the police had not been there. This “looked suspicious” to the officers, so they stopped one of the men and asked for identification. When he refused, they arrested him.
The court held that the fact that the men were in a neighborhood frequented by drug users was not enough for reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the detention was bad
Defendant was standing by the open trunk of a Lexus holding loose wiring. He quickly closed the trunk and walked away from the car when he saw the approaching police car, appearing “real nervous.” Another person ran away when he saw the officers. The officer who looked in the Lexus saw that tools were strewn across the passenger compartment, the interior passenger door was completely stripped, and the front dash was removed near the stereo system.
Defendant was lawfully detained.
When officers drove around the corner in their unmarked vehicle, a group of males who had been standing around a red car took off, and so did the car. One officer got out and ran around the block the other way and got within a few feet of the suspect, who was looking over his shoulder while running towards the officer, before he looked up saw him, and discarded a rock of cocaine prior to being tackled.
The Supreme Court Held that the suspect was not seized until he was tackled because, up to that moment, he had not submitted to the officer assertion of authority
Minor denied that he was involved in a recent carjacking and that he was in possession of any keys. The officer who conducted a lawful patdown search pulled out what felt like a set of keys in the minor’s pocket.
HELD: The officer had probable cause at the time of the “plain feel” search to believe that the keys were evidence linking the minor the carjacking based on the minor’s similarly to the description of one of the suspects, his repeated “inspection” of the stolen vehicle, a police dog’s tracking a scent inside the stolen truck vehicle to the minor, and the minor’s denial of having any keys in his possession.
Officers drove by an intersection where drug activity had been reported and saw a male leaning into a vehicle that had stopped on the street. The officers pulled over, got out, and walked quickly towards the suspect, but said nothing. Upon seeing them approaching, he dropped a paper bag, turned, and started to run away, whereupon he was detained.
HELD: The bag of drugs was abandoned before the detention occurred.
If you arrest and book a known or suspected “foreign national,” or if you detain one for more than __Time?__, you must advise him or her of the right to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country.
two hours
Pringle was the front-seat passenger in a car stopped for speeding. A search of the Nissan sedan conducted with the driver’s consent uncovered $763 in cash from the glove compartment and five plastic baggies of cocaine behind the back-seat armrest. When questioned, Pringle, the driver, and the back-seat passenger all denied ownership of the money or the drugs. All three were arrested for possession of the cocaine.
HELD: The officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. A reasonable officer could infer that any or all three of the vehicle’s occupants were in possession of the narcotics, either jointly or alone.
Officer placed a stolen car under surveillance. When suspect approached it, officer recognized him as someone he had previously arrested for car theft and who had been armed and dangerous. When officer approached, suspect fled into a private residence and slammed the door in the officer’s face.
Warrantless entry to arrest held proper
Officers investigating a rape went to the suspect’s residence. His mother answered. They told her about the situation and asked to talk to her son. She let them inside where they “plain sighted” incriminating clothing and scratch marks.
The warrantless entry and arrest were proper - there was no misrepresentation of their purpose for entering.
An officer got reliable information that a suspect was growing marijuana in the back yard of her apartment complex residence. He went there, but no one was home, so he walked along the common carport area to the back patio. The patio was enclosed but had no gate. Instead, a tree was growing where the gate should have been. The officer looked around the tree, saw a marijuana plant, and then entered the patio to seize it.
The court held that his observation of the plant from the common carport area was proper, but that the warrantless entry of the yard was not.
Police, acting on an anonymous tip, went out to the suspect’s property, walked past his house, went around a locked gate posted with “no trespassing” signs, and walked over a mile onto his private property to find a secluded parcel of marijuana that could not be seen from anywhere else.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld all these actions as involving only “open fields.” The fact that the officers committed a technical trespass also made no difference.
Late one evening, the brother of the victim personally reported hearsay information to the police that his father was right then having sexual intercourse forcibly with his disabled daughter. The officer had heard other information about prior acts of sexuality in the house from a probation officer who was working with the family. Accompanied by the brother, the officer entered the house and the father’s closed bedroom, finding the sex offense in progress.
The warrantless entries were upheld.
Mincey shot and killed a narcotics agent during a buy at Mincey’s apartment. After Mincey was arrested and the premises secured, detectives made an exhaustive, detailed, warrantless search for the next four days, seizing about 200-300 objects.
United States Supreme Court suppressed all evidence seized after the scene had been secured. In the retrial, much of the “suppressed evidence” was admissible because the officers had taken pictures of everything in plain view “during the exigency.”
A sheriff’s deputy stopped Hernandez’s pickup truck solely because it was being driven with a temporary operating permit in the rear window and no license plates. He relied on his experience that operating permits were very often forged or issued for a different vehicle.
HELD: “An officer who sees a vehicle displaying a temporary operating permit in lieu of license plates may not stop the vehicle simply because he or she believes that such permits are often forged or otherwise invalid.”
A California officer stopped a vehicle because its New Jersey license plates did not have current registration tags. As it turned out, none were required under New Jersey law.
The vehicle stop was upheld, however, because such tags are required in California, Nevada, Arizona and Oregon, and even a reasonably well-trained officer cannot be expected to know the registration laws of every state. However, an officer’s “mistake of law” will never result in the suppression of evidence if objectively reasonable suspicion exists to justify the detention despite the misunderstanding.
When neither the driver nor the passenger could produce a valid license after a traffic stop, the officer ordered them out of the car so that he could conduct an impound inventory. Within a minute, the officer found a gun magazine under the driver’s seat cover.
HELD: The passenger’s detention outside the car was lawful as a “brief continuation” of the initial detention for officer safety. As to identification, merely asking a passenger detained after a car stop for identification does not amount to a “separate ‘detention’ requiring separate justification.”
Officer stops a car for a traffic offense, smells marijuana and enters the passenger compartment to search. He sees bloody panties on the floor and seizes them. Later the panties are analyzed and are the main evidence against the suspect in a brutal rape-murder.
The evidence will be suppressed because the officer had no factual basis for believing the panties were crime related.
Note: The best way to handle such a situation is to (1) get consent to keep the evidence for a while, and (2) ask the suspect about the evidence (get lies, admissions, etc.). Sometimes additional circumstances will arise (nervousness, attempt to conceal, evasive answers, etc.) which may make it reasonable to seize the item.
Officers observed the defendant walking through a shopping center at 1:20 a.m. when all the stores were closed. They shined a spotlight on him and got out of their car, and one of the officers said, “Come over here. I want to talk to you.”
HELD: There was a detention because of this “command” and the other circumstances that would make the suspect believe he was not free to leave. Furthermore, the detention was unjustified. Without some indication of criminal activity, just walking through a closed shopping center in the early morning hours does not constitute reasonable suspicion.
An officer saw some U.S. currency change hands in a group of three men standing near a corner in a high-narcotics neighborhood. Wanting to make a field contact, he parked diagonally against the traffic about 10 feet behind the group. When Jones started to walk away, the officer asked him to stop, which he did. When Jones started to reach for his pocket, the officer intervened and discovered narcotics.
HELD: The way the officer suddenly drove up, left his car parked, and hailed Jones was a detention. “The mere fact that [Jones] received money from another person on the street in an area known for drug activity is insufficient justification for a detention.” Accordingly, the contraband was suppressed.
Two city police detectives were assigned to the gang unit, which maintained a photographic file of known gang members and associates. One day they saw five males on known gang “turf,” wearing gang clothing, standing together in front of an apartment where gang members often gathered, talking and socializing. The officers detained them (by ordering them to “stay there”), patted them down, ordered them to sit, interviewed each one individually, and photographed them. The entire process took 15 to 20 minutes.
HELD: Although the department’s policy of stopping, interviewing, and photographing possible gang members for future use was “laudable,” it was illegal. Public concern and outrage over crime and violence caused by gangs is not a sufficient reason to justify a detention without a specific basis for believing the individual is involved in criminal activity.
A college student reported that unknown “Mexican gang members” had telephoned threats that they would go to his on-campus apartment at 6:00 the next morning. Four mornings later, based on a “gut feeling,” an officer who had reviewed the report stopped a car after observing two young Hispanic males look several times at the student’s apartment building and drive “too” cautiously for the three miles the officer followed them.
HELD: The articulable facts fell short of reasonable suspicion.
Officers observed the defendant standing in front of a dance hall and liquor store, showing something in a partially rolled-down paper bag to a group of others gathered around him. As the officers approached in a marked car, someone yelled “Rollers!” and the group dispersed. When the officers drove by again a few minutes later, the defendant was outside again, but ran back into the dance hall. They chased him and ordered him to stop.
The court held that these circumstances–given this day and age where traffic in illegal drugs is endemic to our society–provided a valid basis to detain.
Officers saw two males loading a TV into the trunk of their car at 7:30 p.m. when most nearby businesses were closed. There were no television shops nearby, and the neighborhood had been plagued by burglaries. When they saw the officers, the men looked “shocked,” slammed down the trunk lid, and walked swiftly toward a bar. They ignored the officers’ requests to talk and had to be forcibly detained.
The court ruled there were enough specific facts to make the detention valid.
Two officers, wearing police raid jackets, were patrolling a high narcotics area in an unmarked vehicle when they saw one individual (the suspect) approach another male. The suspect then took his hand from his pocket, looked up, made momentary eye contact with the officers, and then took off running. One officer got out of the patrol car and followed (even “chased”) the suspect on foot, but said nothing and took no other action until after the suspect discarded some cocaine.
HELD: There was no detention at the time of the abandonment, so the cocaine was admissible.
Diaz was arrested as a coconspirator in the sale of Ecstasy tabs to a police informant. He was searched incident to arrest, and his cell phone was seized and turned over to the deputy who made the arrest. Approximately 90 minutes later at the sheriff’s station after Diaz’s interview with a detective, the deputy looked at the cell phone’s text message folder. He found a message “6 4 80,” interpreted to mean six pills of Ecstasy for $80, which prompted Diaz to admit participating in Ecstasy sales.
HELD: The search of the cell phone was valid incident to Diaz’s arrest. Because the phone was “immediately associated with” Diaz’s person, the deputy was “entitled to inspect” its contents at the station 90 minutes after the arrest without a warrant and without exigent circumstances. The same reasoning applies to any containers–open or closed–that are on the arrestee’s person or under his or her immediate control at the time of the arrest, such as a purse, fanny pack, or backpack. The container must be an item of personal property immediately associated with the arrestee’s person justifying a warrantless search. A 200-pound double-locked footlocker in the trunk of a car does not fit within this definition.
Officers, who had probable cause but no warrant to arrest Oaxaca, saw him standing in his open garage, which was attached to his house
Nevertheless, it was illegal for the officers to walk into the garage through its open door without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. “Simply put, a person’s garage is as much a part of his castle as the rest of his home.”
From a planter area 18 inches from a window, an officer peeked through a narrow gap in a defective portion of a closed Venetian blind to investigate suspicious after-hours activity in a business establishment and saw criminal activity.
The evidence was suppressed.
Officer was trying to locate Chavez, whom he believed to be home, and walked a few feet from the front door to the side yard gate to call into the residence. He raised himself on his tip toes to look over the fence and saw a cocked revolver in the side yard.
The observation was lawful (i.e., it was not a search).
An officer was told by an informant that Lovelace was growing marijuana. The officer went to the Lovelace residence and, while standing in the alley, looked through a small knothole in a six-foot-high wooden fence and saw marijuana growing. The officer then got a warrant and seized the marijuana (and other drugs in plain view).
The evidence was suppressed because looking through the knothole was a warrantless “search.” Climbing over a fence or wall may or may not be a “trespass” depending on the nature of the area behind the wall or fence (“curtilage” vs. “open fields” or accessible to public).
At 1:00 a.m., officer saw a minor driving a late-model Acura without license plates or a temporary operating permit in the rear window. The officer could not see if there was a temporary permit in the front window.
HELD: The stop was lawful. The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the car was being driven in violation of Vehicle Code sections 5200 and 5201 license requirements. The court specifically rejected the argument that the officer was required to drive around the vehicle to see all of the windows before making the stop.
At 1:43 a.m., CHP dispatch reported a possibly intoxicated driver “weaving all over the roadway” in a ’80s model blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99. An officer who was less than four miles from where the van was seen positioned himself on the shoulder of Highway 99 to intercept the van. He stopped the van two to three minutes later. He did not observe any weaving, speeding, or other violation of traffic laws before initiating the stop.
HELD: The anonymous tip of a possible intoxicated driver “weaving all over the roadway” combined with the officer’s spotting the described vehicle at the expected time and place provided reasonable suspicion to justify an immediate stop to protect both the driver and other motorists.
Minor stopped for speeding was unlicensed and failed to provide evidence of his identity, proof of insurance, or vehicle registration. Prior to issuing a citation, the officer felt under the driver’s seat for documentation relating to the driver or the truck. From a position behind the driver’s seat, the officer then looked under the seat and found a glass pipe and a box containing a vial with a white powder residue.
HELD: The seizure of the pipe and vial was valid. The area under the front seat, unlike an area such as the trunk, is a location where the documents reasonably may be expected to be found.
At 10:00 p.m., two San Diego officers stopped a Datsun for expired registration tags. As the officers approached the occupants, they saw the driver reach under the seat and heard the sound of metal on metal. Fearing for their safety because of the increased gang activity in the area, the officers ordered the occupants out of the car, checked for weapons under the seat, and found a loaded .25 semiautomatic handgun.
The court upheld the limited weapons search under the circumstances.
An officer personally saw and recognized an individual as someone whose name he had seen about a month earlier on a list of persons with outstanding arrest warrants. The officer called dispatch to seek confirmation. Meanwhile, he detained the suspect and, during the detention, he lawfully recovered some cocaine. A few minutes later, the officer was informed that the warrant had been served two weeks earlier.
HELD: The detention was valid. The officer had reasonable suspicion originally, even though it later disappeared. In other words, a computer “hit” will provide enough to detain, but only confirmation will provide probable cause to arrest.
Officers stopped Durant’s car for failing to signal within 100 feet of a turn, but the stop was not authorized under Vehicle Code §§ 22107 and 22108. One of the officer’s recognized Durant almost immediately as a probationer with a search condition before conducting a patdown search and finding a loaded handgun in Durant’s waistband.
HELD: The intervening circumstance of Durant’s probation search condition attenuated the taint of the erroneous vehicle stop because the “search condition supplied legal authorization to search that was completely independent of the circumstances leading to the traffic stop.” The court noted that there was no evidence of any flagrancy or purposefulness to the erroneous traffic stop. The court also noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by suppressing the gun simply because the officer did not recognize Durant immediately before the stop.
