Cooperation + Aggression: Evol Psych

Question 1

What is the theory of reciprocal altruism?

Answer 1

Adapataions to provide benefits to non-kin can evolve as long as altruistic investment can be returned or reciprocated at some point in the future

Question 2

What are the types of reciprocity interactions?

Answer 2

Tit-for-tat/Contingent Reciprocity and Indirect Reciprocity

Question 3

What does tit for tat/contigent reciprocity entails?

Answer 3

Organism cooperates first and reciprocates on every move and if cooperative partner deflect, deflect in kind

Question 4

What is indirect reciprocity?

Answer 4

Advertising a propensity for generosity and cooperation, promoting a +ve reputation –> make them attractive as a cooperator

Question 5

What does indirect reciprocity explains?

Answer 5

• Why we help strangers w/o expectations of returns
• More helpful and generous when others are watching
• Helpful people are most likely to receive help from others in the same social group

Question 6

What is the premise of reciprocal altruism?

Answer 6

Hunting yields are random → successful sometimes → rely on allies with excess food → excess food is perishable, cannot be stored long → distribute food to allies → generate reciprocal debt + insurance against future shortage

-Short term cost for long term benefit - Win win social exchange
–Benefit of allies > benefit of hogging food

Question 7

How does the problem of cheaters arise?

Answer 7

Social exchange is not simultaneous -> debt repaid in the future -> huge advantage for cheaters -> get benefit from act of altruism + avoid reciprocal cost

Question 8

So how does natural selection deals with the problem of cheaters?

Answer 8

Selection favours a social exchange whenever the provisioner can change the behaviour of a target to the provisioner’s advantage by making the target to fufill conditional requirement for the benefit.

Psych mech to detect fellow cooperators and avoid cheaters (SCT)

Question 9

What cognitive capacities have we develop to partner with cooperators and avoid cheators?

Answer 9

1. Ability to recognise many different individual humans
2. Ability to remember the histories of interactions with different individuals
3. Ability to communicate one’s value to others (what you want)
4. Abilty to model the values of others (what others want)
5. Ability to represent cost and benefits independent of the particular items exchanged (basically represening any item we trade)

Question 10

What is the evidence for cheater-detection adaptations?

Answer 10

Humans are bad at solving logical problems (Wason et al) but we do super well when problems is structured as a social exchange/contract (Cosmides & Tooby)

Question 11

Do we remember cheaters?

Answer 11

Yes, we remb them better if its
* Rare in the population -> benefits of cheating are highest when every1 is cooperative
* No knowledge of cheating actually occured

Question 12

Why do we remember cheaters of low status better than high status?

Answer 12

• Low status cheaters → unlikely to have resources to repay us back in the first place!! → avoid

Social status: based on probabilistic cues - looking at their appearance, jobs ect → estimate likelihood of their resources → likelihood of giving back what is owed

Question 13

How are we able to identify genuine cooperators?

Answer 13

Atruists tend to display “genuine smiles” than non-altruists -> spontaneous smiling is a valid input use indicative of cooperative disposition

People tend to cooperate with healthy-looking individuals becoz they likey to live longer and possess higher-quality resources

Question 14

What is the recalibration theory of anger?

Answer 14

If cheaters are always present + limited number of cooperators -> we either a. avoid social exchange by outputing disgust or if we cannot avoid cheaters/have to work with them, we will b. demand cheaters to reciprocate - recalibration via anger

Question 15

What is the contextual input for the recalibration theory of anger?

Answer 15

Whether a person can demand value recalibration depends on their ability to inflict cost on cheaters or provide greater benefits than intially valued
* Physical strength in men

Question 16

What is costly signalling theory?

Answer 16

Signal desirable characteristics as means of advertising those qualities

Costly signal are honest signal → cannot easily be faked and a low quality singers will exhaust whatever resources they have to fake a high-quality signal → Hard for a poor person to do it consistently → signals a person’s wealth, potential, intelligence and other high fitness indication characteristics

Question 17

What is the banker’s paradox?

Answer 17

Those who need money the omst, are least likely to afford a loan –> ends up not getting the loan

Question 18

What is the problem of friendship?

Answer 18

• Finding friends who are most likely to return help
• Not abandoning friends in need who will return help

Question 19

How would selection shape the friendship adaptation?

Answer 19

• Whether a person whom they extend help will be willing to repay in the future
• Whether a person is in a position to repay in the future
• If helping this person is the best use of one’s limited capacity to help relative to other people who might be more attractive objects of investment

Question 20

How can we tell true friends from fair weather friends?

Answer 20

Desperate times as a costly signaling test - friends who absord high fitness cost and tend to us during desperate times are likley to be true friends

Question 21

What are some problems in a coalition?

Answer 21

• Defectors - individuals who renounce allegience and break off from cooperation for personal benefits
• Free-riders - individuals who claim shares in reward of cooperation without contributing a fair share of work

Question 22

What is the problem of just punishing dectors and free riders?

Answer 22

Punisher faces costs such as retaliation, ability for target of aggression to defend themeleves, condemnation, repuation as a cooperator

Question 23

What are the solutions to the problem of punishment?

Answer 23

Punitive sentiments - desire to harm deflectors and free riders
* more you contribute, more you harbor punitive sentiment -> increase chance a reluctant member of gorup will contribute

Cultural adapations → norms, idea, traditions → if it helps the group to survival → these things will be transferred to new members of the groups → if there is a problem of punishers + defectors and free riders → serve interest in group to minimise free riders and defectors → therefore we teach people to reciprocate back → why some cultures have high emphasis on honour, status → if you break these norms, you are punished.

Reputational benefits for cooperators and punishments
* less likely to cheat with known possibility of punishment + punishers benefit reputation for being trustworhty

Ostracism -> shunning free riders minimize bost cost of free riders and cost of punishment -> causes psychological and physical pain and motivates reparative action

Question 24

Are we violent?

Answer 24

Yes, homo sapiens is a violent species. Of the 10 mil animal species observed, only two are known to cary warefare: humans and chimpanzees

Question 25

What can aggression as an adaptive solution solve?

Answer 25

1. Co-opting resources aka stealing/extortion
2. Defend against attacks
3. Deterrence against aggression
4. Negotiating status and power hierchies
5. Inflicting cost on intrasexual rivals
6. Deterring sexual infidelity

Question 26

Why are men more aggresive than women?

Answer 26

. Sexual selection theory -> higher reproductive celling + lower obligatory parentival investment cost –> risk to get women aka resources

Young male syndrome - demographic where selection for confrontational, competitive capability is most intense (acquire resources, reputation, protect themselves)

Question 27

Waging war is incredible costly, how could natural selection favour warfare in humans?

Answer 27

Long term gain in reproductive resource > reproductive cost of engaging wars
* access of resources, elimination of threats vs loss of mates, offspring, kins and death

Coalition members must believe grp will win + collective resources will be better off
* reduce defection risk

Risk each member take + importance = share of benefits
* reduce free rider

Must be cloacked in veil of ignorance about who will live or die
* risk of death distributed equally -> minimize self-protection mechanism -> less risk of deflection

Question 28

What are the predictions of warefare?

Answer 28

• men, but not women, have evolved psych mech. designed for coalition warfare
• sexual access to women is primary benefit for men to join male coalition
• men should have evolved psych mech functions to detect, prefer and enlist men in colaiton who are willing and able to contribute to its sucess