Chapter 5: Managing Companies: Shares & Shareholders Flashcards
1.1 Shareholders
There are two important consequences of this:
* The shareholders exercise ultimate control over the company; and
* The shareholders hope to receive a financial return on their investment.
The shareholders exercise their control in two key ways:
* By determining the company’s constitution; and
* By voting on shareholder resolutions
Shareholder Power: Although the directors manage the company on a day-to-day basis, a key element of
shareholders’ control is their power to vote on a resolution to remove directors from the board (s 168 CA 2006), and/or to appoint new directors whose approach to managing the company the shareholders prefer (MA 17).
1.2 Separation of powers – Directors’ powers
Check against abuse of their
powers: As part of these
duties (which you saw in the previous topic):
* Directors must disclose certain information about themselves and their dealings with the
company,
* Shareholder approval must be obtained for certain transactions; and
* Shareholders have certain important decisions reserved to them (such as amending the
company’s articles of association, s 21).
1.3 Separation of powers – Shareholders’ reserve powers MA 4 Shareholders’ reserve power
(1) The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified action
(2) No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors have done before the passing of the resolution.
(3) The company’s articles regulate the relationship (and allocate power) between directors (acting as a board) and shareholders (acting through the general meeting)
1.4 The shareholders may act where the board of directors is unable to do
so Key case: Barron v Potter [1914] 1 Ch 895
This case established that the shareholders of the company in a general meeting may act in place of the directors where there is no board of directors competent or able to do so. Here the two directors of the company were not on speaking terms, so that effective board meetings could not be held.
B (one of the directors) called a general meeting at which the shareholders attempted to appoint additional directors. P (the other director) objected that the power to appoint directors was stated under the company’s articles to belong to the directors alone. The court held that in view of the deadlock, the power to appoint directors reverted to the shareholders and so the
appointments were valid.
1.5 The general meeting
General meetings are usually called by the directors (s 302) by passing a board resolution at a board meeting.
The board of directors has the power to call a general meeting of the shareholders by passing a board resolution. This is usually passed by a simple majority of the directors.
The Board needs to give 14 clear days’ notice of a general meeting (s 307(1) and s 360) This is unless the short notice procedure is used (s 307(4)-(6)). If 90% of shareholders with voting rights agree, the short notice procedure allows the general meeting to take place on short notice,
immediately after the board meeting.
1.6 Shareholders can also call a general meeting ss 303-305
1.6.1 If the board refuse to call a general meeting, the shareholders have a reserve power to
do so themselves
Under s 303(1) CA 2006, shareholders together holding not less than 5% of the paid-up voting share capital of the company can serve a request on the company ie the board. The request will
require the board to call a general meeting (the ‘s 303 request’).
The s 303 request must state the general nature of the business which the shareholders wish to be
dealt with at the general meeting and may include the text of the resolution they want to propose
at the meeting.
1.6.2 What are the directors’ obligations on receipt of a s 303 request?
Under s 304(1) CA 2006, when the directors receive a s 303 request, they must call the general meeting within 21 days from the date on which they become subject to the s 303 request to call the general meeting, to be held on a date not more than 28 days after the date of the notice convening the general meeting.
1.6.3 What happens if the directors fail to call the general meeting?
If the directors fail to call a general meeting under s 304(1) CA 2006, all of the shareholders who submitted the s 303 request or any of them representing more than one half of the voting rights of those who submitted that s 303 request, can call a general meeting themselves pursuant to s 305 CA 2006. If the shareholders call the general meeting themselves then that general meeting must be held within 3 months of the date that the directors received the initial s 303 request.
Under s 305(6) CA 2006, if the shareholders are forced to call the general meeting themselves,
they can recover their reasonable expenses for doing so from the company. The company is then able to recoup the monies back from the directors who should have called the general meeting
initially
21 days
Shareholders together holding not less than 5% of the paid up share capital can request on a Board to call a GM
28 days
Directors must call GM within 21 days of the 303 request to be held not more than 28 days later (Section 304)
3 months
If the directors do not call a GM under section 304, shareholders may then call for a meeting themselves. GM must be held within 3 months time
1.7 Annual general meeting (AGM)
You may have heard of an annual general meeting. CA 2006 abolished the requirement for private limited companies to hold an AGM, but public companies remain subject to this requirement (see s 336). For public companies an AGM must be called by directors (s 302) on 21 clear days’ notice (s 307(2), s 360(2)) within six months of the financial year end.
Section 360 provides that the days must be ‘clear’ days. This section applies to most of the provisions regarding notice of meetings in CA 2006. ‘Clear’ days means that the day the notice is given, and the day of the meeting are discounted in calculating the relevant number of days
At the AGM, the directors of the company present an annual report containing information for shareholders about the company’s performance and strategy. Shareholders with voting rights then vote on current issues, such as appointments to the company’s board of directors, executive compensation, dividend payments, and the selection of auditors.
1.8 Voting at general meetings
Shareholders can vote at a general meeting either on:
* A show of hands (where each shareholder has one vote); or
* A poll vote (where each shareholder has one vote per share held).
Key case: Re Horbury Bridge Coal Co (1879)
Lord Jessell MR
We first of all consider what may be termed the common law of the country as to voting at meetings. It is undoubted, and it was admitted by Sir Henry Jackson in his argument for the Respondents, that, according to such common law, votes at all meetings are taken by show of hands.
Of course it may not always be a satisfactory mode – persons attending in large numbers may be small shareholders and persons attending in small numbers may be large shareholders, and therefore in companies provision is made for taking a poll, and when a poll is taken the votes are to be counted according to the number of shares
Under MA 42
Under MA 42, a resolution put to the vote of a general meeting must be decided on a show of hands unless a poll is duly demanded in accordance with the articles.
MA 44 deals with the right to demand a poll vote
(1) A poll on a resolution may be demanded -
(a) in advance of the general meeting where it is to be put to the vote, or
(b)at a general meeting, either before a show of hands on that resolution or immediately after the result of a show of hands on that resolution is declared.
(2) A poll may be demanded by -
(a) the chairman of the meeting;
(b) the directors;
(c) two or more persons having the right to vote on the resolution; or
(d) a person or persons representing not less than one-tenth of the total voting rights of all the shareholders having the right to vote on the resolution.
Right cannot be excluded
Note that this right cannot be excluded: s 321(1) CA 2006 states that a provision of a company’s articles is void in so far as it would have the effect of excluding the right to demand a poll at a
general meeting on any question other than:
(a) The election of the chairman of the meeting; or
(b) The adjournment of the meeting.
1.9 Shareholder voting: Ordinary and special resolutions
As you saw in Section 1, there are two types of shareholder resolution under the CA 2006 requiring different voting thresholds. These are:
* Ordinary resolutions; and
* Special resolutions.
Where the CA 2006 does not specify the type of resolution to be used then an ordinary resolution is required unless the company’s articles require a higher majority (s 281(3) CA 2006). Special
resolutions are required for more key or constitutional decisions such as amending the articles (s 21 CA 2006).
Votes at General Meetings are counted out of all shareholders present and voting.
Differences between ordinary and special resolutions
Ordinary resolution: Requires a simple majority (more than 50% of votes are cast in favour of the resolution) (s 282(1) CA 2006).
Special resolution : Requires a majority of not less than 75% (s 283(1) CA 2006).
1.10.1 Notice (14 clear days)
There are strict rules on giving timely (s 307) and appropriate (s 311) notice to all shareholders entitled to attend a General Meeting. The general notice is 14 clear days (s 307(1), s 360) although
there is a procedure by which short notice can be used if sufficient members are in agreement to this (s 307(4)-(6)). The validity of resolutions passed at a general meeting depends on proper
notice being given.
Quorum (2 shareholders)
The quorum for a General Meeting is two shareholders under s 318(2) (other than for single member companies, for which the quorum is one (s 318(1)). MA 38 confirms that no business other
than the appointment of the chairman of the meeting is to be transacted at a General Meeting if the persons attending it do not constitute a quorum
Proxy (Appointing Representatives)
Under s 324, shareholders may appoint a proxy to exercise any or all of their rights to attend and speak and vote at a general meeting. Corporate shareholders must appoint a representative to attend general meetings under s 323.
1.10.2 Enhanced voting rights
Bushell v Faith clauses
You will recall that a Bushell v Faith
clause is a mechanism by which a company’s directors who are also shareholders can seek to prevent themselves from being removed from office. The clause is inserted into the articles of the company and provides that, when voting on a resolution for the removal of a director in a general meeting, the director/shareholder in question will have their votes weighted by a factor of great enough magnitude that the other shareholders cannot get the requisite majority in the meeting to pass this motion. You will recall that a Bushell v Faith clause is a mechanism by which a company’s directors who are also shareholders can seek to prevent themselves from being removed from office.
The clause is inserted into the articles of the company and provides that, when voting on a resolution for the removal of a director in a general meeting, the director/shareholder in question will have their votes weighted by a factor of great enough magnitude that the other shareholders cannot get the requisite majority in the meeting to
pass this motion.
Bushell v Faith clause & Section 168
Bushell v Faith clauses do not change the requirement under s 168 to pass an ordinary resolution to remove a director; rather they represent an internal agreement amongst the shareholders as to the weight their vote carries on a specific resolution which is not something the courts intervene in.
1.11 Shareholder voting: Written resolutions
Under s 288, private companies may pass shareholder resolutions (both ordinary and special resolutions) using the written resolution procedure, instead of at general meetings. A written resolution has effect as if passed at a general meeting (s 288(4)).
Written resolution to all members
Written resolutions must be sent to all eligible members (ie those entitled to vote on the resolution).
A time limit of 28 days applies for the eligible members to respond, after which time the resolution will be deemed not passed if a sufficient majority of shareholders (over 50% of eligible members for an ordinary resolution or not less than 75% of eligible members for a special resolution) have not indicated that they vote in favour of the resolution. Written resolutions must be passed by the required percentage of all eligible members.