Ch. 12 - Notes / Warnings / Cautions (01 JUNE 22)

Question 1

EMIF (2)

Answer 1

WARNING: Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in an unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual engine failure.

WARNING: With engine anti-ice on, up to 18% torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49% with improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice valves.

Question 2

Engine High-Side Failure in Flight (3)

Answer 2

NOTE: Ng does not pass through the EDECU and is a highly reliable signal

NOTE: Torque signal may be erratic or drop off for high side conditions driven by EDECU failure.

NOTE: With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult. Reducing collective will reveal increasing Nr and verify high-side failure.

INDICATIONS: all of the following exist
1. TRQ is 10% or greater than the other engine.
2. Ng is 5% or greater than the other engine.
3. Np is matches within 5% of the other engine.
4. Nr is at or above 103%.

Question 3

Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations (2)

Answer 3

WARNING: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL.

NOTE: Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.

Question 4

Abort Start (1)

Answer 4

CAUTION: During aborted starts, failure to secure fuel flow may result in engine overtemperature.

Abort engine start if any of the following occur:
1. Ng does not reach 14% within 6 seconds after starter initiation
2. No oil pressure within 30 seconds after starter initiation
3. No light-off within 30 seconds after moving the PCL to IDLE
4. ENG STARTER advisory disappears before reaching 52% Ng
5. TGT is likely to exceed 851* Celsius before idle speed is attained

Question 5

Dual Engine Failure (3)

Answer 5

WARNING: Delay in lowering the collective following a dual-engine failure or the loss of the second engine following a single engine failure will result in loss of rotor rpm and may cause catastrophic failure of the rotor system due to dynamic instability.

WARNING: If the collective TRIM RLSE switch is not depressed, altitude hold could result in a catastrophic loss of Nr.

WARNING: Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in an unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual-engine failure.

Question 6

Engine Air Restart (3)

Answer 6

WARNING: If APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible.

NOTE: Failure to ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch is placed to ENG for crossbleed starts will result in a failed engine start.

CAUTION: Receiving engine Ng less than 24% prior to advancing PCL to IDLE may result in a hot start.

Question 7

Ground Resonance / Unusual Vibrations on Deck (4)

Answer 7

CAUTION: Application of the rotor brake may aggravate the lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.

CAUTION: Continued operations with unusal vibrations on deck may result in rotor system damage or mechanical failures.

Warning: Ground resonance can occur rapidly (with three seconds), and produce violent lateral, vertical, and circular vibrations resulting in difficulty reaching PCLs, Pilot induced oscillations and possible dynamic rollover.

Warning: Failure to ensure ground personnel are clear of the rotor arc and aircraft is free from the deck or chains may result in loss of aircraft or ground personnel.

Question 8

Main Transmission Malfunction (4)

Answer 8

WARNING: Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.

WARNING: Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive.

NOTE: A minimum power airspeed and low altitude profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) permits a quick flare prior to ditching.

NOTE: A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution).

Question 9

Tail/Intermediate Transmission Malfunction (4)

Answer 9

WARNING: Possible indications of tail rotor imminent failure may include tail/intermediate transmission cautions accompanied by strong medium-frequency vibrations and or hot metal fumes or any other associated indications.

WARNING: High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure.

NOTE: Transiting at an altitude to sufficient to enter an auto is recommended.

NOTE: an INT XMSN OIL HOT or TAIL XMSN OIL HOT caution occurring simultaneously with a WCA MISCOMPARE alert may be an indication of a mission computer/backup computer card failure.

Question 10

Loss of Tail Rotor Control (5)

Answer 10

WARNING: Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of tail rotor control.

WARNING: After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCLs may cause excessive and uncontrollable yaw rates.

WARNING: If an uncontrolled right yaw develops at too low of an airspeed, loss of waveoff capability may result. Increasing collective may increase yaw to unrecoverable rates. Performing loss of tail rotor drive (altitude and airspeed not sufficient to establish autorotation) procedures may be required.

WARNING: If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail rotor servo from NORM to BKUP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.

NOTE: A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction.

Question 11

Tail Rotor Quadrant Caution (1)

Answer 11

NOTE: Removing hydraulic power with a single tail rotor cable failure will disconnect the other cable.

Question 12

1 Primary Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak (1)

Answer 12

WARNING: Failure to ensure BACKUP HYD PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 HYD PUMP caution present will result in a loss of tail rotor control when the weight on wheels switch is activated.

Question 13

2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak (1)

Answer 13

Caution: Landing with the BACKUP PUMP in OFF position with a #2 HYD PUMP caution will result in loss of pilot assist servos when the WOW switch is activated.

Question 14

Boost Servo Hardover (1)

Answer 14

NOTE: Up to 75 pounds of left pedal force will be required when hovering with boost servos off with starboard crosswinds. This value is significantly reduced with port crosswinds.

Question 15

Stab Auto Mode Failure (4)

Answer 15

WARNING: It is possible for the stabilator to fail without illumination of the stabilator caution and associated aural warning tone. Initial indication of failure will be an uncommanded pitch change during accelerated or decelerated flight.

WARNING: A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway down stabilator (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose-down pitch change) will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the automatic mode by activating manual mode slewing as required.

WARNING: If accelerated flight is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.

NOTE: In manual mode, the following are not recommended:
-Swimmer deployments lower than 15 feet AGL.
-Night takeoffs, approaches, and landings (except one-time landing following failure).
-Automatic approaches to a hover.
-Simulated emergency procedures, including practice autorotations.
-Flight into known IMC.

Airspeed vs Stab Angle limits:
0/ 150 KIAS
10 / 100 KIAS
20* / 80 KIAS
30* / 60 KIAS
40* / 45 KIAS

Question 16

Electrical Power Failure / Dual Generator Failure (4)

Answer 16

WARNING: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced as much as 49%.

WARNING: Exceeding airspeed versus stabilator angle limits may result in unrecoverable pitch angles.

NOTE: The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the AC essential bus. Attempt to check visually.

NOTE: The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the DC essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35* if full down or 30* if full up when a power failure occurs

Question 17

(#1/#2) Fuel Filter Bypass or (#1/#2) Fuel Pressure Caution (1)

Answer 17

WARNING: intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuations in engine power or flameout.

Question 18

1 and #2 Fuel Filter Bypass or #1 and #2 Fuel Pressure Caution (1)

Answer 18

WARNING: Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuations in engine power or flameout.

Question 19

External Engine Fire (1)

Answer 19

NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

Question 20

APU Fire

Answer 20

NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication

Question 21

Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire (5)

Answer 21

WARNING: Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practicable.

WARNING: Securing all electrical power while IMC or before landing/ditching will result in losing AFCS, ICS and flight instruments.

WARNING: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque may be reduced as much as 49%.

CAUTION: Securing Mission Power when securing unnecessary electrical equipment will prevent system damage.

NOTE: The DIAG page may assist in identifying failing components contributing to the fire.

Question 22

Immediate Landing/Ditching (3)

Answer 22

WARNING: Jettisoning stores at decent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP may result in aircraft/rotor system impact from jettisoned stores.

WARNING: After actuation, the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging or personal survival gear, impeding egress.

WARNING: Unstrapping and attempting to egress before all violent motion or in-rushing water stops may result in injury or incapacitation.

Question 23

Underwater Egress (2)

Answer 23

WARNING: Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.

WARNING: Inflating LPU prior to egressing the aircraft may lead to entrapment.

Question 24

Dual-EGI Failure (1)

Answer 24

WARNING: Altitude Changes of +/- 40 feet may occur with an EGI failure while in a coupled hover.

Question 25

Cargo Hook Emergency Release (2)

Answer 25

Caution: Pressing the cyclic EMER REL button with SONAR ARMING armed, CARGO HOOK CTRL armed, RSQ HOIST PWR/ARMED armed, and the RAST MASTER ON will fire the respective CADs.

WARNING: Activating the cyclic EMER REL pushbutton prior to ensuring all crewmembers are clear of the cargo hook area may cause injury to crewmembers.

Question 26

HELLFIRE Missile Hangfire (3)

Answer 26

WARNING: If hung ordinance is recovered, failure of EOD personnel to wait 30 minutes to handle ordinance following an attempted launch may result in burns from the surface of the missile near the thermal battery location.

NOTE: A rocket motor failure may cause the motor to slow burn or smolder or smoke for more than 3 seconds.

NOTE: Hung ordinance on the right side of the helicopter shall be jettisoned prior to landing aboard air capable ships.

Question 27

Rocket Hangfire (1)

Answer 27

NOTE: Normal rocket motor burn time is less than 1.1 seconds. if burning continues for greater than 1.1 second then sympathetic ignition of adjacent rocket motors has occurred.

Question 28

Sonar Cable Malfunction (3)

Answer 28

WARNING: if the 8.5 outer ring is reached while the TA is leaving the water, there is a significantly increased risk of the TA striking the aircraft, including the rotor blades, which may result in aircrew injury and/or death.

CAUTION: if the 4.25 inner ring is exceeded as the TA is leaving the water during raise operations, there is an increased risk of the TA striking the aircraft, which may result in equipment damage.

NOTE: Disengagement of cable angle hover for 13 seconds followed by re-engagement will clear inertial velocity bias.

Question 29

ALL STORES JETT (7)

Answer 29

WARNING: A catastrophic PIU failure with stores/ordinance on the corresponding weapon station may result in uncommanded jett. of that stations stores/ordinance. Indications of a catastrophic failure may include smoke, fumes, or electrical fire.

NOTE: ALL STORES JETT does not jett CMDS stores. CMDS stores can only be jett by SEL JETT.

NOTE: All emergency jett panel functions operate normally when running any SIM mode

NOTE: For weapons stations, a successful all stores jett will be indicated by the stores being removed from the ORD CTRL page and STOR INV TABLE window within aprox. 3 seconds.

NOTE: The sonobuoy inv. table will not update following sonobuoy jett.

NOTE: With the exception of sonobuoys, when the LIB PIU CB is pulled, ALL STORE JETT is functional regardless of the PIU CB position.

NOTE: With the RIB/LIB CB pulled, emergency jett of the external fuel tanks is available regardless of fuel state.