Antiterrorism Flashcards
Force Protection
security program designed to protect service members, employees, family, facilities, information, and equipment via planned and integrat3d application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personel protective services, and supported by intelligence, counter intel, security programs
defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
antiterrorism
antiterrorism
defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. effective detect, defend, and respond to a terror threat.
Cbt
Combating Terrorism
short for combating terrorism
CbT
what should antiterrorism measures be
scaleable and proportional
Force Protection
preventative measures to mitigbate hostile actions against DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information
what does force protection not include
actions to defeat the enemy
protection agaisnt accidents, weather, disease
characteristic of the FP COnditions
defensive in nature yet proactive enough to provide the DoD cCOmbonent the maximum flexibility to protect DoD elements, personnel, resources, and interests across the full range of military oeprations
FPCON
force protection
3 principles of force protection
-effects
FPCON levels
FPCON measures
purpose of commanders changing FPCON & using the measures
deter detect delay deny defend
what does each level of FPCON correspond to
each level orresponds to an increased probability of a terrorist attack or hostile act
what happens when a commander declares a FPCON level
employs the appropriate FPCON measures to achieve their desired effects to mitigbate the risks from terrorist or hostile act threats
levels of FPCON
5
Normal to Delta
FPCON Normal
-all times. general threats that always exist 9n the world.
FPCON Normal 1
- REgularly inform all personnel of the general threat situation and the reason for any changes in FPCON measures
FPCON Normal 2
Commensurate with mission requirements, reduce installation and facility access points to include ground, water, and air avenues, for vehicles and personnel based on threaty
FPCON Normal 3
Establish and implement procedures to report indications of terrorist or hostile actor suveillance of DoD elements and personnel
FPCON Normal 4
Implement methods to oibtain intelligence and counterintelligence updates on terrorist and other hostile threats
RAM
random antiterrorism measures
FPCON Normal 5
Institute random antiterrorism measures (RAM) to enhance deterrence and detection efforts and other security program requirements
FPCON Normal 6
Ensure all assigned military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, and contractors receive appropriate personnel recovery training pursuant to DoDD 3002.01
FPCON Alpha
terror act/hostile act is possible but there is no specific information indicating a direct/indirect threat to DoD elements
how long must a commander be able to sustain FPCON Alpha
sustain indefinitately
purpose of FPCON Alpha
terror/hostile act is possible but there is no specific intel about specifics
continuum of FPCON
normal - alpha-bravo-charlie-delta
deter, detect, delay, deny, defend
2 commander intents during FPCON Alpha
- implement enhanced capabilities to deter and detect general, non-specific threats of terrorist attacks, hostile acfts, and other security threats targeting DoD elements and personnel
- prepare to implement additional measures designed to delay, deny, and defend against these threats should the likelihood or expected consequences of these threats increase
FPCON Alpha 1
increase the number of RAM to enhance deterrence and detection efforts and other security program requirements
FPCON Alpha 2
conduct random inspections of privately owned vehicles and personnel entering DoD owned/controlled installations and facilities including items in the vehicles and items carried by personnel
FPCON Alpha 3
implement notification and communications procedures. notify personnel of all FPCON changes when they occur. test emergency notification and communication procedures/equipment
FPCON Bravo
applies when an increased or more predictable threat of a terroorist attack or hstile act exists and is directed against DoD elements and personnel
purpose of FPCON Bravo
commanders declare FPCON Bravo when information indicates that a direct or indirect threat of a terrorist attack or hostile act targeting DoD elements and personnel is likely bu tgte specific timinbg, nature, and targets of these threats cannot be identified
direct/indirect terror/hostile act targeting DoD is likely but the specific timing, nature, and targets of htese threats cannot be ID
FPCON Bravo
what happens during FPCON Bravo
- implement mandatory/supplemental FPCON measures to enhance the deterrence and detection of terror attacks/hostile acts/security threats
- prepare to implement supplemental FPCON measures designed to delay, deny, or defend agaisnt these threats should the probability or expected consequences of these threats increases
how long must a commander sustain FPCON Bravo
sustain measures indefinitely a d understand that Brao will likely affect missions and base support operations during prolonged implementation
FPCON Bravo 1
increase the frequency of inspections of privately owned vehicles and their occupants hand-carried items taht are attempting entry onto DOD owned/controleld installations/facilities
FPCON Bravo 2
randomy inspect all types of commercial deliveries. advise family members to check home deliveries
FPCON Bravo 3
enhance off-installation security for DoD facilities like schools, CDC< recruitting centers, critical infrastructure
FPCON Charlie
terror/hostile act incident occurs within the CDR’s area of interest or intelligence received indicates a hostile act or some form of terrorist action or targeting agaisnt DoD elements, personnel, or facilities is likely
information received indicates direct/indirect terror/hostile acts against DoD personnel/elements
FPCON Charlie
what happens during FPCON Charlie
- implement mandatory and supplemental FPCON measures designed to apply delay and deter effects against terrorist attacks and hostile acts
- implement additional plans/procedures to defend against, respond to, and recover from increaed threats shoudl they occur
how long must FPCON Charlie be sustained
affect missions/base support so must be able to sustain throughtout the duration of the threat
FPCON Charlie 1
increae standoff distance to the extent possible around critical facilities, soft targtets, and mass gathering facilities which are vulnerable to attack as dictated by the threat and anticipated tactics
FPCON Charlie 2
conduct inspecftions of all commercial vehicles to include their drivers/occupants that enter DoD property/facilitiesd
MWD
military working dogs
FPCON Charlie 3
employ threat specific search capabilities like mil working dogs and explosive detechtion technology
FPCON Charlie 4
employ lighting, barriers, and obstacles as needed
FPCON Charlie 5
`establish the appropriate number of installation and separate facilitiy perimeter access points to include access poipnts to defense critical infrastructure to support the enforcement of entry control (gound, water, air)
FPCON Charlie 6
discontinue use of Trusted Traveler program for vehicle occupant identification in accordance with DTM -9-012 (Directive -type memorandium)
DTM
Directive-type Memorandum
FPCON Charlie 7
cease all flying except for installation/superior commander operational sorties. CDR can consider deploying UAS if SecDef approval
FPCON Delta
terrorist act/hostile act has occurred or is anticipated against specific installations
purpose of FPCON Delta
focus necessary installation/organzational capabilities on mitigating/eliminating the threat
how long can you sustain FPCON Delta
limited basis and only as long as the necessary response is needed
rules of engagement instruction
CJCS Instruction 3121.01B
FPCON Delta 1
limit access to instalations, separate facilities, and defense critical infrastructure where appropriate to mission-essential personnel and other personnel as determined by the commander
FPCON Delta 2
search all vehicles and personnel entering installationsor facilities including hand carried items, not identified by the CDR as operationally exempt
MCIO
Military Criminal Investigative Organizations
FPCON Delta 3
restrict all non-essential moveemnt
FPCON Delta 4
implement procedures to positively identify all personnel entering and circulating on installations and in facilities with no exceptions
when is deadly force authoritized -9
“only when lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed
- inherent right of self-defense (or to protect others in the vicinity)
- defense of tothers
- assets vital to national security
- inherently dangerous property
- national critical infrastructure
- serious offenses against persons
- arrest/apprehension
- escape
when is it permissible to use deadly force on a suspect during an arrest, apprehension, or escapee
if there is probable cause to believe a person has committed a serious offense and there is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to others
what must be done before utilizing deadily force
verbal warning if the situation permits
rules regarding negligent discharges
no requirements for a special investigation and reporting of negligent discharges beyond that is required to line of dutymsonduct
what must be completed by law enforcement whenever a force is used/weapon is draw even if not used
Statement of Force/Use of Detention Space (NAVMC 11130)
- chambering round sfor weapons not authorized to be carried with rounds chambered
- draw from holster and point even if not discharged
when can you use “less than lethal force”
When can you use less than lethal force
- against persons assaulting otyhers or own self to prevent injuries or continuum of when lesser alternatives don’t work
- physical resistance to lawful arrest when lesser methods dont’ work
- to prefent escape of a person
- prevent destruction of DOD property
- agaisnt menacing/attacking animalsq
what should suspects not be handcuffed to
objects like vehicles
what must the handler do when a military working dog is released - 4
- be sure that the MWD will cease an attack upon command
- be sure that the MWD has identified the same target that the handler is releasing it to attack
- warn bystanders to cease all movement
- call the MWD off the attack as soon as the suspect stops/indicates surrender
3 indications to NOT release the military working dog
- no suspect in sight
- areas where children are present unless if the only other option is a firearm
- crowd of people
aka pepper spray
OC = oleoresin capsicum
preferred over high speed vehicle persuits
roadblocks and tire deflating devices
when can you do a high speed vehicle persuit
local regulations/procedures are in place
pursuing law enforcement/security personnel have communications with supervisiors who have the capability to order termination of htepursuit when it is unsafe or unnecessary
can puruse safetly
vehicle utilized meet state requirements like lights/sirens
HEMI
Human Electro-Muscular INcapication Devie
only DOD authorized HEMI Device
Human Electro-Muscular Incapacitation Deviec (HEMI)
X26E Taser
energy delivered by thge X26E Taser
0.0021 ampres/50K volts
when can you use the X26E Taser
- on base in the performance of law enforcement duties
- off base under Title 10 and 18 of the USC
RAS
Rear Area Security
GCE
Ground Combat Element
objective of RAS
Rear Area Security
-provide for the defense of all forces operating within the MAGTF rear area so thtat those funcation associated with rear area operations may continue in an uninterruped manner with minimum degradation to combat operations
fundamentals of RAS
Rear Area Security
- RAS is a MAGTF responsibility
- Units are responsible for their own local security
- RAS effor places minimum reliance on teh GCE
- the RS effort is proportionate to the threat
responsibility for unit security
unit security is an inherent responsibility for any commander. the fact that a higher commander establishes security measures does not releive a unit commander of that responsibility
examples of active & passive ways units are responsible for their own security
Active: train in weapons, security details to convoys, position low altitude air defense units in depth with the objective area, security reaction forces in the geographical area, close air support
Passive: camoflage, hardening installations, dummy installations/positions for deception, position rear area supports, establish redundant facilities to preclude MAGTF support capabilities form being rendered ineffective should the primary facility be destroyed
Rear Area Seurity effort
must be phased resopnse in direct proprotion to threat capabilities so this requires accurate threat assessment
