AAPL Landmark - Sex Offenders Flashcards
Can a person Convicted under one statute be sentenced under a different statute without a new hearing?
No.
Specht v. Patterson (1967). Sentenced under the Sex Offenders Act without a hearing. The USSC held that commitment proceedings, whether civil or criminal, are still subject to the constitutional guarantees of the 14th Amendment. Thus, due process protections are required.
Does the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination apply to Illinois’s Sexual Dangerous Persons Act?
No.
Allen v. Illinois (1986). The USSC decided that the Act could be applied only if criminal charges were already filed, the Act itself was not criminal–but civil– in nature, because the goal was to provide treatment rather than punishment. It found that the provision of care in a maximum security facility also providing care to convicts did not establish punishment over treatment. In addition, the provision of some due process safeguards by the act did not turn the act into a criminal proceeding requiring the full range of due process protections. The Court further noted that the 14th Amendment guarantee of due process does not require the application of the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination of civil proceedings.
Is the Washington State sexually violent predator statute a criminal law?
No.
Matter of Personal Restrain of Young (1993). The Washington SC decided that the Community Protection Act of 1990 was civil. Thus, criminal protections of double jeopardy and ex post facto laws did not apply. Commitment requires a mental disorder leading to the commission of a violent sexual offense, and committed persons are treated in a psychiatric facility and released as soon as they are no longer dangerous. The state was required to show acute dangerousness for defendants not incarcerated, least restrictive alternatives must be considered, and jury unanimity was required at the beyond a reasonable doubt threshold.
Does the procedure for civil commitment established by the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act violate principles of due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto?
No.
Kansas v. Hendricks (1997). The USSC reversed the appellate decision by ruling that the definition of “mental abnormality” in the Act satisfied “substantive” due process requirements in that there is no constitutional basis for any particular definition of mental disorder nor specific nomenclature. The USSC also found that lack of effective treatment did not make the Act functionally criminal and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post facto principles.
Does incentivizing participation during incarceration in the Kansas Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP), which requires admitting past offenses, violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?
No.
McKune v. Lile (2002). The Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Firstly, the program must have a penological objective, and it was found that the SATP did have an objective that included both rehabilitation and deterrence. Second, any consequences faced by those who choose not to participate must relate to the program’s ultimate goals. These consequences were brought forth by the non-privileged aspect of the program. It allows the participant to realize that their actions have consequences. Lastly, the consequences must not cause compulsion and “must ‘not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’”. It was found that “the penalties facing [the] respondent are the same as those imposed for prison disciplinary violations [which] does not make them coercive.”
Does the ruling in Kansas v. Hendricks require the state to prove that a dangerous individual cannot control his behavior?
No.
Kansas v. Crane (2002). The USSC determined that a lack of complete control was not necessary to be committed as a sexually violent predator. However, the Court disagreed with Kansas and found that some volitional criteria were required to distinguish dangerous offenders subject to civil commitment from those appropriately addressed exclusively through criminal proceedings. Because lack of control is not demonstrable with “mathematical precision,” the Court noted that serious difficulty controlling behavior was adequate for SVP determinations.
Does Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act violate the Ex-Post Facto Clause?
No.
Smith v. Doe (2003). The USSC noted that the sex offender registry was not punishment and, therefore, the Alaska Sex Offender Act was nonpunitive. They deemed it a “civil regulatory scheme,” not a criminal procedure. Since it was a series of civil laws designed to protect the public, it did not violate the Ex-Post Facto Clause.
Can Congress enact legislation to commit civilly convicted mentally ill, sexually violent federal prisoners beyond their scheduled release date?
Yes.
U.S. v. Comstock (2010). The Supreme Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court pointed to five considerations that compelled its holding. (1) the Necessary and Proper Clause grants broad authority. (2) The Court recognized that Congress has long delivered mental health care to federal prisoners. (3) Congress had good reason to pass the statute as it has the power to protect nearby communities from the danger prisoners may pose. (4) The Tenth Amendment does not reserve a zone of authority to the states in this context. (5) The Court recognized that the statute was narrow in scope and did not confer on Congress a general police power, which is reserved to the states.
Must there be evidence as to the effectiveness of the sex offender registry in reducing recidivism and protecting public safety for it to be constitutional?
Yes.
Does #1-5 v. Snyder (2016). Does #1-5” sued Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, challenging the constitutionality of the state’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), arguing that certain amendments to the law were applied retroactively and constituted “punishment” in violation of the ex post facto clause; the case ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that parts of the SORA were unconstitutional as applied to them. The court ruled that parts of the SORA amendments were unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, finding that they constituted “punishment” and could not be applied retroactively. SORA also had no impact on recidivism.
Must the restrictions of a state sex offender registry be proportional to the original commitment offense so as not to violate the Eighth Amendment>
Yes.
Millard v. Rankin (2017). The USSC concluded that the SORA’s intentions were unintentionally punitive, as the plaintiffs were regularly subjected to extreme humiliation. Most significantly, the plaintiffs’ punishments came from the public, not the judicial system. Accordingly, placement on the registry violated the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
