AAPL Landmark - ADA and Disability Rights Flashcards
Are emotional disabilities compensable under workers’ compensation even if they do not result from a direct physical injury or a single mentally disturbing event?
Yes.
Carter v. General Motors (1960). Mr. Carter was entitled to workers’ compensation while psychotic, but when he was no longer psychotic he was not entitled because he would return to a person with a “predisposition” to develop psychosis.
Does a regulation requiring a special permit for developmentally disabled adults violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?
Yes.
City of Cleburn, TX v. Cleburne Living Center (1985). The USSC reasoned that the denial of a special use permit to Cleburn Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. The Court reasoned that “mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.” The USSC used a “strict scrutiny” standard, which required a compelling state interest versus a “rational basis for the unequal treatment.
Is HIV status a disability as defined by the Americans with Disability Act (ADA)?
Yes.
Bragdon v. Abbott (1998). Abbott, a dentist, would only treat Bragdon in a hospital, given her HIV status and risk of transmission. The USSC agreed with the lower courts that HIV was a disability that impaired her life activity, but remanded to decide if there was risk to the dentist.
Does the ADA apply to people who are incarcerated in state prisons?
Yes.
Pennsylvania v. Yeskey (1998). Yeskey had HTN and was denied a BootCamp that would allow him early parole, stating it violated the ADA. The USSC said that prisons do provide benefits under the ADA and that the statute did not assume voluntariness. It did discriminate against Mr. Yeskey under the ADA.
Does continued confinement of individuals with mental disabilities in hospitals beyond their clinical need for that level of care constitute discrimination under the ADA?
Yes.
Olmstead v. Zimring (1999). Georgia, an ID woman, was denied transition to the community but retained at GRH. The USSC said that “unjustified segregation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination.”
Does a disability that limits only specific work-related tasks qualify as a disability under the ADA?
No.
Toyota v. Williams (2002). the USSC said that the appropriate standard to apply would be whether Williams had a disability and whether the condition prevented or restricted Ms. Williams from performing tasks of central importance to most people’s daily lives. The limitation must impair “Major Life Activities.”
Does a validly executed durable power of attorney, which specifies preferred treatment alternatives, carry the same weight for individuals hospitalized for mental illnesses as for those without mental illness?
Yes.
Hargrave v. Vermont (2003). A woman with DPOA banning psychotropic medication was given psychotropic medication in a nonemergency situation.
Can a disabled inmate in a state prison sue the state under Title II of the ADA?
Yes.
U.S. v. Georgia (2006). The USSC said that the ADA statute provided the constitutional guarantee of equal protection across states and that therefore the ADA created a private cause of action against states for conduct that violates the 14th Amendment.
Is New Jersey’s nonjudicial process for forcible medication a violation of the ADA?
No.
Disability Rights of New Jersey, Inc. v. Commissioner, NJ DHS (2015). The 3rd Circuit said that the ADA does not guarantee that disabled people receive the same procedural treatment when being cared for or treated in a hospital setting as those who are not disabled.
Did forced entry by police into the living quarters of a woman threatening violence and known to them to have a mental illness violate her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure?
No.
Sheehan v. City of San Francisco (2015). Officers enter a woman’s home after she threatens them with a knife and shoots her. The 9th Circuit said the 4th amendment was not violated because it was an emergency and the use of force was warranted.
