A7 HUMAN FACTORS Flashcards
7.1 HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOUR
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7.1 MEANING OF THE TERMS: PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY
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7.1 THE INFLUENCE ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR OF PERSONALITY, ATTITUDE, APTITUDE AND MOTIVATION
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7.1 KEY THEORIES OF HUMAN MOTIVATION AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO HEALTH AND SAFETY
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7.1 FW TAYLOR
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7.1 MAYO (HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS)
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7.1 MASLOW (HIERARCY OF NEEDS)
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7.1 MCCLELLAND
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7.1 HERZBERG
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7.1 MCGREGOR
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7.1 EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOUR AT WORK OF EXPERIENCE, SOCIAL AND CUTURAL BACKGROUND, EDUCATION AND TRAINING
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7.1 ONLINE AND OFFLINE PROCESSING, KNOWLEDGE, RULE AND SKILL BASED BEHAVIOR (RASMUSSEN)
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7.1 INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING/PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS (RASMUSSEN AND REASON)
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7.2 PERCEPTION OF RISK
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7.2 HUMAN SENSORY RECEPTORS AND THEIR REACTION TO STIMULI, SENSORY DEFECTS AND BASIC SCREENING TECHNIQUES
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7.2 PROCESS OF PERCEPTION OF DANGER, PERCEPTUAL SET AND PERCEPTUAL DISTORTION
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7.2 ERRORS IN PERCEPTION CAUSED BY PHYSICAL STRESSORS
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7.2 PERCEPTION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK, PERCEPTION AND THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE, FILTERING AND SELECTIVITY AS FACTORS FOR PERCEPTION
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7.2 PERCEPTION AND SENSORY INPUTS, PRINCIPLES OF THE HALE AND HALE MODEL
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7.2 INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE FACE OF DANGER, PRICIPLES OF THE HALE & GLENDON MODEL
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7.3 HUMAN FAILURE CLASSIFICATION HSG48
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7.3 CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN FAILURE TO SERIOUS INCIDENTS,
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7.3 KEGWORTH,
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7.3 HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE
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7.3 PIPER ALPHA
How it happened and what course of actions were taken to prevent recurrence, Lessons learned.
Piper Alpha Facts:
Fire Explosion knocked out fire proof - not Blast proof - walls
Control room damaged in 1st blast
Initial fire could have been extinguished
Fire pumps were set to manual
Lifeboats all in one location and could not be reached from accommodation block
Other platforms did not shutdown instead continued pumping hydrocarbons to Piper Alpha, increasing the fire
Piper Alpha Failures:
Permit to Work System -two permits issued for same task
Platform layout
Delayed decision making
Lack of training
Active fire system set from Auto to Manual
Passive fire protection
Lifeboats
Communications/Shift Handover
7.3 LADBROOKE GROVE
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7.3 GLENRIDDING BECK
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7.3 MILFORD HAVEN
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7.3 CHERNOBYL
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7.4 IMPROVING INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RELAIBILITY IN THE WORKPLACE
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7.4 MOTIVATION AND REINFORCEMENT: WORKPLACE INCENTIVE SCHEMES, JOB SATISFACTION AND APPRAISAL SCHEMES; SELECTION OF INDIVIDUALS - MATCHING SKILLS AND APTITUDES; TRAINING AND COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT; FITNESS FOR WORK AND HEALTH SURVEILLANCE, SUPPORT FOR ILL HEALTH AND STRESS
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7.5 ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
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7.5 THE EFFECT OF WEAKNESSES IN THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ON THE PROBABILITY OG HUMAN FAILURE, EG, INADEQACIES IN THE SETTING OF STANDARDS, POLICY, PLANNING, INFORMATION RESPONSIBILITIES OR MONITORING
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7.5 THE INFLUENCE OF SAFETY CULTURE ON BAHAVIOUR AND THE EFFECT OF PEER GROUP PRESSURE AND NORMS
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7.5 THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL GROUPS WITHIN AN ORGANISATION
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7.5 ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN FAILURE PROBABILITY, EG, SHIFT HANDOVER COMMUNICATION, ORGANSIATIONAL COMMUNICATION ROUTES AND THEIR COMPLEXITY, RELIABULITY AND DEGREE OF FORMALITY
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7.5 PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT AND INTRODUCING CHANGE
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7.6 JOB FACTORS
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7.6 EFFECT OF JOB FACTOR ON THE PROBABILITY OF HUMAN ERROT (EG, TASK COMPLEXITY, PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT, PAYMENT SYSTEMS, SHIFT WORK)
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7.6 APPLICATION OF TASK ANLYSIS
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- 6 THE ROLE OF ERGONOMICS IN JOB DESIGN:
- INFLUENCE OF PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN ON HUMAN RELIABILITY
- THE EMPLOYEE AND THE WORKSTATION AS A SYSTEM
- ELEMENTARY PHYSIOLOGY AND ANTHEROPOMETRY
- THE DEGRADATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE RESULTING FROM POORLY DESIGNED WORKSTATIONS
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7.6 ERGONOMICALLY DESIGNED CONTROL SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO HUMAN RELIABILITY -EG, EXAMPLES OF APPLICATIONS: PRODUCTION PROCESS CONTROL PANELS, CRAME CAB CONTROLS, AIRCRAFT COCKPIT, CNC LATHE, ETX
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7.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICAL STRESSORS AND HUMAN RELIABILITY
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7.6 THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE AND STRESS ON HUMAN RELIABILITY
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7.7 BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE PROGRAMMES
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7.7 PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE PROGRAMMES
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7.7 ORGANSISATIONAL CONDITIONS NEEDED FOR SUCCESS IN BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE PROGRAMMES
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7.7 EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE PROGRAMME CONTENTS.
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Identify four causes of ineffective communications
Ineffective communications come about from a variety of causes (only four required)
Some information is missed or missing
Unnecessary information is included, causing confusion
Information is inaccurate or misleading
The quality of information is poor
Information is not understood (either by transmitter or receiver)
Information is not carried forward over successive shifts
When are problems in communications most likely to occur
The most problems in communications occur:
During plant maintenance, when it runs across more than one shift.
In areas where safety systems may be over-ridden (e.g. Fire deluge system switched to manual).
During deviations from normal work working, such as breakdowns, or lack of spares.
When members of the team have been absent from work for long periods.
If handover takes place between experienced and inexperienced staff.
Human factors influencing safety related behaviour
Individual - characteristics of the individual
Job - characteristics of the job or task being performed
Organisation - characteristics of the organisation
Organisational Factors
Safety culture of the organisation Leadership Resources Work Patterns Communication Policies and procedures Setting standards, lead by example, aims & objectives Commitment and leadership from mgmt (aka positive leadership) Levels of supervision Peer group pressure Consultation and worker involvement Training
Poor work planning, lack of a safety system, poor management, poor culture, one way communication
Job Factors
Task inc unrealistic timescales Workload inc lack of breaks Piecemeal work Environment - noisy dark Displays and controls Procedures Job interest/repetitive nature of the job
Physical match and mental match, missing and unclear instructions, poorly maintained equipment, high workload.
Individual Factors
Competence - knowledge, experience, training and ability
Skills
Personality
Attributes
Risk Perception- the way a person interprets information detected by the senses.
Attitude - how they think and feel about it, change attitudes by education and training, high impact interventions, enforcement and consultation, and involvement in the decision-making process
Motivation - the thing that is making a person do what they do.
Tired staff, nored staff, medical problems, low skill
Factors that impact a person risk perception
Hazard is not detected by human senses Person with some sensory impairment Illness Stress Fatigue Drugs and alcohol Previous experiences Training and education
Improving H&S Behaviour
- Management Commitment and Leadership
- Competent Staff
- Effective Communication
Visible commitment from senior mgrs
- behave safely
- involvement in day-to-day H&S, e.g. by attending H&S meetings
- Taking part in safety tours and audits
- Promote changes to improve safety
- Enforce company safety rules
Competent Staff
Sufficient training Knowledge Experience Other abilities or skills - to carry out work safely and without risk to health
Competent Managers
Understanding of H&S implications of day-to-day decisions
Understand the risks of the tasks they manage, even if they cannot complete the task
Effective communication
Verbal communication Written communication Graphic communication Broadcasting methods Co-operation and Consultation
Verbal communication limitations
Language barrier Jargon not understood Strong accent or dialect Background noise Ambiguous message Recipient may miss information Recipient may forget information No written record as proof Poor transmission quality if by telephone or PA system
Verbal communication merits
Personsal Quick Direct Allows for check of understanding Allows for feedback Exchange of views Tone, facial expression and body language add to message
Written communication limitations
Indirect Takes time to write May contain jargon and abbreviations Impersonal Ambiguous Message not read by recipient Recipient unable to read Immediate feedback unavailable Questions cannot be asked Recipient may have impaired vision
Written communication merits
Permanent record
Reference
Can be written carefully to avoid jargon, abbreviations and ambiguity
Distribution relatively cheap
Graphic communication limitations
Only convey simple messages Expensive to but or produce May not be looked at Symbols or pictograms may be unknown to recipient Immediate feedback unavailable Questions cannot be asked Recipient may have impaired vision
Graphic communication merits
Eye-catching Visual Quick to interpret No language barrier Jargon-free Conveys a message to a wide audience
Buncefield Incident:
Causes:
NICE TO KNOW
Buncefield Incident Causes:
A fill level gauge and high fill level alarm failed
Fuel storage tank overfilled
Fuel leaked out of the vents at the top of the storage tank into the bund
This resulted in a Vapour Cloud
The vapour cloud flowed offsite
Ignition leading to the vapour cloud explosion took place at a pump house
Buncefield Lessons learned:
Need for back-up systems/processes for safety critical devices
Bunds/containment walls to be designed to withstand heat/explosion
Importance of coordinated response & emergency planning
Business/Disaster interruption and or recovery plan
Dealing with media after the incident.
Human Factors
What are the two classifications
Errors - Not intended - SLIPS - LAPSES - MISTAKES - skill based - not intended
Violations - deliberate - routine (normal) - Situational (job pressure) - Exceptional (benefits outweigh the risk)
What can help reduce the number of accident and cases of occupational ill health
Careful consideration of human factors at work can reduce the number of accidents and cases of occupational ill health.
Efficient and effective workforce.
What is an active failure
They have an immediate consequence and are usually made by front line people ( drivers, machine operators)
What is a latent failure
Are made by people who’s tasks are removed in time and space from operational activities (designers decision makers and managers). Latent failures are usually hidden with an organisation until they are triggered by an event likely to have serious consequences (ineffective training, supervision, communication, poor design of plant)
Reducing errors
Reducing errors are more likely to occur under certain circumstances
WORK ENVIRONMENT STRESSORS - eg extremes of heat, noise, poor lighting
EXTREME TASK DEMANDS - eg high workload, repetitive, distractions, interruptions (kegworth
SOCIAL & ORGANISATIONAL STRESSORS - inadequate training, fatigue, family problems, ill health, drugs and alcohol
EQUIPMENT STRESSORS - - poorly designed displays & controls< inaccurate & confusing instructions & procedures
Steps to reduce human errors include
1) addressing the conditions and reducing the stressors which increase the frequency of errors
2) designing plant and equipment to prevent slips and lapses or increase choice of detecting them
3) make certain that arrangements for training are effective
4) designing jobs to avoid the need for tasks which involve very complex decisions, diagnosis or calculations eg write procedures
5) ensuring proper supervision for inexperienced staff and independent checking
6) check job aids are clear, concise and up to date (instructions)
7) consider the possibility of human error in incident investigations
8) monitoring that measures taken to reduce error are effective
