2105 Flashcards

1
Q

the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of the property damage is reduced to, and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk
management

A

safety

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2
Q

dynamic characteristic of the aviation system, whereby safety risks must be continuously mitigated

A

safety

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3
Q

years of the technical era

A

from the early 1900s until the late 1960s

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4
Q

Aviation emerged as a form of mass transportation in which identified safety deficiencies were initially related to technical factors and technological failures.

A

technical era

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5
Q

technological improvements led to a gradual decline in the frequency of accidents, and safety processes were broadened to encompass regulatory compliance and oversight.

A

technical era

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6
Q

years of the human factors era

A

from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s

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7
Q

the frequency of
aviation accidents was significantly reduced due to major technological advances and enhancements to safety
regulations.

A

human factors era

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8
Q

years of the organizational era

A

from the mid-1990s to the present day

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9
Q

from the mid-1990s to the present day

A

organizational era

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10
Q

Who developed the Swiss-Cheese Model

A

Professor James Reason

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10
Q

illustrates that accidents involve successive
breaches of multiple system defenses

A

Swiss-Cheese Model

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11
Q

contends that complex systems such as aviation are extremely well defended by layers of defences, single-point failures are rarely consequential in such systems.

A

Swiss-Cheese Model

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12
Q

can be a delayed consequence of decisions made at the highest levels of the system, which may remain dormant until their effects or damaging potential are activated by specific operational circumstances

A

breaches in safety defenses

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13
Q

are actions or inactions, including errors and violations, which have an immediate adverse effect.

A

active failures

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14
Q

are those that exist in the aviation system well before a damaging outcome is experienced.

A

latent conditions

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15
Q

have all the potential to breach aviation system defenses

A

latent conditions

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16
Q

defences in aviation can
be grouped under three large headings:

A

technology, training, regulations

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17
Q

are largely intuitive in that all those with operational experience have experienced them to varying degrees, and include workforce stability, qualifications and experience, morale, management credibility, and traditional ergonomics factors such as lighting, heating and cooling.

A

workplace conditions

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18
Q

A simple yet visually powerful conceptual tool for the analysis of the components, the features of operational
contexts and the possible interactions with people is the

A

SHEL(L) Model

19
Q

can be used to help visualize the interrelationships among the various components and features of the aviation system

A

SHEL(L) Model

20
Q

4 components of SHEL(L) Model

A

Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware

21
Q

procedures, training, support

A

Software

22
Q

machine and equipment

A

Hardware

23
Q

the working environment in which the rest of the L-H-S system must function

A

Environment

24
Q

humans in the workplace

A

Liveware

25
Q

In the centre of the SHELL model are the humans at the front line of operations. Although humans are remarkably adaptable, they are subject to considerable variations in performance.

A

Liveware

26
Q

refers to the relationship between the human and the
physical attributes of equipment, machines and facilities

A

Liveware-Hardware

27
Q

is the relationship between the human and the supporting systems found in the workplace, e.g. regulations, manuals, checklists, publications, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and computer software.

A

Liveware-Software

28
Q

is the relationship among persons in the work environment. Since flight crews, air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance engineers and other
operational personnel function in groups, it is important to recognize that communication and interpersonal skills, as well as group dynamics, play a role in determining human performance.

A

Liveware-Liveware

29
Q

This interface involves the relationship between the human and both the internal and external environments.

A

Liveware-Environment

30
Q

a mismatch between the Liveware and the other four components contributes
to human error.

A

SHELL Model

31
Q

An action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations from organizational or the operational person’s intentions or expectation

A

Error

32
Q

are failures in the execution of the intended action

A

Slips and Lapses

33
Q

are actions that do not
go as planned

A

slips

34
Q

memory failures

A

lapses

35
Q

failures in the plan of action

A

mistakes

36
Q

assume the error will be made

A

capturing strategies

37
Q

provide direct intervention to reduce or eliminate the factors contributing to the error.

A

reduction strategies

38
Q

the intent is to capture the error before any adverse consequences of the error are felt

A

capturing strategies

39
Q

that they utilize checklists and other procedural interventions
rather than directly eliminating the error.

A

capturing strategies

40
Q

refer to the ability of a system to accept that an error will be made but without experiencing serious consequences.

A

tolerance strategies

41
Q

a deliberate act of willful misconduct or omission resulting in a deviation from established regulations, procedures, norms, or practices

A

violation

42
Q

three types of violations

A

situational violation, routine violation, organizationally induced violation

43
Q

committed in response to factors experienced in a specific context, such as time pressure or high workload.

A

situational violation

44
Q

Such violations are committed in response to situations in which compliance with established procedures makes task completion difficult.

A

routine violations

45
Q

This type of violation tends to occur when an organization attempts to meet increased output demands by ignoring or stretching its safety defenses

A

organizationally induced violations