2105 Flashcards

1
Q

the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of the property damage is reduced to, and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk
management

A

safety

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2
Q

dynamic characteristic of the aviation system, whereby safety risks must be continuously mitigated

A

safety

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3
Q

years of the technical era

A

from the early 1900s until the late 1960s

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4
Q

Aviation emerged as a form of mass transportation in which identified safety deficiencies were initially related to technical factors and technological failures.

A

technical era

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5
Q

technological improvements led to a gradual decline in the frequency of accidents, and safety processes were broadened to encompass regulatory compliance and oversight.

A

technical era

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6
Q

years of the human factors era

A

from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s

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7
Q

the frequency of
aviation accidents was significantly reduced due to major technological advances and enhancements to safety
regulations.

A

human factors era

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8
Q

years of the organizational era

A

from the mid-1990s to the present day

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9
Q

from the mid-1990s to the present day

A

organizational era

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10
Q

Who developed the Swiss-Cheese Model

A

Professor James Reason

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10
Q

illustrates that accidents involve successive
breaches of multiple system defenses

A

Swiss-Cheese Model

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11
Q

contends that complex systems such as aviation are extremely well defended by layers of defences, single-point failures are rarely consequential in such systems.

A

Swiss-Cheese Model

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12
Q

can be a delayed consequence of decisions made at the highest levels of the system, which may remain dormant until their effects or damaging potential are activated by specific operational circumstances

A

breaches in safety defenses

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13
Q

are actions or inactions, including errors and violations, which have an immediate adverse effect.

A

active failures

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14
Q

are those that exist in the aviation system well before a damaging outcome is experienced.

A

latent conditions

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15
Q

have all the potential to breach aviation system defenses

A

latent conditions

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16
Q

defences in aviation can
be grouped under three large headings:

A

technology, training, regulations

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17
Q

are largely intuitive in that all those with operational experience have experienced them to varying degrees, and include workforce stability, qualifications and experience, morale, management credibility, and traditional ergonomics factors such as lighting, heating and cooling.

A

workplace conditions

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18
Q

A simple yet visually powerful conceptual tool for the analysis of the components, the features of operational
contexts and the possible interactions with people is the

A

SHEL(L) Model

19
Q

can be used to help visualize the interrelationships among the various components and features of the aviation system

A

SHEL(L) Model

20
Q

4 components of SHEL(L) Model

A

Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware

21
Q

procedures, training, support

22
Q

machine and equipment

23
Q

the working environment in which the rest of the L-H-S system must function

A

Environment

24
humans in the workplace
Liveware
25
In the centre of the SHELL model are the humans at the front line of operations. Although humans are remarkably adaptable, they are subject to considerable variations in performance.
Liveware
26
refers to the relationship between the human and the physical attributes of equipment, machines and facilities
Liveware-Hardware
27
is the relationship between the human and the supporting systems found in the workplace, e.g. regulations, manuals, checklists, publications, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and computer software.
Liveware-Software
28
is the relationship among persons in the work environment. Since flight crews, air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance engineers and other operational personnel function in groups, it is important to recognize that communication and interpersonal skills, as well as group dynamics, play a role in determining human performance.
Liveware-Liveware
29
This interface involves the relationship between the human and both the internal and external environments.
Liveware-Environment
30
a mismatch between the Liveware and the other four components contributes to human error.
SHELL Model
31
An action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations from organizational or the operational person's intentions or expectation
Error
32
are failures in the execution of the intended action
Slips and Lapses
33
are actions that do not go as planned
slips
34
memory failures
lapses
35
failures in the plan of action
mistakes
36
assume the error will be made
capturing strategies
37
provide direct intervention to reduce or eliminate the factors contributing to the error.
reduction strategies
38
the intent is to capture the error before any adverse consequences of the error are felt
capturing strategies
39
that they utilize checklists and other procedural interventions rather than directly eliminating the error.
capturing strategies
40
refer to the ability of a system to accept that an error will be made but without experiencing serious consequences.
tolerance strategies
41
a deliberate act of willful misconduct or omission resulting in a deviation from established regulations, procedures, norms, or practices
violation
42
three types of violations
situational violation, routine violation, organizationally induced violation
43
committed in response to factors experienced in a specific context, such as time pressure or high workload.
situational violation
44
Such violations are committed in response to situations in which compliance with established procedures makes task completion difficult.
routine violations
45
This type of violation tends to occur when an organization attempts to meet increased output demands by ignoring or stretching its safety defenses
organizationally induced violations