02E: AVOIDABLE TURNBACKS, NOTABLE SAFETY EVENTS, FDM EVENTS AND HAZARD REPORTS Flashcards
Air Condition
GTB due to ECAM caution COND HOT AIR FAULT
ECAM caution COND HOT AIR FAULT triggered on taxi out. ECAM actions require the crew to set the HOT AIR pb switch off.
It may be noted that MEL condition (21-63-03B) which allows dispatch of aircraft with the Hot Air Valve in the open position (provided the trim air valves are checked closed), is not there for a few registrations. These registrations only have conditions 21-63-03A and 21-63-03C which both require the hot air valve to be checked closed.
The MEL in these mentioned aircraft is different because of the type of computers for Air Conditioning system installed on these aircraft are different from others. These aircraft are equipped with Zone Controllers whereas rest of the aircraft are equipped with ACSCs.
Auto Flight
RTO due to ATHR INOP
MEL was thereafter referred to and flight continued after applying the relevant MEL procedures. (MEL procedures require the ATHR system to be permanently deactivated by pressing and holding either autothrust instinctive disconnect pb for at least 15s). (Refer MEL MI 22-30-01 and MO 22-30-01A)
Though the crew in all cases correctly applied the MEL and continued flight, take off was rejected due the first column of the FMA being blank.
There is often confusion whether a TOGA takeoff is the only option available with the ATHR system inoperative. It must be understood that there is no relationship between the A/THR system and performing a FLEX takeoff. The related EPR/N1, during a flex takeoff is calculated as a function of the flexible temperature entered in the FMGS (MCDU). The flexible temperature is a function of the aircraft weight and environmental conditions and is in no way related to the status of the A/THR system.
Brakes
GTB due to Brake Hot alert and take-off configuration test unsatisfactory.
During taxi out Brakes HOT ECAM alert triggered with temperature of brake No.4 fluctuation between 330-480°C
Flight crew concluded that the alert was false, but the TO config test was not successful and was not able to clear the ECAM.
In the above case, a BRAKES HOT actual alert is a NO DISPATCH while a false alert requires the crew to refer to MEL Items and MEL Operational procedures.
A sudden increase of brake no.4 temperature from 330 to 480 degrees with the other brake temperatures remaining below 100 degree Celsius during taxi would imply that it was NOT an actual alert. A false alert requires reference to MEL MI-32-07.
Doors
RTO’s due to Sliding Window opening on Take off roll.
There have been a few in service events of reject take off’s (RTO’s) due to the sliding window opening on take off roll.
In all cases, the events took place on the first flight of the day either after a major inspection or a night halt.
To ensure that the sliding window is correctly closed and locked, crew must push the handle of the sliding window fully forward to the closed position and check that the red indicator is visible. This must be verified during the ‘Before start checklist’. (Refer PRONOR-SOP) (Ref Fig. 1)
Core competencies:
Application of Procedures (APK)
Air turn back due to ECAM alert DOOR AFT CARGO.
During climb, the above ECAM alert triggered. Aircraft was levelled off at FL100. Thereafter, an air turn back and precautionary landing was carried out.
Scrutiny of aircraft documents revealed that an MEL was already invoked on this aircraft for AFT CARGO DOOR indication. (Refer MEL MI-52-07-05 and MO-52-07-05A)
As the ECAM alert was false in this case, flight could have continued safely to destination by following ECAM actions. No crew action is required as long as cabin pressure is checked and found normal. Cabin pressure and V/S must be checked to establish if the warning is genuine or spurious. (Refer FCOM PRO-ABN-DOOR).
RTO due to ENG No.1 not developing takeoff thrust and aircraft veering to the left.
Take off was rejected at approximately 51 knots as ENG No.1 did not spool up and aircraft veered to the left.
Data confirmed that ENG No.1 was not stabilized at 50% N1, before take off thrust was set. Thrust levers were initially moved to the CLB detent and then to the FLX/MCT detent.
RTO due to ECAM ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET
Take off was rejected at 50 kts due to the above CAM appearing on setting thrust levers in the FLX/MCT detent. Aircraft then returned to bay.
This ECAM is triggered either when the Flex mode is not armed or when the Flex mode is armed but the flight crew sets one or both thrust levers out of the FLX/MCT detent.
Flight Control
GTB due to ECAM F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE
During taxi out ECAM caution ECAM F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE was triggered. The crew performed the ECAM actions, re-entered the ZFW and CG figures from the trim sheet, the caution re-appeared. Crew then decided to return to the bay.
Flight crew can disregard this amber CAM after cross checking the MCDU CG value entries with Load and Trim sheet CG values and continue the flight if CG position on the pitch trim wheel is in the green band. Once checked & confirmed, the takeoff may be continued and the ECAM will disappear after liftoff due to Auto-trim function activation. Crew to also refer to 6E digest issue 2&3 of 2019 on the subject.
Aircraft initially turned into bay but later continued flight after ECAM F/CTL FLAP FAULT
Aircraft was initially dispatched with SFCC Flap system 2 under MEL. After pushback, on completion of Engine no. 2 start, ECAM alert F/CTL FLAP SYS FAULT was triggered.
In the above case, Flap system 2 was under MEL. After pushback on completion of Engine no.2 start, Flap system 1 was not yet powered by Green hydraulic as Engine no. 1 had not started yet. Hence, a FLAPS FAULT alert was triggered as both Flap channels were not powered.
Hydraulics
GTB due to ECAM HYD G/Y ENG 1(2) PUMP LO PR
During post flight analysis and debrief with the crew, it came to light that in some cases crew were found rushing through the MEL procedure due to pressure from TC. In one case, the ECAM was being handled with the aircraft continuing to taxi.
When the ECAM alert triggers, the PTU is indicated running and the ECAM actions require to turn the G ENG 1 PUMP OFF. At this stage it is not possible to identify an actual or false alert as the LO PR is indicated on the SD page with the OVHD fault light and the PTU indicating running. After turning the ENG 1 PUMP OFF, the PTU will continue to run in order to transfer pressure to the G HYD system.
It is important to note that after the PTU pb switch is turned back to AUTO, the PTU will remain ‘indicated running’ (as the false alert is still displayed), and flight can be continued as the dispatch conditions have been met.
Surveillance
RTO at 102 knots due to Predictive windshear warning.
Crew decided to continue take off from planned runway and TOGA thrust was used.
During take off roll, Predictive windshear warning triggered and take off was rejected at a speed of 102 knots with a maximum recorded speed of 109 knots.
It is important to remember that windshear avoidance comes first and before recognition and recovery.
Though crew actions were appropriate for the predictive windshear warning, take off could have been delayed until conditions improved, since windshear was suspected (reports from ATC) Opposite runway could always have been requested for departure considering location of likely windshear.
