Wk 10 - R2P Flashcards
History of Kosovo/NATO intervention, Yugoslavia
Post-Srebrenica: realisation of severity in Bosnia - NATO to engage at will
Bosnian muslim/Croat govt until ’95 winning with might – allegations over who supplied/trained them
Post-95 Bosnians saw defeat coming – Sreb as grab for territory
1996: Kosovo Liberation Army launches against Serbs
1998: Serbian govt retaliation, civilian deaths; 200000 refs, 500 000 IDPs; Ch7 but didn’t include ‘use of force’ language; US/France considers NATO response – interpreted resolutions as legitimising force
The NATO intervention in Kosovo was followed which 5 final demands, made at negotiations in France?
With what effect? (x1)
Demands by NATO of Serbian army – Cease all combat Withdraw military Accept peacekeepers Refugee return and unimpeded aid Political framework Serbia refuses NATO troops throughout country
Failure of the Rambouillet, France negotiations in France led to… (x8)
Quick move by NATO to force:
Argued for humanitarian grounds – refugees, regional stability; inaction by UNSC
Justified based on prior Ch7 resolutions (even though no explicit authorisation)
Subsequent commission found it illegal but legitimate
Quick end due to Milosovic surrender - 78 day air campaign
June 1999: Kosovo established under transitional UN admin; NATO as unnamed security (Russia didn’t veto resolution as NATO not named in it); accepts territorial integrity of Yugoslavia
But Kosovo independence declared/largely recognised in 2008
What are the issues around the success of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo?
Effects: increased violence and civilian deaths resulting from Serb response to bombings; 1.3 million displaced; cant kill everyone – so brutal they all leave = brings less international response; UNHCR overwhelmed
Means: unwillingness to commit NATO troops – army as reality = unlikely need for bombing; privileging soldiers over civilians
Motive: why Kosovo? Inconsistent application of intervention policies – do we always intervene? Impractical, but hypocritical
What do Rwanda and Srebrenica have in common, that differentiates them from Kosovo?
Rwanda and Srebrenica as failures to act
Kosovo as illegal but legitimate
Failures and illegality of interventions pre-2000 led to calls for… (x2)
Rules
Responsible sovereignty
The International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 was… (x4)
Panel of international experts
Conducted consultations with governments, NGOs, IO, universities, think tanks.
In both developed, developing world.
Findings were non-binding
R2P builds on the concept of… (x1)
Defining protection as… (x2)
Responsible sovereignty
State as primary holder of responsibility
Which falls to international community in cases of failure
ICISS Report 2001 suggested which 3 elements of responsibility?
But… (x1)
Prevent: address root causes of conflict/crises – an HS notion
React: respond to need appropriately (inc coercive sanctions, prosecutions, interventions)
Rebuild: reconstruction, reconciliation, recovery
Prevent and rebuild quickly dropped
ICISS report argues that intervention is… (x2)
Not a right: issue then of choice of when to do it
Instead, is duty: responsibility on international community, in extremis only – large scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing
ICISS Report 2001 established which four conditions for interventions, based on just war principles? (plus evaluation of Them re Kosovo/Libya)
Right intention: to halt/avert suffering; met in Kosovo
Last resort: non-military means exhausted; questionable in Kosovo
Proportional: minimal scale, duration, intensity; Kosovo failed – bigger than nec.
Reasonable prospect of success: outcome must be better than not intervening; yes in Kosovo, not Libya
ICISS report 2001 made what 2 suggestions for addressing UNSC failures to protect/intervene?
‘Uniting for peace’ options in UNGA – call it a procedural matter; hasn’t been used since the 50s; still wouldn’t have same power, eg can’t allocate budget
Regional orgs acting within own defined boundaries: NATO can’t go after non-NATO states; need subsequent SC authorisation to make legal, as in Kosovo
The 2005 World Summit Outcome document is… (x6)
The defining official R2P
State responsibility accepted for protection against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity
Expansion from ICISS: using Ch6 and 7 to do so
Narrowing from ICISS on international responsibilities
UNSC authorisation only – still fluffy, who/how to determine event occurred? Plenty of wiggle room for SC on when to take action
Used in later UNGA debates and UNSC res
What is the three pillar approach? (x4)
The way R2P is now accepted, from Sec-Gen Report ‘Implementing the R2P’
Responsibility remains with the state
International community to assist the state in meeting obs
And to respond decisively in cases of failure
Pushback against the R2P concept has arisen from… (x2)
Imperialist concept? Designed to support intervention? and
Total misinterpretations of the doctrine
