Welfare Flashcards by Tom goldsworthy

Evidence that income related to demand for redistribution

Finseraas (2009)

Data - individual-level data from European Social Survey (22 countries)
Demand for redistribution decreases as income increases

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Evidence that labour market risk related to demand for redistribution

Iversen and Soskice (2009) - individuals w/greater labour market risk more likely to support more social spending and welfare state generosity
Rehm (2011) – individuals w/greater risk of losing job more likely to demand higher unemployment benefits

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Finseraas (2009)

Demand for redistribution decreases as income increases

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Iversen and Soskice (2009)

Individuals w/greater labour market risk more likely to support more social spending and welfare state generosity

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Rehm (2011)

Individuals w/greater risk of losing job more likely to demand higher unemployment benefits

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Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012)

Both redistribution AND social insurance demands for welfare supported at individual-level
Overall support for generous welfare states explained by correlation between labour market risk and low incomes
(a) High correlation – both groups broadly same people and overall electoral support for generous social welfare low
(b) Low correlation – 2 groups overlap less and support for generous social welfare is greater

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Evidence that the structure of the income distribution affects support for welfare states

Lupu and Pontusson (2011)

1a. Social distance = key determinant of redistribution preferences
1b. Income = good proxy for social distance in absence of cross-cutting ethnic cleavages

Theory – social distance/affinity impacts ability to empathise with (and hence support for redistribution to) certain groups
Empirical evidence - middle-income voters empathise w/poor and support redistribution when income distance between middle/poor small relative to distance between middle/rich (w/o cross-cutting ethnic cleavages)

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Evidence that racial fractionalisation affects support for welfare states

Eger (2010)

Sweden:

Clear evidence that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects support for social welfare spending
Recent immigration had negative impact on support for universal welfare spending

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Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

ETHNIC PERCEPTIONS:
(i) When minority ethnic groups perceived to be disproportionately poor, support for redistribution depressed
ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION:
(i) Differences in ethnic fractionalisation explain 1/4 of US/European differences in welfare generosity
(ii) Racial fragmentation interfered w/formation of unified socialist party in US
BELIEFS:
(i) Correlation between belief that luck determines income and social welfare spending
POLITICAL SYSTEM:
(i) PR systems associated w/larger transfer spending in OECD
(ii) Proportionality (measure of % of average district’s vote needed to win seat) accounts for ~1/2 of US/European differences in welfare generosity

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Eger (2010)

Ethnic heterogeneity and support for welfare spending

Clear evidence in Sweden that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects support for social welfare spending
recent immigration had negative impact on support for universal welfare spending

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Lupu and Pontusson (2011)

Structure of income distribution affects support for redistribution

social distance = key determinant of redistribution preferences
income a good proxy in absence of cross-cutting ethnic cleavages
Empirical evidence – w/o cross-cutting ethnic cleavages, middle-income voters will empathise w/poor and support redistribution when income distance between middle/poor small relative to distance between middle/rich

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Theory - why social distance/affinity impacts support for redistribution

social distance/affinity impacts ability to empathise with (and hence support for redistribution to) certain groups

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Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller (2018)

Altruism and support for redistribution

Test several different approaches in which support for welfare/redistribution determined by altruism related to income inequality
Finding – support for ‘income-dependent altruism’ hypothesis, which predicts:
(1) as inequality level increases, both rich and poor have stronger pro-redistribution preferences
(2) rich more responsive to changes in inequality
Main determinant of welfare state support = individual utility and self-interested reasons for welfare state support remain most important

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Evidence that altruism explains some support for welfare states/redistribution

Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller (2018)

A. Finding – support for ‘income-dependent altruism’ hypothesis, which predicts:

(i) as inequality level increases, both rich and poor have stronger pro-redistribution preferences
(ii) rich more responsive to changes in inequality
(iii) Main determinant of welfare state support = self-interest

Rueda (2017)

A. Material self-interest = most important factor shaping poor’s redistribution preferences (who consistently support redistribution)
B. Rich can ‘afford to be altruistic’ and support redistribution, conditional on identity of the poor (due to social identity theory, in/out groups)

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Beramendi and Rehm (2016)

Policy feedback - progressivity and redistribution preferences

Strength of association between income and support for redistribution varies significantly cross-nationally
Progressivity of tax/transfer system = major determinant of this variation
(a) more progressive - income more strongly predicts redistribution preferences because ‘who gets what’ conflict increases

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Evidence for policy feedback as explanation of cross-national variation in support for welfare states

Beramendi and Rehm (2016)
(a) progressivity of tax/transfer system = major determinant of predictive power of income on redistribution preferences across different countries
Gingrich and Ansell (2012)
(a) individual risk much less important determinant of welfare state preferences in countries with:
(i) high employment protection
(ii) welfare benefits not dependent on employment status

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Gingrich and Ansell (2012)

Policy feedback - employment protection and welfare benefits

Individual risk much less important determinant of welfare state preferences in countries with:
(i) high employment protection
(ii) welfare benefits not dependent on employment status

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Evidence that perceptions of ethnic minorities impact support for redistribution

Alesina and Glaeser (2004) – when minority ethnic groups perceived to be disproportionately poor, support for redistribution depressed

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Why do Beramendi and Rehm (2016) argue that cross-national variation in strength with which income predicts redistribution support explained by progressivity of tax system?

a) more progressive - income more strongly predicts redistribution preferences because ‘who gets what’ conflict increases
(b) less progressive - more overlap between tax contributions and receipts, so redistribution struggles less salient

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Is self-interest or altruism a stronger motivation for welfare state support?

Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller (2018)

Main determinant of welfare state support = individual utility and self-interested reasons for welfare state support remain most important

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Evidence for multi-dimensionality of redistribution preferences

Trumpy and Cavaille (2014)

A. Strong support for multi-dimensional framework

(i) Self-interested motive – redistribution support as beneficiary ‘from rich’
(ii) Other-oriented motive – redistribution support as contributor ‘to poor’

Rueda (2017)

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Trumpy and Cavaille (2014)

MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES

Dichotomy of self-interests vs altruistic motivations for redistribution attitudes = wrong
Strong support for multi-dimensional framework
(i) Self-interested motive – redistribution support as beneficiary ‘from rich’
(ii) Other-oriented motive – redistribution support as contributor ‘to poor’

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Evidence for interaction between welfare state generosity and voter turnout?

Franzese (2002)

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Franzese (2002)

Positive interaction between welfare state generosity and voter turnout

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When minority ethnic groups perceived to be disproportionately poor, support for redistribution depressed

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

Is self-interest or altruism a stronger motivation for welfare state support?

Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller (2018) Main determinant of welfare state support = individual utility and self-interested reasons for welfare state support remain most important

Rueda (2017)

MATERIAL-SELF INTEREST + OTHER-REGARDING REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES 1. Material self-interest = most important factor shaping poor's redistribution preferences (who consistently support redistribution) 2. Rich can 'afford to be altruistic' and support redistribution, conditional on identity of the poor (due to social identity theory, in/out groups) 3a. Group homogeneity magnifies importance of altruism for rich 3b. Group heterogeneity limits importance of altruism for rich

Rueda (2017)

1. ETHNIC PERCEPTIONS: (i) When minority ethnic groups perceived to be disproportionately poor, support for redistribution depressed 2. ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION: (i) Differences in ethnic fractionalisation explain 1/4 of US/European differences in welfare generosity (ii) Racial fragmentation interfered w/formation of unified socialist party in US 3. BELIEFS: (i) Correlation between belief that luck determines income and social welfare spending 4. POLITICAL SYSTEM: (i) PR systems associated w/larger transfer spending in OECD (ii) Proportionality (measure of % of average district's vote needed to win seat) accounts for ~1/2 of US/European differences in welfare generosity

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION AND WELFARE GENEROSITY (i) Differences in ethnic fractionalisation explain 1/4 of US/European differences in welfare generosity (ii) Racial fragmentation interfered w/formation of unified socialist party in US

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

PR systems associated w/larger transfer spending in OECD

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

INFLUENCES ON WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT 1. Cumulative left control of government strongly positively associated w/welfare generosity (most important factor) 2a. Constitutions w/many 'veto points' in policy process (e.g. strong bi-cameralism, federalism etc) slowed change (e.g. USA, Switzerland) 2b. Negative association between no. veto points and social security spending as % of GDP

Huber and Stephens (2001)

Cumulative left control of government strongly positively associated w/welfare generosity

Huber and Stephens (2001)

Why do Funk and Gathmann (2013) find that PR leads to lower 'targeted' spending on things like roads?

In PR systems w/national districts, geographically targeted spending makes no electoral sense

Evidence on impact of electoral system on overall level of government spending?

Mixed evidence

SWISS CANTONAL ELECTORAL REFORM 1. Data: (i) novel’ evidence of electoral reform in Swiss cantonal parliaments (ii) Over last century or so, Swiss cantons at different times moved from plurality to PR electoral systems (iii) Common history reduces problems of unquantifiable historical + institutional differences inherent in cross-sectional studies 2. Results: (i) Electoral success of left primary a consequence (not cause) of electoral reform (ii) Pre-existing left strength didn’t predict electoral reform (iii) PR benefits left parties, leading to increased spending on welfare and education (iv) PR leads to lower 'targeted' spending (e.g. roads) (v) No clear evidence that PR changes total overall level of government spending

Funk and Gathmann (2013)

WHY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS PRODUCE LEFT/RIGHT BIAS 1. Empirical support for A and B: A. Voting behaviour (Iversen/Soskice argument) B. Electoral geography (regional distribution of votes biases vote-seat translation against left in majoritarian systems, due to wide margins by which left wins urban districts) C. Party fragmentation (if right more fragmented than left in PR countries, less chance of winning)

Manow and Doing (2017)

Individuals w/greater labour market risk more likely to support more social spending and welfare state generosity

Iversen and Soskice (2009)

Individuals w/greater risk of losing job more likely to demand higher unemployment benefits

Rehm (2011)

IMPACT OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS 1. Initial choice may have been influenced by left strength 2. But this doesn't mean that now, since introduced, PR hasn't independently reinforced left strength

Clark, Golder and Golder (2009)

IMPACT OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS 1. Initial choice may have been influenced by left strength 2. But this doesn't mean that now, since introduced, PR hasn't independently reinforced left strength

Policy feedback - employment protection and welfare benefits 1. Individual risk much less important determinant of welfare state preferences in countries with: (i) high employment protection (ii) welfare benefits not dependent on employment status

Gingrich and Ansell (2012)

Ethnic heterogeneity and support for welfare spending 1. Clear evidence in Sweden that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects support for social welfare spending 2. recent immigration had negative impact on support for universal welfare spending

Eger (2010)

1. Both redistribution AND social insurance demands for welfare supported at individual-level 2. Overall support for generous welfare states explained by correlation between labour market risk and low incomes (a) High correlation – both groups broadly same people and overall electoral support for generous social welfare low (b) Low correlation – 2 groups overlap less and support for generous social welfare is greater

Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012)

Empirical evidence that overall support for generous welfare states explained by correlation between labour market risk and low income levels?

Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012)

Pre-existing strength of left-wing may have influenced initial choice of electoral system

Boix (1999)

Pre-existing strength of left-wing may have influenced initial choice of electoral system

Iversen, Soskice and Cusack (2007)

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 1. Right/centre-right parties controlled >50% parliamentary representation in almost all PR countries in last 100 years, yet almost no attempts to adopt majoritarian systems 2. Indicates left strength may not be key reason for adoption of PR 3. Instead, key to understanding electoral choice = differences in economic structures at end of 19th century

Iversen, Soskice and Cusack (2007)

Cross-national correlation between belief that luck determines income and social welfare spending

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

4. POLITICAL SYSTEM: (i) PR systems associated w/larger transfer spending in OECD (ii) Proportionality (measure of % of average district's vote needed to win seat) accounts for ~1/2 of US/European differences in welfare generosity

Alesina and Glaeser (2004)

Negative association between no. veto points and social security spending as % of GDP

Huber and Stephens (2001)

Structure of income distribution affects support for redistribution 1. social distance = key determinant of redistribution preferences 2. income a good proxy in absence of cross-cutting ethnic cleavages 3. Empirical evidence – w/o cross-cutting ethnic cleavages, middle-income voters will empathise w/poor and support redistribution when income distance between middle/poor small relative to distance between middle/rich

Lupu and Pontusson (2011)

Korpi and Palme (2003)

Falls in replacement rates across OECD from 80s onwards, especially in UK

Korpi and Palme (2003)

Castles (2004)

Welfare generosity stops growing around 1980 in OECD

Castles (2004)

Evidence for welfare state retrenchment?

1. Castles (2004) (i) Welfare generosity stops growing around 1980 in OECD 2. Korpi and Palme (2003) (i) Falls in replacement rates across OECD from 80s onwards, especially in UK

Why has welfare state spending as % of GDP continued to rise, despite supposed evidence of retrenchment?

1. Demographic pressures - e.g. ageing population | 2. Baumol's disease - productivity grows far more slowly in services, so should expect rising spending as % of GDP

Rueda and Stegmueller (2016)

1. PUZZLE - after controlling for material self-interest, great variation in redistribution preferences of rich remains 2. REASON - rich in more unequal countries = more supportive of redistribution due to concern w/crime

Rueda and Stegmueller (2016)

Kristov et al (1992)

Social affinity literature - individuals care more about well-being of others, the more they’re like themselves

Kristov et al (1992)

Taylor and Taylor-Gooby (2015)

UK WELFARE ATTITUDES: 1. EVIDENCE - relatively little change in welfare attitudes in last 4 years 2. CONTEXT - worse recession in decades + 5 years of government spending cuts 3. IMPLICATION - remarkable stability of attitudes

Taylor and Taylor-Gooby (2015)

O'Grady (2017)

1. DATA - Swiss panel data 2. PUZZLE - individual preferences for redistribution + social spending remarkably stable 3. FINDINGS: A. Voters rely on long-run values in preference formation B. Polarisation in preferences between income and risk groups due to: (i) Ideological + economic socialisation in family (ii) Early economic experiences (iii) Occasional large changes in circumstance C. Correlations between circumstances + preferences caused by: (i) Enduring shocks (ii) Low inter-generational mobility (iii) Tendency of left-wing parents to be poorer

O'Grady (2017)

What long-run values do voters rely on when forming preferences over social spending and redistribution?

O'Grady (2017) Polarisation in preferences between income and risk groups due to: (i) Ideological + economic socialisation in family (ii) Early economic experiences (iii) Occasional large changes in circumstance

Curtice (2017)

BSA evidence from last 20 years: 1. Voters’ priorities changed little (i) Health service consistently = no. 1 priority (ii) Meeting needs of unemployed consistent low priority 2. Important trends: (i) Voters less keen on government becoming involved in needs of unemployed (ii) Decreased urgency about spending on pensions and financial needs of elderly (i) Reduced support for public spending cuts, likely in reaction post-crash austerity years

Curtice (2017)

Key trends in British views about the role of government?

Curtice (2017) Over last 20 years: (i) Voters less keen on government becoming involved in needs of unemployed (ii) Decreased urgency about spending on pensions and financial needs of elderly (i) Reduced support for public spending cuts, likely in reaction post-crash austerity years

How have UK voters' priorities changed in last 20 years?

Curtice (2017) Voters’ priorities changed little (i) Health service consistently = no. 1 priority (ii) Meeting needs of unemployed consistent low priority

De Vries (2017)

1. Benefit cheats judged more harshly than tax avoiders | 2. Reason - possibly due to more negative attitude towards benefit claimants as a group

De Vries (2017)

Why are those engaging in benefit fraud judged more harshly than tax avoiders?

De Vries (2017) Reason - possibly due to more negative attitude towards benefit claimants as a group

Baldwin and Huber (2010)

ETHNIC GROUP INEQUALITY LOWERS PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 1. Strong + robust relationship between level of public goods provision and between-group inequality (income inequality between ethnic groups) 2. Tests indicate BGI has causal impact on public goods provision, though likely to be 2-way relationship 3. Relationship stronger in least-advanced democracies

Baldwin and Huber (2010)

Evidence that economic inequality between ethnic groups impacts public spending?

Baldwin and Huber (2010) ETHNIC GROUP INEQUALITY LOWERS PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 1. Strong + robust relationship between level of public goods provision and between-group inequality (income inequality between ethnic groups) 2. Tests indicate BGI has causal impact on public goods provision, though likely to be 2-way relationship 3. Relationship stronger in least-advanced democracies

Fernandez and Jaime-Castillo (2018)

1. FINDING - cross-national differences in class differences in pro-redistribution attitudes mostly explained by level of redistribution 2. REASON - preferences of rich esp. sensitive to level of redistribution (i) High levels of redistribution increase group consciousness among policy winners + losers

Fernandez and Jaime-Castillo (2018)

PR benefits left parties, leading to increased spending on welfare and education

Funk and Gathmann (2013)

Welfare Flashcards

(84 cards)