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Class Flashcards

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1
Q

Evidence of significant decline in class voting?

A
  1. Evans and De Graaf (2013) - 15 countries 1960-2005

2. Nieuwbeerta (2006) - 20 countries 1945-90

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2
Q

Evans and De Graaf (2013)

A
  1. DATA - 15 Western democracies 1960-2005
  2. FINDINGS:
    (i) Significant decline in class voting
    (ii) Though class continues to have impact in most countries to varying degrees
  3. EXPLANATION:
    (i) Ideological gap between main parties has solid impact on levels of class voting
    (ii) Polarisation along left-right dimension associated with substantially higher levels of class voting
  4. CAVEAT
    (i) Polarisation explains most of the changes in class voting, but unexpected linear decline remains (because there is no systematic decline in polarisation)
    (ii) ~1/5th of linear decline explained by increased education levels
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3
Q

Nieuwbeerta (2006)

A
  1. Data - 20 countries 1945-90
  2. General decline in class voting
  3. Significant cross-national variation (more significant declines in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia; no substantial declines in Netherlands and Switzerland)
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4
Q

Evidence of cross-national variation in decline of class voting?

A
  1. Nieuwbeerta (2006)
  2. More significant declines in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia
  3. No substantial declines in Netherlands and Switzerland
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5
Q

Theory - how might Dalton’s theory of cognitive mobilisation explain decline in class voting?

A
  1. rising education levels and spread of mass media
  2. more educated voters have greater access to more impartial political information
  3. voters better able to make own judgements/choices
  4. less need for partisanship as heuristic short-cut for vote choice
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6
Q

Empirical evidence for cognitive mobilisation as explanation of decline in class voting

A

Elff (2007)

  1. 7 countries 1975-2002
  2. Measures effect of education, TV watching and political discussions on class voting
  3. Predicts much weaker declines in class voting than have actually occurred
  4. Education risen steadily in recent decades, but most changes in class voting = non-linear
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7
Q

Elff (2007)

A

Testing cognitive mobilisation and post-materialism as explanations of declines in class voting

  1. Cognitive mobilisation:
    (a) Measures - education, TV watching and political discussions
    (b) predicts much weaker declines in class voting than have actually occurred
    (c) education risen steadily in recent decades, but most changes in class voting = non-linear
  2. Post-materialism:
    (i) Differences between actual and predicted changes statistically significant and non-trivial
    (ii) Post-materialism = common trend, but class declines only in some countries
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8
Q

Theory - how might Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis explain decline in class voting?

A
  1. increased affluence and economic security led younger citizens to prioritise ‘post-materials’ concerns relating to social and environmental issues
  2. class cleavage based on economic interests of working-class vs middle/upper class
  3. Increasing % of post-materialists (for whom economic and material concerns of lesser importance) means class voting will decrease
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9
Q

Theory - how might party strategy explain decline in class voting?

A

If parties converge on right-left spectrum, right-left values less relevant and class voting likely to decline

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10
Q

Key factor explaining party convergence towards centre?

A
  1. Shrinking of working class due to de-industrialisation a key factor driving convergence to centre
  2. Evidence – size of labour force employed in industry fell 40% 1960-2005 in Europe
  3. Fits Best’s (2011) theory that electoral relevance of a cleavage group partly determined by size of group
  4. left-wing respond by reaching out to middle-class, reducing gap between them and centre-right parties
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11
Q

Elff (2009)

A

Class voting due to party platform convergence

  1. Voting preferences of different class groups not changed
  2. Class voting primarily declined due to changing positions of parties
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12
Q

Cross-national evidence for party strategy as explanation of decline in class voting?

A
  1. Evans and De Graaf (2013):
    (i) Ideological gap between main parties has solid impact on levels of class voting
    (ii) Polarisation along left-right dimension associated with substantially higher levels of class voting
    (iii) CAVEAT - polarisation explains most of the changes in class voting, but remains unexpected linear decline (because there is no systematic decline in polarisation)
    (iv) ~1/5th of linear decline explained by increased education levels
  2. Elff (2009):
    (i) voting preferences of different class groups not changed
    (ii) class voting declined due to changing positions of parties
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13
Q

Individual-level country evidence for party convergence as explanation of declines in class voting?

A
  1. Britain – Evans and Tilley (2017):
    (a) Previously stable relationship between class and party weakened dramatically in mid 90s
    (b) Coincides w/Blairite shift in Labour party, who moved party to centre, converging on Conservatives
  2. Denmark – Hobolt (2013):
    (a) Class voting not significantly declined in Denmark over last 4 decades
    (b) Danish parties continue to offer distinctive positions on left-right dimension, w/v. limited evidence of convergence witnessed in other countries
  3. Australia – Marks (2013):
    (a) Substantial declines in class voting since 70s
    (b) Evidence that when ideological positions of major parties converge, class voting decreases
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14
Q

Hobolt (2013)

A

Denmark – Hobolt (2013):

(a) Class voting not significantly declined in Denmark over last 4 decades
(b) Danish parties continue to offer distinctive positions on left-right dimension, w/v. limited evidence of convergence witnessed in other countries

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15
Q

Marks (2013)

A

Australia – Marks (2013):

(a) Substantial declines in class voting since 70s
(b) Evidence that when ideological positions of major parties converge, class voting decreases

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16
Q

Possible exception to declines in class voting? Which theory explain this?

A
  1. Belgium – no significant declines in class voting
  2. Reason – seeming counter-example due to historic relative importance of religious cleavage over class
  3. Implication – not in interests of main parties to converge in same way
  4. Conclusion – party strategy explanation accommodates this because change in class voting contingent on party strategy, so explanation succeeds in explaining cross-country variation
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17
Q

Evidence of increasing strength of relationship between occupation and voting behaviour

A
  1. Oesch and Rennwald (2018):
    A. Electoral competition in tri-polar space (left vs centre-right vs radical right) anchored in occupational structure
    B. Key bases of electoral support:
    (i) LEFT = socio-cultural professionals
    (ii) CENTRE-RIGHT = large employers + managers
    (iii) RADICAL RIGHT = traditional working-class
  2. Oesch (2008):
    A. Economically powerful classes now split based on cultural divisions resulting from occupation
    B. Socio-cultural professionals vote for left (primary concern for individual ‘client’, not employer, + inter-personal work logic → libertarian view)
    C. Technical professionals (e.g. bankers, lawyers) vote for right (command structure/primary concern for employer + technical work logic) → authoritarian view)
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18
Q

Oesch and Rennwald (2018)

A

REALIGNMENT OF CLASS VOTING IN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

  1. Electoral competition in tri-polar space (left vs centre-right vs radical right) anchored in occupational structure
  2. Key bases of electoral support:
    (i) LEFT = socio-cultural professionals
    (ii) CENTRE-RIGHT = large employers + managers
    (iii) RADICAL RIGHT = traditional working-class
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19
Q

Oesch (2008)

A

New expression of class voting along cultural divide

  1. Decline in ‘traditional’ class voting (on economic dimension) misinterpreted as decline in ‘class voting’
  2. Evidence indicates new expression of class voting
  3. Classes still systematically differ in voting behaviour, but with realignment along cultural divide (based on logic of work)
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20
Q

Classic Weberian notion of class

A
  1. groups w/shared economic interests, which affect life chances due to similar positions in labour market
  2. i.e. exclusively based on economic interests resulting from position in labour market
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21
Q

How does Oesch’s definition of class differ from classic Weberian notion?

A
  1. Weber - class based exclusively on economic interests resulting from position in labour market
  2. Oesch - extended idea of class to include logic/type of work, as well as economic interests
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22
Q

Criticism of Oesch’s re-definition of class?

A
  1. CLASS NOT THE SAME AS OCCUPATION
    (i) Class may be a function of occupation, but conceptually distinct
    (ii) Based on traditional concepts of class, not clear that Oesch’s occupation schema based on logic of work reflects class per se
  2. POTENTIAL ENDOGENEITY
    (i) May construct class schema around new voting patterns, inevitably finding a relationship because explanatory variable constructed to fit dependent variable
    (ii) People choose type of work based on their politics
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23
Q

Response to criticisms of Oesch’s ‘re-definition’ of class?

A
  1. Concept of class necessarily evolved (due to socio-economic structural changes)
  2. Weberian concept sufficient for industrial society in which primary division = manual industrial workers (support left) vs non-manual service workers (support right)
  3. Post-industrial changes to labour markets and economic advancement mean:
    (a) Traditional industrial class rapidly declined
    (b) Large diversity of types of jobs in expanding service sector
  4. Therefore, necessary to also include type/logic of work in concept of class
  5. Still continuity with Weberian concept of class based on position within labour market
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24
Q

Cross-national evidence that subjective class identification differs from objective identification

A
  1. Evans and Kelley (1995):
    (a) 6 Western countries
    (b) self-reported class often poorly correlated w/objective class position
    (c) Reason – many identify w/middle class regardless of economic position
    (d) UK exception – many objectively middle class continue to think of themselves as working class
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25
Q

Evidence for Britain as exception to relationship between subjective and objective class identification?

A

Evans and Mellon (2016):

  1. ~25% in working class occupations
  2. Yet 60% self-identify as working class
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26
Q

What is the puzzle generated by cross-national evidence that subjective class identification differs from objective class identification?

A
  1. Despite decline in its strength, continues to be relationship between vote choice and class
  2. Puzzle - what is the mechanism for class voting, if not via shared class identity/consciousness and group affiliation?
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27
Q

Theoretical explanation of class voting, despite disconnect between objective and subjective class identification?

A
  1. Views on economic left-right issues driven by economic self-interest
  2. low-income earners have more to gain from greater redistribution, so support left parties
  3. high-income earners want to protect earnings from redistribution, so support right parties
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28
Q

Empirical evidence that economic self-interest explains voting behaviour/redistribution preferences?

A
  1. Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007) - in 22 European countries, those in working class jobs systematically more economically egalitarian
  2. Evans and Tilley (2017) - in Britain, occupational middle class ~20% more likely to be opposed to redistribution
  3. Finseraas (2009) – low income citizens more likely to support greater redistribution and welfare generosity, in line w/economic self-interest
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29
Q

Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007)

A

Economic preferences of working-class

  1. In 22 European countries, those in working class jobs systematically more economically egalitarian
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30
Q

Finseraas (2009)

A

low income citizens more likely to support greater redistribution and welfare generosity, in line w/economic self-interest

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31
Q

Evans and Mellon (2016)

A

UK WORKING-CLASS IDENTIFICATION

  1. ~25% in working class occupations, yet 60% self-identify as working class
  2. Working class identification doesn’t influence redistribution attitudes among occupational middle class
  3. Working-class identification is associated w/cultural attitudes though:
    (i) More authoritarian
    (ii) Less pro-immigrant
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32
Q

Hayes (1995)

A

Impact of class identification on political attitudes

Cross-nationally:

  1. Class identification important to political attitudes in no. areas
  2. Exception = attitudes towards government intervention in economy
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33
Q

Evidence that importance of subjective class identification to vote choice declined

A

Heath et al (2009)

  1. Sense of belonging to a social class declined, despite relatively stable % identifying with each class
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34
Q

What explains cross-national evidence of higher % of people identifying as middle class vs their status as objectively working class?

A
  1. Evans and Kelley (1995)
  2. Reference group theory – people form class perceptions by comparing to others
  3. Distorts perceptions and encourages middle class identification
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35
Q

What explains British evidence of higher % of people identifying as working class vs status as objectively middle class?

A
  1. Heath et al (2009) - In Britain, class identity in large part a function of father’s social class and occupation, for men at least
  2. Curtis (2016) - Class origin a strong predictor of class identity, suggesting lingering socialisation process related to economic conditions in early life
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36
Q

Evans and Kelley (1995)

A

Class identification in Europe

  1. Data - 6 Western countries
  2. Evidence:
    (a) self-reported class often poorly correlated w/objective class position
    (b) Reason – many identify w/middle class regardless of economic position
    (c) UK exception – many objectively middle class continue to think of themselves as working class
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37
Q

Heath et al (2009)

A

In Britain:

  1. Sense of belonging to a social class declined (despite relatively stable % identifying with each class)
  2. Class identity in large part a function of father’s social class and occupation, for men at least
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38
Q

Best (2011)

A

Electoral relevance of a cleavage group partly determined by size of group

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39
Q

Examples of countries in which class voting declined more significantly?

A

Britain, Germany, Australia

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40
Q

Examples of countries in which class voting declined less?

A

Belgium, Denmark

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41
Q

Evidence on theory that leadership effects become more important in politics due to influence of media

A

Clarke et al (2004)

Leadership effects always been important and have NOT grown in strength

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42
Q

Gingrich (2017)

A

Changing left support in Europe

  1. Working class in Europe moving more to populist right
  2. Left parties in Europe no longer working class parties (in terms of base of electoral support)
  3. Stable overall left vote share in Europe
43
Q

Evidence for increasing OECD income inequality

A
  1. OECD average Gini coefficient increased 10% from mid 80s to 00s
  2. Gini coefficient increased in 17/22 countries over this period
44
Q

Evidence of convergence in party platforms

A

Data - comparative manifesto project

  1. Evans, De Graaf and Jansen (2013)
    (a) Evidence of convergence in some countries, but with cross-national variation
  2. Pontusson and Rueda (2008)
    (a) limited convergence, on average (polarisation in some countries, like Sweden and the USA)

3a. Clear convergence in Britain + Australia + France
3b No clear convergence in Denmark or Switzerland
3c. Clear polarisation in Sweden and in USA (if consider congressional behaviour)

45
Q

Curtice (2016) - perceptions of difference between main parties

A

% in Britain who perceive “not much” difference between main parties:

1980s – <10%
1997 – ~25%
2005 – ~45%

46
Q

Evidence of declines in voter perceptions of differences between main parties

A

Curtice (2016)

% in Britain who perceive “not much” difference between main parties:

1980s – <10%
1997 – ~25%
2005 – ~45%

47
Q

Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)

A

Relationship between inequality and redistribution

  1. Within-country positive association between increases in inequality and increases in redistribution
  2. Explained by 2 automatic mechanisms:

(a) Increased unemployment (post-industrial changes led to increased unemployment and resultant rise in benefits claimed led to automatic increase in redistribution)
(b) Concentrated gains at top (income inequality increased, leading to automatic increase in redistribution, given progressive nature of tax systems)

48
Q
  1. Evidence of relationship between inequality and redistribution
  2. Explanation?
A

Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)

  1. Within-country positive association between increases in inequality and increases in redistribution
  2. Explained by 2 automatic mechanisms:

(a) Increased unemployment (post-industrial changes led to increased unemployment and resultant rise in benefits claimed led to automatic increase in redistribution)
(b) Concentrated gains at top (income inequality increased, leading to automatic increase in redistribution, given progressive nature of tax systems)

49
Q

Kenworthy and McCall (2007)

A

OECD survey data on redistribution preferences 1979-99

  1. Little to no change in support for redistribution
  2. Despite increased income inequality
50
Q

Evidence of changes in redistribution preferences in OECD over time

A

Kenworthy and McCall (2007)

  1. OECD survey data on redistribution preferences 1979-99
    (a) Little to no change in support for redistribution
    (b) Despite increased income inequality
  2. No significant increase in perceptions of income inequality, even in countries with sharpest increases
51
Q

Rennwald and Evans (2014)

A

NATURE OF CLASS VOTING = PARTY POSITION + ISSUE SALIENCE

  1. Data - Case-study of Austria and Switzerland
  2. Class basis of social democratic party support:
    (a) Switzerland = socio-cultural specialists
    (b) Austria = working-class
  3. Difference explained by relative emphasis put on new cultural issues (Swiss left emphasises these more)
52
Q

How do Oesch and Rennwald (2018) define class voting?

A

class voting = systematic link between voters’ class location (as defined by position in labour market) and parties they support

53
Q

Why do Oesch and Rennwald (2018) argue that class positions reflect both economic and cultural attitudes?

A
  1. Jobs not just about earning an income
  2. Jobs involve exposure to experiences of autonomy/control and specific sets of social interactions, which shape values on economic + cultural issues
54
Q
  1. DATA - 15 Western democracies 1960-2005
  2. FINDINGS:
    (i) Significant decline in class voting
    (ii) Though class continues to have impact in most countries to varying degrees
  3. EXPLANATION:
    (i) Ideological gap between main parties has solid impact on levels of class voting
    (ii) Polarisation along left-right dimension associated with substantially higher levels of class voting
  4. CAVEAT:
    (i) Polarisation explains most of the changes in class voting, but remains unexpected linear decline (because there is no systematic decline in polarisation)
    (ii) ~1/5th of linear decline explained by increased education levels
A

Evans and De Graaf (2013)

55
Q

How do Evans and De Graaf (2013) measure polarisation between main parties? Why is this important?

A
  1. Along left-right economic dimension

2. ‘New expression’ of class voting may be along cultural dimension

56
Q
  1. Voting preferences of different class groups not changed

2. Class voting primarily declined due to changing positions of parties

A

Elff (2009)

57
Q

In Britain:

(a) Previously stable relationship between class and party weakened dramatically in mid 90s
(b) Coincides w/Blairite shift in Labour party, who moved party to centre, converging on Conservatives

A

Evans and Tilley (2017)

58
Q

In Denmark:

(a) Class voting not significantly declined in over last 4 decades
(b) Danish parties continue to offer distinctive positions on left-right dimension, w/v. limited evidence of convergence witnessed in other countries

A

Hobolt (2013)

59
Q

In Australia:

(a) Substantial declines in class voting since 70s
(b) Evidence that when ideological positions of major parties converge, class voting decreases

A

Marks (2013)

60
Q
  1. Electoral competition in tri-polar space (left vs centre-right vs radical right) anchored in occupational structure
  2. Key bases of electoral support:
    (i) LEFT = socio-cultural professionals
    (ii) CENTRE-RIGHT = large employers + managers
    (iii) RADICAL RIGHT = traditional working-class
A

Oesch and Rennwald (2018)

61
Q

(a) Economically powerful classes now split based on cultural divisions resulting from occupation
(b) Socio-cultural professionals vote for left (primary concern for individual ‘client’, not employer, + inter-personal work logic → libertarian view)
(c) Technical professionals (e.g. bankers, lawyers) vote for right (command structure/primary concern for employer + technical work logic) → authoritarian view)

A

Oesch (2008)

62
Q

In UK:

(a) ~25% in working class occupations
(b) Yet 60% self-identify as working class

A

Evans and Mellon (2016)

63
Q

In Britain, occupational middle class ~20% more likely to be opposed to redistribution

A

Evans and Tilley (2017)

64
Q

In Britain, sense of belonging to a social class declined, despite relatively stable % identifying with each class

A

Heath et al (2009)

65
Q

In Britain, class identity in large part a function of father’s social class and occupation, for men at least

A

Heath et al (2009)

66
Q

Class origin a strong predictor of class identity, suggesting lingering socialisation process related to economic conditions in early life

A

Curtis (2016)

67
Q

Leadership effects always been important and have NOT grown in strength

A

Clarke et al (2004)

68
Q

OECD average Gini coefficient increased …..% from ….. to …..

A

OECD average Gini coefficient increased 10% from mid 80s to 00s

69
Q

Gini coefficient increased in ….. out of ….. countries from …… to …..

A

Gini coefficient increased in 17/22 countries from the mid 80s to 00s

70
Q

% in Britain who perceive “not much” difference between main parties:

1980s – <10%
1997 – ~25%
2005 – ~45%

A

Curtice (2016)

71
Q

Curtis (2016)

A

Class origin a strong predictor of class identity, suggesting lingering socialisation process related to economic conditions in early life

72
Q

Heath (2016)

A

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AFFECTS CLASS VOTING

  1. Political supply arguments can’t explain high class voting in 60s, despite low polarisation
  2. Decline in no. working-class Labour candidates contributed to class dealignment

PROBLEMS

  1. Both trending phenomena, so hard to rule out spurious regression
  2. Selection bias:
    (i) Labour likely field working-class candidates in strongest working-class areas
    (ii) Strength of working-class in area might cause working-class candidate to be field (or not), so difficult to establish direction of causality
  3. Decline in working-class Labour MPs mostly pre-1997, but changes in Labour working-class support for more recent (post-2010)
73
Q

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AFFECTS CLASS VOTING

  1. Political supply arguments can’t explain high class voting in 60s, despite low polarisation
  2. Decline in no. working-class Labour candidates contributed to class dealignment

Problems:

  1. Both trending phenomena, so hard to rule out spurious regression
  2. Selection bias:
    (i) Labour likely field working-class candidates in strongest working-class areas
    (ii) Strength of working-class in area might cause working-class candidate to be field (or not), so difficult to establish direction of causality
  3. Decline in working-class Labour MPs mostly pre-1997, but changes in Labour working-class support for more recent (post-2010)
A

Heath (2016)

74
Q

Evidence that descriptive representation may impact class voting

A

Heath (2016)

  1. Political supply arguments can’t explain high class voting in 60s, despite low polarisation
  2. Decline in no. working-class Labour candidates contributed to class dealignment

Problems:

  1. Both trending phenomena, so hard to rule out spurious regression
  2. Selection bias:
    (i) Labour likely field working-class candidates in strongest working-class areas
    (ii) Strength of working-class in area might cause working-class candidate to be field (or not), so difficult to establish direction of causality
  3. Decline in working-class Labour MPs mostly pre-1997, but changes in Labour working-class support for more recent (post-2010)
75
Q

Evidence that in Britain, working-class identification is associated with cultural attitudes:

(i) More authoritarian
(ii) Less pro-immigrant

A

Evans and Mellon (2016)

76
Q

CLASS VOTING = PARTY POSITION + ISSUE SALIENCE

  1. Data - Case-study of Austria and Switzerland
  2. Class basis of social democratic party support:
    (a) Switzerland = socio-cultural specialists
    (b) Austria = working-class
  3. Difference explained by relative emphasis put on new cultural issues (Swiss left emphasises these more)
A

Rennwald and Evans (2014)

77
Q

Evidence that the nature of class voting is a function of issue salience, as well party position?

A

Rennwald and Evans (2014)

  1. Data - Case-study of Austria and Switzerland
  2. Class basis of social democratic party support:
    (a) Switzerland = socio-cultural specialists
    (b) Austria = working-class
  3. Difference explained by relative emphasis put on new cultural issues (Swiss left emphasises these more)
78
Q

….. (…..)

% in Britain who perceive “not much” difference between main parties:

1980s – …..%
1997 – …..%
2005 – …..%

A

Curtice (2016)

% in Britain who perceive “not much” difference between main parties:

1980s – <10%
1997 – ~25%
2005 – ~45%

79
Q
  1. Data - 20 countries 1945-90
  2. General decline in class voting
  3. Significant cross-national variation (more significant declines in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia; no substantial declines in Netherlands and Switzerland)
A

Nieuwbeerta (2006)

80
Q

Across 22 European countries, those in working class jobs systematically more economically egalitarian

A

Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007)

81
Q

UK WORKING-CLASS IDENTIFICATION

  1. ~25% in working class occupations, yet 60% self-identify as working class
  2. Working class identification doesn’t influence redistribution attitudes among occupational middle class
  3. Working-class identification is associated w/cultural attitudes though:
    (i) More authoritarian
    (ii) Less pro-immigrant
A

Evans and Mellon (2016)

82
Q

Data - …..

  1. Evans, De Graaf and Jansen (2013)
    (a) Finding - …..
  2. Pontusson and Rueda (2008)
    (a) Finding - …..

3a. Clear convergence in …..
3b No clear convergence in …..
3c. Clear polarisation in …..

A

Data - comparative manifesto project

  1. Evans, De Graaf and Jansen (2013)
    (a) Evidence of convergence in some countries, but with cross-national variation
  2. Pontusson and Rueda (2008)
    (a) limited convergence, on average (polarisation in some countries, like Sweden and the USA)

3a. Clear convergence in Britain + Australia + France
3b No clear convergence in Denmark or Switzerland
3c. Clear polarisation in Sweden and in USA (if consider congressional behaviour)

83
Q

Goldthorpe class schema

A
  1. KEY DISTINCTIONS:
    (i) Employment relations (i.e. employers vs self-employed vs employees)
    (ii) Contract type (service vs labour)
  2. EXAMPLES:
    (i) Highest class I = higher-grade professionals (e.g. managers, lawyers, bankers)
    (ii) Lowest class VII = semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers
84
Q

Highest class in Goldthorpe class schema?

A

Highest class I = higher-grade professionals (e.g. managers, lawyers, bankers)

85
Q

Lowest class in Goldthrope class schema?

A

Lowest class VII = semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers

86
Q

Main axes of Goldthrope class schema

A

(i) Employment relations (i.e. employers vs self-employed vs employees)
(ii) Contract type (service vs labour)

87
Q

Problems with Goldthrope class schema?

A
  1. Relationship between contract type and nature of work increasingly complex
    (i) Casualisation of professional jobs
    (ii) Employment protection for some working-class jobs
  2. Deindustrialisation - manual workers a shrinking class anyway
  3. New low class jobs = low-paid service jobs in gig economy (e.g. Uber, Deliveroo), which are v. insecure
  4. May ignore underclass (group of long-term dependents on state benefits, incl. unemployed, single parents etc)
88
Q

Key reasons for lack of emergence of a unified socialist party in the USA?

A
  1. Ethnically divided working class (Alesina and Glaeser 2004)
  2. Differential turnout (service class turnout much higher vs working class)
89
Q

In what senses might Oesch’s re-definition of class raise questions of potential endogeneity?

A

(i) May construct class schema around new voting patterns, inevitably finding a relationship because explanatory variable constructed to fit dependent variable
(ii) People choose type of work based on their politics

90
Q

Changing left support in Europe

  1. Working class in Europe moving more to populist right
  2. Left parties in Europe no longer working class parties (in terms of base of electoral support)
  3. Stable overall left vote share in Europe
A

Gingrich (2017)

91
Q

Empirical evidence for post-materialism as explanation of decline in class voting

A

Elff (2007)

  1. FINDINGS:
    (i) Differences between actual and predicted changes statistically significant and non-trivial
    (ii) Post-materialism = common trend, but class declines only in some countries
  2. PREDICTION - if true, Elff argues we should see centre-left gaining middle-class post-materialists and losing working-class materialist voters
  3. PROBLEM - much greater evidence for this prediction since Elff’s paper, lending support to post-materialist theory
92
Q

What is the problem with Elff’s argument against post-materialism as an explanation of declines in class voting (i.e. that we should see centre-left gaining middle-class post-materialists and losing working-class materialist voters)

A

Much greater evidence for this prediction since Elff’s paper, lending support to post-materialist theory

93
Q

Evans and Tilley (2011)

A
  1. CLAIM - voters only responsive to changes in party polarisation after 1974
  2. REASON - voters became more instrumental, rather than expressive (of social group allegiance/partisan loyalty) after this due to partisan dealignment + cognitive mobilisation
94
Q
  1. CLAIM - voters only responsive to changes in party polarisation after 1974
  2. REASON - voters became more instrumental, rather than expressive (of social group allegiance/partisan loyalty) after this due to partisan dealignment + cognitive mobilisation
A

Evans and Tilley (2011)

95
Q

How can we explain high class voting in 60s in Britain, despite low polarisation?

A
  1. Heath (2016)
    (i) Decline in no. working-class Labour candidates contributed to class dealignment
  2. Evans and Tilley (2011)
    (i) After 70s, voters became more instrumental, rather than expressive (of social group allegiance/partisan loyalty) due to partisan dealignment + cognitive mobilisation
96
Q

Why do Evans and De Graaf (2013) find that there remains an unexpected linear decline in class voting, even though polarisation explains most declines in class voting cross-nationally?

A

Because there is no systematic decline in polarisation

97
Q

Problems with Heath’s (2016) argument that declines in the number of working-class Labour candidates helps explain class dealignment?

A

PROBLEMS:

  1. Both trending phenomena, so hard to rule out spurious regression
  2. Selection bias:
    (i) Labour likely field working-class candidates in strongest working-class areas
    (ii) Strength of working-class in area might cause working-class candidate to be field (or not), so difficult to establish direction of causality3. Decline in working-class Labour MPs mostly pre-1997, but changes in Labour working-class support for more recent (post-2010)
98
Q

Response to claim that Oesch’s definition of class is endogenous because people choose their work based on their pre-existing political preferences

A

Kitschelt and Rehm (2014)

Self-selection plays a role, but given people spend over 1/3rd of waking time at work, not plausible that your job doesn’t affect orientation in social/political world

99
Q

Kitschelt and Rehm (2014)

A

OCCUPATIONS AS A SITE OF POLITICAL PREFERENCE FORMATION

  1. Individuals’ work experiences in their job shape political attitudes
  2. People spend over 1/3rd of waking time at work, so not plausible that your job doesn’t affect orientation in social/political world
100
Q

OCCUPATIONS AS A SITE OF POLITICAL PREFERENCE FORMATION

  1. Individuals’ work experiences in their job shape political attitudes
  2. People spend over 1/3rd of waking time at work, so not plausible that your job doesn’t affect orientation in social/political world
A

Kitschelt and Rehm (2014)

101
Q

Spies (2013)

A
  1. DATA - working-class radical right support in 13 West European countries 1980-2002
  2. FINDING - where economic dimension of party competition decreased in salience and converged, working-class support for radical right parties significantly higher
102
Q
  1. DATA - working-class radical right support in 13 West European countries 1980-2002
  2. FINDING - where economic dimension of party competition decreased in salience and converged, working-class support for radical right parties significantly higher
A

Spies (2013)

103
Q

Evidence that working-class support for radical right parties affected by salience and polarisation of economic dimension of party competition

A

Spies (2013)

  1. DATA - working-class radical right support in 13 West European countries 1980-2002
  2. FINDING - where economic dimension of party competition decreased in salience and converged, working-class support for radical right parties significantly higher

Political Sociology (5 decks)

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