Political Participation Flashcards
1
Q
Problem with ‘resource model’ explanation of education as predictor of conventional participation?
A
Overall educational levels increased, but evidence that conventional political participation decreased over same period (in terms of turnout and party membership)
2
Q
Nie et al (1996)
A
Sorting model of education:
- Education impacts political participation through social status
- Social status determined by relative, not absolute, education
- High education individuals exposed to social networks that encourage political participation and have more at stake in elections
3
Q
Education is “widely recognised as the single most powerful factor influencing whether someone participates in politics”
A
Campbell (2013)
4
Q
Evidence against resource model of education and conventional political participation?
A
Overall educational levels risen in recent decades but turnout and membership of political parties fallen
5
Q
Norris (2002)
A
Education = “best predictor of experience of protest politics” (exception = strikes)
6
Q
Biggs (2015)
A
In Britain:
- Total protest activity fallen in recent decades
(a) after accounting for dramatic fall in strike activity
(b) demonstrations and boycotts increased, but strike activity = most significant % of overall activity - Protest action once again the “preserve of the middle class” and educated in Britain
(a) strikers tend to be working-class and less educated
(b) no. strike days fallen 95% from 1970s to 2000s
7
Q
Campbell (2013)
A
- Education “widely recognised as the single most powerful factor influencing whether someone participates in politics”
- Individual factors known to correlate w/participation all have social dimension
8
Q
Definition of political participation
A
“activity by a private citizen designed to influence government decision-making” (Huntington and Nelson 1976)
9
Q
Conventional forms of political participation?
A
voting, petitions, joining a party, contacting MP
10
Q
Unconventional forms of political participation
A
strikes, boycotts, protests
11
Q
Evidence that education predicts conventional political participation
A
- Powell (1986)
(a) Avg. 10% difference in turnout between most and least educated
(b) As high as 37% in Switzerland - Meta-analysis (Smets et al 2013):
(a) Education 1 of only variables w/consistent effect
(b) Success rate across studies = ~70%
(c) Statistically significant on average
12
Q
Persson (2013)
A
- Education might be correlated w/another variable that’s really driving relationship (e.g. cognitive ability, family background)
- No clear consensus on mechanism
13
Q
Evidence that suggests institutional context likely to be important, in general, in explaining political participation
A
Cross-country variation more striking than variation between types of individuals
14
Q
Evidence that compulsory voting increases turnout
A
- Blais and Carty (1990)
(a) estimate 10-15% increase in turnout
(b) result confirmed by every study of turnout in Western democracies
- Smets et al (2013)
(a) virtually all studies confirm mobilising effect of compulsory voting
15
Q
Evidence that electoral rules influence turnout
A
Blais and Carty (1990):
- estimate 9-12% increase in turnout due to PR
- PR gives voters more meaningful choice and eliminates ‘wasted votes’ problem in SMD systems
- But, overall results still relatively mixed and context-dependent (e.g. close race in FPTP elections might generate more incentive to vote and higher turnout compared to PR system)
16
Q
Main features of institutional context likely to influence turnout
A
- compulsory voting laws
- electoral rules
- voter facilitation rules
17
Q
Main features of political context likely to influence turnout
A
- closeness of elections
2. grievances
18
Q
Blais and Carty (1990)
A
- Compulsory voting increases turnout 10-15%
2. PR increases turnout 9-12%
19
Q
Blais (2006)
A
- turnout decreases 1-2% when gap between 1st and 2nd parties increases by 10%
- In 27/32 studies reviewed, closeness of elections affects turnout
20
Q
Evidence that closeness of elections influences turnout
A
Blais (2006)
- turnout decreases 1-2% when gap between 1st and 2nd parties increases by 10%
- In 27/32 studies reviewed, closeness of elections affects turnout
21
Q
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998)
A
No effect of economic downturns on turnout
22
Q
Grasso and Guigni (2016)
A
Economic grievances and protest activity
- relative deprivation positively impacts probability of protest in last year
- effect greater in economic context of higher unemployment
23
Q
Evidence that economic grievances may increase political participation
A
Grasso and Guigni (2016)
- relative deprivation positively impacts probability of protest in last year
- effect greater in economic context of higher unemployment
24
Q
Evidence of impact of social networks on turnout
A
- Nickerson (2008) – voting “contagious” within households
- Fowler (2005) – 1 person’s decision to vote affects up to 4 others on average
- Gerber and Green (2000) - people vote because friends/family/colleagues vote and because they’re asked to by campaigners
- Gerber et al (2008) - large-scale field experiment showed that mailings which included voting behaviour of neighbours increased turnout by >8% (v. significant effect that applied to all, not just those w/pre-existing sense of civic duty)
- Fieldhouse and Cutts (2012) - living w/someone who votes increases turnout, esp. for young people
25
Nickerson (2008)
voting “contagious” within households
26
Fowler (2005)
1 person’s decision to vote influences up to 4 others on average
27
Evidence of impact of social networks on unconventional political participation
Lim (2008) – protestors often recruited from fellow members of voluntary group
28
Evidence of impact of social media on unconventional political participation
1. Theorcharis (2011) – social media had significant impact on mobilisation of young people in student fee protests and 2011 riots
2. Theorcharis et al (2014) young used Twitter to mobilise support in recent protests in Spain, US, Greece, UK
29
Indirect effects of social networks on political participation (Campbell 2013)
1. Education
2. Religious attendance
3. Political knowledge
4. Political conviction
5. Civic duty
30
Gerber and Green (2000)
people vote because friends/family/colleagues vote and because they're asked to by campaigners
31
Gerber et al (2008)
1. Large-scale field experiment demonstrated importance of social pressure as inducement to vote
2. Mailings that include voting behaviour of neighbours increase turnout by >8% (v. significant effect)
3. Effect = 4 times the size of mail-out which just reminds people of civic duty to vote
4. Applies to everyone, not just those w/pre-existing sense of civic duty
32
Lim (2008)
Protestors often recruited from fellow members of voluntary group
33
Theorcharis (2011)
1. Fee protests and 2011 riots
2. Social media assisted offline political action by making actions/coordination more effective + aims more widely known
3. Social media raised awareness + fostered moral support
34
Theorcharis et al (2014)
1. young used Twitter to mobilise support in recent protests in Spain, US, Greece, UK
2. Tweets linked information containing mobilising resources
3. Tweets used to mobilise other sympathetic/supportive groups through political discussion + raise awareness
35
Evidence of declining turnout
1. Turnout decreased >10% on average across established European democracies 1950-2015
2. Average now almost 70%
36
Evidence that declines in turnout concentrated among particular group?
Blais and Rubenson (2013) - turnout declines concentrated among young
37
Blais and Rubenson (2013)
1. EVIDENCE - turnout declines concentrated among young
2. EXPLANATION:
(i) Cohort replacement w/less civically minded cohorts
(ii) Turnout decreased disproportionately among those who don’t believe in duty to vote
3. PROBLEM – in Britain, trends in sense of duty to vote not strongly correlated w/turnout change
38
Plutzer (2002)
1. Strong empirical support for developmental model of voting
2. Most people either voters/non-voters as habit
3. Strong role of inertia means turnout in 1st few eligible elections has large effect on turnout in subsequent elections
39
Developmental model of voting
Plutzer (2002)
1. Most people either voters/non-voters as habit
2. Strong role of inertia means turnout in 1st few eligible elections has large effect on turnout in subsequent elections
40
Reasons that forming habit of voting more costly at younger age
1. Still establishing social network that will guide/motivate political behaviour
2. still gaining maturity + political interest/knowledge
3. younger voters less integrated into society and so less engaged in political process
41
Evidence that lowering voting age led to fall in turnout
Franklin (2004):
(a) Lowering voting age already led to 3% fall in turnout in established democracies
(b) Effect on aggregate turnout not fully realised until all cohorts socialised into voting when legal age = 21 left electorate and replaced w/cohorts socialised when legal age = 18
(c) Estimated total effect = 4% decline in turnout
42
Franklin (2004)
(a) Lowering voting age already led to 3% fall in turnout in established democracies
(b) Effect on aggregate turnout not fully realised until all cohorts socialised into voting when legal age = 21 left electorate and replaced w/cohorts socialised when legal age = 18
(c) Estimated total effect = 4% decline in turnout
43
Reasons that party identification = important predictor of turnout
1. partisan loyalties reduce information and decision-making costs
2. voting becomes habit borne out of partly loyalty
3. parties mobilise supporters to vote
44
Evidence of partisan dealignment
1. Dalton and Wattenberg (2002)
(a) % of voters who identify as non-partisan risen from ~30% to ~40% 1976-92
2. Political party membership declined ~1M in last 3 decades in UK and France, a 2/3 decline since 1980
45
Dalton and Wattenberg (2002)
% of voters who identify as non-partisan risen from ~30% to ~40% 1976-92
46
Political party membership declined ..... in last 3 decades in ..... and ....., a ..... decline since .....
Political party membership declined ~1M in last 3 decades in UK and France, a 2/3 decline since 1980
47
Evidence that partisan dealignment partly explains long-term trend of falling turnout
1. Britain (Heath 2007)
(a) reduced strength of party identification accounts well for long-term trend of turnout decline
2. USA (Wattenberg 2000)
(a) partisan dealignment had substantial impact on turnout decline
48
Heath (2007)
Reduced strength of party identification accounts well for long-term trend of turnout decline in Britain
49
Wattenberg (2000)
Partisan dealignment had substantial impact on turnout decline in USA
50
Gray and Caul (2000)
1. Data – 18 industrial democracies 1950-97
2. Nations w/reduced unionisation saw biggest avg. declines in turnout
3. 20% decline in union density (like that experienced by Netherlands) associated w/2.8% fall in turnout
4. Conclusion - only likely to explain small, but significant, part of turnout decline
51
Evidence for falling unionisation as cause of declining turnout
Gray and Caul (2000)
1. Data – 18 industrial democracies 1950-97
2. Nations w/reduced unionisation saw biggest avg. declines in turnout
3. 20% decline in union density (like that experienced by Netherlands) associated w/2.8% fall in turnout
4. Conclusion - only likely to explain small, but significant, part of turnout decline
52
Theoretical explanation of why declining unionisation might lead to fall in turnout
Trade unions:
1. mobilise members to vote by contacting and educating them
2. Remind members of importance of voting
3. Create strong social networks in which social pressure to vote = v. strong
53
Evidence for globalisation as explanation of declining turnout, and problem with this evidence
Fisher and Marshall (2014)
1. cross-national data from 23 OECD countries (1970-2007)
2. Strong support for constraint hypothesis (measured by foreign ownership), w/variable explaining over ½ of decline in turnout
3. Spurious correlation - globalisation is a trending variable and so strongly correlated with any other trending variables in recent decades
54
Theoretical explanation of how globalisation might affect turnout
Globalisation constrains government policy and so reduces incentives to vote
55
Evidence that income negatively correlated with turnout
Verba et al (1995)
56
Akee et al (2018)
EFFECT OF INCOME ON PARTICIPATION
1. Test effect of plausibly random positive external income shock due to quasi-experimental government cash transfer scheme in US
2. Results – children in families receiving cash transfer more likely to vote as adults (even if parents didn’t vote), but adults no more likely to vote
3a. Causal mechanism (human capital) – children in families that received income transfers more likely to complete additional education
3b. Causal mechanism (social capital) – children in families that received income transfers less likely to move, improving ability of child to maintain meaningful social connections and increasing benefit to civic participation in community that they care about
57
Evidence that income impacts political participation
Akee et al (2018)
1. Test effect of plausibly random positive external income shock due to quasi-experimental government cash transfer scheme in US
2. Results – children in families receiving cash transfer more likely to vote as adults (even if parents didn’t vote), but adults no more likely to vote
3a. Causal mechanism (human capital) – children in families that received income transfers more likely to complete additional education
3b. Causal mechanism (social capital) – children in families that received income transfers less likely to move, improving ability of child to maintain meaningful social connections and increasing benefit to civic participation in community that they care about
58
Persson et al (2018)
QUASI-EXPERIMENT - EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON PARTICIPATION
1. Research design – exploit plausibly exogenous variation in education attainment following gradual roll-out of Swedish school reforms
2. Results – extended education increased turnout among low SES students
3. Causal mechanism – most likely to be driven by direct nature and content of education (i.e. skills + norms individuals learn at school)
59
Fieldhouse and Cutts (2012)
living w/someone who votes increases turnout, esp. for young people
60
Grabarek (2011)
PARTIES MOBILISE HIGH INCOME/EDUCATION VOTERS
1. Citizens w/highest levels of income and education contacted by parties at much higher rates
2. Reason:
(a) Parties = rational actors and want to receive highest return on mobilising efforts
(b) Parties target individuals known to them (drawn from same social networks) and likely to participate
61
Heath (2016)
1. Working class consistently less likely to vote in Britain, but gap widened substantially in recent decades
2. Reason – fall in working-class turnout due to decrease in no. working-class Labour candidates
62
Education = “best predictor of experience of protest politics” (exception = strikes)
Norris (2002)
63
In Britain:
1. Total protest activity fallen in recent decades
(a) after accounting for dramatic fall in strike activity
2. Protest action once again the "preserve of the middle class" and educated in Britain
Biggs (2015)
64
“Activity by a private citizen designed to influence government decision-making”
Huntington and Nelson (1976)
65
(a) Avg. 10% difference in turnout between most and least educated
(b) As high as 37% in Switzerland
Powell (1986)
66
Meta-analysis:
(a) Education 1 of only variables w/consistent effect
(b) Success rate across studies = ~70%
(c) Statistically significant on average
Smets et al (2013)
67
Compulsory voting increases turnout by 10-15% (confirmed by all studies of turnout)
Blais and Carty (1990)
68
Who estimates that PR increases turnout 9-12%?
Blais and Carty (1990)
69
1. turnout decreases 1-2% when gap between 1st and 2nd parties increases by 10%
2. In 27/32 studies reviewed, closeness of elections affects turnout
Blais (2006)
70
1. Relative deprivation positively impacts probability of protest in last year
2. Effect greater in economic context of higher unemployment
Grasso and Guigni (2016)
71
Voting “contagious” within households
Nickerson (2008)
72
1 person’s decision to vote affects up to 4 others on average
Fowler (2005)
73
People vote because friends/family/colleagues vote and because they're asked to by campaigners
Gerber and Green (2000)
74
Large-scale field experiment showed that mailings which included voting behaviour of neighbours increased turnout by >8% (v. significant effect that applied to all, not just those w/pre-existing sense of civic duty)
Gerber et al (2008)
75
Living w/someone who votes increases turnout, esp. for young people
Fieldhouse and Cutts (2012)
76
Protestors often recruited from fellow members of voluntary group
Lim (2008)
77
1. Turnout decreased ..... on average across established European democracies .....
2. Average turnout is now almost .....
1. Turnout decreased >10% on average across established European democracies 1950-2015
2. Average turnout is now almost 70%
78
(a) Lowering voting age already led to 3% fall in turnout in established democracies
(b) Effect on aggregate turnout not fully realised until all cohorts socialised into voting when legal age = 21 left electorate and replaced w/cohorts socialised when legal age = 18
(c) Estimated total effect = 4% decline in turnout
Franklin (2004)
79
The % of voters who identify as non-partisan has risen from ~30% to ~40% 1976-92
Dalton and Wattenberg (2002)
80
According to ..... and ..... (.....), the % of voters who identify as non-partisan has risen from .....% to .....% from ..... to .....
According to Dalton and Wattenberg (2002), the % of voters who identify as non-partisan has risen from ~30% to ~40% from 1976 to 1992
81
1. Data – 18 industrial democracies 1950-97
2. Nations w/reduced unionisation saw biggest avg. declines in turnout
3. 20% decline in union density (like that experienced by Netherlands) associated w/2.8% fall in turnout
4. Conclusion - only likely to explain small, but significant, part of turnout decline
Gray and Caul (2000)
82
Fisher and Marshall (2014)
1. Cross-national data from 23 OECD countries (1970-2007)
2. Strong support for constraint hypothesis (measured by foreign ownership), w/variable explaining over ½ of decline in turnout
3. Problem of spurious correlation - globalisation is a trending variable and so strongly correlated with any other trending variables in recent decades
83
Caren et al (2011)
US NON-CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION 1972-2008
1. Protest activity
(a) Cohort analysis shows baby boomers who grew up in 1960s (age of protest) much more likely to have participated in protest
(b) But little evidence of overall increase in likelihood of having ever protested
(c) no fundamental change in overall level of protest
2. Petition signing
(a) robust increase over time
84
Robust increase in petition signing over time in US
Caren et al (2011)
85
US protest activity 1972-2011:
(a) Cohort analysis shows baby boomers who grew up in 1960s (age of protest) much more likely to have participated in protest
(b) But little evidence of overall increase in likelihood of having ever protested
(c) no fundamental change in overall level of protest
Caren et al (2011)
86
Countries in which turnout NOT significantly changed in last 3/4 decades?
Malta and Denmark
87
Countries in which party membership significantly increased in last 3/4 decades?
Greece and Spain
88
Partisan dealignment had substantial impact on turnout decline in USA
Wattenberg (2000)
89
Reduced strength of party identification accounts well for long-term trend of turnout decline in Britain
Heath (2007)
90
Evidence that political party membership declined in recent decades
Political party membership declined ~1M in last 3 decades in UK and France, a 2/3 decline since 1980
91
Evidence on impact of voter facilitation rules on turnout
Meta-analysis - Smets et al (2013):
1. Mixed results
2. <50% 'success' rate in studies reviewed
92
How does compulsory voting increase turnout?
Sanctions increase costs of non-voting
93
Selected variables found to have consistent effect on turnout in 10% or more of studies (Smets et al 2013)
1. Education
2. Mobilisation
3. Vote in previous election
4. Party identification
5. Political interest
6. Political knowledge
94
Smets et al (2013)
1. How many articles do they survey?
2. How many independent variables are included within these articles?
3. How many variables were included within 100% of studies?
1. 90 articles
2. >170 independent variables
3. 0 included in all studies
95
Why might proportional electoral system boost turnout?
1. fewer wasted votes
| 2. more parties (so more likely to identify more strongly with a party and more parties will mobilise voters)
96
Why might majoritarian electoral system boost turnout?
1. more decisive outcomes (rather than coalitions under PR)
| 2. fewer parties (lower complexity and information costs)
97
Evidence that economic downturns have no effect of on turnout
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998)
98
Evidence that total protest activity fallen in recent decades in Britain
Biggs (2015)
1. Total protest activity fallen in recent decades
(a) after accounting for dramatic fall in strike activity
(b) demonstrations and boycotts increased, but strike activity = most significant % of overall activity
99
In Britain:
1. What types of protest activity have increased in recent decades?
2. What types have fallen?
Biggs (2015)
1. Demonstrations and boycotts increased
2. Strikes (the most significant % of total activity) fallen
100
Sorting model of education:
1. Education impacts political participation through social status
2. Social status determined by relative, not absolute, education
3. High education individuals exposed to social networks that encourage political participation and have more at stake in elections
Nie et al (1996)
101
Explain the sorting model of education
Nie et al (1996)
1. Education impacts political participation through social status
2. Social status determined by relative, not absolute, education
3. High education individuals exposed to social networks that encourage political participation and have more at stake in elections
102
Individual factors known to correlate w/participation all have social dimension
Campbell (2013)
103
1. Education might be correlated w/another variable that’s really driving relationship (e.g. cognitive ability, family background)
2. No clear consensus on mechanism
Persson (2013)
104
..... and ..... (.....)
1. Compulsory voting increases turnout .....%
2. PR increases turnout .....%
Blais and Carty (1990)
1. Compulsory voting increases turnout 10-15%
2. PR increases turnout 9-12%
105
..... (.....)
1. turnout decreases .....% when gap between 1st and 2nd parties increases by .....%
2. In ..... out of ..... studies reviewed, closeness of elections affects turnout
Blais (2006)
1. turnout decreases 1-2% when gap between 1st and 2nd parties increases by 10%
2. In 27/32 studies reviewed, closeness of elections affects turnout
106
1. Strong empirical support for developmental model of voting
2. Most people either voters/non-voters as habit
3. Strong role of inertia means turnout in 1st few eligible elections has large effect on turnout in subsequent elections
Plutzer (2002)
107
..... (.....)
(a) Lowering voting age already led to .....% fall in turnout in established democracies
(b) Effect on aggregate turnout not fully realised until .....
(c) Estimated total effect = .....% decline in turnout
Franklin (2004):
(a) Lowering voting age already led to 3% fall in turnout in established democracies
(b) Effect on aggregate turnout not fully realised until all cohorts socialised into voting when legal age = 21 left electorate and replaced w/cohorts socialised when legal age = 18
(c) Estimated total effect = 4% decline in turnout
108
Evidence that partisan dealignment partly explains declines in turnout
1. Heath (2007)
(i) Reduced strength of party identification accounts well for long-term trend of turnout decline in Britain
2. Wattenberg (2000)
(i) Partisan dealignment had substantial impact on turnout decline in USA
109
..... (.....)
1. Data – 18 industrial democracies from ..... to .....
2. Nations w/reduced unionisation saw biggest avg. declines in turnout
3. .....% decline in union density (like that experienced by .....) associated w/.....% fall in turnout
4. Conclusion - .....
Gray and Caul (2000)
1. Data – 18 industrial democracies 1950-97
2. Nations w/reduced unionisation saw biggest avg. declines in turnout
3. 20% decline in union density (like that experienced by Netherlands) associated w/2.8% fall in turnout
4. Conclusion - only likely to explain small, but significant, part of turnout decline
110
EFFECT OF INCOME ON PARTICIPATION
1. Test effect of plausibly random positive external income shock due to quasi-experimental government cash transfer scheme in US
2. Results – children in families receiving cash transfer more likely to vote as adults (even if parents didn’t vote), but adults no more likely to vote
3a. Causal mechanism (human capital) – children in families that received income transfers more likely to complete additional education
3b. Causal mechanism (social capital) – children in families that received income transfers less likely to move, improving ability of child to maintain meaningful social connections and increasing benefit to civic participation in community that they care about
Akee et al (2018)
111
QUASI-EXPERIMENT - EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON PARTICIPATION
1. Research design – exploit plausibly exogenous variation in education attainment following gradual roll-out of Swedish school reforms
2. Results – extended education increased turnout among low SES students
3. Causal mechanism – most likely to be driven by direct nature and content of education (i.e. skills + norms individuals learn at school)
Persson et al (2018)
112
Experimental evidence of the impact of education on politics participation
Persson et al (2018)
QUASI-EXPERIMENT - EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON PARTICIPATION
1. Research design – exploit plausibly exogenous variation in education attainment following gradual roll-out of Swedish school reforms
2. Results – extended education increased turnout among low SES students
3. Causal mechanism – most likely to be driven by direct nature and content of education (i.e. skills + norms individuals learn at school)
113
PARTIES MOBILISE HIGH INCOME/EDUCATION VOTERS
1. Citizens w/highest levels of income and education contacted by parties at much higher rates
2. Reason:
(a) Parties = rational actors and want to receive highest return on mobilising efforts
(b) Parties target individuals known to them (drawn from same social networks) and likely to participate
Grabarek (2011)
114
Why do parties mobilise high income/education voters?
Grabarek (2011)
1. Parties = rational actors and want to receive highest return on mobilising efforts
2. Parties target individuals known to them (drawn from same social networks) and likely to participate
115
Evidence that citizens with high income/education levels are contacted by parties at much higher rates
Grabarek (2011)
PARTIES MOBILISE HIGH INCOME/EDUCATION VOTERS
1. Citizens w/highest levels of income and education contacted by parties at much higher rates
2. Reason:
(a) Parties = rational actors and want to receive highest return on mobilising efforts
(b) Parties target individuals known to them (drawn from same social networks) and likely to participate
116
1. Working class consistently less likely to vote in Britain, but gap widened substantially in recent decades
2. Reason – fall in working-class turnout due to decrease in no. working-class Labour candidates
Heath (2016)
117
Powell (1986)
(a) Avg. 10% difference in turnout between most and least educated
(b) As high as 37% in Switzerland
118
Blais (2000)
KEY LIMITATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY:
1. No explanatory power for those w/strong sense of duty
(i) Vote out of moral obligation, not cost-benefit calculation
2. Limited explanatory power
(i) Costs/benefits do affect propensity to vote (e.g. closeness effects elections)
(ii) But effects weaker than model would predict
3. People don't interpret P term as model predicts
(i) Model says P = probability of casting decisive vote
(ii) Instead people think about vague feeling that their vote counts because election not a foregone conclusion
119
1. What does the P term in the rational choice voting model represent?
2. How does Blais (2000) argue it is really interpreted?
1. Model says P = probability of casting decisive vote
| 2. Instead people think about vague feeling that their vote counts because election not a foregone conclusion
120
Green and Shapiro (1994)
Problems with attempt to 'fix' rational choice model by including 'D' term:
1. Little attempt to weigh costs of voting against psychic benefits, so argument about balance of costs/benefits becomes tautological
2. Post hoc exogenous addition to model to avoid conclusion of irrationality
3. Unclear why civic duty would fluctuate between years, or different types of election
4. If civic duty explains voting, then how account for relative lack of letter writing to government officials and enthusiasm for jury service?
121
IMPACT OF WEATHER ON TURNOUT
1. Weather doesn’t affect odds of voting among those w/strong sense of civic duty, but does affect those w/o
2. Suggests more complex interaction between normative mindset and decision-making process
Knack (1994)
122
For whom does weather affect turnout? For whom does it not?
Knack (1994)
1. Weather doesn’t affect odds of voting among those w/strong sense of civic duty, but does affect those w/o
2. Suggests more complex interaction between normative mindset and decision-making process
123
1. For whom does weather affect turnout? For whom does it not?
2. What implication can be drawn from this?
Knack (1994)
1. Weather doesn’t affect odds of voting among those w/strong sense of civic duty, but does affect those w/o
2. Suggests more complex interaction between normative mindset and decision-making process
124
What are the problems with including a 'D' term in the rational choice model to avoid the paradox of voting?
Green and Shapiro (1994)
1. Little attempt to weigh costs of voting against psychic benefits, so argument about balance of costs/benefits becomes tautological
2. Post hoc exogenous addition to model to avoid conclusion of irrationality
3. Unclear why civic duty would fluctuate between years, or different types of election
4. If civic duty explains voting, then how account for relative lack of letter writing to government officials and enthusiasm for jury service?
125
Curtice (2016)
YOUNGER COHORTS LESS LIKELY TO VOTE IN BRITAIN
1. Turnout increases w/age and young esp. unlikely to vote
2. Cohort replacement effects seem to be stronger than life-cycle effects, indicating more recent cohorts less likely to vote
126
YOUNGER COHORTS LESS LIKELY TO VOTE IN BRITAIN
1. Turnout increases w/age and young esp. unlikely to vote
2. Cohort replacement effects seem to be stronger than life-cycle effects, indicating more recent cohorts less likely to vote
Curtice (2016)
127
Evidence that younger cohorts are less likely to vote in Britain?
Curtice (2016)
1. Turnout increases w/age and young esp. unlikely to vote
2. Cohort replacement effects seem to be stronger than life-cycle effects, indicating more recent cohorts less likely to vote
128
Counter-evidence to Blais and Rubenson's (2013) theory that turnout decreases partly due to lower sense of civic duty among younger voters?
In Britain, trends in sense of duty to vote not strongly correlated w/turnout change
129
1. EVIDENCE - turnout declines concentrated among young
2. EXPLANATION:
(i) Cohort replacement w/less civically minded cohorts
(ii) Turnout decreased disproportionately among those who don’t believe in duty to vote
3. PROBLEM – in Britain, trends in sense of duty to vote not strongly correlated w/turnout change
Blais and Rubenson (2013)
130
Biggs and Kawalerowicz (2015)
Participants in 2011 London riots = economically deprived and most likely to come from:
(i) Economically disadvantaged areas
(ii) Areas w/high ethnic fractionalisation
131
Participants in 2011 London riots = economically deprived and most likely to come from:
(i) Economically disadvantaged areas
(ii) Areas w/high ethnic fractionalisation
Biggs and Kawalerowicz (2015)
132
Evidence of characteristics of participants in 2011 London riots?
Biggs and Kawalerowicz (2015)
Participants in 2011 London riots = economically deprived and most likely to come from:
(i) Economically disadvantaged areas
(ii) Areas w/high ethnic fractionalisation
133
Causality problem with evidence that political discussion correlated with political participation?
Those w/pre-existing propensity to participate may seek out social networks in which political discussions more frequent
