Week 2 Flashcards
Hazard vs Risk
Hazard
is the potenital to cause / A hazard is something with the potential to cause harm
(e.g. when crossing a road cars are a hazard)
Risk
= likelihood x consequences
-> something additional (heavy machine is moving around) -> risk a person is in front of the machine, the driver can’t see the person
is the likelihood (probability) of harm taking place
(e.g. when crossing a highway, the risk of an accident) /
Types of hazard
- physical hazards -> e.g. someone falls form a roof
- chemical hazards -> substances
- biological hazards -> substances
- psychological hazards -> hunman are getting sick because of stress
- environmental hazards
Hazard of a container ship
- Weather
- collision
- human error
- technical issue
- grownding
Formula risk
Risk = likelihood x consequences
Hazard Switzerland
- Cyber
- Energy crisis
- Business interruption (e.g. Gotthard tunnel, war)
The impact of the energy crisis is a new risk entry and a core concern for firms.
Hazard Germany
- Business interruption
- Cyber
- Energy crisis
Business interruption remains the top ris, while firms are also worried about the energy crisis.
Hazard Australia
- Natural catastrophe
- Business interruption
- Climate change
Natural catastrophe is the new top risk, drivne by events such as flooding, which resultetd in the country’s costliest-ever natural catastrophe
Classifaction
Diversifiable Risk
* fire / flooding -> diversifiable
Undiversifiable Risk (e.g. inflation)
Pure risk vs Speculative Risk
Pure risk
* can only be negative (property risk)
* Property risk, people risk
Speculative risk
* coud be a positive and negative risk
* economic / market
Difference between
* Hazard riks
* Operational risk
* Financial risk
* Strategic risk
Hazard risk
Arises from property, liability or peronnel losss exposure
* fire, never positive
Operational risk
Arises form people, processe, systems or controls
* cyber attack
Financial risk
Arises form the effect of market forces on financial assets or liabilities
* change in electricity prices -> could be positive and negative
Strategic risk
Arises form trends in the economy and socitey
* missing a trend -> could be positive, only a hype
Analytical Tools and Statistics in Risk Management
Measuring the effectiveness of risk prevention measures
We rarely can link safety decisions to individuals / specific accidents, However, we often can get aggregate results
-> Seatbelts saved an estimated 14,955 lives in the United States in 2017
Except when we can’t:
Antilock brakes (ABS) have zero net effect on fatal crashes, people think they can drive faster because the breaks are better
And sometimes the data are misleading:
since the introduction of steel helmets the number of head injuries has increased considerably … because before their introduction many of
those injured were killed outright
–> are we looking at the right thing
Bow tie analysis
- what happens when we lost control and the hazard is releast -> what will happen then
- left side: threats -> how can we prevent this?
- rigt side: Cosequences -> how do we limit the extend of the consequences?
Delphi method
we ask different experts one questions, then we write a factsheet and distribute this to everyone, but they don’t know which statement is from wich person -> Anonimity to avoid group dynamics
How to avoid a catastrophe?
-> near misses
Near misses
There are often unremarked small failures that permeate day-to-day business but cause no immediate harm. People are hardwired to missinterpret or ignore the warning embedded in these failures.
Multiple near misses preceded every disaster and business crisis we studied and most of the misses were ignored and missread.
How to avoid a catastrophe?
-> Cognitive biases conspire blind manager to the near misses
Normalization of deviance (Abweichungen)
* the tendency over time to accept anomalies (Unregelmässigkeiten)
Outcome bias
* When people observe successful outcomes, they tend to focus on the results more than on the complex processes that led to them. Whenn people observe a successful outcome, their natural tendency is to assume that the process that led to it was fundamentally sound, even when it demonstrably wansn’t.