Voting Behaviour Flashcards
state social factors and demographic factors that influence voting behaviour
- social class
- region
- gender
- age
- ethnicity
but many other factors can be influential
What is the popular misconception of working class voters and middle and upper class voters?
the popular misconception that the working class (WC) always vote Labour and the middle class (MC) and upper class (UC) are invariably Conservative. Like any misconception, there is an element of truth in this. Up until the late 1960s, possibly as many as 80% of people voted the way their social class indicated. From 1945 until 1970, general elections were defined by the effectiveness with which the Labour and Conservative parties succeeded in mobilizing their core support. The Conservatives generally relied on the support of A, B and C1 voters, with Labour’s core support among C2, D and E voters. In the 1964 general election, Labour’s Harold Wilson won 64% of the votes of DE voters, while the Conservative PM, Alec Douglas-Home, won 78% of the support of the AB voters.
How were elections defined from 1945 to 1970?
. From 1945 until 1970, general elections were defined by the effectiveness with which the Labour and Conservative parties succeeded in mobilizing their core support. The Conservatives generally relied on the support of A, B and C1 voters, with Labour’s core support among C2, D and E voters. In the 1964 general election, Labour’s Harold Wilson won 64% of the votes of DE voters, while the Conservative PM, Alec Douglas-Home, won 78% of the support of the AB voters. A close link between class and party support is often described as voting attachment.
Explain the social class composition
Social Class Composition: CLASS - COMPOSITION AND DESCRIPTION A - Higher managerial & managerial (judges, top civil servants, doctors, company directors) Upper middle class
B -
Middle managers & professionals (teachers, lawyers, accountants, social workers)
Middle class
C1 -
Clerical workers, junior managerial roles, shop owners
Lower middle class
C2 - Skilled workers (builders, electricians, hairdressers)
Aspirational working class
D -
Semi-skilled & unskilled workers (labourer, bar staff, call centre staff)
Working class
E -
Lowest grade jobs, casual workers, long-term unemployed, pension dependent elderly
Lower working class
State and explain reasons why class used to be closely associated with voting trends
- The way people voted was part of their class identity. To be MC or UC was to be conservative and voting for this party added to your status, to be WC meant you would support the party of the WC and voting Labour expressed your class solidarity.
- Both major parties developed strong, deep roots within communities, so there was a culture of voting for one party or another. The wealthy commuter belt around London, for example, was steeped in Conservative values while the poorer east of London had a strong sense of being a Labour-led community. Such roots were strengthened by Labour’s associations with strong trade unions.
- There was a selfish reason. The CP was perceived to govern more in the interests of the MC and the better off, while the LP developed policies to help the WC and the poor. It was therefore rational to choose the party associated with your class.
Explain the impact of class on voting in the 2016 EU referendum
AB - 43% voted leave
C1 - 51% voted leave
C2 - 64% voted leave
DE - 64% voted leave
As can be seen above, the WC, made up of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers and lower income groups were more likely to vote Leave. This accords with the tendency of these groups to support UKIP, which was not a surprising conclusion. We do however, have to treat this with caution. It may well be that these voting trends were not due to class but were issue based. In other words, those in social class groups C2, D and E believe that they have been the most disadvantaged by EU membership, in particular the perceived adverse effect on employment and wages created by free movement of workers within the EU. Thus, support for UKIP and the Leave campaign may be less a case of class voting and more a reflection of instrumental voting: voting behaviour which is motivated by self-interest – where people favour a party that they believe will do most good for themselves through its policies.
What has facilitated the decline in class-based voting?
The outcomes of general elections are however, influenced by a variety of other factors and it would be simplistic to argue that the public can always be relied on to vote according to class-based allegiance. The decline of class-based voting is known as partisan dealignment and since the 1970s, the results of general elections have often been determined by striking examples of voting based on the government’s competence (valence) and the salience (importance) of specific issues rather than according to class.
How did Thatcher overcome class barriers in the 1979 election?
since the 1970s, the results of general elections have often been determined by striking examples of voting based on the government’s competence (valence) and the salience (importance) of specific issues rather than according to class.
For example, in the 1979 general election, Margaret Thatcher startled political commentators by launching the Conservative campaign in Labour-supported Cardiff. This was a clever attempt to disassociate the party from being too MC. The campaign’s resulting focus on controlling inflation and confronting trade union power following the excessive number of strikes during the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ was so popular that there was an 11% swing to the Conservatives by C2 voters and a 9% swing by DE voters. Thatcher won three general elections (1979, 1983 and 1987) with significant amounts of WC support.
Explain how Tony blair overcame class barriers in the 1997 election
Like Thatcher, Tony Blair was highly successful at broadening Labour’s appeal far beyond its core support. He increased Labour’s share of the vote in all social categories, as well as winning a majority of support in all age groups with the progressive appeal of New Labour.
Explain how Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa May made dramatic inroads and gains into different class categories?
In the 2017 general election, Jeremy Corbyn made dramatic inroads into the AB social category doing unexpectedly well in prosperous MC seats, some of which, like Canterbury, had never returned a Labour MP, while Theresa May made striking gains among DE voters in traditional WC seats. This was largely due to pro-Europeans in higher social classes wanting to punish the Conservatives for Brexit by voting Labour, while large numbers of DE voters felt the Conservatives would be more likely to deliver Brexit and control Immigration.
How is class voting complicated by smaller parties or nationalist parties
The question of whether we vote according to our social class is further complicated by the reasons why voters of all classes might choose to vote for the Liberal Democrats and nationalist parties. The variations within social classes highlighted in the table on class composition, further demonstrate why it is so important to avoid generalisations when examining voting trends. Indeed, the more one studies voting behaviour, the more one appreciates that the reasons why we vote as we do are determined by a vast range of rational and possibly even irrational factors. This means that the political battle at election time, is often largely fought among two types of voter: those whose class identity is not clear and those who do vote the way their class characteristics indicated that they might. The latter group are known as deviant voters because it is difficult to predict how they will vote. Similarly, floating voters tend to vote unpredictably and are liable to change the way they vote fairly often
What type of voters are elections are largely fought over and explain what these type of voters are
This means that the political battle at election time, is often largely fought among two types of voter: those whose class identity is not clear and those who do vote the way their class characteristics indicated that they might. The latter group are known as deviant voters because it is difficult to predict how they will vote. Similarly, floating voters tend to vote unpredictably and are liable to change the way they vote fairly often
Has class voting completely disappeared?
In recent years it is clear class voting has declined noticeably. This is not to say it has disappeared, but it is certainly less pronounced. As illustrated in patterns of voting behaviour for Labour by those in class DE and the link between class AB and Conservative voting:
1964 - 61% of DE voting for labour
2015 - 41% of DE voting labour
2017 - 59% of DE voting labour
1964 - 78% of AB voting conservative
2015 - 45% of AB voting conservative
2017 - 43% of AB voting for conservative
- In 1964, as expected, 64% of class DE voted for Labour.
- There is still a tendency of up to a third of the old WC to vote Conservative, but the correlation between class and voting remains strong.
- ‘Deviant’ Conservative support among the WC was understood to be the result of a factor known as deference. This is a tendency for some members of this class to defer to or respect those whom they considered to be their superiors – i.e. members of the UC and MC who were perceived to be Conservatives.
- Some lower MC and some WC voters aspired to be MC and so vote Conservative as evidence of their aspiration.
- The correlation between class AB and Conservative voting has always been strong, there have been fewer deviant voters in this class.
Explain the decline in certain classes voting for conservative and labour
Nevertheless, the decline has been marked, falling from 78% voting Conservative in 1964 to only 40% in 2010, with a small recovery in 2015 and 2017. To some extent this was reflection of New Labour’s achievement in attracting MC support away from the Conservatives, but the decline in class-based voting habits has deeper roots. Among the causes of the decline are the following factors:
- A trend known as class dealignment has been important. This is a tendency for progressively fewer people to define themselves in terms of their class or consider themselves a particular class – suggesting that social class has declined in its importance in UK culture and has less of an impact on voting behaviour.
- The main parties, including the Liberal Democrats, have tended, especially after the 1980s, to adopt policies which are centrist and consensual and can therefore appeal to a wider class base, largely in the centre of society.
- There has been a rise in the influence of other factors, notably valence (competence voting). This has tended to replace social class as a key factor in voting behaviour.
evidence supporting class based voting behaviour
- deference - wc may vote conservative as they perceive them as their superiors due to them being MC or UC
- some may vote based on aspirations e.g lower MC and some WC wanting to be MC so vote conservative
- AB have always voted conservative as there are fewer deviant voters or aspirational voters
- people may vote according to their class identity and class solidarity
- parties having deep roots in communities e,g wc and poor communities so likely to vote labour and may be apart of trade unions so vote labour
evidence againist class based voting behaviour
- class dealignment - people tend to no longer define themselves in terms of class or consider themselves a particular class
- valence - people vote depending if they believe the government is competent
- more parties adopting centrist policies, so they appeal to everyone rather than social class
- deviant voters and floating voters have emerged - they tend to be unpredictable in their support or switch parties each election
- instrumental voting
- partisan dealignment
Explain how the ethnicity can be influential determiner on voting behaviour
The impact of ethnicity in determining voting behaviour is significant. As data illustrates, among BME (black and minority ethnic) groups, there is a strong bias against the conservatives and towards Labour. The bias towards the LP is clear and consistent:
1997 - 18% of BME voted conservative
70% of BME voted labour
9% of BME voted liberal democrat
2015 - 23% BME voted conservative
65% BME voted labour
4% of BME voted labour
2017 - 21% BME voted conservative
65% BME voted labour
6% of BME voted labour
What is the historic connection between BME voting labour
Historically, since Commonwealth immigrant communities were generally within the C2, D and E classes, they were more likely to vote Labour because of its high spending on the welfare state and close association with the trade union movement. Therefore, the answer to why the BME community favour Labour is closely linked to socio-economic factors and a greater likelihood that members will be more likely to hold left-wing preferences. This suggests that the relevant factor here, is class and income, not ethnicity. The commitment that the LP has shown towards multiculturalism and the way in which Labour introduced the first Race Relations Act in 1965, 1968 and 1976 to outlaw discrimination have further provided it with a strong historical connection with immigrant communities. Conversely, the influence of Enoch Powell, whose ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968 called for an end to Commonwealth immigration – has led to a hostile legacy between the CP and immigrant communities.
In the 2017 general election which party leader were more successful with BAME groups
In the 2017 general election, Jeremy Corbyn’s strong empathy for BME groups contributed to Labour winning 49 of the 73 seats in Greater London, which has a population of just 45% white British. The result in East Ham, which has a non-white population of 77%, making it the most ethnically diverse constituency in the UK, is particularly revealing with Labour gaining 83.2% share of the vote compared to the Conservatives, with 12.8% (UKIP gained 1.2%). The Conservatives, on the other hand, held just five of the 75 most ethnically diverse constituencies in the UK in the 2017 general election.
Is the pattern of BAME groups voting labour changing? Is this pattern because of ethnicity or other factors?
, British Future, a think tank that studies attitudes towards migration and ethnicity. It suggests that the ethnic bias towards the Conservatives may be waning. Indeed, research suggests that a majority of the Hindu and Sikh community now support the CP. These well-established groups have prospered more than black and Muslim populations and so are becoming increasingly MC – with MC status comes support for the CP. Whereas, black communities and Muslims continue to support the LP in large numbers. British Future also reports that the black population is the most likely group to favour Labour. These links support the socio-economic argument that it is primarily social class and not ethnicity that is the key factor influencing voting behaviour
How has age been influential on voting behaviour?
The influence on age and voting behavior is significant. There is a strong correlation between party support and age. The Conservative Party’s support is strongest among older voters, while the Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties have generally won the support of younger voters.
1997 election
voters aged: 55-64 - 47% voted conservative
whereas voters age 18-24 - 41% voted labour
1997 election -
55-64 and 65+ - 36% voted conservative
whereas
18-24 and 25-34 voted labour
2017 election -
65+ - 59% voted conservative
18-24 - 67% voted labour
2019 election
65+ - 67% voted conservative
18-24 - 56% voted labour
state possible factors for the relationship between age and voting behaviour
. Younger people do not wish to be seen as ‘conservative’ in the more general sense of the word and voting for the CP might be a symptom of that emotion.
. There is a tendency for the young to hold more left-wing views – this may be the result of a heightened interest in ideas such as inequality, social justice and freedom, more associated with the LP, the LDs and the Green Party (GP) than the CP.
. It is alleged that Winston Churchill once commented, ‘If a man is not socialist by the time he is 20, he has no heart. If he is not Conservative by the time he is 40, he has no brain.’ This remark suggests that young voters are emotional and older voters are more rational.
. Perhaps it is more compelling to suggest that younger people have fewer responsibilities and can therefore indulge in more outward-looking ideas, whereas in later life the responsibilities of a career, a family and property ownership may lead to more cautious views. The older generation may see the Conservatives as the party that is more family friendly, more security conscious and more sympathetic to property owners. It has traditionally emphasised policies which appeal more to older voters, such as low taxation, strong national defence, law and order and in recent years, has been significantly more Eurosceptic than the LP and the LDs. These policies tend to have a particular appeal to older property-owning voters, who tend to favour security and stability and, having more financial responsibilities and savings than younger voters, are keen for their taxes to be kept as low as possible. In the 2017 general election, for example, older people who had paid off their mortgages were significantly more likely to vote Conservative, while younger people who rented were much more likely to vote Labour.
. Voting by the young for what may be described as ‘radical’ parties is more understandable. The young tend to adopt more radical ideas, for example about environmental protection, social justice and democratic reform. The table shows a small bias among younger groups to the LDs, but a more dramatic illustration can be seen in the link between age and likelihood of voting for the GP. Voting for the GP increases markedly with younger age categories. In 2015, 8% of voters aged 18-24 voted Green, but only 2% of the 65+ range – a 400% difference. The GP are a left-wing party on many issues, not just environmental.
. To reinforce the link between radicalism and the young, it has been noted that a large proportion of new members of the LP in 2015-16, most of whom joined to support Jeremy Corbyn, were young voters.
. The SNP is radical in one respect – its support for Scottish independence – but generally it can be seen as a moderate left-wing party. In the 2015 general election, there was an age effect, though less dramatic than that for Green voting, with 5.5% of voters aged 18-24 voting for the SNP, compared to 3.1% of the 65+ range. In the 2014 Scottish referendum, 71% of the new 16-17 year-old voters voted in favour of independence compared to only 27% of the 65+ category.
state any criticisms of the possible factors for the relationship between age and voting behaviour
- age may not be a determining factor but more linked to the economic situation of each generation or the voter as young people still have some financial responsibility and may vote for parties that better their economic situation old or young
- different patterns may emerge if they see welfare better
- older people may hold more radical ideas as seen with populist parties
- more traditional for generations - so changes with each generation
In relation to electoral success which parties have benefitted from support linked to age and is this changing?
In terms of electoral success, the CP has historically benefitted from the greater support that it has among older people because older people are more likely to vote. Younger people may be attracted to radical ideas but are less likely to vote, so providing the CP with an inbuilt advantage. However, in the 2017 general election, Jeremy Corbyn’s youth-focused campaign; pledging to abolish tuition fees and his idealistic commitment to resolving world problems through international organisations such as the UN, did encourage more young people to vote than any general election since 1992, but even in 2017 there was still a significant imbalance with older voters more likely to cast their ballots. As the data below illustrates, the tendency of older people to vote in larger numbers than younger voters favours the CP, as does the growing age of the UK’s population.
18-24 years olds - 5% of the proportion of UK population - 54% voted in the 2017 general election
65+ - 18% of the proportion of Uk population - 71% voted in the 2017 general election
Both the LP and the CP have been at their most successful when they have been able to reach beyond their core age support. In 1997, for example, the LP achieved a 5% lead over the CP among voters aged 65+, helping Blair to his landslide victory, while Thatcher’s 1979 victory, the CP achieved a 1% lead over the LP among 18-24 year-olds.
State areas by region which give support to certain parties in the 2017 general election
CONSERVATIVE PARTY:
South England - 54% voted conservative
Midlands - 50%
LABOUR PARTY REGIONS:
North East - 53%
London - 55%
Liberal democrat:
South England - 11%
SNP -
Scotland - 37%
Plaid Cymru -
10% - Wales
How is region influential in voting behaviour
, all of the national parties can claim a significant concentration of support in certain parts of the country. In every general election, the majority of seats do not change hands, because of the inbuilt majority that a party has in a particular region. Even though the 2017 general election was highly volatile, only 71 out of 650 seats changed hands – just 11% of the total number. As a general rule, the industrial north is more likely to vote Labour and the south, Conservative.
state key patterns between region and voting behaviour
Key patterns between region and voting behaviour can be identified:
- The south of England, particularly the South East, is the most prosperous region in the UK, with high levels of home ownership and little tradition of heavy industrial trade unionism. The Conservatives do disproportionately well here. The ethnically white rural parts of the UK are also classic Conservative territory, whether this is East Anglia, Devon, Cumbria or Northumberland.
- The Conservatives are also dominant in the Midlands, though slightly less so than in the South.
- Labour leads in the north of England, but this is no longer a decisive lead. They dominate ethnically diverse big cities with large WC populations and major centres of industrial production such as South Wales, Merseyside, Greater Manchester and Tyne and Wear
- Scotland has moved from being a Labour stronghold before 2010, to being dominated by the SNP and then returning to a three-party contest in 2017.
- Until 2015 Wales was not dominated by any one party, but there was genuine competition between four parties there. However, Labour dominates after 2017.
- Liberal Democrats have little support outside of London and the south of England. They fare disproportionately badly out of the UK’s FPTP electoral system, because they have fewer areas of concentrated support. However, they do have some heartlands: the South West, rural Wales and the far north of Scotland – where there is a long tradition of small-scale non-conformist artisans who do not identify with either of the main political parties. Since 1950, Orkney and Shetland, for example, has always returned a Liberal/LD MP to Westminster.
How are regional variations influential in party success?
There is a sense that the LP does have deep roots and strong local party organisations in the north of England and in Wales, so it is inevitable that the party will poll well in those regions. Similarly, voting for the CP in the south of England is understandable because, in rural and suburban area, the Conservatives have long dominated the political culture. These regional variations are, therefore, real factors. In other words, regional variations in voting behavior, may in fact be class variations rather than geographical ones. Wealth, income and prosperity are not evenly distributed in the UK. The southeast is much wealthier than the rest of England. There are many more depressed, deprived and declining areas in the north, South Wales and Scotland, as well as several decayed city centres and areas where traditional industries have declined. It would be surprising, therefore, if such areas did not favour left-wing policies proposed by Labour (though in 2015, the SNP took advantage of the Scottish situation, taking over from Labour as the entrenched party). The key point here, is therefore, is that much of the regional variation in voting behavior can be traced to economic rather than regional influences
Explain key battlegrounds for parties that help to decide the results of general elections
The key battlegrounds which have disproportionately decided the result of general elections have generally been London and the Midlands, where Labour and Conservatives have focused their resources on winning in key marginal seats. However, recent general elections have challenged a number of accepted principles of regional voting behavior. A number of surprise constituency results in 2017 suggests that voter dealignment is challenging the traditional dominance of political parties in certain regions. The CPs association with Brexit and their stricter controls on immigration provided them with unexpected victories in traditional WC seats such as Mansfield, which had been Labour since 1923. Conversely, Labour’s more cosmopolitan outlook and more consistent opposition to Brexit in the EU referendum enabled it to win seats like Canterbury, which had been Conservative since 1918. Therefore, voter dealignment is influencing both class and regional voting as the public increasingly votes according to issues rather than traditional loyalties.
How has voter dealignment be seen in scotland
Scotland:
The industrial areas of Scotland traditionally provided Labour with large parliamentary support, while the Conservatives, Liberals/Liberal Democrats and the SNP gained significantly fewer seats. Indeed, so unpopular had the CP become in Scotland that they won no seats there in the 1997 general election. However, the way in which the SNP has become the largest party at Holyrood, and ran such a high-profile independence campaign during the 2014 referendum, has completely changed the political landscape of Scotland.
In the 2015 general election, the SNP won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster. The 2017 general election then provided another shock, with the Conservatives, under the leadership of Ruth Davison, won 13 seats to become the second biggest Scottish party. This highlights just how unstable and unpredictable Scottish politics has become during recent general elections.
How has voter dealignment reflect in key battlegrounds like London
London:
The soaring cost of home ownership, as well as dramatic levels of inequality have significantly damaged the CP’s fortunes in Greater London. The way in which the capital voted decisively to Remain in the 2016 EU referendum has further damaged the CP in London since voters associated it most closely with Euroscepticism. The multicultural and metropolitan values that Labour espouses have further entrenched its support in the capital. In the 2017 general election, Labour secured 49 seats in London, compared to 21 for the CP and 3 for the LDs.
Evaluate the significance of region in voting behaviour in the UK - evidence to support the statement
- the south of england, south east most prosperous region in the Uk, high level of home ownership and little tradition of unionism - they are more likely to vote conservative
- strongholds of political parties can determine success as strong core support
- strong roots and connections
- some areas still have deep rooted concentration and support for parties
- scotland more likely to vote SNP
- metropolitan/diverse cities have labour support as they have large working class populations - however closer analysis does show that it relates to ethnicity and class rather than region
Evaluate the significance of region in voting behaviour in the uk - evidence againist
- economic and social class can link more than region as seen in 2019 election where there has been a changed link and parties losing their strongholds
- voter dealignment
- instrumental voting regions may not stay loyal always to their roots as seen with Brexit
- economic and class background - north - deprived and south - wealthier
- significance of region may look like region but more economic and class based
Explain the impact of education on voting behaviour
The impact of education on determining voting behavior significantly changed in the 2017 general election. Those with higher educational qualifications comprise the top social brackets and have traditionally been more likely to vote for the CP.
However, in 2017, there was a change in voting patterns, with the CP increasing their support among those in the lowest social classes with fewest educational qualifications and Labour achieving higher levels of support among those with degrees in the top brackets. This unusual result may be an anomaly. However, it may also be part of a long-term trend in which the CP have closely aligned themselves with stricter controls on immigration, thereby increasing their support among white WC voters who feel threatened by globalization and so decisively voted Brexit in the 2016 referendum.
Conversely, Labour’s more liberal approach to immigration and its more nuanced approach to Brexit have dramatically increased its support among better educated more cosmopolitan voters who voted Remain and have been dismayed by what they see as Conservative insularity.
What does Goodhart state about voting behaviour in relation to education
In ‘The Road to Somewhere’ (2017) Goodhart, has contrasted the less educated ‘somewheres’, who are rooted to their communities through lack of opportunities, with the better educated ‘anywheres’, who have the educational qualifications to take advantage of globalisation. According to Goodhart, in 2017, it seemed as though Labour generated much increased support among the ‘anywheres’, while the Conservatives achieved their own breakthrough with the ‘somewheres’.
state with example the significance of higher educational qualifications in the 2017 general election
Degree or higher - 48% voted labour whereas 33% voted conservative
Other qualifications - 39% voted labour whereas 46% voted conservative
No qualifications - 35% voted labour and 52% voted conservative
Explain how political parties slowly started to articulate to the concerns of women and men
From 1945 until the 1980s political parties attempted to gain the ‘housewives’ vote’ by articulating women’s concerns with family issues. However, as men and women increasingly play similar roles in the family and the workplace, this has become less relevant. Gender is not a relevant factor in voting behavior or determining the result of general elections. However, statistics reveal that there is virtually no difference between the way males and females typically vote
Is voting behaviour gendered?
Clearly voting is not gendered. Furthermore, there is no noticeable trend in the comparative figures over the 23 years shown. However, although the overall gap is minimal, in the 2017 general election it was striking that among 18-24 year-old voters, just 18% of women voted Conservative and 73% voted Labour, whereas 36% of men in this age group voted Conservative and 52% Labour. However, this imbalance is not reflected in previous recent elections and shows the interplay between two demographic factors of gender with age.
Over a longer period, there is a slightly tendency for more women to vote Labour than men, but it is highly variable and not statistically very significant. The gender of the PM does not seem to be significant, as illustrated in figures for 2017 when Theresa May was leader of the CP in the table above – it did not lead to more women voting for the CP. The figures below show that when Margaret Thatcher was the leader of the CP – the first female leader of a political party in the UK, more women voted for her in 1979 but by 1987, her female share of the vote had declined.
Are elections continued to be influenced by social and demographic factors or are their other factors significant?
Although social and demographic factors are significant when explaining voter choice, partisan dealignment has resulted in the political context in which a general election is held, to be of increasing importance. Reflecting a decline of traditional voting loyalties, the electorate increasingly make decisions based on a number of judgements about the governing and opposition parties – reflecting what is important to them.
Electoral judgements are increasingly based on the competency and effectiveness of the government and are called valence factors. With the decline of class-based voting, valence factors become more significant in determining the result of a general election.
explain valence
VALENCE:
The electorate make decisions based on the competency of parties – they make a valence judgement based on a number of valence issues
state factors that impact on individual voting in relation to valence
- Governing competency
- Manifesto
- Campaign
- Leadership
Summarise valence
Valence can be summed up as follows:
How generally competent was the previous government and how competent do voters think other parties would be in government?
How economically competent was the government and are other parties likely to be?
Is the manifesto and campaign realistic, achievable and appealing?
Are they led by a dominant decisive leader with a good record as a politician?
These valence issues are also connected to how united a party is. It is often said that a disunited party has no chance of winning a general election as voters dislike this division and uncertainty.
Leading political analyst Peter Kellner (2012) summed up valence by stating:
‘Millions of voters don’t take a strong view on individual issues, they take a valence view of politics. They judge parties and politicians, not on their manifestos, but on their character. Are they competent? Honest? Strong in crisis? Likely to keep promises?’
Explain the valence factor of governing competence
GOVERNING COMPETENCE:
Most political commentators today argue that valence is the most important predictor of voting behaviour, particularly with the emergence of partisan dealignment. It can be contrasted with positional voting where voters choose a party based on its position on one or a group of issues, such as which party will cut taxes or which will spend the most on education or the NHS?
As well as general competence, voters pay special attention to economic competence. This includes how well they believe a party will manage the UK economy and how well they believe it has done so in the past. This may be described as judgements about governing competence – who will be most responsible with the taxpayers’ money? Who will do most to spread wealth or promote growth? This can sometimes be described as economic voting and it is a powerful influence on voting behaviour. Voters will look at the performance of the UK economy and decide which party has done the most to improve it and which has damaged it in the past. For example, after the economic crisis from 2008, Labour was blamed by many voters for allowing government debt to rise to an extremely high rate – Labour defeats in 2010 and 2015 were based partly on such economic voting. Whereas in contrast, the Conservative Party has an image of fiscal responsibility and good management – in 2016 the chancellor of the exchequer, Philip Hammond, stated he would manage the economy on a ‘pragmatic’ basis, so people could feel confident about his competence
Explain the valence factor of manifesto
THE MANIFESTO:
In its manifesto, a political party will explain the policies upon which it will govern. It is unlikely that voters will engage with all the elements of a manifesto, however it is important that it is carefully composed since particular policies may help swing the result, while unpopular or confusing ones could undermine a campaign.
Two examples demonstrate the influence of a party’s manifesto and how the electorate made judgements based on its competence: 1. In 1987 the LP manifesto did not commit to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. This enabled the CP to claim that Labour could not be trusted on defence, their campaign posting boldly stating ‘LABOUR’S POLICY ON ARMS’ next to an image of a surrendering soldier. 2. The 1992 Labour manifesto commitment to increase public spending allowed the CP to claim successfully that a Labour government would mean a ‘tax bombshell’ for every family.
On both occasions, the Labour manifesto helped contribute to the CP victory. However, in 2017 the CP’s manifesto pledged that if elderly people receiving NHS care at home had assets of more than £100,000 then the excess would contribute to the cost of care after death. The plan was supposed to provide a fairer system of care but was quickly labelled a ‘dementia tax’ by the press and the CP campaign stalled as it became embroiled in defending the policy. Meanwhile, Labour’s manifesto commitment to abolish tuition fees boosted votes the from young and first-time voters, while its promise of an end to austerity and the introduction of higher taxes for the top 5% of the population had broad appeal.
Explain the valence factor of leadership
LEADERSHIP:
As voters have become more prepared to vote imaginatively rather than according to their social class, the image that the party leader projects and their public perception has become increasingly important. At a GE, voters are choosing a future PM as well as a ruling party and a local MP. Some PMs have been able to win convincingly largely because they were able to present themselves as competent leaders. Therefore, the image and qualities of party leaders are a key factor impacting on voting behaviour. The qualities that the public normally cite as important in a leader include:
- Honesty and integrity
- decisiveness
- accountability - can be held accountable
- charismatic (personality) - likeability
- clear vision, public speaking skills and compassion
The media would certainly have us believe that the character and image of party leaders are vital in the outcome of elections. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Writing on the BBC website before the 2015 general election, professor of politics at Oxford University, Archie Brown stated that the idea that party leaders can win or lose elections is rarely true and that the personality of the leader is only significant if it is an extremely close-run race. He argued that it isn’t uncommon for the party with the less popular leader to win an election – using the 1979 general election as an example, where the Labour PM James Callaghan, despite being 20% ahead in popularity polls – lost the election. Similarly, in the 2010 GE, Nick Clegg was the most popular leader following impressive showings in televised leadership debates, but his party’s share of the vote fell by 1% and the LDs lost 5 of its parliamentary seats.
Is there conflicting evidence to show that the popularity of a party leader swings elections?
Conflicting evidence: However, there appears to be some evidence that the popularity of party leaders do swing elections: Cameron had the best poll rating in the 2015 GE and his party won. However, closer analysis reveals that despite this victory, the LP’s vote rose more than the CP’s vote, 1.5% to 0.8% when Miliband was far less popular. Furthermore, Nigel Farage was the least popular of all the leaders and yet UKIP’s share of the vote shot up by 9.5%. Nevertheless, during the 2017 GE a remarkable phenomenon occurred. Starting the campaign as the underdog, reviled by much of the press, opposed by many of his own MPs and unpopular among voters, Jeremy Corbyn created a bandwagon effect, mostly among the young. There is little doubt that his resurgence was a major influence on the outcome of that election and the Labour revival which increased the LP share of the vote by 9.6% - leadership can make a difference
Explain the valence factor of election campaign
ELECTION CAMPAIGN:
During the actual campaign leading to an election, party activity becomes more intense and much effort, political skill and professionalism is used to convey the party message and convey governing competence. Although the actual campaign must last as atleast three weeks it usually goes on for four or more. The national campaign is designed to: (a) reinforce the views of those who are committed to the party, (b) recruit the genuinely undecided and (c) convert the waverers in other parties. The local campaign is still important in marginal constituencies where a small number of votes can change party control. Here, the purpose to get out the maximum vote, by speech making, canvassing and organising portal voting. The key debate is whether campaigns influence the result of a general election
State FOR arguments for the question: Do campaigns influence the result of a general election
FOR:
- Although some campaigns simply reinforce existing attitudes, others may challenge them. The growth of partisan dealignment suggests campaigns do increasingly matter as voters are much more volatile. Parties are keen to target these voters with their message
- In the 1974, the liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe was able to exploit widespread discontentment with Edward Heath and Harold Wilson and increased the liberal share by 11.8%
- In 1992, John Major’s decision to abandon stage-managed events and take his soap box to town centres changed the dynamic of the campaign and handed the conservatives and unexpected victory
- In 2010, Nick Clegg’s impressive performance on televised debates, lead to their role in a coalition government
- In 2017, Jeremy Corbyn’s optimistic rallies and popular manifesto commitments contrasted sharply with May’s uninspiring campaign appearances. Labour dramatically increased is support from 30% at the beginning of the campaign to 40% in the election
State AGAINIST arguments for the question ‘Do campaigns influence the result of a general election;?
NO:
- Some political commentators argue that the influence of a campaign is exaggerated as most voters have decided how they are going to vote in advance
- In the 1950s and 60s, the class allegiance that parties could depend on meant that campaigns made little difference. Even some modern campaigns have little impact on people’s voting intentions
- Harold Wilson’s presidential campaign in 1964 was designed to make him appeal to voters as a British John. F Kennedy, but it only led to a 0.2% increase in labour share of the vote
- In 1970, Edward Heath’s campaign was dismissed as bland and uninspiring and plans had been drawn up to force his resignation when he lost - therefore his victory was unexpected
- in 1997, John major decided on a long campaign to reduce Tony Blair’s huge lead in the polls, however, the polls rarely changed and labour won
- In spite of a poor conservative campaign in 2017, they still managed to increase their share of the vote from 36.9% in 2015 to 42.4% in 2017
Explain opposition leaders in relation to the valence factor campaigns
OPPOSITION LEADERS:
Sometimes opposition leaders can generate support by capturing the mood of the nation. For example, in 1997, the energy of Blair’s campaign and his attractive self-confidence had huge appeal in the country in contrast to John Major’s reputation for dithering weak leadership. Successful opposition leaders are thus able to set the agenda of an election to their campaign.
Winston Churchill: 1951 GE
Churchill successfully campaigned on a manifesto pledge to ‘set the people free’ promising to end rationing and reduce the MCs tax burden. He also won support by contrasting one-nation conservative values with the class-based socialism of the Atlee government
Margaret Thatcher: 1979 GE
Although personally less popular than labour PM james callaghan. Thatcher was presented as sensible and forthright successfully focused the general election on the government’s failure to confront the growing power of trade unionism
David Cameron 2010 GE:
He succeed in focusing the general election on the huge increase in national debt under Gordon Brown. This was presented as Labour’s weakest point and contributed to Brown’s defeat. That cameron did not achieve a parliamentary majority was due to a strong showing by the liberal democrats under Nick Clegg
Explain how opposition leaders failing to engage with the public can affect the campaign
Opposition leaders can fail to engage with the public and may even lose support as the campaign continues
Neil Kinnock (1992 GE):
Having lost to Thatcher in 1987, Kinnock was confident of defeating major in 1992. However, the triumphant presidentialism of his campaign grated with core swing voters. At the sheffield rally just days before the election he was incoherent with excitement and his behaviour shocked enough voters back to the CP to give major a slim victory.
Michael Howard (2005 GE): He succeeded in reducing Blair's majority, however Anne Widdecombe's jibe that 'there was something of that night' about him, meant it was difficult to inspire widespread popular support for the conservatives. His support for the Iraq War (2003) also ensured that the anti-war vote went to the liberal democrats under Charles Kennedy
Ed Miliband (2005 GE) He failed to persuade enough voters that he had the strength of character to be PM. An attempt to provide him with greater stature by having him publicly unveil a 9-foot stone tablet with his campaign promises carved into it backfired when it was ridiculed as 'Edstone' and the 'heaviest suicide note in history'
How has the leadership of other political parties e.g minority party leadership been important in determining elections. How does this relate with the liberal democrat party?
MINORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP
Although every modern PM has been a member of the CP or the LP, the leadership of other political parties has often been important in determining the result of a general election:
Liberals/Liberal Democrats: The 1964, 1974 and 2010 general elections all demonstrate how a strong showing by the leader of the Liberal/Liberal Democrat parties can a have a significant impact on the result:
1964:
Although Harold Wilson had expected to win a decisive victory over Conservative PM Alec Douglas-Hume, it was reduced by the energetic campaign led by the Liberal leader Jo Grimond who increased their share of the vote by %.3%. largely reflecting the campaign appeal to the young
1974:
In the ‘who governs Britain? Election, Jeremy Thorpe provided an exciting alternative to Edward Heath CP and Harold Wilson LP. The Liberal leader increased their share of the vote by 11.8% and by holding the balance of power was able to force the resignation of Edward Heath as PM.
2010:
This was the first election in which televised leadership debates were held in the UK. Nick Clegg’s engaging personality made him the clear winner, forcing Cameron and Brown to admit, ‘I agree with Nick.’ The LD’s party-political broadcasts only focused on his trustworthiness. The 57 LD MPs elected to Parliament denied Cameron a majority, leading to the first coalition government since 1945.
