Virtue Ethics Flashcards
act-centred ethical theory
particular actions are bearers of moral value
action-and-motive-centric account
moral judgements of acts come from evaluations of both the action and the motivations behind the action
agent-centred ethical theory
moral worth of an action is often determined by the intentions, motivations, character or virtues of the agent performing the action
consequentialism
morality of an action depends only on its consequences
deontology
morality of an action depends on conformity to certain rules or moral norms
eudaimonia
human flourishing , well-being, happiness
imitation
observing and emulating the behaviours of virtuous people
moral education
formal instruction as well as socialisation and learning from virtuous role models
natural virtue
a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom (Hursthouse, 2001)
phronesis / practical wisdom
the ability to discern the morally right course of action in specific situations by considering various factors, inc. relevant virtues, the circumstances, and the individual’s own experience & judgement
self-effacing
an ethical theory is self-effacing if whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, cannot be the agent’s motivation for doing it
i.e. if it tells us that we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts
virtue
“a virtue is, at least, a character trait which is admirable, embodying a commitment to some ethical value” (Annas, 2007)
how does Annas (2007) define virtue?
“a virtue is not just a disposition which happens to have certain effects. It is a disposition which works through the agent’s practical reasoning, built up from decisions and manifesting and expressing itself in decisions and choices which reflect the agent’s deliberations” (Annas, 2007)
what does Hurka argue are the two principal accounts of virtue?
one defines virtue by reference to flourishing, the other by an aretaic property of admirability (Hurka, 2001)
what is phronesis / practical wisdom?
practical wisdom is knowing what is good, right, or best, given a particular set of circumstances
phronesis is the wisdom that allows us to go beyond attempting to do the right thing with no notion of its effect or context
what are the two aspects of practical wisdom?
characteristically comes only with experience of life
the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones
how do individuals develop the skill of phronesis?
individuals develop the skill of practical wisdom through a process of moral education and moral reflection. There are several ways this can happen:
- moral education: through formal instruction, such as ethical philosophy courses, as well as through socialisation and learning from virtuous role models
- imitation: by observing and emulating the behaviours of virtuous people, individuals can internalise virtuous character traits and gain a deeper understanding of how to apply them in their own lives
- experience and reflection: by reflecting on their own experiences, moral dilemmas, and the consequences of their actions, individuals can develop a deeper understanding of how virtues should be applied in specific contexts. This process involves critically assessing one’s own actions, motivations, and the outcomes of those actions
- community and dialogue: engaging in ethical discussions with others, seeking different perspectives, and receiving feedback can contribute to the refinement of practical wisdom. By engaging in dialogue and being open to different viewpoints, individuals can broaden their understanding of ethical issues and enhance their ability to make morally informed decisions
how is phronesis linked to virtue?
practical wisdom is a key virtue that virtuous people possess
- ability to discern the morally right course of action in specific situations by considering various factors, inc. relevant virtues, the circumstances, and the individual’s own experience and judgement
- involves applying general principles and virtues to concrete situations, taking into account the particularities of each case
not a matter of simply following a set of rules or relying on external guidance, rather it is a skill or capacity that is cultivated through the development of virtuous character traits
- virtuous individuals, who have internalised and integrated virtues into their character, are better equipped to exercise practical wisdom in determining the morally right action
what is Slote’s theory of right action?
right action as one which the agent does from a virtuous motive
what is Martineau’s theory of right action?
right action as one which is done from the most virtuous motive available to the agent
virtue & vice is a binary distinction so agent cannot act unless has virtuous motive
what is Hursthouse’s theory of right action?
right action as one that a virtuous agent would have performed
doesn’t include motive, looks at the action itself
give a characterisation of virtue ethics.
two principal accounts of virtue ethics: one defines the virtues by reference to flourishing, the other by an aretaic property of admirability
while all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central & practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these & other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts & how we should live our lives as a whole
how is virtue ethics structured?
virtue ethics is ‘goodness-first’ but not structured like consequentialism
- according to VE, the right thing to do isn’t what maximises eudaimonia
- act in ways that constitute eudaimonia not act to promote eudaimonia
the virtuous agent lives a flourishing life precisely by being virtuous
what are some of the forms of virtue ethics?
Aristotelian virtue ethics
eudaimonist / flourishing account
Hursthouse’s account
Martineau’s account
Slote’s account
what is Aristotelian virtue ethics?
Aristotle declared that a virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits. These traits derive from natural internal tendencies, but need to be nurtured; however, once established, they will become stable
begin with the idea that the ultimate end of practical reason is eudaimonia
- for Aristotle, eudaimonia is determined by the telos of rational animals : “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence over a complete life”
one attains happiness by a virtuous life & the development of reason and the faculty of theoretical wisdom
- calls for intellectual excellences and excellences of character - the virtues
moral virtue is a relative mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, and in general the moral life is one of moderation in all things except virtue
moral virtue cannot be achieved abstractly - it requires moral action in a social environment
what is the doctrine of the mean & how does it relate to Aristotelian virtue ethics?
Aristotle’s own more detailed view about excellence of character is given by the ‘doctrine of the mean’
such excellences are those states of the emotional part of the soul, as manifested in action, that lie at a middle point determined by reason between excess and deficiency (each of which are vices) in the dimension of feeling that distinguishes them
e.g. to be brave is to be such as to feel such fear as to choose neither recklessly (too little fear) nor cowardly (too much fear)
many counterexamples:
- e.g. honest action cannot always be understood as a mean between two different dishonest actions
despite counterexamples, we can grasp the structure of Aristotelian virtue ethics without going into details of the doctrine / committing to it
what is habituation & how does it relate to Aristotelian virtue ethics?
Aristotle emphasises the importance of habituation in developing virtues
virtues are acquired through practice & habit, not through theoretical knowledge
what is the eudaimonist account of virtue ethics?
built on Aristotle, emphasises the importance of virtues for human flourishing
a virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia
a flourishing-based theory says a person has reason to act rightly only or ultimately because doing so will contribute to her own flourishing
- if we believe that virtues are the selection of traits that an individual must possess in order to lead this sort of life, then this presents him with sufficient motivation to act in accordance with these virtues, that is, to act morally (Anscombe, 1958)
how does the flourishing account define virtue?
the flourishing account defines virtues as those traits a person needs to flourish or live well and vices as traits destructive of flourishing (Hurka, 2001)
defines virtues in terms of their relationship with eudaimonia
what are some objections to the eudaimonist account of virtue ethics?
egoism charge
self-effacing
what is Hursthouse’s account of virtue ethics?
right action as one that a virtuous agent would have performed
doesn’t include motive, looks at the action itself
what is the connection between Hursthouse’s account of virtue ethics and Kant?
connection to Kant: acting from… vs acting in accordance with…
distinction between an actions moral worth and an actions rightness
what are Hursthouse’s V describing virtue ethics?
virtue ethics is described:
- as an ethics which is ‘agent-centred’ rather than ‘act-centred’
- as concerned with being rather than doing
- as addressing itself to the question, ‘what sort of person should I be?’ rather than the question, ‘what sorts of action should I do?’
- as taking certain areteic concepts (good, excellence, virtue) as basic rather than deontic ones (right, duty, obligation)
- as rejecting the idea that ethics is codifiable in rules or principles that can provide specific action guidance
what is an objection to Hursthouse’s account of virtue ethics?
appears to give the right answer but doesn’t account for moral worth. Decision procedure concerns account of rightness, and some sense of moral worth
Hursthouse’s V are no more than mere slogans - which, like most slogans, are pretty misleading
how could you amend Hursthouse’s account of virtue ethics to avoid the objection that it doesn’t account for moral worth?
amend Hursthouse’s account with Slote’s account
just add condition of moral worth to Hursthouse’s account to avoid objection
Hursthouse is theory of right action; and it also morally worthy if has a virtuous motive (Slote)
what is Martineau’s account of virtue ethics?
right action as one which is done from the most virtuous motive available to the agent
if there are no virtuous motives available, the action cannot be right so the agent shouldn’t do it
- virtue & vice is a binary distinction - only act on virtuous motives; at the very least the action must be done from virtuous motive
under Martineau’s account of virtue ethics, is it a binary distinction between virtues and vices?
yes
virtue & vice is a binary distinction - only act on virtuous motives; at the very least the action must be done from virtuous motive
what are possible objections to Martineau’s insistence that the right action is the one done from the MOST virtuous motive?
is it possible to rank virtues?
demanding
- high threshold (prevents acting from motives that are not the MOST virtuous)
what is Slote’s account of virtue ethics?
Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of an agent’s motivations
a right action is one which the agent does from a virtuous motive
what is an objection to Slote’s account of virtue ethics?
‘ought implies can’ objection
Sidgwick’s prosecutor example: prosecutor tries to convict a guilty defendant but does so from malice
if the prosecutor secures a deserved conviction, many will say he has acted rightly even though he has done so from a vicious motive.
but Slote’s view, by requiring actual virtuous motives, must deem the prosecutor’s action wrong
theory of right action gives wrong action ; claim is counterintuitive
violates ‘can’ because both required NOT to do it (because evil motive) but at the same time require to DO it (because it is the right action)
what are the main objections to virtue ethics?
egoism charge
action-guiding critique (moral action indeterminacy)
self-effacing
what is the egoism charge?
virtue ethics seems unattractively focused on the agent’s own flourishing
take the first account of virtue based on reference to flourishing. If an agent only performs a virtuous act in the interest of his flourishing, then this surely detracts from its virtuous property
- foundationally egoistic, insisting that their reasons to act & be motivated in these ways derive ultimately from their own flourishing (Hurka, 2001)
- virtue has instrumental rather than intrinsic value, final end being own flourishing
what is the primary response to the egoism charge?
that it rests on a misrepresentation of the relationship between being virtuous and flourishing
how can a virtue ethicist avoid the charge of egoism?
to avoid the charge of egoism define the state of flourishing simply as the state of being virtuous
the agent aiming at their own flourishing is merely aiming at being a virtuous person as these ends are one and the same
dispels the charge of egoism (rather, the theory is simply agent-centric), as the virtues are being pursued as ends in themselves, with ‘flourishing’ describing their collective attainment
do other accounts of virtue ethics (e.g. aretaic) fall foul of the egoism charge?
no
aretaic account identifies the virtues as those traits of character with an aretaic property of admirability thus can in principle unite the two properties (well-being & admirability) (Hurka, 2001)
“aretaic property says a person has reason to act rightly only because doing so will express virtue on her part” (Hurka, 2001)
how can the egoism objection reply to the aretaic account of virtue response?
if our theory of flourishing cannot ascribe any part of its value independently of virtues, it follows that being virtuous is both necessary and sufficient to lead a good life
this is NOT the case
what is the objection to virtue ethics that it cannot justify other-regarding views?
“if a flourishing-based virtue ethics is foundationally egoistic, it seems natural to assume that the practical rationality invokes reasons only about goods in the agent’s own life. But then the account cannot justify other-regarding views such as benevolence and justice, which aim at other people’s good.” (Hurka, 2001)
what is the action-guiding critique?
one key task of moral philosophy is prescription - telling us what the right thing to do is
virtue ethics seems overly concerned with being rather than doing and, as such, fails to provide us with proper guidance around how we are to act
- does not produce ‘codifiable principles (Hurka, 2001)
places too much emphasis on cultivating virtuous character traits without offering clear guidance or rules for determining right or wrong actions in specific situations, or for moral dilemmas - what happens when conflicting virtues come into play? (Hurka, 2001)
“virtue ethics yields only the prescription, ‘do what the virtuous agent - the one who is just, honest, charitable etc - would do in these circumstances.’ And this gives me no guidance unless I am (and know I am) a virtuous agent myself” (Hursthouse, 2001)
implies that if less than fully virtuous, as most people are, will not know how to act as do not know what a ‘virtuous’ person would do
ambiguity can lead to moral relativism or subjectivity - individuals may justify their actions based on their own interpretation of what constitutes virtuous behaviour
what is the problem with the ambiguity suggested by the action-guiding critique?
ambiguity can lead to moral relativism or subjectivity - individuals may justify their actions based on their own interpretation of what constitutes virtuous behaviour
what is the ‘formulation ambiguity’ response to the action-guiding critique?
potential ambiguity in the formulation ‘what a virtuous person would do’
- what some virtuous person would do
- weaker criterion so can avoid objection - what every virtuous person would do
- strict criterion
- not obvious that all virtuous agents would agree on the same action (they are not homogenous)
what is Hursthouse’s phronesis / practical wisdom response to the action-guiding critique?
Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics does offer practical guidance through the concept of phronesis
phronesis is the ability to discern the morally right course of action in specific situations by considering various factors, inc. relevant virtues, the circumstances, and the individual’s own experience & judgement
involves applying general principles and virtues to concrete situations, taking into account the particularities of each case
in this way, virtue ethics does provide guidance for moral decision-making
- emphasis on cultivating virtuous character traits & developing practical wisdom enables individuals to navigate complex situations and make morally sound judgements
so while virtue ethics may not offer a rigid set of rules, it provides a framework that allows for nuanced and context-dependent ethical reasoning
what is the self-effacing objection to virtue ethics?
an ethical theory is self-effacing if whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, cannot have been the agent’s motivation for doing it
we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts
if an agent aims at her own flourishing or virtue, she does not act from the required motives and so does not achieve the flourishing or virtue that is her goal
what are the responses & replies to the self-effacement objection to virtue ethics?
response (affects other ethical theories)
- Stocker (1976) originally introduced the self-effacement objection as a problem for deontology and consequentialism
- the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximise the general happiness
reply (still affects virtue ethics)
- Keller (2007) observes she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what the virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics faces the same problem
Woodcock response (action-and-motive-centric account)
- not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011)
- action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives
- action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives
- AMC account is not self-effacing as what it values (what rightness is based on) does include the person’s motives: in acting how the virtuous agent would act, and so performing the act that expresses virtue, a person is motivated by the virtuous agent’s motives (the virtues)
Aristotelian response
- self-effacement is not a problem that ethical theories need to avoid
- one appealing feature of virtue ethics is the Aristotelian idea that ‘one who is learning to be virtuous may find it useful to have the explicit motive of emulating the virtuous person’
- therefore, whether self-effacement is a problem for virtue ethics depends, in part, on the developmental stage of the agent
Reply (self-effacement not a problem for other ethical theories)
- if self-effacement is not a problem for virtue ethics, then it is not a problem for other ethical theories either
what is Woodcock’s response to the self-effacement objection?
action-and-motive centric account
not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011)
action-and motive-centric account: when someone is motivated from the X reasons by which the virtuous person would be motivated, then she is ‘motivated as the [virtuous] person would be motivated’ without being required ‘to have any explicit thoughts of the virtue itself, or of the fully virtuous person’
action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives
AMC account is not self-effacing as what it values (what rightness is based on) does include the person’s motives: in acting how the virtuous agent would act, and so performing the act that expresses virtue, a person is motivated by the virtuous agent’s motives (the virtues)
what is the Aristotelian response to the self-effacement objection?
self-effacement is not a problem ethical theories need to avoid
one appealing feature of virtue ethics is the Aristotelian idea that ‘one who is learning to be virtuous may find it useful to have the explicit motive of emulating the virtuous person’
therefore, whether self-effacement is a problem for virtue ethics depends, in part, on the developmental stage of the agent
how does the flourishing account fail to capture our intuition?
“a flourishing-based theory says the explanation is self-regarding: that the action will make his own life better or more flourishing. But this is not, intuitively, the right explanation. The right explanation is that the action will make the other’s life better” (Hurka, 2001)
can virtues sometimes be faults?
yes
commonly accepted truism that a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts & feels as she should
but it is equally common, in relation to particular putative examples of virtues, to give these truisms up
- generous or honest “to a fault”
- someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie, in their desire to prevent hurting someone’s feelings
- courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to if he were timid
can virtues conflict?
yes
forces hierarchy of values
how does Aristotle’s moral education help resolve potential conflicts between virtues / deciding the right action?
both the virtuous adult & the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends
- e.g. children & adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken
it is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him
given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation
what does virtue ethics have to say on abortion?
the right of a woman to control her own body does not settle the matter: it is possible to act within one’s rights whilst acting in a way that a virtuous person would not
the personhood of the foetus cannot settle the issue: whether one is a good or bad person cannot depend on ability to solve problems in metaphysics
the loss of human life is always a serious matter
the morality of abortion turns ultimately on whether a women’s reasons are commensurate with the seriousness of the action
