Consequentialism & Nonconsequentialist Constraints

Question 1

act consequentialism

Answer 1

the morality of an action depends on the consequences brought about by the action a person took

Question 2

actual consequentialism

Answer 2

actions are right or wrong depending on the consequences they actually bring about

Question 3

actualism

Answer 3

when a person is deciding which action would be best, they should weigh the consequences of actions based on what their actual choices will be in the future

Question 4

agent-neutral

Answer 4

an agent-neutral reason is a reason that applies to anybody, regardless of their particular circumstances

Question 5

agent-relative

Answer 5

an agent-relative reason is a reason that applies only to particular individual

Question 6

consequentialism

Answer 6

the morality of an action depends only on its consequences

Question 7

constraint

Answer 7

limits the list of possible actions we can take to further the good

Question 8

disaster-avoidance clause

Answer 8

if it prevents disaster then an action is permissible

Question 9

doctrine of doing and allowing (DDA)

Answer 9

there is a significant moral difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen

Question 10

doctrine of double effect (DDE)

Answer 10

there is a moral constraint on intending evil, even when the evil will be a means to a greater good. Nonetheless, we may be permitted to employ neutral or good means to pursue a greater good, even though we foresee evil side effects if (1) the good is proportionate to the evil and (2) there is no better way to achieve this good (Kamm, 2013)

Question 11

equivalence thesis

Answer 11

there is no intrinsic moral difference between harming and not-aiding

Question 12

expected consequentialism

Answer 12

a person acts rightly by doing the action that has the highest level of “expected utility”

Question 13

hedonism

Answer 13

judge actions based on how much pleasure or pain they produce

Question 14

impartial

Answer 14

everyone’s welfare counts equally in determining the deontic status of an action

Question 15

inviolability

Answer 15

entails a protection of an individual’s negative rights

Question 16

negative right

Answer 16

a right to non-interference

Question 17

nonconsequentialism

Answer 17

denies that the rightness or wrongness of our conduct is determined solely by the goodness or badness of the consequences of our acts or the rules to which those acts conform

Question 18

partial nonconsequentialism

Answer 18

might advocate prerogatives but no constraints (Scheffler, 1982) or constraints but no prerogatives (Kagan, 1989)

Question 19

pluralist consequentialism

Answer 19

actions should be judged on a plurality of consequences (e.g. justice, happiness, knowledge)

Question 20

positive right

Answer 20

right to self-authority , self-mastery

Question 21

possibilism

Answer 21

when a person is deciding which action would be best, they should weigh the consequences of actions based on what the possible actions they would be capable of taking in the future

Question 22

prerogatives

Answer 22

moral prerogatives permit an agent to (1) act in ways that do not maximise the impartial good, and (2) act for reasons that stem from his personal perspective, rather than from the perspective of an impartial judge (Kamm, 2013)

Question 23

principle of permissible harm (PPH)

Answer 23

it is permissible for (1) greater good and (2) means that have greater good as their noncausal flip side to cause a lesser evil, but not permissible for an act (3) to require a lesser evil as a means to greater good, or (4) to directly cause a lesser evil as a side effect when the act has greater good as mere causal effect

Question 24

rule consequentialism

Answer 24

an action A is right iff A is in accordance with a rule which if generally followed / accepted makes the outcome best

Question 25

satisficing consequentialism

Answer 25

to perform an action that is “good enough” with respect to its consequences, even if some alternative action would have even better consequences

Question 26

subjective consequentialism

Answer 26

a person’s actions are right or wrong depending on what they thought the consequences would be

Question 27

universal

Answer 27

everyone whose welfare will be affected by one’s action counts morally

Question 28

utilitarianism

Answer 28

the moral worth of an action is determined by how much happiness or suffering it brings to the world, and therefore people should always do whatever will bring about the most happiness to the most people

Question 29

veil of ignorance

Answer 29

moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by denying decision-makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options

Question 30

what are two key features of consequentialism?

Answer 30

universal = holds that everyone whose welfare will be affected by one’s action counts morally

impartial = everyone’s welfare counts equally in determining the deontic status of an action

Question 31

what is the difference between actual and expected consequentialism?

Answer 31

actual consequences: to act rightly is to do whatever produces the best consequences

expected consequences: a person acts rightly by doing the action that has the highest level of “expected utility”

• expected utility is a combination of the good (or bad) effects that one predicts will result from an action and the probability of those effects occurring

Question 32

what is Smart’s drowning Hitler example? what is its relevance to the debate between actual vs expected consequences?

Answer 32

imagine the action of a person who, in 1938, saves someone from drowning.

while we generally regard saving a drowning person as the right thing to do and praise people for such actions, the person saved from drowning in this case was Adolf Hitler

had Hitler drowned, millions of other people might have been saved from suffering and death between 1938 and 1945

if utilitarianism evaluates the rescuer’s actions based on actual consequences, then the rescuer did the wrong thing

if utilitarianism judges the rescuer’s action by its foreseeable, expected consequences, then the rescuer did the right thing

Question 33

should consequentialism be used as a theory of rightness or as a decision procedure?

Answer 33

most consequentialists claim that it should be a theory of rightness

• “it is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgement” (Bentham, 1789)

a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures & refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge

Question 34

how does understanding consequentialism as a theory of rightness help defend against some criticisms.

Answer 34

a consequentialist criterion of right implies that it would not be morally right to use consequentialism as a decision procedure in cases where it would not maximise utility to try to calculate utilities before acting

if the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision

a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures & refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge

Question 35

why is consequentialism unlikely or unhelpful as a decision-procedure?

Answer 35

unforeseen & unforeseeable consequences

Question 36

what intuition supports act consequentialism?

Answer 36

most people agree that we morally ought to improve the world where possible and acting to bring about the best outcomes seems a natural way to achieve this

Question 37

what are the main objections to act consequentialism?

Answer 37

main objections to act consequentialism

1. unable to make sense of familiar moral options
2. unable to make sense of familiar moral constraints
3. consequentialism operates with a dubious notion of goodness
4. consequentialism is self-defeating
5. consequentialism gives no practical guidance at all

Question 38

what is the demandingness objection to act consequentialism?

Answer 38

requirement to maximise utility strikes many people as too demanding because it interferes with the personal decisions that most of us feel should be left up to the individual

the demandingness objection specifically takes issue with the extent to which a theory is demanding on the individual’s self-interest

leaves no room for actions that are permissible yet do not bring about the best consequences

• everything that is suboptimal is impermissible

Question 39

what is Singer’s version of consequentialism?

Answer 39

1. suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad
2. if it in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it
3. it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbour’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away
4. the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position

very demanding form of consequentialism

Question 40

what are some issues with Singer’s version of consequentialism?

Answer 40

very demanding (although Singer believes morality should be this demanding, no one said it should be easy)

premises 3 & 4 reject to commonly held intuitions about our moral obligations

Question 41

what is the supererogation objection to consequentialism?

Answer 41

this objection deals with the idea that a plausible principle of beneficence should not require too big a personal sacrifice in order to help strangers

due to agent-neutrality, consequentialism seems unable to make sense of special obligations we have to particular individuals or groups (e.g. family)

Question 42

what does Wolf mean by act consequentialism being a “morality for saints”?

Answer 42

moral saint: “a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be”

Question 43

what is the alienation (nearest-and-dearest) objection to act consequentialism?

Answer 43

impartiality assumption alienates us from loved ones

focuses on the way in which acting for consequentialist reasons seems incompatible with acting in ways that partly constitute valuable relationships

due to agent-neutrality, consequentialism seems unable to make sense of special obligations we have to particular individuals or groups (e.g. family)

• fails to recognise the moral legitimacy of giving special preferences to ourselves & people that we know and care about

Question 44

what is Stocker’s (1976) hospital case used to demonstrate the alienation objection?

Answer 44

you are ill & lying in hospital

a friend comes to the hospital to visit you

at the end of the visit, when you thank her for making the trip, she remarks that she did it because she knew it would give you pleasure and was thus obligated by consequentialism to visit

upon hearing this, you instantly feel disheartened; the fact that the friend visited us out of moral obligation, and not simply due to her love for us seems to make it feel less satisfying on our behalf

Question 45

which scholar offers the hospital case as an example of the alienation objection?

Answer 45

Stocker, 1976

Question 46

what is the permissibility objection to act consequentialism?

Answer 46

“wrong answers” objection

gives the wrong answers to moral questions (permits various actions that everyone knows are morally wrong)

Question 47

what are some amendments that can be made to consequentialism in response to objections?

Answer 47

multi-level consequentialism

satisficing consequentialism

rule consequentialism

the agent-relative / agent-neutral distinction

motive consequentialism

Question 48

how does single-level consequentialism differ from multi-level consequentialism?

Answer 48

single-level: normative reason = motivating reason

multi-level: normative reason ≠ motivating reason

distinction to be made between one’s motivating reason & one’s normative reason for action

• a motivating reason is a reason that explains why an action was done (e.g. love, friendship)
• a normative reason justifies why an action is right or wrong (e.g. performing this action will maximise general welfare)

multi-level endorses act consequentialism for right action but endorses a different decision procedure

• only takes consequentialism to be a theory of rightness not as a decision procedure

Question 49

what is multi-level consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?

Answer 49

multi-level consequentialism endorses act consequentialism for right action but endorses a different decision procedure

• only takes consequentialism to be a theory of rightness not as a decision procedure

view that individuals should usually follow tried-and-tested rules of thumb / heuristics, rather than trying to calculate which action will produce the most well-being

distinction to be made between one’s motivating reason & one’s normative reason for action

• a motivating reason is a reason that explains why an action was done (e.g. love, friendship)
• a normative reason justifies why an action is right or wrong (e.g. performing this action will maximise general welfare)

Question 50

how can multi-level consequentialism help respond to the hospital case?

Answer 50

I can visit my friend out of friendship (motivating reason), and the reason that doing so is right is because it maximises general welfare (normative reason)

Question 51

what are some objections to multi-level consequentialism?

Answer 51

incompatible with real relationship values

self-effacing

Stocker’s disharmony between motives & reasons

• ‘reasons’ are the justifications & values one has for taking a particular action; ‘motives’, however, are the true impulses behind an action
• motives & reasons must be in harmony during interpersonal activities for moral values to be realised
• genuine love & friendship are among the greatest pleasures that one can experience, however, if they are done purely as a means to an end & not an end in themselves, the pleasure of those emotions is lost

Question 52

what is Stocker’s disharmony between motives & reasons objection to multi-level consequentialism?

Answer 52

‘reasons’ are the justifications & values one has for taking a particular action; ‘motives’, however, are the true impulses behind an action

motives & reasons must be in harmony during interpersonal activities for moral values to be realised

genuine love & friendship are among the greatest pleasures that one can experience, however, if they are done purely as a means to an end & not an end in themselves, the pleasure of those emotions is lost

Question 53

what is satisficing consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?

Answer 53

X brings about a sufficient amount of Y

to satisfice is to perform an action that is “good enough” with respect to its consequences, even if some alternative action would have even better consequences

it is not morally wrong to fail to contribute to a charity if one contributes enough to other charities & if the money or time that one could contribute does create enough good, so it is not just wasted

Question 54

which scholar offers satisficing consequentialism?

Answer 54

Slote, 1984

Question 55

what is an objection to satisficing consequentialism?

Answer 55

arbitrary threshold of defining ‘good enough’, unwelcome implications

• suggests morality is indifferent between saving 2 people and saving 6 people

licences gratuitous harms

• so long as it leaves us over the threshold, there’s nothing wrong with a harm even when a non-harmful act was available (Bradley, 2006)

Question 56

what is rule consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?

Answer 56

an action A is right iff A is in accordance with a rule which if generally followed / accepted makes the outcome best

part of determining which code would be ideal requires that one consider the costs of successfully getting people to internalise a rule that requires people to be completely impartial in their decisions that affect their own welfare and the welfare of loved ones

Question 57

what are some objections to rule consequentialism?

Answer 57

ideal world objection / compliance level objection (Parfit, 2011)

• compliance vs internalisation

collapses into act consequentialism (Smart, 1973)

rule worship objection (Smart, 1973)

Question 58

what is the ideal world objection / compliance level objection to rule consequentialism?

Answer 58

optimal rules under conditions of universal compliance prescribe acts that are obviously wrong in conditions of partial non-compliance

compliance formulation: an act is morally permissible if and only if it is allowed by the code of rules, which if generally complied with, would produce the most good

internalisation formulation: an act is morally permissible if and only if it is allowed by the code of rules whose internalisation by the vast majority would produce the most good

Hooker favours the internalisation formulation

• internalisation can have benefits that mere compliance doesn’t have

Question 59

are versions of rule consequentialism that use rates of compliance other than 100% more robust?

Answer 59

philosophers have proposed versions of rule consequentialism that assess the consequences of rules under some rates of compliance other than only 100%

• e.g. at 90% (Hooker, 2000)

but these still fall foul of the ‘distant world objection’ (Podgorski, 2018)

Question 60

what is the difference between compliance and internalisation of rules? why does it matter for rule consequentialism?

Answer 60

compliance: one complies with a code of rules if and only if one acts in accordance with that code of rules

internalisation: one has internalised a code of rules if and only if one both believes that the right thing to do is what is specified by the code and has the psychological dispositions and character traits that dispose one to do what is specified by the code, to feel guilt when one violates the code, and to resent it when others violate the code

Hooker favours the internalisation formulation

• internalisation can have benefits that mere compliance doesn’t have
• e.g. suppose that you have internalised the rule that says “retaliate against an attacker” and that you are totally transparent in the sense that people know your dispositions just by looking at you. Your having internalised the rule will, then, have the benefit of deterring potential attackers without your ever having to retaliate against any attackers. This is a benefit that merely complying with the rule doesn’t have

Question 61

what is the limitation of internalisation of rules?

Answer 61

might be more costly to get one code of rules internalised than another, and we should not overlook this cost since, absent obtrusive governmental policing & sanctions, internalisation is necessary to ensure general compliance

Question 62

what is the objection to rule consequentialism that it collapses into act consequentialism?

Answer 62

RC is extensionally equivalent to act consequentialism (Lyons)

E.g. Kant’s claim that lying is always wrong

• many deem too rigid & claim it fails to account for the circumstances in which the lie is being told
• more plausible rule could be that offered by Nathanson, which says “do not lie except in special circumstances that justify lying”
• what are these special circumstances - for a utilitarian correct circumstances would be when lying would generate more good than telling the truth
• RU adopting this approach & advocating a moral code that consists of a list of rules of this form would look like “do x except when not doing x maximises utility” and while this seems plausible, it also is identical to AU

reason for not formulating RC in terms of compliance

Question 63

what is the limitation on the ‘collapses into act consequentialism’ objection to rule consequentialism?

Answer 63

collapse objection depends on a universal-conformity model of rule consequentialism

Question 64

what is the “rule worship” objection to rule consequentialism?

Answer 64

“rule worship”: an irrational deference to rules that has no utilitarian justification (Smart, 1973)

sometimes need to break a rule (e.g. promise) for another rule (e.g. killing)

• creates hierarchy of rules

can lead to disaster e.g. Hitler case

Question 65

how can a rule consequentialist respond to the “rule worship” objection?

Answer 65

response: override rule that requires one to prevent disaster even when doing so requires breaking other rules (Brandt)

but what counts as disaster?

Question 66

how can agent-relative consequentialism help respond to the nearest-and-dearest objection?

Answer 66

we have more information on those near to us so can better approximate their expected utility at given points

sometimes it is required that we are able to give extended action with feedback

we have more commitment to those close to us

Question 67

how can the agent-relative / agent-neutral distinction help respond the demandingness objection?

Answer 67

since “my” projects depend on my interests and desires, and since “my” interests and desires do not seem to generate agent-neutral reasons, by elimination the reasons in question must be agent-relative

having established that there are genuine agent-relative reasons, conclude that it must sometimes be possible to pursue our own interests instead of the overall good, since agent-relative reasons will sometimes outweigh agent-neutral reasons

if there is more value in benefiting oneself or one’s family and friends than there is disvalue in letting strangers die (without killing them), then spending resources on oneself or one’s family and friends would maximise the good

thus the fact that moral requirements exist does not need to conflict with the pursuit of our own projects

Question 68

how does agent-relative consequentialism capture commonsense moral intuition?

Answer 68

agent-relative consequentialists can assign more weight to the welfare of a friend of an agent when assessing the value of the consequences of that agent’s acts

in this way, consequentialists try to capture common moral intuitions about the duties of friendship (Jackson, 1991)

Question 69

does nonconsequentialism deny that consequences can be a factor in determining the rightness of an action?

Answer 69

no

only denies that they are the sole determinant of the rightness or wrongness of an action

Question 70

what does contemporary nonconsequentialism typically include?

Answer 70

personal prerogatives not to maximise the good & constraints on producing the good (Kamm, 2013)

Question 71

what are prerogatives? what is the consequence of including them?

Answer 71

a prerogative denies that agents must always maximise good consequences

hence, it allows for the possibility that some acts are supererogatory because, while they are not morally required, they are morally valuable in virtue of producing better consequences (Kamm, 2013)

Question 72

give an example of a partial nonconsequentialist who advocates for prerogatives but no constraints.

Answer 72

Scheffler, 1982

Question 73

give an example of a partial nonconsequentialist who advocates for constraints but no prerogatives.

Answer 73

Kagan, 1989

Question 74

what are the justifications for prerogatives?

Answer 74

non-alienation (Scheffler, 1982)

• humans are psychologically predisposed to be most concerned about their own projects
• morally permitted to pursue their non-optimific projects for personal reasons, cannot be alienated from their fundamental natures

people are ends-in-themselves (personal sovereignty)

• since we should not view people as mere means of promoting the greater good, each of us can sometimes justifiably pursue non optimific goals
• on this view, the foundation of prerogatives can also be the foundation of constraints on interferences, as both are connected to the idea of personal sovereignty
• moral obligation less about doing as much good as possible than it is about respect for persons

Question 75

what is Scheffler’s (1982) non-alienation justification for prerogatives?

Answer 75

humans are psychologically predisposed to be most concerned about their own projects

morally permitted to pursue their non-optimific projects for personal reasons, cannot be alienated from their fundamental natures

this justification does not morally limit others from interfering with someone in their quest to maximise the good; it only implies that someone need not always act of his own accord for impartial good for impartial reasons

this non-alienation justification suggests agents should be permitted to try to control what they care about most

Question 76

what is Kamm’s (2013) ‘people are ends-in-themselves’ justification for prerogatives?

Answer 76

since we should not view people as mere means of promoting the greater good, each of us can sometimes justifiably pursue non-optimific goals

on this view, the foundation of prerogatives can also be the foundation of constraints on interferences, as both are connected to the idea of personal sovereignty

prerogatives can be seen as a by-product of the fact that moral obligation is not about producing as much good as possible. It is about respect for persons and doing as much good as that requires

Question 77

what are the most commonly proposed constraints?

Answer 77

(1) a strong duty not to harm owed to each individual and so correlative to that individual’s right not to be harmed; and/or (2) a prohibition against intending harm

Question 78

what is the equivalence thesis? how can we rebut it?

Answer 78

equivalence thesis: consequentialists argue that there is no intrinsic moral difference between harming and not-aiding

principle of contextual interaction: a property can behave differently in one context than in another
If we can find even one set of comparable cases in which a harming is morally worse than a not-aiding, we rebut a universal claim like the Equivalence Thesis

Question 79

what is the Bathtub Case (Rachels, 1975)?

Answer 79

1. Smith will inherit a fortune if his little cousin dies. One evening while the child is taking his bath, Smith drowns him
2. Jones will inherit a fortune if his little cousin dies. When Jones enters the bathroom, he sees that the child slipped and fell face down in the water. Although Jones could easily save the child, he does nothing, intending that the child die

Question 80

why are the two Bathtub cases different? (Kamm, 2013)

Answer 80

1. in killing we introduce a threat that was not previously present, while in letting die, we do not interfere with a currently present threat
2. in killing we act, while in letting die we fail to act (in particular, we refrain from acting);
3. in killing we cause someone to lose life that he would have had independently of our actions at that time; in letting die, someone loses only life that he would have had with our help at that time; and
4. in killing we interfere first with the victim, while in letting die, we avoid being interfered with (by having to aid)

Question 81

what general conclusions can we gain from applying our conclusions about killing and letting die to the general moral distinction between harming and not-aiding?

Answer 81

1. when we kill or let someone die, we might reasonably think that she has some right to her life. But when we harm or do not aid someone in non-life-and-death cases, what they lose – or fail to get – may be something to which they have no right
2. generally, when someone kills, they interfere with another’s body in ways they do not do when they let die. However, if we harm someone in non-life-and-death cases, we may not necessarily interfere with her body any more than if we do not aid

Question 82

what does Foot appeal to to justify the DDA?

Answer 82

Foot appeals to negative / positive rights to justify DDA

• in the Trolley Case, comparing violations of negative rights - comparing killing one to killing five (numbers count)
• in the Judge Case, comparing violations of negative right and positive rights

negative rights have priority over positive rights (Foot, 1967)

• violations of negative rights take precedence
• justifies doing/allowing distinction

Question 83

how does the distinction between negative & positive rights justify the DDA?

Answer 83

negative rights have priority over positive rights (Foot, 1967)

• violations of negative rights take precedence
• justifies doing/allowing distinction

Question 84

what are three justifications for arguing doing harm is more morally significant than merely allowing harm?

Answer 84

1. typical difference in cost to the agent of avoiding doing harm as compared to the cost of avoiding allowing harm

• HOWEVER, some instances of refraining from doing harm exacting tremendous costs; some cases of providing aid require next to no sacrifice (only provides a rough guide)

2. doing harm to an individual is more disrespectful of that person than merely allowing harm to befall him

• easier to claim than defend

3. the appropriate sort of facts about a particular agent can ground especially compelling moral requirements

Question 85

are the three justifications for arguing doing harm is more morally significant than merely allowing harm successful?

Answer 85

all three justifications are unsuccessful in defending the moral relevance of the distinction between doing and allowing (all are agent-focused)

Question 86

is there a meaningful distinction between withdrawing aid & initiating a threat?

Answer 86

Foot contends relevant distinction between initiating a threatening sequence of events or keeping it going & allowing a threatening sequence that is already in train to continue (Foot, 1967)

one suggestion is that whether an act of withdrawing aid or protection counts as killing or letting die depends on whether the barrier to death that one removes is a barrier that one has oneself provided

Question 87

what is the moral significance between removing operative vs as-yet-inoperative aid?

Answer 87

if aid or protection against a lethal threat is both operative and self-sustaining, withdrawing it appears to count as killing irrespective of whether the person who withdraws it is also the person who provided it (Kagan, 1991)

but, when aid that is as-yet-inoperative is withdrawn, it seems to make a difference to whether this counts as killing or letting die whether the person who withdraws it is also the person who provided it (Kagan, 1991)

Question 88

what are the Abdul cases? how do they help explain the difference between removing operative vs as-yet-inoperative aid?

Answer 88

Abdul 1: Food is being sent to the starving inhabitants of a remote village but Abdul intercepts the supplies and steals them

Abdul 2: A check that can be used to buy food is on its way to the village but Abdul intercepts and steals the check

Abdul 3: Abdul himself writes a check and mails it to the village. Later, however, he intercepts the check and tears it up

Abdul 4: Abdul writes a check for the village and gives it to a friend to mail. A moment later he changes his mind and asks the friend to return it to him

in each of these cases Abdul does something that prevents aid from reaching its intended beneficiaries. He interferes in a sequence of events in such a way that people die who would not otherwise have died. He therefore violates the constraint against doing harm

yet common-sense morality holds that what Abdul does in Abdul 3 and in Abdul 4 is permissible

Question 89

is there a moral difference between intending vs foreseeing harm?

Answer 89

DDE: there is a moral constraint on intending evil, even when the evil will be a means to a greater good. Nonetheless, we may be permitted to employ neutral or good means to pursue a greater good, even though we foresee evil side effects if (1) the good is proportionate to the evil and (2) there is no better way to achieve this good (Kamm, 2013)

DDE prohibits actions that aim at evil ends, but leaves room for those undertaken in pursuit of the good, but that have foreseeable but unintended evil consequences

Question 90

what are some objections to the DDE?

Answer 90

lacks consideration for justice and fairness - i.e. the rights of the victim (Kamm, 2013)

subjectivity: the DDE can be subject to interpretation and can be applied differently by different people

• difficulty in distinguishing between intended & foreseen consequences, especially in complex situations
• difficulty in determining proportionality between good & bad consequences. This is especially true when the bad consequences are severe, and the good consequences are minor

traditional DDE is too strong - seems to rule out intentionally harming someone to promote that person’s overall good, and it rules out intentionally harming someone to help others even when that person is no worse off than he would have been otherwise (Kamm, 2013)

major objection (Thomson, 1999): states of mind (such as intending) cannot make an act that is otherwise permissible be impermissible

Question 91

what is the PPH and how is it connected to the DDE?

Answer 91

PPH is a sharpening of DDE in terms of what is permissible or not permissible as means

PPH: it is permissible for (1) greater good and (2) means that have greater good as their noncausal flip side to cause lesser evil, but not permissible for an act (3) to require lesser evil as a means to greater good, or (4) to directly cause lesser evil as a side effect when the act has greater good as mere causal effect (Kamm, 1989)

Question 92

how does the PPH distinguish between the substitution and subordination of persons?

Answer 92

PPH gives expression a moral distinction between substitution & subordination of persons (Kamm, 2007)

it is sometimes permissible to substitute a person for others so that the substituted person is threatened instead of the original people

this contrasts with subordinating one person to others, as in Transplant Case (CS5), which is not permissible

Question 93

is the PPH inviolable?

Answer 93

inviolability of PPH is not absolute - limited qualitatively (PPH permits some ways of harming) and may be limited quantitatively (e.g. PPH may be overridden to save a million people)

Question 94

what is a rights-centric nonconsequentialist approach?

Answer 94

the fact that people have moral status means that treating them morally requires considering their interests

the moral status of a given individual might override the calculation of consequences

changes the frame of case studies

• rather than framing questions in terms of what the agent is permitted or obligated to do, we should instead concern ourselves with what treatment the victim is entitled to receive

this approach is not merely about producing as much good as possible, but rather about maintaining respect for individuals and doing as much good as this requires

Question 95

how does the inviolability of a person’s rights affect consequentialist calculations?

Answer 95

entitlement of ‘victim’ might reasonably be framed around a person’s inviolability

connection to Kant’s categorical imperative specifying that we should treat people not merely as means but as ends in themselves, and whose lives have an unconditional value (Kamm, 2013)

high degree of inviolability is correlated with a strong right protecting a person’s life. To transgress this right would then constitute a moral wrong

Question 96

what are the advantages of a rights-based approach to consequentialism?

Answer 96

common sense

• intuitive appeal to incorporating provisions for individual respect into our version of consequentialism as it tends to align itself with commonsense notions of fairness & justice, acknowledging the separateness of persons in a way that is typically overlooked by consequentialist arguments

practical value

• appreciate this by considering what would happen if everybody were permitted to act in disregard to inviolability

Question 97

what are the limitations of the inviolability constraint?

Answer 97

while inviolability entails a protection of an individual’s negative rights, it does not make provisions for positive rights

link to doing harm vs withholding aid

Question 98

what are the counterarguments to a rights-based approach?

Answer 98

both arguments centre around an individual wishing to forgo their inviolability: veil of ignorance & saving millions

Question 99

what is the veil of ignorance counterargument to a rights-based approach? (Kamm, 2013)

Answer 99

individual’s decision-making from behind a veil of ignorance

consider the case where a person does not know if, at some point in their life, they may find themselves in the trolley problem, either in the group of five or as the one

Kamm’s outline of the counterargument suggests that the rational individual would choose to forego their rights, as their chances of being saved are greater than their chances of being sacrificed

evaluation: while such a decision may be the strictly rational choice, there is cause to question whether individuals would be quite so content to bargain away their moral status

Question 100

what is the saving millions counterargument to a rights-based approach?

Answer 100

perhaps in the instance where sacrificing one life would protect millions, an individual could conceivably wish for their rights to be foregone

evaluation: while true that many would be happy to sacrifice their own life in the interest of saving such a great number of lives, it is difficult to know where each individual would draw the line

Question 101

CASE STUDY: judge in a riot (Foot, 1967)

Answer 101

imagine a judge faced with a difficult decision: either frame and execute an innocent man, or allow five people to be killed in a riot that started because people were outraged by the innocent man not being executed

Question 102

CASE STUDY: Trolly Driver Decision

Answer 102

a trolley is hurtling along the tracks and the driver sees five people on the track in front of him. On the other track, there is one person

the trolley driver must make a choice: either divert the trolley onto the other track where it will hit and kill one innocent person, or let it continue on its current path and run over five people

consequentialist response: kill the one

Question 103

CASE STUDY: Trolley with Bystander Decision

Answer 103

a trolley is about to collide with five people, resulting in their deaths. A bystander has the ability to divert the trolley such that it travels along a different set of tracks, however, doing so will cause it to collide and kill one person.

consequentialist response: not only defensible, but morally obligatory, for the bystander to divert the trolley, as doing so would result in the greater good by minimising total number of deaths

possible non-consequentialist response: adopt the view that we are required to maximise the good within the scope of certain constraints & prerogatives

Question 104

what is Foot’s argument regarding the distinction between the judge case and the trolly driver case?

Answer 104

wrong for the judge to kill one person in as judge has to choose between killing one & merely allowing five to die

not wrong for trolley driver to kill as the choice is between killing one & killing five

what might account for our moral judgements in these cases? The DDA is one possible explanation, the DDE another one

Question 105

CASE STUDY: transplant case

Answer 105

doctor tasked with treating five gravely ill patients, each in need of a different organ transplant. Doctor scheduled to meet with a healthy patient for a routine check-up. This patient would make a suitable organ donor for all other ill patients. Harvesting patient 5’s organs would save all five other patients, at the cost of just one

without an inviolability constraint in place, it might follow that the doctor is morally obligated to sacrifice the life of the healthy patient to save the lives of the others

however, universalising this behaviour (permitting doctors to sacrifice the lives of patients without their consent) would lead to a world in which patients feared doctors and avoided entering hospitals out of concern for their lives

if we value rights above all, we must acknowledge that the rights of all are compromised when any one individual’s rights are transgressed

to prevent a gradual erosion of rights, we must impose an inviolability condition such that it can never be considered morally permissible for them to be violated, irrespective of an agent’s intent, or the consequences of an act on the greater good

Question 106

CASE STUDY: euthanasia throat cancer (Rachels, 1975)

Answer 106

case of incurable throat cancer patient that will die in next few days but is in agony so wants to end it sooner

• if one withholds treatment, it may take longer for the patient to die & so he may suffer more than he would if more direct action were taken and a lethal injection given
• strong reason to think that active euthanasia is preferable to passive

doctrine that active euthanasia is always wrong while passive euthanasia is sometimes permissible can be challenged for several reasons:

• active euthanasia is in many cases more humane than passive euthanasia
• doctrine rests on a distinction between killing & letting die that itself can be questioned

Question 107

CASE STUDY: abortion (Kagan, 1991)

Answer 107

claim: a merely extractive abortion involves the active withdrawal of life-supporting aid from the foetus

• therefore when a pregnant woman has a merely extractive abortion, thereby withdrawing life-supporting aid that she herself has been providing to a foetus, she does not kill the foetus but merely allows it to die

objections to claim:

1. even if we concede that withdrawing aid in progress that one has oneself been providing counts as an instance of letting die, the agent who performs an abortion is typically not the pregnant woman herself but is instead her doctor. Since the doctor terminates life-support that someone else has provided, he kills the foetus rather than lets it die
2. even a merely extractive abortion is an instance of doing something that results in the foetus’s death - namely, actively removing the foetus from the environment that supports its life. Hence, it is odd to describe it as merely allowing death to occur
3. in order for one to allow a person to die, there must be some preexisting threatening sequence of events that one fails to arrest or to which one removes some barrier by which it has been blocked. But in the case of a merely extractive abortion, there is no threat to the foetus which the abortion allows to continue by failing to arrest it or by unblocking it. The abortion itself “originates the sequence which ends in the death of the foetus, and the destruction comes about ‘through the agency’ of the mother who seeks the abortion.” (Foot). A merely extractive abortion is, therefore, an act of killing rather than an instance of allowing the foetus to die