Consequentialism & Nonconsequentialist Constraints Flashcards
act consequentialism
the morality of an action depends on the consequences brought about by the action a person took
actual consequentialism
actions are right or wrong depending on the consequences they actually bring about
actualism
when a person is deciding which action would be best, they should weigh the consequences of actions based on what their actual choices will be in the future
agent-neutral
an agent-neutral reason is a reason that applies to anybody, regardless of their particular circumstances
agent-relative
an agent-relative reason is a reason that applies only to particular individual
consequentialism
the morality of an action depends only on its consequences
constraint
limits the list of possible actions we can take to further the good
disaster-avoidance clause
if it prevents disaster then an action is permissible
doctrine of doing and allowing (DDA)
there is a significant moral difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen
doctrine of double effect (DDE)
there is a moral constraint on intending evil, even when the evil will be a means to a greater good. Nonetheless, we may be permitted to employ neutral or good means to pursue a greater good, even though we foresee evil side effects if (1) the good is proportionate to the evil and (2) there is no better way to achieve this good (Kamm, 2013)
equivalence thesis
there is no intrinsic moral difference between harming and not-aiding
expected consequentialism
a person acts rightly by doing the action that has the highest level of “expected utility”
hedonism
judge actions based on how much pleasure or pain they produce
impartial
everyone’s welfare counts equally in determining the deontic status of an action
inviolability
entails a protection of an individual’s negative rights
negative right
a right to non-interference
nonconsequentialism
denies that the rightness or wrongness of our conduct is determined solely by the goodness or badness of the consequences of our acts or the rules to which those acts conform
partial nonconsequentialism
might advocate prerogatives but no constraints (Scheffler, 1982) or constraints but no prerogatives (Kagan, 1989)
pluralist consequentialism
actions should be judged on a plurality of consequences (e.g. justice, happiness, knowledge)
positive right
right to self-authority , self-mastery
possibilism
when a person is deciding which action would be best, they should weigh the consequences of actions based on what the possible actions they would be capable of taking in the future
prerogatives
moral prerogatives permit an agent to (1) act in ways that do not maximise the impartial good, and (2) act for reasons that stem from his personal perspective, rather than from the perspective of an impartial judge (Kamm, 2013)
principle of permissible harm (PPH)
it is permissible for (1) greater good and (2) means that have greater good as their noncausal flip side to cause a lesser evil, but not permissible for an act (3) to require a lesser evil as a means to greater good, or (4) to directly cause a lesser evil as a side effect when the act has greater good as mere causal effect
rule consequentialism
an action A is right iff A is in accordance with a rule which if generally followed / accepted makes the outcome best
satisficing consequentialism
to perform an action that is “good enough” with respect to its consequences, even if some alternative action would have even better consequences
subjective consequentialism
a person’s actions are right or wrong depending on what they thought the consequences would be
universal
everyone whose welfare will be affected by one’s action counts morally
utilitarianism
the moral worth of an action is determined by how much happiness or suffering it brings to the world, and therefore people should always do whatever will bring about the most happiness to the most people
veil of ignorance
moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by denying decision-makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options
what are two key features of consequentialism?
universal = holds that everyone whose welfare will be affected by one’s action counts morally
impartial = everyone’s welfare counts equally in determining the deontic status of an action
what is the difference between actual and expected consequentialism?
actual consequences: to act rightly is to do whatever produces the best consequences
expected consequences: a person acts rightly by doing the action that has the highest level of “expected utility”
- expected utility is a combination of the good (or bad) effects that one predicts will result from an action and the probability of those effects occurring
what is Smart’s drowning Hitler example? what is its relevance to the debate between actual vs expected consequences?
imagine the action of a person who, in 1938, saves someone from drowning.
while we generally regard saving a drowning person as the right thing to do and praise people for such actions, the person saved from drowning in this case was Adolf Hitler
had Hitler drowned, millions of other people might have been saved from suffering and death between 1938 and 1945
if utilitarianism evaluates the rescuer’s actions based on actual consequences, then the rescuer did the wrong thing
if utilitarianism judges the rescuer’s action by its foreseeable, expected consequences, then the rescuer did the right thing
should consequentialism be used as a theory of rightness or as a decision procedure?
most consequentialists claim that it should be a theory of rightness
- “it is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgement” (Bentham, 1789)
a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures & refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge
how does understanding consequentialism as a theory of rightness help defend against some criticisms.
a consequentialist criterion of right implies that it would not be morally right to use consequentialism as a decision procedure in cases where it would not maximise utility to try to calculate utilities before acting
if the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision
a criterion of the right can be useful at a higher level by helping us choose among available decision procedures & refine our decision procedures as circumstances change and we gain more experience and knowledge
why is consequentialism unlikely or unhelpful as a decision-procedure?
unforeseen & unforeseeable consequences
what intuition supports act consequentialism?
most people agree that we morally ought to improve the world where possible and acting to bring about the best outcomes seems a natural way to achieve this
what are the main objections to act consequentialism?
main objections to act consequentialism
- unable to make sense of familiar moral options
- unable to make sense of familiar moral constraints
- consequentialism operates with a dubious notion of goodness
- consequentialism is self-defeating
- consequentialism gives no practical guidance at all
what is the demandingness objection to act consequentialism?
requirement to maximise utility strikes many people as too demanding because it interferes with the personal decisions that most of us feel should be left up to the individual
the demandingness objection specifically takes issue with the extent to which a theory is demanding on the individual’s self-interest
leaves no room for actions that are permissible yet do not bring about the best consequences
- everything that is suboptimal is impermissible
what is Singer’s version of consequentialism?
- suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad
- if it in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it
- it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbour’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away
- the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position
very demanding form of consequentialism
what are some issues with Singer’s version of consequentialism?
very demanding (although Singer believes morality should be this demanding, no one said it should be easy)
premises 3 & 4 reject to commonly held intuitions about our moral obligations
what is the supererogation objection to consequentialism?
this objection deals with the idea that a plausible principle of beneficence should not require too big a personal sacrifice in order to help strangers
due to agent-neutrality, consequentialism seems unable to make sense of special obligations we have to particular individuals or groups (e.g. family)
what does Wolf mean by act consequentialism being a “morality for saints”?
moral saint: “a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be”
what is the alienation (nearest-and-dearest) objection to act consequentialism?
impartiality assumption alienates us from loved ones
focuses on the way in which acting for consequentialist reasons seems incompatible with acting in ways that partly constitute valuable relationships
due to agent-neutrality, consequentialism seems unable to make sense of special obligations we have to particular individuals or groups (e.g. family)
- fails to recognise the moral legitimacy of giving special preferences to ourselves & people that we know and care about
what is Stocker’s (1976) hospital case used to demonstrate the alienation objection?
you are ill & lying in hospital
a friend comes to the hospital to visit you
at the end of the visit, when you thank her for making the trip, she remarks that she did it because she knew it would give you pleasure and was thus obligated by consequentialism to visit
upon hearing this, you instantly feel disheartened; the fact that the friend visited us out of moral obligation, and not simply due to her love for us seems to make it feel less satisfying on our behalf
which scholar offers the hospital case as an example of the alienation objection?
Stocker, 1976
what is the permissibility objection to act consequentialism?
“wrong answers” objection
gives the wrong answers to moral questions (permits various actions that everyone knows are morally wrong)
what are some amendments that can be made to consequentialism in response to objections?
multi-level consequentialism
satisficing consequentialism
rule consequentialism
the agent-relative / agent-neutral distinction
motive consequentialism
how does single-level consequentialism differ from multi-level consequentialism?
single-level: normative reason = motivating reason
multi-level: normative reason ≠ motivating reason
distinction to be made between one’s motivating reason & one’s normative reason for action
- a motivating reason is a reason that explains why an action was done (e.g. love, friendship)
- a normative reason justifies why an action is right or wrong (e.g. performing this action will maximise general welfare)
multi-level endorses act consequentialism for right action but endorses a different decision procedure
- only takes consequentialism to be a theory of rightness not as a decision procedure
what is multi-level consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?
multi-level consequentialism endorses act consequentialism for right action but endorses a different decision procedure
- only takes consequentialism to be a theory of rightness not as a decision procedure
view that individuals should usually follow tried-and-tested rules of thumb / heuristics, rather than trying to calculate which action will produce the most well-being
distinction to be made between one’s motivating reason & one’s normative reason for action
- a motivating reason is a reason that explains why an action was done (e.g. love, friendship)
- a normative reason justifies why an action is right or wrong (e.g. performing this action will maximise general welfare)
how can multi-level consequentialism help respond to the hospital case?
I can visit my friend out of friendship (motivating reason), and the reason that doing so is right is because it maximises general welfare (normative reason)
what are some objections to multi-level consequentialism?
incompatible with real relationship values
self-effacing
Stocker’s disharmony between motives & reasons
- ‘reasons’ are the justifications & values one has for taking a particular action; ‘motives’, however, are the true impulses behind an action
- motives & reasons must be in harmony during interpersonal activities for moral values to be realised
- genuine love & friendship are among the greatest pleasures that one can experience, however, if they are done purely as a means to an end & not an end in themselves, the pleasure of those emotions is lost
what is Stocker’s disharmony between motives & reasons objection to multi-level consequentialism?
‘reasons’ are the justifications & values one has for taking a particular action; ‘motives’, however, are the true impulses behind an action
motives & reasons must be in harmony during interpersonal activities for moral values to be realised
genuine love & friendship are among the greatest pleasures that one can experience, however, if they are done purely as a means to an end & not an end in themselves, the pleasure of those emotions is lost
what is satisficing consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?
X brings about a sufficient amount of Y
to satisfice is to perform an action that is “good enough” with respect to its consequences, even if some alternative action would have even better consequences
it is not morally wrong to fail to contribute to a charity if one contributes enough to other charities & if the money or time that one could contribute does create enough good, so it is not just wasted
which scholar offers satisficing consequentialism?
Slote, 1984
what is an objection to satisficing consequentialism?
arbitrary threshold of defining ‘good enough’, unwelcome implications
- suggests morality is indifferent between saving 2 people and saving 6 people
licences gratuitous harms
- so long as it leaves us over the threshold, there’s nothing wrong with a harm even when a non-harmful act was available (Bradley, 2006)
what is rule consequentialism? how can it help respond to the demandingness objection?
an action A is right iff A is in accordance with a rule which if generally followed / accepted makes the outcome best
part of determining which code would be ideal requires that one consider the costs of successfully getting people to internalise a rule that requires people to be completely impartial in their decisions that affect their own welfare and the welfare of loved ones
what are some objections to rule consequentialism?
ideal world objection / compliance level objection (Parfit, 2011)
- compliance vs internalisation
collapses into act consequentialism (Smart, 1973)
rule worship objection (Smart, 1973)
what is the ideal world objection / compliance level objection to rule consequentialism?
optimal rules under conditions of universal compliance prescribe acts that are obviously wrong in conditions of partial non-compliance
compliance formulation: an act is morally permissible if and only if it is allowed by the code of rules, which if generally complied with, would produce the most good
internalisation formulation: an act is morally permissible if and only if it is allowed by the code of rules whose internalisation by the vast majority would produce the most good
Hooker favours the internalisation formulation
- internalisation can have benefits that mere compliance doesn’t have
are versions of rule consequentialism that use rates of compliance other than 100% more robust?
philosophers have proposed versions of rule consequentialism that assess the consequences of rules under some rates of compliance other than only 100%
- e.g. at 90% (Hooker, 2000)
but these still fall foul of the ‘distant world objection’ (Podgorski, 2018)
what is the difference between compliance and internalisation of rules? why does it matter for rule consequentialism?
compliance: one complies with a code of rules if and only if one acts in accordance with that code of rules
internalisation: one has internalised a code of rules if and only if one both believes that the right thing to do is what is specified by the code and has the psychological dispositions and character traits that dispose one to do what is specified by the code, to feel guilt when one violates the code, and to resent it when others violate the code
Hooker favours the internalisation formulation
- internalisation can have benefits that mere compliance doesn’t have
- e.g. suppose that you have internalised the rule that says “retaliate against an attacker” and that you are totally transparent in the sense that people know your dispositions just by looking at you. Your having internalised the rule will, then, have the benefit of deterring potential attackers without your ever having to retaliate against any attackers. This is a benefit that merely complying with the rule doesn’t have
what is the limitation of internalisation of rules?
might be more costly to get one code of rules internalised than another, and we should not overlook this cost since, absent obtrusive governmental policing & sanctions, internalisation is necessary to ensure general compliance
what is the objection to rule consequentialism that it collapses into act consequentialism?
RC is extensionally equivalent to act consequentialism (Lyons)
E.g. Kant’s claim that lying is always wrong
- many deem too rigid & claim it fails to account for the circumstances in which the lie is being told
- more plausible rule could be that offered by Nathanson, which says “do not lie except in special circumstances that justify lying”
- what are these special circumstances - for a utilitarian correct circumstances would be when lying would generate more good than telling the truth
- RU adopting this approach & advocating a moral code that consists of a list of rules of this form would look like “do x except when not doing x maximises utility” and while this seems plausible, it also is identical to AU
reason for not formulating RC in terms of compliance
what is the limitation on the ‘collapses into act consequentialism’ objection to rule consequentialism?
collapse objection depends on a universal-conformity model of rule consequentialism
what is the “rule worship” objection to rule consequentialism?
“rule worship”: an irrational deference to rules that has no utilitarian justification (Smart, 1973)
sometimes need to break a rule (e.g. promise) for another rule (e.g. killing)
- creates hierarchy of rules
can lead to disaster e.g. Hitler case
how can a rule consequentialist respond to the “rule worship” objection?
response: override rule that requires one to prevent disaster even when doing so requires breaking other rules (Brandt)
but what counts as disaster?
how can agent-relative consequentialism help respond to the nearest-and-dearest objection?
we have more information on those near to us so can better approximate their expected utility at given points
sometimes it is required that we are able to give extended action with feedback
we have more commitment to those close to us
how can the agent-relative / agent-neutral distinction help respond the demandingness objection?
since “my” projects depend on my interests and desires, and since “my” interests and desires do not seem to generate agent-neutral reasons, by elimination the reasons in question must be agent-relative
having established that there are genuine agent-relative reasons, conclude that it must sometimes be possible to pursue our own interests instead of the overall good, since agent-relative reasons will sometimes outweigh agent-neutral reasons
if there is more value in benefiting oneself or one’s family and friends than there is disvalue in letting strangers die (without killing them), then spending resources on oneself or one’s family and friends would maximise the good
thus the fact that moral requirements exist does not need to conflict with the pursuit of our own projects
how does agent-relative consequentialism capture commonsense moral intuition?
agent-relative consequentialists can assign more weight to the welfare of a friend of an agent when assessing the value of the consequences of that agent’s acts
in this way, consequentialists try to capture common moral intuitions about the duties of friendship (Jackson, 1991)
does nonconsequentialism deny that consequences can be a factor in determining the rightness of an action?
no
only denies that they are the sole determinant of the rightness or wrongness of an action
what does contemporary nonconsequentialism typically include?
personal prerogatives not to maximise the good & constraints on producing the good (Kamm, 2013)
what are prerogatives? what is the consequence of including them?
a prerogative denies that agents must always maximise good consequences
hence, it allows for the possibility that some acts are supererogatory because, while they are not morally required, they are morally valuable in virtue of producing better consequences (Kamm, 2013)
give an example of a partial nonconsequentialist who advocates for prerogatives but no constraints.
Scheffler, 1982
give an example of a partial nonconsequentialist who advocates for constraints but no prerogatives.
Kagan, 1989
what are the justifications for prerogatives?
non-alienation (Scheffler, 1982)
- humans are psychologically predisposed to be most concerned about their own projects
- morally permitted to pursue their non-optimific projects for personal reasons, cannot be alienated from their fundamental natures
people are ends-in-themselves (personal sovereignty)
- since we should not view people as mere means of promoting the greater good, each of us can sometimes justifiably pursue non optimific goals
- on this view, the foundation of prerogatives can also be the foundation of constraints on interferences, as both are connected to the idea of personal sovereignty
- moral obligation less about doing as much good as possible than it is about respect for persons
what is Scheffler’s (1982) non-alienation justification for prerogatives?
humans are psychologically predisposed to be most concerned about their own projects
morally permitted to pursue their non-optimific projects for personal reasons, cannot be alienated from their fundamental natures
this justification does not morally limit others from interfering with someone in their quest to maximise the good; it only implies that someone need not always act of his own accord for impartial good for impartial reasons
this non-alienation justification suggests agents should be permitted to try to control what they care about most
what is Kamm’s (2013) ‘people are ends-in-themselves’ justification for prerogatives?
since we should not view people as mere means of promoting the greater good, each of us can sometimes justifiably pursue non-optimific goals
on this view, the foundation of prerogatives can also be the foundation of constraints on interferences, as both are connected to the idea of personal sovereignty
prerogatives can be seen as a by-product of the fact that moral obligation is not about producing as much good as possible. It is about respect for persons and doing as much good as that requires
what are the most commonly proposed constraints?
(1) a strong duty not to harm owed to each individual and so correlative to that individual’s right not to be harmed; and/or (2) a prohibition against intending harm
what is the equivalence thesis? how can we rebut it?
equivalence thesis: consequentialists argue that there is no intrinsic moral difference between harming and not-aiding
principle of contextual interaction: a property can behave differently in one context than in another
If we can find even one set of comparable cases in which a harming is morally worse than a not-aiding, we rebut a universal claim like the Equivalence Thesis
what is the Bathtub Case (Rachels, 1975)?
- Smith will inherit a fortune if his little cousin dies. One evening while the child is taking his bath, Smith drowns him
- Jones will inherit a fortune if his little cousin dies. When Jones enters the bathroom, he sees that the child slipped and fell face down in the water. Although Jones could easily save the child, he does nothing, intending that the child die
why are the two Bathtub cases different? (Kamm, 2013)
- in killing we introduce a threat that was not previously present, while in letting die, we do not interfere with a currently present threat
- in killing we act, while in letting die we fail to act (in particular, we refrain from acting);
- in killing we cause someone to lose life that he would have had independently of our actions at that time; in letting die, someone loses only life that he would have had with our help at that time; and
- in killing we interfere first with the victim, while in letting die, we avoid being interfered with (by having to aid)
what general conclusions can we gain from applying our conclusions about killing and letting die to the general moral distinction between harming and not-aiding?
- when we kill or let someone die, we might reasonably think that she has some right to her life. But when we harm or do not aid someone in non-life-and-death cases, what they lose – or fail to get – may be something to which they have no right
- generally, when someone kills, they interfere with another’s body in ways they do not do when they let die. However, if we harm someone in non-life-and-death cases, we may not necessarily interfere with her body any more than if we do not aid
what does Foot appeal to to justify the DDA?
Foot appeals to negative / positive rights to justify DDA
- in the Trolley Case, comparing violations of negative rights - comparing killing one to killing five (numbers count)
- in the Judge Case, comparing violations of negative right and positive rights
negative rights have priority over positive rights (Foot, 1967)
- violations of negative rights take precedence
- justifies doing/allowing distinction
how does the distinction between negative & positive rights justify the DDA?
negative rights have priority over positive rights (Foot, 1967)
- violations of negative rights take precedence
- justifies doing/allowing distinction
what are three justifications for arguing doing harm is more morally significant than merely allowing harm?
- typical difference in cost to the agent of avoiding doing harm as compared to the cost of avoiding allowing harm
- HOWEVER, some instances of refraining from doing harm exacting tremendous costs; some cases of providing aid require next to no sacrifice (only provides a rough guide)
- doing harm to an individual is more disrespectful of that person than merely allowing harm to befall him
- easier to claim than defend
- the appropriate sort of facts about a particular agent can ground especially compelling moral requirements
are the three justifications for arguing doing harm is more morally significant than merely allowing harm successful?
all three justifications are unsuccessful in defending the moral relevance of the distinction between doing and allowing (all are agent-focused)
is there a meaningful distinction between withdrawing aid & initiating a threat?
Foot contends relevant distinction between initiating a threatening sequence of events or keeping it going & allowing a threatening sequence that is already in train to continue (Foot, 1967)
one suggestion is that whether an act of withdrawing aid or protection counts as killing or letting die depends on whether the barrier to death that one removes is a barrier that one has oneself provided
what is the moral significance between removing operative vs as-yet-inoperative aid?
if aid or protection against a lethal threat is both operative and self-sustaining, withdrawing it appears to count as killing irrespective of whether the person who withdraws it is also the person who provided it (Kagan, 1991)
but, when aid that is as-yet-inoperative is withdrawn, it seems to make a difference to whether this counts as killing or letting die whether the person who withdraws it is also the person who provided it (Kagan, 1991)
what are the Abdul cases? how do they help explain the difference between removing operative vs as-yet-inoperative aid?
Abdul 1: Food is being sent to the starving inhabitants of a remote village but Abdul intercepts the supplies and steals them
Abdul 2: A check that can be used to buy food is on its way to the village but Abdul intercepts and steals the check
Abdul 3: Abdul himself writes a check and mails it to the village. Later, however, he intercepts the check and tears it up
Abdul 4: Abdul writes a check for the village and gives it to a friend to mail. A moment later he changes his mind and asks the friend to return it to him
in each of these cases Abdul does something that prevents aid from reaching its intended beneficiaries. He interferes in a sequence of events in such a way that people die who would not otherwise have died. He therefore violates the constraint against doing harm
yet common-sense morality holds that what Abdul does in Abdul 3 and in Abdul 4 is permissible
is there a moral difference between intending vs foreseeing harm?
DDE: there is a moral constraint on intending evil, even when the evil will be a means to a greater good. Nonetheless, we may be permitted to employ neutral or good means to pursue a greater good, even though we foresee evil side effects if (1) the good is proportionate to the evil and (2) there is no better way to achieve this good (Kamm, 2013)
DDE prohibits actions that aim at evil ends, but leaves room for those undertaken in pursuit of the good, but that have foreseeable but unintended evil consequences
what are some objections to the DDE?
lacks consideration for justice and fairness - i.e. the rights of the victim (Kamm, 2013)
subjectivity: the DDE can be subject to interpretation and can be applied differently by different people
- difficulty in distinguishing between intended & foreseen consequences, especially in complex situations
- difficulty in determining proportionality between good & bad consequences. This is especially true when the bad consequences are severe, and the good consequences are minor
traditional DDE is too strong - seems to rule out intentionally harming someone to promote that person’s overall good, and it rules out intentionally harming someone to help others even when that person is no worse off than he would have been otherwise (Kamm, 2013)
major objection (Thomson, 1999): states of mind (such as intending) cannot make an act that is otherwise permissible be impermissible
what is the PPH and how is it connected to the DDE?
PPH is a sharpening of DDE in terms of what is permissible or not permissible as means
PPH: it is permissible for (1) greater good and (2) means that have greater good as their noncausal flip side to cause lesser evil, but not permissible for an act (3) to require lesser evil as a means to greater good, or (4) to directly cause lesser evil as a side effect when the act has greater good as mere causal effect (Kamm, 1989)
how does the PPH distinguish between the substitution and subordination of persons?
PPH gives expression a moral distinction between substitution & subordination of persons (Kamm, 2007)
it is sometimes permissible to substitute a person for others so that the substituted person is threatened instead of the original people
this contrasts with subordinating one person to others, as in Transplant Case (CS5), which is not permissible
is the PPH inviolable?
inviolability of PPH is not absolute - limited qualitatively (PPH permits some ways of harming) and may be limited quantitatively (e.g. PPH may be overridden to save a million people)
what is a rights-centric nonconsequentialist approach?
the fact that people have moral status means that treating them morally requires considering their interests
the moral status of a given individual might override the calculation of consequences
changes the frame of case studies
- rather than framing questions in terms of what the agent is permitted or obligated to do, we should instead concern ourselves with what treatment the victim is entitled to receive
this approach is not merely about producing as much good as possible, but rather about maintaining respect for individuals and doing as much good as this requires
how does the inviolability of a person’s rights affect consequentialist calculations?
entitlement of ‘victim’ might reasonably be framed around a person’s inviolability
connection to Kant’s categorical imperative specifying that we should treat people not merely as means but as ends in themselves, and whose lives have an unconditional value (Kamm, 2013)
high degree of inviolability is correlated with a strong right protecting a person’s life. To transgress this right would then constitute a moral wrong
what are the advantages of a rights-based approach to consequentialism?
common sense
- intuitive appeal to incorporating provisions for individual respect into our version of consequentialism as it tends to align itself with commonsense notions of fairness & justice, acknowledging the separateness of persons in a way that is typically overlooked by consequentialist arguments
practical value
- appreciate this by considering what would happen if everybody were permitted to act in disregard to inviolability
what are the limitations of the inviolability constraint?
while inviolability entails a protection of an individual’s negative rights, it does not make provisions for positive rights
link to doing harm vs withholding aid
what are the counterarguments to a rights-based approach?
both arguments centre around an individual wishing to forgo their inviolability: veil of ignorance & saving millions
what is the veil of ignorance counterargument to a rights-based approach? (Kamm, 2013)
individual’s decision-making from behind a veil of ignorance
consider the case where a person does not know if, at some point in their life, they may find themselves in the trolley problem, either in the group of five or as the one
Kamm’s outline of the counterargument suggests that the rational individual would choose to forego their rights, as their chances of being saved are greater than their chances of being sacrificed
evaluation: while such a decision may be the strictly rational choice, there is cause to question whether individuals would be quite so content to bargain away their moral status
what is the saving millions counterargument to a rights-based approach?
perhaps in the instance where sacrificing one life would protect millions, an individual could conceivably wish for their rights to be foregone
evaluation: while true that many would be happy to sacrifice their own life in the interest of saving such a great number of lives, it is difficult to know where each individual would draw the line
CASE STUDY: judge in a riot (Foot, 1967)
imagine a judge faced with a difficult decision: either frame and execute an innocent man, or allow five people to be killed in a riot that started because people were outraged by the innocent man not being executed
CASE STUDY: Trolly Driver Decision
a trolley is hurtling along the tracks and the driver sees five people on the track in front of him. On the other track, there is one person
the trolley driver must make a choice: either divert the trolley onto the other track where it will hit and kill one innocent person, or let it continue on its current path and run over five people
consequentialist response: kill the one
CASE STUDY: Trolley with Bystander Decision
a trolley is about to collide with five people, resulting in their deaths. A bystander has the ability to divert the trolley such that it travels along a different set of tracks, however, doing so will cause it to collide and kill one person.
consequentialist response: not only defensible, but morally obligatory, for the bystander to divert the trolley, as doing so would result in the greater good by minimising total number of deaths
possible non-consequentialist response: adopt the view that we are required to maximise the good within the scope of certain constraints & prerogatives
what is Foot’s argument regarding the distinction between the judge case and the trolly driver case?
wrong for the judge to kill one person in as judge has to choose between killing one & merely allowing five to die
not wrong for trolley driver to kill as the choice is between killing one & killing five
what might account for our moral judgements in these cases? The DDA is one possible explanation, the DDE another one
CASE STUDY: transplant case
doctor tasked with treating five gravely ill patients, each in need of a different organ transplant. Doctor scheduled to meet with a healthy patient for a routine check-up. This patient would make a suitable organ donor for all other ill patients. Harvesting patient 5’s organs would save all five other patients, at the cost of just one
without an inviolability constraint in place, it might follow that the doctor is morally obligated to sacrifice the life of the healthy patient to save the lives of the others
however, universalising this behaviour (permitting doctors to sacrifice the lives of patients without their consent) would lead to a world in which patients feared doctors and avoided entering hospitals out of concern for their lives
if we value rights above all, we must acknowledge that the rights of all are compromised when any one individual’s rights are transgressed
to prevent a gradual erosion of rights, we must impose an inviolability condition such that it can never be considered morally permissible for them to be violated, irrespective of an agent’s intent, or the consequences of an act on the greater good
CASE STUDY: euthanasia throat cancer (Rachels, 1975)
case of incurable throat cancer patient that will die in next few days but is in agony so wants to end it sooner
- if one withholds treatment, it may take longer for the patient to die & so he may suffer more than he would if more direct action were taken and a lethal injection given
- strong reason to think that active euthanasia is preferable to passive
doctrine that active euthanasia is always wrong while passive euthanasia is sometimes permissible can be challenged for several reasons:
- active euthanasia is in many cases more humane than passive euthanasia
- doctrine rests on a distinction between killing & letting die that itself can be questioned
CASE STUDY: abortion (Kagan, 1991)
claim: a merely extractive abortion involves the active withdrawal of life-supporting aid from the foetus
- therefore when a pregnant woman has a merely extractive abortion, thereby withdrawing life-supporting aid that she herself has been providing to a foetus, she does not kill the foetus but merely allows it to die
objections to claim:
- even if we concede that withdrawing aid in progress that one has oneself been providing counts as an instance of letting die, the agent who performs an abortion is typically not the pregnant woman herself but is instead her doctor. Since the doctor terminates life-support that someone else has provided, he kills the foetus rather than lets it die
- even a merely extractive abortion is an instance of doing something that results in the foetus’s death - namely, actively removing the foetus from the environment that supports its life. Hence, it is odd to describe it as merely allowing death to occur
- in order for one to allow a person to die, there must be some preexisting threatening sequence of events that one fails to arrest or to which one removes some barrier by which it has been blocked. But in the case of a merely extractive abortion, there is no threat to the foetus which the abortion allows to continue by failing to arrest it or by unblocking it. The abortion itself “originates the sequence which ends in the death of the foetus, and the destruction comes about ‘through the agency’ of the mother who seeks the abortion.” (Foot). A merely extractive abortion is, therefore, an act of killing rather than an instance of allowing the foetus to die
