Relativism

Question 1

agent relativism

Answer 1

it is right for agent A to do X if and only if, according to A’s moral framework, it is right for A to X

Question 2

critic relativism

Answer 2

the statement “it is right for agent A to do X” made by C is true iff according to C’s moral framework, it is right for A to do X

Question 3

descriptive moral relativism (DMR)

Answer 3

as a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be

Question 4

empirical thesis of relativism

Answer 4

there are deep and widespread moral disagreements

Question 5

inner judgements (Harman)

Answer 5

inner judgements are judgements made when we say that someone should have done something or comment on the rightness or wrongness of someone’s actions

Question 6

metaethical moral relativism (MMR)

Answer 6

the truth or falsity of moral judgements, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons

Question 7

metaethical thesis of relativism

Answer 7

the truth or justification of moral judgements is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons

Question 8

moral objectivism

Answer 8

moral judgements are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense

Question 9

moral relativism

Answer 9

the view that there are no objective moral truths, instead moral judgements are true relative to a moral framework

not the case that all our moral judgements are false, rather there are many moral frameworks, none of which is better or more correct than the others

Question 10

moral scepticism

Answer 10

the view that we are never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgements

Question 11

normative moral relativism

Answer 11

the idea that all societies should accept each other’s differing moral values, given that there are no universal moral principles

Question 12

pluralistic relativism

Answer 12

accounts for the moral disagreements by holding that there is more than one adequate morality

Question 13

sound argument

Answer 13

for an argument to be sound its premises must all be true, and its conclusion must logically follow from them

Question 14

valid argument

Answer 14

an argument is valid when if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true

Question 15

what are the three positions that moral relativism can take?

Answer 15

empirical, metaethical, or normative

Question 16

what is the Sextus Empiricus quote supporting DMR?

Answer 16

“there is nothing by nature good or bad…the same thing is thought bad by one person and good by another”

Question 17

who said “there is nothing by nature good or bad…the same thing is thought bad by one person and good by another”?

Answer 17

Sextus Empiricus

Question 18

how is DMR often thought to have been established?

Answer 18

through anthropology and other empirical disciplines

Question 19

what is the implication of MMR?

Answer 19

that moral judgements have moral authority or normative force but only relative to some group or culture

truth value of moral judgements is relative to society

the justification of moral judgements is relative rather than absolute

Question 20

give an example for MMR.

Answer 20

“polygamy is wrong”

may be true for one society but false relative to another. It is neither true nor false

Question 21

why is the justification of moral judgements relative rather than absolute under MMR?

Answer 21

different societies have different evidence available to them

different societies have different standards of justification and there is no rational basis for resolving these differences

Question 22

why was normative moral relativism initially adopted?

Answer 22

it is a prescriptive position adopted initially by many anthropologists reacting against the ethnocentrism characteristic of the colonial era

Question 23

why is normative moral relativism sometimes not considered a form of relativism in and of itself?

Answer 23

it is a prescriptive position adopted initially by many anthropologists reacting against the ethnocentrism characteristic of the colonial era

because it is prescriptive, many would say that what is being described here is not really a form of relativism but is, rather, a position entailed by moral relativism

Question 24

what is the issue with normative moral relativism?

Answer 24

just because certain actions are okay in some cultures doesn’t mean that other cultures cannot rightfully condemn them

e.g. bribery

Question 25

what is cultural relativism?

Answer 25

cultural relativism says that there is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cultural codes (Rachels & Rachels, 2015)

Question 26

which scholars write about cultural relativism?

Answer 26

Rachels & Rachels, 2015

Question 27

what are some of the claims emphasised by cultural relativists?

Answer 27

1. different societies have different moral codes
2. the moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; so, if a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right, at least in that society (key claim)
3. there is no objective standard that can be used to judge one society’s code as better than another’s. There are no moral truths that hold for all people at all times
4. the moral code of our own society has no special status; it is but one among many
5. it is arrogant for us to judge other cultures. We should always be tolerant of them

Question 28

what is the problem with the claims that cultural relativists emphasise?

Answer 28

claims (2) and (5) seem to conflict

• e.g. when the Nazi army invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, thus beginning World War II, this was an intolerant action of the first order. But what if it conformed to Nazi ideals? A cultural relativist, it seems, cannot criticise the Nazis for being intolerant, if all they’re doing is following their own moral beliefs

Question 29

how can cultural relativists respond to the criticism that they cannot criticise the Nazi’s for their intolerance?

Answer 29

cultural relativism holds that the norms of a culture reign supreme within the bounds of the culture itself (Rachels & Rachels, 2015)

• “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” - avoids Nazi example; as soon as entered Poland, bound by norms of Polish society

Question 30

what is the cultural differences argument?

Answer 30

1. different cultures have different moral codes
2. therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture

Question 31

is the cultural differences argument sound?

Answer 31

not sound
- premise concerns belief, conclusion concerns what really is the case

• argument is invalid

e.g. some societies believe that earth is flat, others believe earth is a sphere. Doesn’t follow from the mere fact that people disagree that there is no “objective truth” in geography

Question 32

what are some of the limitations to the cultural differences argument?

Answer 32

cultural differences can be exaggerated

• we differ in our beliefs, not in our values
• many factors work together to produce the customs of a society. Not only are the society’s values important but so are its religious beliefs, its factual beliefs, and its physical environment - we cannot conclude that two societies differ in values just because they differ in customs

Question 33

what is the argument from disagreement?

Answer 33

prem1: there is a lot of moral disagreement

prem2: moral disagreement is unusually intractable

conc: the best explanation of this disagreement is that there is no single objectively true morality, but there are moral truths that are relative to moral frameworks

Question 34

what is the deductive argument from disagreement?

Answer 34

prem1: there is variation of moral codes between and within cultures

conc: therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture

Question 35

is the deductive argument from disagreement sound?

Answer 35

no

even if the premise was true, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from it and might still be false

the premise concerns belief whereas the conclusion concerns what really is the case hence the argument’s invalidity

e.g some groups believe that the earth is flat and others believe it is a sphere
- this argument would suggest that from the mere fact that people disagree, there is no objective truth in geography
- this is FALSE

Question 36

give an example to prove that the deductive argument from disagreement is not sound.

Answer 36

some groups believe that the earth is flat and others believe it is a sphere

this argument would suggest that from the mere fact that people disagree, there is no objective truth in geography

this is FALSE

Question 37

how can the deductive argument from disagreement potentially be saved from criticism that it is not sound?

Answer 37

deductive argument could potentially be saved by adding an epistemological premise that, for example, fundamental moral truths have to be self-evident

HOWEVER, the idea of ‘self-evident’ is not clear and is, in itself, a term which could induce disagreement (Enoch, 2011)

Question 38

what is the explanatory argument from disagreement?

Answer 38

prem1: there is deep, wide-ranging disagreement in moral matters across cultures and historical eras, as well as within them

prem2: what best explains such disagreement is that moral opinions do not reflect an objective, independent moral reality, but rather perspectives, cultures, ways of life, or something of the sort

conc: therefore, moral opinions do not reflect an objective, independent moral reality, but rather perspectives, cultures, ways of life, or something of the sort (from 1. and 2., by inference to the best explanation (IBE))

Question 39

what is an objection to the relativist’s explanatory argument from disagreement?

Answer 39

problematic first and foremost because its conclusion as it stands is consistent with Robust Realism (Enoch, 2011)

robust realist can reply: perhaps our moral opinions do not reflect the objective moral reality. But this does not show that there is no such reality to be reflected

Question 40

how can a realist respond to the explanatory argument from disagreement?

Answer 40

given that this argument is found on IBE, there are three ways a realist may respond (Enoch, 2011)

1. Deny existence of widespread moral disagreement
2. Deny the need to explain widespread moral disagreement
3. Respond with equally possible and plausible alternative explanations

Question 41

is there really widespread moral disagreement?

Answer 41

there is disagreement on specific moral judgements but this disagreement need not be genuinely moral disagreement or even disagreement at all (Enoch, 2011)

there are different moral views, but perhaps these can be explained by other factors

cultural differences may be exaggerated (Rachels & Rachels, 2015)

Question 42

give some examples of moral disagreement between cultures.

Answer 42

the status of women
slavery
infanticide

Question 43

give some examples of moral disagreement within cultures.

Answer 43

acceptability of abortions
euthanasia
vegetarianism
welfare support levels

Question 44

can different moral views be explained by other factors? if so, what are these?

Answer 44

1. there might be important differences in the situations of agents who appear to disagree
2. there might be important differences in the non-moral beliefs of agents
3. there might be general agreement in moral principles, but disagreement in how they should be implemented in particular cases
4. there might be moral indeterminacy - vagueness (e.g. at which moment does a foetus gain moral status), or incommensurability of values (e.g. is there a determinate answer for how important equality is versus liberty?)

Question 45

does disagreement on specific moral judgements mean there is genuine moral disagreement?

Answer 45

not necessarily

because the disagreement about specific moral judgements does not stem from genuine moral disagreement but rather from different factual beliefs that are relevant to the application of the agreed-upon moral principles (Enoch, 2011)

Question 46

are cultural differences exaggerated? if so, what is the implication?

Answer 46

potentially (Rachels and Rachels, 2015)

if exaggerated, the ‘widespread’ nature of moral disagreement is not as problematic as first appears

they argue what we differ in is our beliefs, not our values

customs of a society are formed through the combination of many factors such as its religious beliefs and its physical environment and as such, it is a large jump to conclude that two societies differ in values just because they differ in customs

Question 47

what is the Eskimo Infanticide case? what does it show?

Answer 47

Eskimos permit and sometimes encourage infanticide which, on the surface, is shocking to other cultures

however, this practice is not due to a fundamental disregard for children or human life but instead, arose from the need for drastic measures to ensure group survival (high regard for human life)

Eskimo values not dissimilar to ours, difference stems from choices that the environment forces them to make which ours does not

Question 48

does moral disagreement require an explanation?

Answer 48

the realist is arguably not entitled to assume that disagreement does not call for an explanation but in the same way, nor can the relativist assume that it does

given our cognitive shortcomings, agreement rather than disagreement is what calls for explanation (Enoch, 2011)

Question 49

are there alternative explanations to the IBE argument?

Answer 49

many moral matters are complex and people are often the victims of any number of cognitive shortcomings

people often let our interests influence our beliefs and given that our interests differ this accounts for differences in our beliefs

• there is strong correlation between the moral views that people take on controversial moral matters and the views that would serve them better
• e.g. would be surprising if the rich were in favour of socialism and the poor in favour of libertarianism

people can be subject to manipulation and so to the distorting effects of their self-interests

• could explain the difference in scope of disagreement in morality (Enoch, 2011)

Question 50

what is the fundamental flaw of realist responses to the IBE argument?

Answer 50

any realist responses to the IBE version of argument from disagreement are incomplete as they are versions of IBE themselves and as such are subject to the same objections

Question 51

is moral disagreement consistent with the existence of objective moral values?

Answer 51

is it possible that some people / cultures are systematically better than others at discerning objective moral truths, and so those people have moral knowledge and others are just mistaken?

difficult to substantiate this claim

Question 52

is moral relativism a good explanation of moral disagreement?

Answer 52

suppose that Claire had an abortion, which is permissible according to her moral framework. You and I disagree over whether what she did is permissible - you think it is, I think it isn’t

agent relativism: Claire’s abortion is morally permissible, since it is permitted by her moral framework

critic relativism: Claire’s abortion is both morally permissible & not morally permissible, or more precisely, it is permissible according to your moral framework & not permissible according to mine

so at best we only think we are disagreeing, really we are not

so it is not clear that relativism is a good explanation of moral disagreement at all

Question 53

what is Harman’s version of moral relativism?

Answer 53

Harman believes that morality arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one another (Harman, 1975)

• makes sense only in relation to and with reference to one or another such agreement or understanding
• defends an individualistic, idealised agent moral relativism

a moral judgement that a person ought to do X (an “inner judgement”) implies that the person has motivating reasons to do X, and that a person is likely to have such reasons only if he or she has implicitly entered into an agreement with others about what to do

• moral judgments of this kind are valid only for groups of persons who have made such agreements

Question 54

what are inner judgements?

Answer 54

inner judgements are judgements made when we say that someone should or ought to have done something or comment on the rightness or wrongness of someone’s actions (Harman, 1975)

Question 55

what are two key characteristics of inner judgements?

Answer 55

1. they imply that the agent has reasons to do something
2. the speaker in some sense endorses these reasons and supposes that the audience also endorses them

Question 56

according to Harman, what logical form to moral judgements take?

Answer 56

according to Harman, moral judgements have the logical form:

“ought (A, D, C, M)” meaning that given A has motivating attitudes M and given C, D is the course of action for A that is supported by the best reasons (Harman, 1975)

moral “oughts” are “reason-involving”: if you morally ought to X, you must have sufficient reason to X. But you have sufficient reason to X only if you would be motivated to X when you had made no mistakes of reasoning about X

Question 57

what example can be used for Harman’s inner judgements argument?

Answer 57

example: professional assassin would have no motivation not to murder even if he reasoned ideally. So it is not the case that he morally ought not to murder

reply: but if the assassin were a good & rational person, he would recognise an objective moral obligation, and hence a sufficient reason, not to kill

Harman: this supposed reason is not consistent with a scientific conception of the world

Question 58

what is the internalism argument from disagreement against moral realism?

Answer 58

prem1: someone morally ought to Φ only if they are, or under suitable conditions would be, motivated to Φ

prem2: agents’ motivations diverge fairly radically, so that there is no type of action that all are, or under suitable conditions would be, motivated to perform

prem3: there is no moral ought-judgement that is true of everyone

conc: therefore, robust realism is false

Question 59

is the internalism argument from disagreement an argument for relativism or against realism?

Answer 59

an argument against realism

NOT for relativism

Question 60

is the internalism argument from disagreement against moral realism valid?

Answer 60

yes

Question 61

how can a realist respond to the internalism argument from disagreement against moral realism?

Answer 61

realist only has two ways of responding: either through premise 1 by rejecting internalism, or through premise 2, by arguing that agents’ motivations are not radically diverse

if they do not reject internalism, they must argue that some motivations are necessarily found in all agents

the other approach simply says the internalist premise is false & it entails even more clearly false propositions

• e.g. that it is not true to say of Hitler that he ought not to have done what he did (Harman, 1975)

Question 62

what are some objections to Harman’s inner judgement?

Answer 62

one traditional difficulty for implicit agreement theories concerns what motivates us to do what we have agreed to do

• not enough to say that we have implicitly agreed to keep agreements, since the issue would then be why we keep that agreement
• if we agree in this sense to do something, we intend to do it and intending to do it is already to be motivated to do

not all agreements are morally binding e.g. those made under compulsion

• if agreement = agreement in intentions, then there was no agreement in the first place

implicit agreements are too weak a basis on which to found morality

• if they had already agreed, why is there a problem with making it explicit?
• agreements sometimes hard to specify e.g. the understanding that exists among the members of a team of acrobats or a symphony orchestra

Question 63

what is Williams’ critique of relativism - the relativism of distance?

Answer 63

Williams criticises “vulgar” relativism: which holds both that “wrong” means “wrong for a society” and also that it is wrong to criticise other societies (the second claim is not relativised)

ethical appraisals are appropriate in real confrontations but not notional confrontations

• real confrontation: a divergent outlook is a real option for us
• notional confrontation: a divergent outlook is known but is not a real option for us

Question 64

what is the distinction between “real” and “notional” confrontation in Williams’ relativism of distance?

Answer 64

real confrontation: a divergent outlook is a real option for us

notional confrontation: a divergent outlook is known but is not a real option for us

a “real” rather than “notional” confrontation is one where we could consider going over to living by that culture, whilst retaining a grip on reality, and we can compare the two cultures in the light of this transition

• e.g. we could never embrace the outlook of a medieval samurai: since this is a notional confrontation, it would be inappropriate to describe this outlook as just or unjust
• in real confrontations, relativism unhelpfully discourages the evaluation of another outlook that is a genuine option for us

Question 65

what are the three (most distinctive & influential) relativist propositions that Bernard Williams wants to reject?

Answer 65

1. ‘right’ can only be coherently understood as meaning ‘right for a given society’
2. ‘right for a given society’ is supposed to be understood in a functionalist sense
3. it is therefore wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere, etc. with the values of another society

Question 66

who said of relativism, “the anthropologist’s heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy”

Answer 66

Bernard Williams, 1972

Question 67

what are Williams’s three objections to the three relativist positions?

Answer 67

objection 1: propositions (1) and (3) are contradictory

objection 2: understanding society in a functionalist sense is problematic

objection 3: there are certain moral values that make (3) very unintuitive

Question 68

why does Bernard Williams think the relativist propositions (1) and (3) are contradictory?

Answer 68

proposition (3) implies a non-relative sense of right, which is not allowed in proposition (1), which advocates relativism

if we can judge or interfere with other societies’ values based on ours then we are not holding the non-relativist view

Question 69

why does Bernard Williams think understanding society in the functionalist sense is problematic?

Answer 69

proposition (2) imports functionalist problems into relativism

functionalists focus on the long term survival of society

if survival is understood in terms of members of those communities having descendents then many functionalist problems about the necessity of cultural survival will be false
- e.g. Welsh nationalists maintain that the survival of the Welsh language is a condition of the survival of Welsh society
- merely having descendents is not ‘enough’ for the sustenance of the community

if survival is understood in terms of survival of values, and if ‘societies’ are understood as groups with certain values, then functionalist propositions are tautological

Question 70

why does Bernard Williams think there are certain moral values that make the relativist proposition (3) very unintuitive?

Answer 70

morality is not a mere social etiquette

there are inherent features of morality that makes it difficult to regard a morality as applying only to a group

• there are some inherent ‘universal’ features

Question 71

how could a relativist respond to Bertrand Williams’ objections?

Answer 71

proposition (2) is dispensable, such that (3) does not follow

a moral rule does not need to be functionalist; you can say ‘it just is’ without having to justify (non-cognitivist like Ayer)

Ayer holds the emotivist view that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes

Question 72

explain the objection to relativism that argues it implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable.

Answer 72

if we say beliefs and actions are right or wrong only relative to a specific moral standpoint, it then becomes possible to justify almost anything

we are forced to abandon the idea that some actions are just plain wrong

nor can we justify the idea that some forms of life are obviously and uncontroversially better than others, even though almost everyone believes this

according to the relativists, say the critics, the beliefs of slave-owners and Nazis should be deemed true and their practices right relative to their conceptual-moral frameworks; and it is not possible for anyone to prove that their views are false or morally misguided, or that there are better points of view

Question 73

how can relativists respond to the criticism that it implies obvious moral wrongs are acceptable?

Answer 73

criticism is less persuasive if we take critic-relative relativism as allows beliefs and practices within a culture to be judged according to norms external to that culture

what makes their position relativistic is their denial that there is any neutral, transcultural court of appeal to provide an objective justification for preferring one standpoint over another

Question 74

explain the objection that relativism is pragmatically self-refuting.

Answer 74

“everything is subjective” is nonsense

if everything was actually subjective then the statement would be false, because then the statement’s truth value would depend on the agent and cannot be put in terms of a blanket statement

someone who believes that “everything is subjective” would not claim that “everything is subjective” because they would recognise that “everything is subjective,” even the statement itself

if everything was objective, then the statement that “everything is subjective” must be false

Question 75

why is the relativist position on tolerance problematic?

Answer 75

tolerance is not the same as respect

moral relativists inconsistently posit a principle of tolerance as a universal obligation

the relativist’s advocacy of tolerance is morally misguided since not everything should be tolerated

Question 76

why is tolerance NOT the same as respect under relativism?

Answer 76

showing genuine respect for a culture means taking its beliefs seriously, and that means viewing them as candidates for critical appraisal

the relativist eschews any evaluation of other cultures’ norms in the name of tolerance; however, this attitude is actually patronising. It suggests that the beliefs could not withstand critical scrutiny, or perhaps that they are just not worth appraising

Question 77

why do some argue that moral relativists inconsistently posit a principle of tolerance as a universal obligation?

Answer 77

according to the relativist’s own position, members of other societies where tolerance is not viewed so positively have no reason to accept the idea that one ought to be tolerant

Question 78

why do some argue that the relativist’s advocacy of tolerance is morally misguided?

Answer 78

it requires us to be tolerant of intolerance, at least if it occurs in another culture

the more difficult, practical question concerns not whether we should ever criticise the beliefs and practices found in other cultures, but whether we are ever justified in trying to impose our values on them through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, boycotts, or military force

this question has arisen in relation to such practices as saree in India, persecution of religious or ethnic minorities, female circumcision, and legalised violence against women

Question 79

what are the alternatives to moral relativism?

Answer 79

moral scepticism: we are never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgements

moral objectivism: moral judgements are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense

moral realism: there are moral facts & moral values that are objective & independent of our perception of them or our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes towards them

Question 80

what is the implication if moral disagreements can be rationally resolved?

Answer 80

if moral disagreements can be rationally resolved, then there is little incentive to endorse the disagreement-based arguments supporting MMR

Question 81

what are the arguments supporting the idea that moral disagreements are rationally resolvable?

Answer 81

objectivist argument:
objectivists maintain that moral disagreements tend to arise from at least a party failing to be logical, perhaps because they are influenced by passion, prejudice, self-interest, ideology, etc

once they notice & correct their mistakes, the moral dispute can be resolved

relativist argument:
relativists allow for the possibility for moral disagreements to be resolved rationally in the case where the moral frameworks of the two societies coincide

MacIntyre (1994): it is possible to realise, through imagination, that a conflicting moral tradition is rationally superior to one’s own tradition

Question 82

what are the arguments against the idea that moral disagreements are rationally resolvable?

Answer 82

objectivist:
even objectivists allow for the inability for rationality to resolve moral disagreements in cases where the concept involved is indeterminate, vague, or if the relevant facts are unknown

• e.g. in the case where the agent is deciding which wire to cut to deactivate the bomb, but they do not know which wire would save them and which would cause an explosion

relativist:
relativists maintain that because moral disagreements are rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations, the disagreement cannot be resolved by pointing out that the other party has made factual or logical mistakes

BUT arguing from different moral frameworks does not preclude the possibility of resolving the dispute rationally

MacIntyre (1994): it is possible to realise, through imagination, that a conflicting moral tradition is rationally superior to one’s own tradition

Question 83

is it still possible to rationally resolve moral disagreements even if we think that they are rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations?

Answer 83

yes

arguing from different moral frameworks does not preclude the possibility of resolving the dispute rationally

MacIntyre (1994): it is possible to realise, through imagination, that a conflicting moral tradition is rationally superior to one’s own tradition

Question 84

what are the implications if morality is uniform across societies?

Answer 84

if morality is uniform across all societies, then it works as evidence for objectivism (but not necessarily against relativism)

Question 85

what are the arguments supporting the idea that morality is uniform across societies?

Answer 85

Wattles (1996): the role-reversal test
- “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is prominent both in Western and non-Western traditions

Donnelly (2013): international human rights movement and basic moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, killing etc. indicate substantial moral agreement

Foot (1978): shared criteria of moral values (e.g. not just any kind of behaviour can cover ‘rude’)

Question 86

what are the arguments against the idea that morality is uniform across societies?

Answer 86

the existence of agreement of basic moral prohibitions of lying, stealing, killing etc only covers particular aspects of morality

• if being moral was limited to these things, society would be a very unhappy place

the criteria for moral value is not so simple as Foot (1978) outlines)

• e.g. courage understood as “confronting difficulty to achieve some perceived good” can mean both pacifists & warriors are courageous

Question 87

how can relativism and objectivism be reconciled?

Answer 87

pluralistic relativism

meta-ethical pluralists believe that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also some striking moral agreements across societies

pluralistic relativism accounts for the plurality of values and for moral ambivalence by holding that there is not just one adequate morality

Question 88

what is Wong (1996)’s conception of pluralistic relativism?

Answer 88

Wong (1996) argued that more than one morality may be true, but there are universal constraints on what could be a true morality

• the first point is a form of metaethical relativism: it says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies
• the second point is a concession to moral objectivism: it acknowledges that objective factors concerning human nature & the human situation should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality could be one of the true ones

Taking the view of pluralist relativism, Wong (1996) argues, is the best way to explain recognising that the person is still reasonable in making the conflicting judgement

Question 89

which scholars fall under the pluralistic relativist title?

Answer 89

Copp (1995), Wong (1996), Foot (2002)