Error Theory & Fictionalism Flashcards
abolitionism
given that there are no objective moral values, we should abandon moral discourse altogether
akrasia
weakness of will, or the disposition to act contrary to one’s own considered judgement about what it is best to do
error theory
view that our moral practice has a fundamental flaw in that it presupposes the existence of objective moral values when, in fact, there are no such values
fictionalism
given that there are no objective moral values, objective moral values are adopted as fiction
hermeneutic fictionalism
we do not aim at the literal truth but only appear or pretend to do so
inference to the best explanation (IBE)
the procedure of choosing the hypothesis or theory that best explains the available data
internalism about motivation (practicality)
necessarily, if you (know that you) have a moral obligation, you are motivated to act
internalism about reason (normativity)
necessarily, if you (know that you have) a moral obligation, you have sufficient reason to act
modus tollens argument
deductive argument using inference of the form
“if P, then Q. Not Q. Therefore, not P”
moral relativism
the view that there are no objective moral truths rather moral judgements are true relative to a moral framework
naturalism
scientific entities and properties are all that exist [and the scientific method is the only way of gaining knowledge]
non-naturalism
moral properties exist and are not identical with or reducible to any natural property or properties in some interesting sense of ‘natural’
objectivity
independence from our thoughts / feelings / perspective “mind-independence”
propagandism
the evidence that makes a moral error theory compelling is somehow concealed so that the majority gain the benefits of sincere moral beliefs without this in any way clashing with evidence that they have been exposed to
revolutionary fictionalism
when engaging in a discourse, we ought only to make such pretend-assertions
scientific method
the importance of observation, inference to the best explanation (IBE), theoretical virtues of parsimony and elegance etc
scientific world view
the world is made up of fundamental physical particles, fields, forces, etc and nothing else
supervenience
a relation of necessary covariance among properties.
a set of properties A supervenes on a set of properties B just in case, necessarily, no objects can differ with respect to A unless they differ with respect to B as well (Sturgeon, 2006)
what is error theory a possible response to?
the apparent conflict between science and ethics
what is the implication of error theory?
follows from error theory that moral judgements are (almost) all “systematically and uniformly false” (Miller, 2013)
who said that moral judgements are (almost) all “systematically and uniformly false”?
Miller, 2013
what is the key distinction between error theorists & moral relativists?
they agree that there are no objective moral truths but the relativist does NOT agree that this means that all our moral judgements are therefore false
the relativist instead thinks that moral judgements are true relative to a certain moral framework
what do relativists believe moral judgements are rooted in?
moral judgements are rooted in personal or cultural preferences, social conventions, or individual emotions and experiences
why doubt the existence of objective moral values?
Mackie has 4 arguments:
- the argument from relativity (disagreement)
- the argument from supervenience
- the argument from queerness - metaphysical
- the argument from queerness - epistemological
what is the argument from disagreement (relativity)?
prem1: there is deep, widespread moral disagreement
prem2: the existence and intractable nature of this moral disagreement is inconsistent with the existence of objective moral values
conc: therefore, there are no objective moral values
if there were objective moral values, one would expect a higher degree of consensus across cultures & individuals regarding moral principles and judgements
“well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community”
(Mackie, 1999)
who said in context of the argument from relativity “well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community”
Mackie, 1999
give some examples of variation both between and within cultures as well as across time periods.
between: status of women
within: acceptability of abortion or euthanasia
historical evolution: slavery
what are the two branches of the argument from queerness?
metaphysical
epistemological
what is the metaphysical argument from queerness?
prem1: if there were objective moral values, they would have to be utterly different and strange from anything else we know about
prem2: there is no such thing that is intrinsically action-guiding & motivating
conc: therefore, there are no objective moral values
why are moral values unlike anything else? (in the argument from queerness)
they seem to combine three properties which together are inconsistent or at least incompatible with naturalism
- objectivity: independence from our thoughts / feelings / attitudes
- internalism about motivation (practicality): necessarily, if you (know that you) have a moral obligation, you are motivated to act
- internalism about reason (normativity): necessarily, if you (know that you have) a moral obligation, you have sufficient reason to act
what are the three properties that moral values combine seemingly inconsistently?
- objectivity: independence from our thoughts / feelings / attitudes
- internalism about motivation (practicality): necessarily, if you (know that you) have a moral obligation, you are motivated to act
- internalism about reason (normativity): necessarily, if you (know that you have) a moral obligation, you have sufficient reason to act
of the three properties that moral values combine, what are natural properties?
natural properties are typically
EITHER
objective, but not intrinsically motivating or normative
(e.g. negative charge on an electron)
OR
intrinsically motivating (and so normative, at least in providing internal reasons) but subjective
(e.g. pleasure? desire-satisfaction?)
what is the tension between objectivity & internalism about motivation (practicality)?
how can a mind-independent value have a necessary connection with motivation?
what is the tension between objectivity & internalism about reasons (normativity)?
additional premise: necessarily, if you (know that you) have a reason to act, you are motivated to act on it
how could this be if moral value is mind-independent?
what is the tension between internalism (of both kinds) & naturalism?
natural properties do not appear to have any necessary connection with either motivation or normativity
why & how does internalism about motivation conflict with naturalism and objectivity?
recognition of a natural property does not normally bring with it any motivation. Therefore, internalism conflicts with naturalism
if moral properties are objective, how could recognising them bring motivation - may not be coherent. Therefore, internalism conflicts with objectivity
isn’t is possible to be depressed & lack all motivation, but know you have a moral obligation
- e.g. mother with moral obligation to look after children, but severely depressed so have no motivation
isn’t it possible to be an amoralist, who recognises moral obligations but doesn’t care about them? (Brink)
give an example of recognition of a natural property but a lack of associated motivation.
isn’t is possible to be depressed & lack all motivation, but know you have a moral obligation
- e.g. mother with moral obligation to look after children, but severely depressed so have no motivation
give a counterexample to the metaphysical argument from queerness.
quarks in physics
they are of a very strange sort but they still exist
what is the epistemological argument from queerness?
prem: if there were objective moral values, our methods of knowing about them would have to be very unlike our methods of knowing about other things (especially, our method of knowing about natural properties, the scientific method)
conc: so there are no objective moral values
i.e. there is conflict between scientific method & moral epistemology
what is Harman’s version of the scientific method?
the scientific method involves observation and - where facts cannot be directly observed - inference to the best explanation (IBE)
what is the cloud chamber example? what does it show?
a physicist is making an observation to test a scientific theory. Seeing a vapour trail in a cloud chamber, she thinks to herself, “that’s a proton.”
Harman: that there is a proton is part of the best explanation of the physicist’s observation and subsequent belief
but, he argues, objective moral values never play a role in the best explanation of observations and moral judgements
what is the Hoodlums example? what does it show?
you round a corner and encounter a group of young hoodlums tormenting a cat. Seeing them pouring petrol on the cat and setting light to it, you think to yourself, “that’s wrong.”
the best explanation of your moral judgement is your moral sensibility, shaped by your upbringing, not objective moral values
therefore, we have reason to believe in scientific entities such as protons but not objective moral values
what is Sturgeon’s / Cornell realist reply to Harman’s cloud chamber and Hoodlums examples?
Sturgeon: objective moral facts can play an explanatory, causal role
e.g. that slavery was a more oppressive institution in the US during the years between the American Revolution and the Civil War than it had been before or elsewhere partially explains the growth of antislavery sentiment in the US during that time
give an example of objective moral facts playing a causal role.
e.g. that slavery was a more oppressive institution in the US during the years between the American Revolution and the Civil War than it had been before or elsewhere partially explains the growth of antislavery sentiment in the US during that time
what is the evolutionary “debunking” argument against moral knowledge?
Street’s Argument:
- evolutionary forces have influenced our moral judgements
- evolutionary forces influence in the direction of increased fitness
- increased fitness is not the same as objective moral truth
- therefore we have good reason to think that our moral beliefs are mistaken, or if they are accurate, it is a mere coincidence
- therefore we cannot have moral knowledge
why is the evolutionary “debunking” argument a problem for morality?
we have evolved to have certain moral judgements because of the particular path that evolution has taken us
moral judgements come from evolution & evolution isn’t about coming to know moral properties / moral truths
given that there are no objective moral values, what are the options?
- abolitionism
- ignore the conclusion of the argument for error theory
- propagandism
- fictionalism
can disregard 2. and 3. as suboptimal & unstable
what are some issues that Joyce highlights about abolitionism?
Joyce highlights a number of issues that might arise from abolitionism:
agents face an incentive to deviate from the rules if they can avoid being caught, as these only have instrumental rather than intrinsic value
- agents face no internal punishment (of conscience) & only external punishment (of ostracisation) which can be avoided if never caught
agents lose peace of mind, integrity & sense of good will when norms are derived from pragmatic rather than moral considerations
which scholar highlights the issues that might arise from abolitionism?
Joyce, 2001
is it fair to suggest that abolitionism would inflict anarchy upon us?
no, more likely outcome is that former moral judgements will now take the form of less-demanding social norms
why is propagandism suboptimal?
suboptimal as no policy that encourages the belief in falsehoods, or the promulgation of false beliefs in others will be practically stable in the long run
- it is “not wise to risk having a society of epistemological wrecks in order to achieve some projected good through massive deception” (Garner, 1993)
- “amounts to the promulgation of manipulative lies” (Joyce, 2005)
- would produce social confusion & a lack of confidence in normal belief-forming mechanisms
who said it is “not wise to risk having a society of epistemological wrecks in order to achieve some projected good through massive deception” about the instability of propagandism?
Garner, 1993
who said that propagandism “amounts to the promulgation of manipulative lies”?
Joyce, 2005
what is the difference between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism?
hermeneutic fictionalism: we do not aim at the literal truth but only appear or pretend to do so
revolutionary fictionalism: when engaging in a discourse, we ought only to make such pretend-assertions
what does Joyce use to justify her revolutionary moral fictionalism over abolitionism?
Joyce uses akrasia & examples to disprove those who object that “mere fiction could not have any significant impact on one’s decisions” (Joyce, 2001)
what is the Exercising example that supports fictionalism as a response to error theory?
proposition P: I ought to get up at 6 every morning, without exception, and go on a run, otherwise I will put on weight at an unacceptable rate
in order to avoid putting on weight I do not have to do this every day: it would be enough if I did it (say) three days a week
although I don’t believe P (I’ve judged at least once in a critical context that P is false and I’m still disposed to judge it false were I to occupy a critical context again), and make-believe that P, my taking up the attitude of make-believe towards P acts as a bulwark against weakness of will and helps prevent ‘akratic sabotage’
get the benefits of genuinely believing that P is true, even though I don’t believe that P is true but adopt a fictionalist attitude towards P instead
by using trivial examples such as exercising and the rigid routine of running every day needed to stay on track, he demonstrates the capacity of fictionalism to fend off, to some degree, the temptation of inactivity and on a wider scale akrasia
what is the Blackjack Example that supports fictionalism?
in blackjack players are frequently persuaded to take a side bet called an ‘insurance’, which they will, more often than not, lose money on
yet a study showed that more than 12% of players always insure
perhaps an exaggeration to argue that fiction of morality would provide all the benefits that a believed morality brings, it can be seen that moral fictionalism is the best alternative given there are no objective moral values
