Trade & Development, Sanctions Flashcards

1
Q

What is ISI?

A
  • Substituting previously imported manufactured goods with domestically produced goods
  • As opposed to focusing on producing goods that can be exported to international markets (export-oriented industrialization)
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2
Q

The stages of ISI/EOI

A

Everyone starts with easy ISI:
- Domestic manufacturing of relatively simple consumer goods for the home market
– Technology and machines easily acquired from abroad
– Relies on low-skilled labor

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3
Q

What are the options available once easy ISI is exhausted?

A
  • Start exporting easy ISI products to the world (East Asian Model) = Export Oriented Industrialization
  • Secondary ISI: manufacture less simple goods for the home market (eg. cars) (Latin American Model)
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4
Q

Government policies to promote (secondary) ISI

A
  • Trade barriers
  • Investment in activities the private sector would not produce:
    – Roads, transportation networks, electricity, telecommunications
    – Large-scale operations - steel plants, auto plants
  • State-owned enterprises (and mixed-owned)
    – Chemical, telecommunications, electricity, railways, metal fabrication
  • Tax policies
    – “Taxed” agricultural exports through “Market Boards”
    – Marketing Board: purchased crops from farmers at below-world market prices, then sell them on the world market at world market prices
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5
Q

“Neo-liberal” criticism of ISI

A
  • States are bad planners
    – They can’t foresee which industries will be competitive and which will be successful
    – States are poor at distributing resources efficiently
  • Government had to cover industry losses
    – Created budget deficits
    —> Industries weren’t profitable
    – Funded through borrowing
    —> Increased national debts
  • Persistent trade imbalance (Current Account)
    – Importing more than exporting
    – Agriculture was taxed and thus less efficient (less exports)
    – MFG goods not competitive internationally (more imports)
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6
Q

The economic ideas behind ISI: Structuralism

A
  • Dominant in Development Economics:
    – Industrialization -> Development
  • Prebish-Singer Hypothesis: Free trade does not benefit developing countries
    – Developing countries’ terms of trade (price of exports vs price of imports) diminishes over time because demand in primary commodities is less elastic than demand in manufactured goods
    – Most research disputes this claim, but governments believed it (initially)
  • Belief that industrialization wouldn’t happen by itself, required “Big Push” by governments
    – Coordination problems
    – Infant Industry Arguments
    – Need for government provided infrastructure
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7
Q

Who benefits/loses from ISI?

A

Generally developing countries are abundantly endowed in land and poorly endowed with capital
- Agriculture is the land-abundant sector (export-oriented)
- Manufacturing is the capital-abundant sector (import-competing)
- So land-owners should be pro-free-trade
- Owners of capital should be anti-free-trade

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8
Q

Who held political power pre-during-post WW2?

A

Pre WW2:
- Land-owners (abundant factor) had political control (through less than democratic means)
The depression and WW2: led to price shocks and closed markets:
- State had to produce their own goods
- Land owners lost income because of tough times
- Capital ad labor grew as political forces
– Because of their new economic importance
After WW2:
- Capital (and some labor) now had political control and thus imposed protectionist (ISI) measures to maintain their incomes

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9
Q

ISI in Latin America

A

How did they pay for ISI?
- Through marketing boards, but also sovereign borrowing
- Did they pay it back? Not all of it
Latin American debt crisis
- Starting in 1982 (the lost decade)
- States lost access to global credit markets when they couldn’t repay their loands
- Had dramatic consequences on their ability to manage the economy
- No longer can they fund or subsidize unprofitable industries
IMF intervene and forces reform
- Bails out countries with burdensome debts
- Forces them to abandon ISI and adopt the “Washington Consensus”

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10
Q

Export Oriented Industrialization (East Asian Model)

A
  • After WW2 they adopt easy ISI
  • Late 50s - early 60s: shift emphasis to exports
    – Forced manufacturers to worry about international competitiveness
    – Invested in domestic industries that were profitable in world markets (LA and Africa didn’t)
    —> Path to development: labor intensive -> capital intensive -> technology and skill intensive
  • Relied on protectionism for their domestic markets
  • BUT allowed selective liberalization to lower costs for “critical inputs” (just like LA)
  • Also benefited from a stable macroeconomic environment
    – Low inflation (helped encourage savings)
    – Fairly valued exchange rate (helped promote exports)
    – Conservative fiscal policies (didn’t run deficits that required sovereign borrowing)
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11
Q

Why did the Asian “Tigers” reform and not the states of Latin America?

A

Interests and institutions (one explanation):
- “Losers” from globalization gain power with Great Depression/World Wars worldwide
- WW2 decimated the political power of existing interest groups in Asia
– In Asia, they start from a clean slate
- In Latin America, interest groups remain in tact
– “Losers” of globalization remain in power

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12
Q

Why didn’t states move away from ISI quicker?

A

Politics:
- The primary motivation of leaders is to remain in power
- Good politics =/= good policies
- Leaders that tried to adopt policies against the interests of their political supporters were removed (or threatened with removal) from office
- ISI persisted not because it was good policy but because those in political power would lose from liberalization
– Workers grew dependent on the manufacturing industries and subsidies
– Farmers (who would benefit) lost power and couldn’t support politicians that would adopt export-oriented approaches
– ISI became entrenched
- East Asia didn’t have this problem because WW2 provided a clean slate

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13
Q

How did states move away from ISI?

A
  • Trade imbalances and debts couldn’t last forever
  • Eventually, creditors stopped financing loans and politicians couldn’t provide the goodies that individuals had grown accustomed to
  • In danger of losing power, they sought aid from the IMF and World Bank
  • The IMF and World Bank made loans conditional on adopting neo-liberal policies
    – Known as “the Washington Consensus”
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14
Q

What is economic coercion?

A
  • Refers to the use of a state’s economic power, rather than military power, as a tool of foreign policy
  • Goal: force another state to change policies or behavior
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15
Q

Five forms of economic sanctions

A

Trade sanctions (most common)
- Export sanctions or import sanctions
Aid
- Positive or negative
Finance
- Lending and investment restrictions
- Positive or negative
Currency (monetary)
- Destabilize the value of country’s currency
Asset targeting
- Seizure of a country’s (or individual’s) cases

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16
Q

Further distinction on economic sanctions

A

Unilateral
- One state imposes sanctions
Multilateral
- Many states impose sanction - the more the better as there are few alternative markets

17
Q

How sanctions usually require (inter)dependence

A
  • Existing ties are dependence on another country is (often) necessary for sanctions to be useful
  • The US and EU give aid to many countries and have large consumer markets that are a magnet for imports
  • Many countries are dependent on their aid and market
18
Q

Domestic economic cost of sanctions

A
  • With interdependence comes mutual costs
  • Sanctions hurt the target state but also hurt the sending state
  • Lost trade and investment
  • These winners and losers are sometimes politically important constituents
  • Sanctions can be costly signals if they impose a significant cost on the sender
    – The more it hurts the more resolved the sender is
19
Q

Arguments that sanction do not work

A
  • Many in the policy community believe sanctions of ineffective
    – Are they right or do they have bad quantitative reasoning skills
  • Haubauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990, 2009) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
    – Collected data on each imposition of sanctions and stated goals
    – Found that 34% of sanctions have been effective at achieving goals
  • Pape (1997) Why Economic Sanctions do not Work
    – Most economic sanctions complement military threats/actions
    – When we consider only economic sanctions, only 4% are effective
20
Q

Imposition is the failure of a threat (sanctions)

A

Drezner (2003), Lacy and Niou (2004)
- We have a selection bias problem in observing only imposition effectiveness
- If sanctions get states to change behavior, simply the threat of a sanction should do so
- States should be capable of determining, before imposition, if the costs of sanctions > the cost of policy change
- Successful sanction events should end at the threat stage

21
Q

How come we still see imposition if it’s simply the failure of threat? (sanctions)

A
  • Miscalculation by the target
    – Target through costs of sanctions for target < the cost of policy change
    – Imposed sanctions can eventually work if the cost > cost of policy change
    —> Hovi et al (2007) “When do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work” World Politics
  • Miscalculation by sender
    – Sender thought: costs of sanctions for target > the cost of policy change
  • Resolute target
  • Sender has alternative goals, Baldwin (1985
22
Q

Other possible goals of sanctions that is not policy change

A

There is no reason that policy change should be the only, or most important, goal or reason to impose sanctions
- “Making an example” (a wider audience)
- Demonstrate meaningful threat
- Appease domestic audience
- Punishment
- Deprivation of important military equipment

23
Q

The costs of sanctions (for target state)

A
  • The costs of sanction often fall on average citizens
    – This is often intentional as senders hope the people will overthrow or put pressure on the regime
    – UN sanctions on Iraq 1990s
    —> Food prices increases 25 times over 5 years
    —> 100k-227k deaths (many young children) 1991-1998
  • Elites can benefit from sanctions
    – They have a monopoly on essential products and can control black markets
    – Corruption in UN Food for Oil Program (Iraq)
24
Q

Comprehensive vs Targeted Sanctions

A
  • Comprehensive sanctions target an entire economy - and thus impose widespread costs
  • Policymakers have started to favor targeted sanctions that impose direct costs on policymakers or key supporters of the government
25
Q

Do targeted sanction work better?

A
  • Hard to tell as it is a recent phenomenon of the post 9/11 world
  • “More humane, less effective” - Drezner (2011)
  • Anecdotal evidence that in a few cases it might have mattered
    – Libya, Angola
  • Comprehensive sanctions probably work better on democracies - Lektzian and Souva (2007)
26
Q

Limits of economic coercion

A
  • “Weaponized interdependence” may lead to states seeking to avoid interdependence with those that abuse economic relationships (Farrell and Newman (2019))
    – US/China abuse of economic leverage may backfire in the long run
  • Some problems are so fundamental to a regime’s survival that economic power is not sufficient
    – North Korean Nuclear Weapons
    – US sanctions on Cuba (regime change)
    – Russia backing down from Ukraine War
  • Human rights sanctions can make repression worse when leaders see them as threats to their political survival
    – Though some success stories (Apartheid South Africa)