Topics 46-51 Flashcards
Three exchange functions
Exchange functions fall into three primary categories: product standardization, trading venue, and reporting services.
- Product standardization. Exchanges set the terms of traded, standardized products. Terms include maturity dates, trading price increments, and delivery grades and locations.
- Trading venue. Exchanges may be physical locations or electronic platforms that provide a central location for trading, which then facilities price discovery. Entities trading on an exchange must accept the exchange’s rules and conditions.
- Reporting services. Exchanges report transaction prices to various entities, including trading participants, vendors, and subscribers.
Explain the developments in clearing that reduce risk
Clearing is the process of reconciling and matching contracts between counterparties from the time the commitments are made until settlement. Clearing, along with the mechanisms of margining and netting, are important counterparty risk mitigants. Margining involves posting both initial and variation margins. Initial margin represents upfront funds posted to mitigate against counterparty default, while variation margin represents the daily transfer of funds (cash or other assets) to cover position gains and losses. Netting refers to consolidating multiple offsetting positions between counterparties into a single payment.
Direct clearing is a mechanism for bilaterally reconciling commitments between two counterparties. For example, consider a scenario where counterparty X has an agreement to sell 10 contracts at $50 to counterparty Y, and Y has an agreement to sell 10 contracts to X at $55. Instead of exchanging the full 10 contracts and associated payments of $500 and $550, under a direct netting scenario only the net payment o f the $50 difference is paid by X to Y. This type of direct clearing for OTC derivatives is typically called netting, or payment of difference.
A clearing ring is a mechanism to reduce counterparty exposure between three or more exchange members. A clearing ring is voluntary for exchange members. Once members join, however, they must accept the rules of the exchange and must accept each other’s contracts and allow for counterparties to be substituted. For example, if counterparty X is long a contract with counterparty Y, and Y is long the same number of contracts with Z, then Y may be removed from the ring and the two separate obligations would be replaced with a single obligation between X and Z. Clearing rings are designed to mitigate counterparty risk, improve liquidity and facilitate the close-out process. Not all exchange members would benefit from joining a clearing ring. Members that have a single position with another counterparty would not benefit from the ring.
Complete clearing refers to clearing through a central counterparty (CCP). The CCP, which can be either operated directly by an exchange or provided as a service by an independent third party, assumes the contractual obligations o f clearing exchange members and acts as a buyer to sellers and a seller to buyers. By doing so, the CCP reduces counterparty risk and facilitates both clearing and settlement. Complete clearing can be seen as an improvement to a clearing ring since it reduces the risk of member failure and any resulting contagion effect.
CCPs also use margining rules to help protect against counterparty risk. Initial margin involves members pledging upfront funds to offset closeout costs in a member default scenario. Variation margin involves settlement of daily profit and loss of derivatives contracts (mark-to-market process).
Compare exchange-traded and OTC markets and describe their uses
Identify the classes of derivatives securities and explain the risk associated with them
OTC derivatives comprise of five broad classes: interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity, and credit derivatives.
It is important to note, however, that although interest rate derivatives comprise the majority of the OTC derivatives market, counterparty risk is particularly a concern for certain foreign exchange derivatives (including cross-currency swaps), which typically have long-dated maturities and require the exchange of notional principal. Furthermore, credit default swaps tend to be more volatile and can carry significant wrong-way risk (when the credit quality of the counterparty is inversely related to the level of exposure to the counterparty).
As mentioned, interest rate derivatives dominate the market by gross notional value outstanding of contracts. However, measuring OTC derivatives exposure through gross notional value can be misleading.
SPVs benefits and risks
One of the main benefits of SPVs is that they alter bankruptcy rules and transform
counterparty risk into legal risk. The specific legal risk is that the courts may view the SPV and the originating firm as a single legal entity. This is referred to as consolidation, and it would effectively negate the intended benefits of the SPV as a separate, bankruptcy remote legal entity.
Derivatives Product Companies (DPCs)
DPCs are set up by firms as bankruptcy remote subsidiaries to originate derivatives products and sell them to investors. Unlike SPVs, however, in order to receive a strong (e.g., AAA) rating they are separately capitalized and have restrictions on their activities and margin. DPCs calculate their internal quantitative risk assessment to quantify credit risk and to make sure they are benchmarked similarly relative to the desired AAA ratings criteria.
A DPCs AAA rating depends on three criteria:
- market risk minimization through participating on both sides of the market,
- parent support, with the bankruptcy remote status shielding against the parent’s potential distress, and
- credit risk and operational risk management through restrictions like limits, margin, and daily mark-to-market.
DPCs used defined triggers for their own failure through a “pre-packaged bankruptcy” process, which lays out the bankruptcy process and is intended to provide a simpler alternative to the standard bankruptcy process. Once a firm enters bankruptcy, DPCs could either continue on as part of another firm, or be terminated.
The advent of alternative AAA-rated entities, the perception that DPCs were inextricably linked to their parents and the loss of credibility in their AAA rating following the global financial crisis essentially rendered DPCs obsolete mechanisms.
Monolines and Credit Derivative Product Companies (CDPCs)
Monolines are highly-rated insurance companies that provide financial guarantees, called “credit wraps” to investors. CDPCs are similar to the DPCs, discussed earlier, but have a business model more similar to that o f a monoline.
Monolines and CDPCs are well-capitalized entities with their AAA ratings supported by capitalization requirements based on possible losses and related to the assets for which they provided guarantees. They are generally highly leveraged entities that do not have to post margin. During the recent global financial crisis, several monolines failed (including XL Financial Assurance Ltd., AMBAC Insurance Corporation, MBNA Insurance Corporation), and both monolines and CDPCs, which are considered similar to monolines, fell out of
favor.
Lessons Learned from Risk Mitigation (vs. SPVs, DPCs, monolines, and CDPCs)
The history of SPVs, DPCs, monolines, and CDPCs provide the following valuable lessons for CCPs in a central clearing setting:
- CCPs give priority to OTC derivatives counterparties to the detriment of other parties, including bondholders. This increases the risk in other markets.
- Relying on a solid legal framework exposes CCPs and exchange members to legal risk. For example, as seen in the case of SPVs and DPCs, courts may change the priority of claims in a bankruptcy scenario, or courts in different jurisdictions may rule in contradictory ways.
- Although CCPs share similarities with monolines and CDPCs in that they are highlyrated entities set up to manage counterparty risk, CCPs do not take residual risk in the market given that they maintain a matched book of trades. This is in contrast to monolines and CDPCs, which typically have one-way market exposures.
- In contrast to monolines and CDPCs, which post no variation margin and often no initial margin, CCPs require members to post both initial and variation margin.
Provide examples of the mechanics of a central counterparty (CCP)
A central counterparty (CCP) plays an important role in the clearing and settlement of transactions following the initial trade execution. Clearing refers to the processes (including margining and netting) between the period from trade execution until settlement. This period is typically short (a few days or months) for classically cleared non over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. In contrast, for OTC derivatives this time period could extend to years or even decades. Settlement of a trade occurs when the trade is completed and all payments have been made and legal obligations satisfied.
Loss mutualization is a form of insurance and refers to members’ contributions to a default fund to cover future losses from member defaults. Since all members must contribute to the fund, the potential losses from the default of any given member are contained. When a member does default, any amounts that cannot be covered from the member’s own resources are covered from the fund. Given that losses are spread among surviving members, it is possible that a member will suffer losses even if it never traded with the defaulting counterparty or had no positions with the CCP.
Products of CCPs
The OTC derivatives markets include a wide range of products ranging from standard to non-standard and exotic derivatives. There are currently four categories of OTC derivatives according to their stages of central clearing history:
- Products with a long history of central clearing (e.g., interest rate swaps).
- Products with a short history of central clearing (e.g., index credit default swaps).
- Products that may soon be centrally cleared (e.g., interest rate swaptions, credit default swaps).
- Products that are not suitable for central clearing (e.g., exotic derivatives including Asian options, and derivatives with illiquid reference assets).
The following conditions are important for a product to be centrally cleared:
- Standardization: Legal and economic terms should be standard.
- Complexity: Transactions need to be easily valued for trading and margin purposes, therefore only less complex (i.e., vanilla, not exotic) trades can be cleared.
- Liquidity: Cleared products are typically more liquid than OTC products. Liquidity is important for determining market price for initial margin and default fund contributions, and for the auctioning process. CCPs are also reluctant to develop clearing capability for products that could not be properly cleared due to thin trading. Liquidity also allows for easier close out of trades in a default scenario.
Participants of CCPs
Transacting with CCPs is restricted to clearing members only. Becoming a member includes a number of requirements, including:
- Admission criteria: CCPs set different criteria for admission, including restrictions on credit quality (e.g., investment grade only) and size (e.g., minimum $50 million).
- Financial commitment: The primary financial commitment by a member is to contribute to the CCP’s default fund.
- Operational criteria: Members’ operational requirements include posting margin, and participating in “fire drills” to simulate member default and in auctions if default does occur.
Number ofCCPs
A single, large CCP may be optimal given the benefits of offsetting trades and cost minimization through economies of scale. However, it is generally not feasible to have a single CCP for the following reasons:
- Regional differences: Regional CCPs may be beneficial to centrally clear trades in the region’s currency and under the laws and regulations of the region.
- Product types: CCPs often specialize in clearing certain derivatives products.
- Regulatory reasons: Regulations may dictate that products be cleared by local CCPs. However, CCPs need not operate in isolation, and CCPs working together may be necessary. It is important to recognize, however, that this may increase systemic risk and the risk of contagion during stress times.
Types of CCPs
Arguments exist for both a utility-driven CCP and a profit-driven CCP. A utility-driven
CCP would be focused on long-term stability rather than short-term profits. A profit-driven CCP would be focused on the bottom line in order to attract personnel and build the best systems. Currently, there are stronger arguments in favor of profit-driven CCPs.
Describe advantages and disadvantages of central clearing of OTC derivatives
Central clearing through CCPs has the following advantages:
- Transparency: In OTC markets, parties typically do not see all outstanding trades between the various counterparties. CCPs have a consolidated view of trading positions and can therefore better react to extreme events.
- Offsetting: By transacting through a CCP, duplicate bilateral contracts can be offset, which improves flexibility for new transactions and reduces costs.
- Loss mutualization: A member’s losses are distributed among all surviving members, which spread the impact of losses, reduce costs, and minimize market impact and systemic risk.
- Legal and operational efficiency: The centralized role of CCPs in the clearing (margining, netting) and settlement process improves operational efficiency while reducing costs.
- Liquidity: The daily margining of products in a centrally-cleared market ensures greater transparency in product valuation, which increases product liquidity.
- Default management (counterparty risk): CCPs act as the counterparty to each trade, which reduces counterparty risk. Member defaults are centrally managed through the auction process which minimizes price disruptions.
While we noted loss mutualization as an advantage of the central clearing process, it can lead to potential problems, including moral hazard and adverse selection.
- Moral hazard: Moral hazard is the risk that one party will take on higher risk knowing that another party bears the costs of this risk. In central clearing, the risk is that members will have less incentive to monitor risk knowing that the CCP takes on most of the risks.
- Adverse selection: Adverse selection is the risk that participants with a better understanding of product risks and pricing will trade more products whose risks the CCP underprices, and will trade fewer products whose risks the CCP overprices.
- Bifurcation: The separation of trading into cleared and non-cleared products can increase cash flow volatility even for hedged products.
- Procyclicality: Procyclicality essentially reflects the downside of margining. It reflects a scenario where a CCP increases margin requirements (initial margin) in volatile markets or during a crisis, which may aggravate systemic risk.
Compare and contrast bilateral markets to the use of novation and netting
The legal process of interposing the CCP between the seller and the buyer is called novation. Through novation, one contract (the bilateral contract between OTC participants) is replaced with another contract (or contracts) with the CCP.
Market participants often prefer to offset rather than to terminate trades, which creates redundant trades. When trades are novated to a CCP, these redundant trades become a single net obligation between each participant and the CCP. This process is called multilateral offsetting, or netting. Netting reduces total risk and minimizes the potential of a domino effect stemming from the default of a participant.
Assess the impact of central clearing on the broader financial markets
When a CCP is included in the clearing process, systemic risk in the financial markets is reduced, but can be increased at the same time. Systemic risk is reduced because CCPs reduce counterparty risk by offsetting positions (novation and netting), they provide transparency for the market, and improve liquidity. However, the potential requirement that members post higher initial margin during times of increased market volatility could increase systemic risk. In addition, concentrating all trades in a single place exposes the market to the risk of CCP failure and heightened systemic risk.
Identify and explain the types of risks faced by CCPs
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Default Risk
The default of a clearing member and its flow through effects is the most significant risk for a CCP.
Passing on losses to other clearing members may result in defaults by
those members. The loss allocation methods may be considered unfair because some of them, such as variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH) and tear-ups, impose losses on “winning positions.” -
Model Risk
OTC derivatives are not priced by the market but are instead priced using valuation models that perform the mark-to-market function, which subjects CCPs to model risk. -
Liquidity Risk
There are large amounts of cash inflows and outflows flowing through the CCP due to initial margins and margin calls.
There is the risk that the CCP’s investments are not always quickly and easily convertible to cash, which may require some liquidity support from a central bank. In this regard, a CCP is required to have sufficient liquid resources to meet its obligations in the event of the failure of one or two of its largest clearing members. The Basel III leverage ratio (calculated
as the bank’s tier 1 capital divided by its exposure) requirements serve to minimize the amount of risk taking.Overall, regulations have attempted to address a CCP’s potential liquidity risks; however, they may reduce the availability of clearing services. -
Operational Risk
Due to the centralization of some functions within a CCP to increase efficiency, additional risks arise that affect counterparties due to concentration at the CCP. CCPs face operational risks that are common to all entities such as business interruption due to information systems failures and internal or external fraud. However, a systems failure within a CCP could have a disastrous impact on many counterparties, especially if they hold large positions. -
Legal Risk
Legal risks in the form of litigation or claims may arise due to differing laws in different jurisdictions or laws that are inconsistent with the CCP’s regulations. -
Other Risks
- Investment risk refers to the risk of losses of margin funds resulting from investment actions performed within or outside o f the stated investment policy.
- Settlement and payment risk refers to the risk that a bank no longer provides cash settlement services between a CCP and its members.
- Foreign exchange risk refers to the risk of mismatches between margin payments and cash inflows or outflows in different currencies.
- Custody risk refers to the risk of loss of securities, margins, or both by a custodian due to its failure, fraud, or negligence.
- Concentration risk refers to the risk of clearing members, margins, or both that are located in a single geographic area. Essentially, it is a lack of diversification.
- Sovereign risk refers to the risk that a foreign government could default on its debt obligations, thereby causing members to fail. It also refers to any potential loss in the value of sovereign bonds held as margin.
- Wrong-way risk refers to the risk that exposure to a counterparty is negatively correlated with the credit quality of the counterparty. In other words, it occurs when credit exposure to a counterparty and the default risk of the counterparty increase together.
Identify and distinguish between the risks to clearing members as well as non-members
Non-members face exposure from CCPs, clearing members, and other non-members. If a CCP fails, a non-member may be able to avoid losses so long as its counterparty (a clearing member) is solvent. Unlike clearing members, non-members are not required to contribute to default funds so, therefore, non-members are not exposed to losses that result from CCP failures.
Furthermore, the extent of non-members’ losses due to defaults o f CCPs and clearing members lies with the initial margins and whether they are segregated, guaranteed, or both. In addition, non-members face the risk of not being able to port their trades should the counterparty member default. As a result, such trades may have to be closed out at a loss.
Finally, one has to consider non-members’ liability with respect to CCP loss allocation rules. It is possible that clearing members are able to pass on losses to non-members through VMGH or tear-up, which would reduce the gains o f non-members. Clearing members are unable to pass on losses resulting from default fund utilization, rights of assessment, and forced allocation.
Identify and evaluate lessons learned from prior CCP failures
There are five key lessons learned from prior CCP failures:
- Operational risk must be controlled to the maximum extent possible. For example, information systems should be updated sufficiently to be robust enough to handle unusually high trading volumes and to detect significant price changes.
- Variation margins should be recalculated often and collected quickly (i.e., multiple times a day in certain cases). Having an information system that allows for automated payments could assist in preventing liquidity shortfalls. In addition, having crossmargining linkage arrangements (offsetting of hedged positions) between CCPs may avoid liquidity problems due to the hedging activities of the various CCPs.
- Initial margins and default funds should be sufficiently large in order to withstand significant negative asset value declines as well as increased return correlations during a crises. The assumptions behind the initial margin computations need to be amended to account for significant changes in the market.
- CCPs must actively monitor positions, penalize overly concentrated positions, and promptly liquidate or hedge extremely large positions.
- CCPs must have one or more external sources of liquidity to avoid default due to illiquidity (even though it is still solvent).
Calculate a financial institution’s overall foreign exchange exposure
A bank’s actual exposure to any given currency can be measured by the net position exposure. Net exposure is the extent to which a bank is net long (or positive) or net short (or negative) in a given currency. For example, a bank’s net euro (EUR) exposure would be:
net EUR exposure = (EUR assets — EUR liabilities) + (EUR bought — EUR sold)
net EUR exposure = net EUR assets + net EUR bought
A positive net exposure position means that we are net long in a currency. In other words, we hold more assets than liabilities in a given currency. In this instance, the financial institution faces the risk that the foreign currency will fa ll in value against the domestic currency.
A negative net exposure position means that we are net short in a currency. The financial institution faces the risk that the foreign currency will rise in value against the domestic currency.
Identify and describe the different types of foreign exchange trading activities
A financial institution’s buying and selling of foreign currencies, and hence the institution’s position in the FX market, reflects four key trading activities:
- Enabling customers to participate in international commercial business transactions.
- Enabling customers to take positions in real or financial foreign investments. Note that a financial institution may also transact in foreign currencies to take positions in real or financial foreign investments for its own portfolio.
- Offsetting exposure in a given currency for hedging purposes.
- Speculating on foreign currencies in search of profit by forecasting and/or anticipating futures FX rate movements.
For acrivities 1 and 2 the bank typically serves as an agent for the customers
(receives a fee) and does not assume the FX risk itself.
On-Balance-Sheet Hedging
On-balance-sheet hedging is achieved when a financial institution has a matched maturity and currency foreign asset-liability book. Figure 2 is an illustration
Off-Balance-Sheet Hedging
Rather than matching foreign assets with foreign liabilities, we may choose to remain unhedged on the balance sheet. If we do, we could hedge off-balance-sheet by taking a position in the forward market. This hedge would appear as a contingent off-balance-sheet claim as an item below the net income line.
Rather than repatriating CHF and exchanging them for USD at the end of the period at an unknown rate, the bank can enter into a contract to sell forward the expected principal and interest on the loan at the current known forward exchange rate for USD/CHF, with the delivery of Swiss francs to the buyer of the forward contract taking place at the end of the investment horizon. This method effectively removes the future spot exchange rate uncertainty that is related to
investment returns on the Swiss loan.
Describe how a non-arbitrage assumption in the foreign exchange markets leads to the interest rate parity theorem, and use this theorem to calculate forward foreign exchange rates
The hedged dollar return on foreign investments should be equal to the return on domestic investments. IRP implies that in a competitive market, a firm should not be able to make excess profits from foreign investments (i.e., a higher domestic currency return from lending in a foreign currency and locking in the forward rate of exchange).
To remember this formula, note that when the forward and spot rates are expressed as direct quotes (DC/FC), righthand side of the equation also has the domestic (interest rate) in the numerator and the foreign (interest rate) in the denominator.
If we expressed the forward and spot rates as indirect quotes (FC/DC), then the righthand side of the equation would have the foreign (interest rate) in the numerator and the domestic (interest rate) in the denominator. So it’s either domestic over foreign for everything, or foreign over domestic for everything.
IRP can also be stated using continuously compounded rates as follows:
forward = spot x e(rDC - rFC)T
Explain why diversification in multicurrency asset-liability positions could reduce portfolio risk. Describe the relationship between nominal and real interest rates.
Each domestic and foreign nominal interest rate consists of two components. The first component is the real interest rate, which reflects a given currency’s real demand and supply for its funds. Differences in real interest rates will cause a flow of capital into those countries with the highest available real rates of interest. Therefore, there will be an increased demand for those currencies, and they will appreciate relative to the currencies of countries whose available real rate of return is low.
The second component is the expected inflation rate, which reflects the amount of compensation required by investors to offset the expected erosion of real value over time due to inflation. Differences in inflation rates will cause the residents of the country with the highest inflation rate to demand more imported (cheaper) goods. For example, if prices in the United States are rising twice as fast as in Australia, U.S. citizens will increase their demand for Australian goods (because Australian goods are now cheaper relative to domestic goods). If a country’s inflation rate is higher than its trading partners’, the demand for the
country’s currency will be low, and the currency will depreciate.
The nominal interest rate, r, is the compounded sum of the real interest rate, real r, and the expected rate of inflation, E(i), over an estimation horizon.
exact methodology: (1 + r) = (1 + real r) [l + E(i)]
linear approximation: r ~ real + E(i)