The Origins of the First World War 1890-1914

Question 1

Explain the end of the Reinsurance Treaty, the beginning of the ‘New Course’

Answer 1

a. Once Bismarck was dismissed, German foreign office officials advised his successor Caprivi not to renew the reinsurance treaty with Russia
b. They argued with some justification that it conflicted with the Dual Alliance of 1879 and the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887
c. Instead they decided to work for a new alliance system or ‘New Course’, which would associate Britain with Germany’s two allies, Italy and Austria, and so hold both Russia and France in check
d. It was felt that Germany was now strong enough to give up Bismarck’s complicated system of checks and balances and should ally with states with which it had an apparently common interest

Question 2

Explain Britain’s refusal to join the Triple Alliance

Answer 2

a. The German problem was that, while the British government was ready to settle colonial disputes with them, as eventually it also did with France and Russia, it was not prepared to negotiate binding alliances
b. Berlin refused to believe this, and remained convinced that sooner or later French and Russian pressure on Britain’s large and vulnerable empire would end in war and force Britain to turn to Germany
c. ‘For s’ as Caprivi remarked in 1893, ‘the best opening of the next great war is for the first shot to be fired from a British ship. Then we can be certain of expanding the triple alliance into a quadruple alliance
d. Ultimately though, this was wishful thinking, and the British were determined not to join the Triple Alliance, because, as Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister observed, the liability of having to defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is greater than that of having to defend the British isles against France
e. Having failed to secure a British alliance, Germany now became increasingly more dependent on Austria as its key ally, and consequently the Austrians were in a position to put pressure on the Germans to back them against Russia when the next major Balkans crisis erupted
f. It also accelerated the negotiation of the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance

Question 3

Explain the Franco-Russian Alliance 1894

Answer 3

a. The Kaiser’s state visit in July 1891 to London convinced the Russians – wrongly – that Britain and Germany had a secret alliance
b. Nikolay Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, therefore suggested to the French that the two states should begin to negotiate an entente
c. Talks began almost immediately and the French fleet visited the Russian base of Kronstadt as a symbolic act of friendship
d. Within a month the two states had already agreed to take counsel together upon every question of a nature to jeopardise the general peace
e. A year later this was backed up with a secret defensive military agreement which was approved by both governments in January 1984:
i. Russia would assist France with ‘all her available forces’ if it was attacked by Germany or Italy supported Germany
ii. France would do the same for Russia if it was attacked by Germany or Austria backed by Germany
iii. The Treaty was to last as long as the Triple Alliance
f. The Treaty marked the end of France’s isolation in Europe and even though its precise terms were secret, fuelled German fears that in any future war France and Russia would be allies
g. The potentially dangerous situation in which Germany now found itself was partly obscured by the shift of European rivalries in the 1890’s from Europe and the Balkans to Africa and China
h. Outside Europe, Germany, France and Russia were able often to cooperate t the cost of the British Empire
i. For a time Germany still remained confident that Britain, whose huge and vulnerable empire was coming under intense pressure, would be forced into an agreement on Germany’s terms with the Triple Alliance, but this, as we have seen, was a miscalculation

Question 4

Briefly outline the emergence of nationalism and great power rivalry

Answer 4

a. The 1890’s witnessed a renewed scramble for territory and influence in Africa and Asia by the Great Powers joined by Japan
b. However, contrary to expectations, imperial rivalries in Africa and China did not lead to the outbreak of a major war between the European powers, but they did encourage the growth of nationalism, imperialism, militarism in each European country
c. The struggle for empire was at its most intense in:
a. The Upper Nile
b. South Africa
c. China

Question 5

Explain the Upper Nile and Fashoda Crisis

Answer 5

a. The French, bitterly resentful of Britain’s dominant position in Egypt, which it had acquired in 1882, intended to seize a wide strip of territory right across central Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic
b. Both Britain and France raced to control the territories of the Upper Nile
c. In September 1898 a small French force reached the Upper Nile first and hoisted the French flag t Fashoda, but was confronted a few days later by an army under General Kitchener which had just defeated the Sudanese force at Omdurman
d. An armed clash that could have led to war between Britain and France was avoided when Kitchener decided not to use force to eject the French
e. Instead it was left to the two governments to find a diplomatic solution
f. France, deserted by both Russia and Germany had little option but to concede totally to British demands in the Sudan
g. Fashoda has been called by the historian J.V Keiger; ‘the worst crisis in Franco-British relations since Waterloo’
h. Yet, paradoxically, it also led to an improvement in Anglo-French affairs, as influential voices in Paris began to argue that France should cut its losses, write off Egypt and gain British backing for the annexation of Morocco

Question 6

Explain the Jameson Raid and the Kaiser’s response

Answer 6

a. Here the British faced similar threats to their colonial ambitions, this time from the Germans, whom they feared would try to extend their power eastwards from German South West Africa to the borders of the Transvaal
b. This would effectively block any northward British expansion
c. The economic significance of the Transvaal had been transformed by the discovery o gold there in 1886, and by 1894, its economy was dominated by the Germans
d. German bankers controlled the Transvaal’s National Bank and some 20% of foreign investment in the state came from Germany
e. The independence of the Boers was, however, threatened by the large number of British prospectors and adventurers who poured in
f. When Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister of Britain’s Cape Colony, illegally launched a badly planned and unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Boer government, the Jameson Raid, in 1895, the Germans couldn’t remain indifferent to it
g. At first the Kaiser wanted to declare the Transvaal a German protectorate, send military aid to Paulus Kruger, the President, and then summon a Congress in Berlin, which would redraw the map of South Africa, but in the end he was persuaded by British diplomats that because of British naval power, these were just empty threats
h. Instead he sent a telegram to Kruger congratulating him on preserving their independence of his country against attack
i. This caused intense resentment in Britain as it was perceived to be Germany meddling in the private affairs of the British Empire
j. Windows belonging to German owned shops were smashed and for the first time popular anti-German feeling became widespread and intense

Question 7

Explain the Boer War and the absence of the Continental League

Answer 7

a. Four years later, Kruger, who had rebuilt the Boer army ad equipped it with modern Germany artillery, declared war on Britain believing that France, Germany and Russia would intervene and force Britain to make concessions
b. ‘There could never be’. As historian AJP Taylor observed ‘a more favourable opportunity, in theory, for the Continental Powers to exploit British difficulties’
c. Yet nothing happened both because British control of the seas mad military intervention physically impossible and because neither France, Russia nor Germany could in the final analysis agree to cooperate
d. Britain was therefore able to defeat the Boers in a long drawn out war, which ended only in 1902

Question 8

Explain developments in China

Answer 8

a. As in Africa, Great Power rivalry in China was determined by a mixture of political, economic and strategic factors
b. Up to the 1890s Britain had been able to dominate China’s foreign trade and, through its superior sea power, block any attempts by other powers to divide up the Chines Empire; but the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway by Russia, which commenced in 1891, completely changed the situation as Russia would now be able to deploy troops to back its demands
c. Russia’s main aim in China was to annex Manchuria and gain an ice-free port in Korea
d. In China, unlike Africa, Britain now faced the prospect of a challenge to its commercial position from a major military land power
e. Russia could usually rely on the backing of France and Germany in China, while Britain’s only potential ally was Japan, which saw Russian expansion into Korea and Manchuria as a threat to its own security

Question 9

Explain the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902

Answer 9

a. To protect their interest Japan and Britain negotiated a defensive alliance
b. Japan recognised Britain’s interest in China, while Britain accepted that Japan was ‘in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially’ interested in Korea
c. Both powers then went on to agree in January 1902 that if these interests were threatened, each power should be free to take the necessary action to protect them
d. In the event of war between Japan and another country, Britain would remain neutral unless a third power came to Russia’s assistance
e. Similarly, if Britain were involved in a conflict in the Far East, Japan would only intervene if a third power declared war against Britain

Question 10

Explain the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Answer 10

a. When it became clear by 1904 that Russia would not withdraw troops from Manchuria to cede to Japan a dominant position in Korea, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty enabled Japan to launch a surprise attack on Port Arthur
b. The subsequent Russo-Japanese War was fought in isolation
c. Neither France, which had just signed a colonial agreement with Britain, ‘the Entente’, nor Germany wanted to fight Britain, and each feared that its involvement in a Far Eastern war would make it vulnerable to attack in Europe
d. After the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima and the of the Russian army at Mukden, the Russians, paralysed by revolution at home, agreed to mediation by the US President in August 1905
e. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia ceased to be an immediate threat to either Britain or Japan in the Far East and withdrew from Korea and Manchuria

Question 11

Explain the making of the Triple Entente

Answer 11

a. At the end of the 19th century it was the British Empire that was under pressure and a war between Britain and Russia over China seemed imminent
b. Although Germany faced a potentially hostile Franco-Russian Alliance in Europe, in Africa and the Far East it was often able to cooperate with these two powers against Britain
c. By 1907 however, the international situation had undergone a sea change
d. It was Germany that was isolated and Britain had settled its most acute disagreements with both Russia and France
e. Anglo-German relations had sharply deteriorated to a point where war between these hitherto friendly powers was a distinct possibility
f. In any war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance, it was safe to predict that by 1907 Britain would join France and Russia
g. The main causes of this dramatic change, which some historians call a ‘diplomatic revolution’ are as follows:
• Growing Anglo-German commercial rivalry
• The Construction of the German fleet combined with an aggressive or clumsy weltpolitik, which forced Britain into taking action to preserve its position as a Great Power
• The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 made Britain independent of Germany in the Far East
• The Franco-British Agreement of April 1904 at last marked the end of Anglo-French hostility over Egypt
• Germany’s violent reaction to French claims to Morocco in 1905 only cemented the France-British Entente even more
• Russia’s defeat by Japan made Russia less of a threat to British interests in China an made possibly the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907

Question 12

Explain Anglo-German Economic Rivalry

Answer 12

a. Between 1900 and 1914 Germany became an economic giant
b. The Germany steel and iron industries, protected from foreign competition tariffs, could undercut rivals abroad by selling at some 40% below the current price
c. Germany had also made startling progress in developing chemical, electrical and engineering industries which were in the forefront of the second industrial revolution
d. By 1910 Germany also possessed the second largest merchant fleet in the world (Britain 1st) and after Britain and France was the third largest creditor nation
e. German exports dominated the Middle Eastern, South American and South African markets and had largely displaced British goods there
f. Inevitably the German ‘economic miracle’ was a challenge to Britain’s long commercial and industrial supremacy and caused considerable anxiety and hostility
g. A popular book by E.E Williams, Made in Germany, argued with considerable exaggeration that ‘on all hands England’s industrial supremacy is tottering to its fall, and this result is largely Germany work’
h. In retaliation against Germany imports there were growing demands in Britain or the end of free trade and the introduction of tariffs
i. This in turn led to German fears that they were about to be shut out of British markets and to increased demands for the acquisition of a larger German colonial Empire

Question 13

Explain Anglo-German Naval Rivalry

Answer 13

a. It was above all the Anglo German naval arms race that inflamed public opinion in both countries
b. The launching of the German naval programme in 1897 alarmed Britain, and led to an escalating arms race between the two states, which by 1912 – in the words of the Austrian Foreign Minister – had become the ‘dominant element of the international situation’
c. The construction of the German navy struck at the core of the British power: in order to preserve its empire, Britain had to retain control of the seas
d. As long as Germany continued to build up its navy, Britain would therefore ultimately be numbered among Germany’s enemies
e. The German government intended to build within 20 years a German fleet of 60 battleships, which was to be aimed against British naval bases in the North Sea, Admiral Tirpitz, the head of the German navy, was convinced that this would ultimately force Britain to make major colonial concessions to Germany
f. This programme was also genuinely popular in Germany and appealed to the new German nationalism
g. The British government responded to the challenge by modernising the Royal Navy and designing in 1906 the New Dreadnought battleship, which made every other ship afloat obsolete
h. This, however, only made it easier for the Germans to catch up as inevitably it reduced Britain’s overwhelming lead
i. Thus, when in 1908 the Germans announced a supplementary programme consisting of four capital ships per year for the next four years, often hysterical demands in the British popular press and skilfully orchestrated campaigns by the Navy League pressure group pushed the British government into agreeing to build eight new battleships in 1909 and a further 10 over the next two years
j. In 1909-10 and then again in 1912 attempts were made to find a formula which could defuse the dangerous tensions generated by the naval race, but each time there were insuperable objections to a settlement
k. Britain wanted to safeguard its naval supremacy by negotiating a fixed ratio for capital ships, while the Germans wanted a cast-iron assurance that Britain would remain neutral if Germany had to fight France and Russia
l. Britain could not afford to stand aside and see another defeat of France by Germany, which would lead to the Germany domination of the European continent

Question 14

Explain the making of the Anglo-French Entente

Answer 14

a. After their humiliation at Fashoda, the French were determined to occupy Morocco
b. Once it was clear that the Germans would not help them, Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, began to look into London
c. Britain had initially been hostile to the prospect of a French protectorate in Morocco, as it might threaten the great British naval base in Gibraltar, but by 1902 Morocco was on the verge of civil war and the restoration of order by the French seemed the better option
d. The looming war in the Far East between Japan and Russia also played an important part in pushing the states into agreement as both feared what the historian John Lowe has called the ‘nightmare scenario of Britain and France having to fight each other as the “seconds” of their allies’
e. Ultimately, of course, the French hoped to associate Britain with the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance, while the British government hoped that an Anglo-French colonial entente would lead to a similar agreement with Russia
f. The agreement was signed on 9 April 1904 and settled Anglo-French colonial problems in three main areas:
i. The French exchanged their fishing rights around Newfoundland for territorial compensation in West Africa
ii. Siam (Thailand) was divided into two zones of influence and a condominium (join control of a territory by two states) was set up in the New Hebrides
iii. France agreed not to block British plans for financial reform in Egypt, provided Britain recognised France’s right to maintain law and order in Morocco. Secret clauses the made provision for the establishment of protectorate at some future date by France over Morocco ad by Britain over Egypt
g. While it improved Anglo-French relations, it is important to grasp that this agreement was not an alliance and neither country was committed to come to the help of the other in the event of war
h. Arguably, together with the Japanese Alliance, it made Britain even more independent of continental entanglements and it was only Germany’s violent reaction to its provision for the French control of Morocco that turned the agreement into a virtual Franco-British Alliance against Germany

Question 15

Explain the First Moroccan Crisis 1905-1906 (Tangier)

Answer 15

a. The German Chancellor, Bulow, decided to challenge the right to control Morocco which had been given to France by the Anglo-French Agreement
b. Optimistically, he believed that he could destroy both the Dual Alliance and the Entente Cordiale, and that a new Russo-German Alliance would emerge, which would effectively isolate France
c. In early 1905 the French government, ignoring all warnings from Berlin, began to reform the Moroccan administration
d. The Kaiser interrupted his Mediterranean cruise to land at Tangier and greeted the Sultan of Morocco as an independent ruler
e. The Germans then demanded a conference on the future of Morocco and the resignation of Delcasse
f. At first it seemed that Berlin really would win a significant success
g. The French cabinet agreed to a conference and forced Delcasse to resign
h. Then in July, the Kaiser and Nicholas II of Russia met at Bjorko and signed a defensive alliance to cooperate against any power in Europe
i. Yet all these successes were purely temporary and by April 1906 Germany had suffered a crushing defeat
j. The Russian government never ratified the Bjorko Agreement and let it lapse, and France was significantly strengthened when the British government came down firmly on the side of the French
k. When the conference opened at Algeciras in January 1906, Germany secured the backing of only Austria and Morocco
l. The other nine states agreed that France had a special interest in Morocco. Together with the Spanish, the French were therefore entrusted with the supervision of the Moroccan police, while France was also given control of the state bank
m. However, the Germans did win the concession that all the powers should enjoy equal economic rights within Morocco
n. The Moroccan incident was, as AJP Taylor stressed, ‘a true crisis, a turning point in European history’
o. For the first time since 1870 a Franco-German war seemed a real possibility
p. There were no armies or fleets mobilised, but the senior official in the German Foreign Ministry, Friedrich von Holstein, and the German military high command were certainly ready to risk war, as Russia was weak and the French army was inadequately equipped
q. In December 1905 the Schlieffen Plan was perfected for a two front war, while the British and French military staffs also began seriously to discuss what action should be taken if Germany invaded France

Question 16

Explain the Anglo-Russian Entente 1907

Answer 16

a. The Anglo Russian Entente of 1907, like the Anglo French Agreement was not initially aimed at Germany
b. The British had long wished to negotiate a compromise with Russia that would take the pressure off Afghanistan and northern India
c. On the Russian side, the Anglo-French Entente and Japan’s victory in the Far East made an agreement with Britain increasingly necessary
d. It had little option but to improve its relation with London if it was to maintain its alliance with France
e. The Anglo Russian Agreement was signed in August 1907, like the Anglo French Agreement it was concerned only with colonial matters:
i. The Russian gave up all claims to Afghanistan and recognised interest in Tibet
ii. Persia (Iran) was divided into zones of influence: the north went to Russia, the south to Britain, with a neutral zone in between
iii. Both Empires recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet

Question 17

Explain how following the Tangier Crisis 1905-1906 Germany was now on the defensive

Answer 17

a. The Triple Entente was not a formal alliance system, but it did mark a shift in the balance of power in Europe
b. No longer could the Germans assume that an Anglo-Russian war would break out that would enable them to force Britain – or Russia – into becoming a subordinate ally
c. The ententes did not, however, completely remove all friction between their members
d. Anglo-Russian friction continued, for instance, in Persia
e. Nor did they necessarily mean that Germany would be isolated and encircled
f. There were still influential voices in France arguing for a settlement with Germany
g. In 1909, the French and Germans even signed an agreement for economic cooperation in Morocco
h. Yet by the end of 1910 Franco-German relation were again rapidly worsening, as local French official in in Morocco were breaking the Algeciras Agreement by steadily increasing their power in Administrative, economic and financial affairs
i. In Germany, the New Foreign Secretary, von Kiderlen-Wachter, was also determined to pursue a more decisive and aggressive foreign policy

Question 18

Explain the Second Moroccan Crisis and its consequences 1911 (Agadir)

Answer 18

a. Watcher’s opportunity to reassert Germany’s rights in Morocco came when in May 1911 French troops intervened in Fez after riots against the Sultan of Morocco had broken out
b. It soon became clear that France, contrary to the agreement of 1906, was going to occupy the whole country
c. The German government immediately insisted on territorial compensation from territory in the French Congo, and sent on 1 July the Panther, a gunboat to the south Moroccan port of Agadir: The hope was, as Wachter expressed it, that ‘by seizing a (territorial) pawn, the imperial government will be placed in a position to give the Moroccan affair a turn which should cause the earlier setbacks of 1905 to pass into oblivion’
d. Initially, the French government was ready to negotiate with the Germans as the Russians, still resenting the lack of French help during the Bosnian crisis, made it clear that they could offer the French no military assistance at all
e. But then on 21 July Britain intervened decisively
f. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, voiced his government’s policy when he stated that Britain could not be ‘treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account’
g. The British were anxious to prevent a German diplomatic success which they feared would destroy the Entente, but they were also signalling to the French that Britain must not be ignored in any new Moroccan agreement
h. In fact, the warning was seen as an ultimatum against Germany and it made a Franco German compromise much more difficult to achieve
i. In the end, through secret negotiations, the French reached an agreement with the Germans in November 1911, which allowed France to establish a protectorate over Morocco, provided that Germany was given a small part of the French Congo and its economic interests in Morocco were respected
j. Essentially this was another diplomatic defeat for the Germans as they failed to extract any major concessions from the French

Question 19

Explain the acceleration of the arms race

Answer 19

a. The second Moroccan crisis had very serious consequences for the peace of Europe
b. It heightened tension between Germany and Britain and France, which fuelled the arms race and made Germany increasingly desperate or a diplomatic victory
c. The German government, pushed by the army, public opinion and a highly effective pressure group called the Wehrverein, increased the size of the army by about 29,000 men in 1912 and then a year later a further increase of 117,000 men and 119 officers and non-commissioned officers was improved
d. In Britain, the Navy League and the National Service League subjected their own government to similar pressures
e. The French meanwhile compensated for their smaller population by extending the period of conscription from two to three years and by modernising their artillery and equipment
f. Russia had to rebuild its armed forces after the disaster of the Russo-Japanese War
g. By the financial year 1913-14 Russia was spending over 800 million roubles on rearmament
h. By June 1914 the peacetime strength of the Russian army was on target to reach almost two million men, which was three times as large as Germany’s

Question 20

Explain the strengthening of the Triple Entente

Answer 20

a. When Raymond Poincare became French Prime Minster in 1912 he was determined as a consequence of the second Moroccan crisis to strengthen the Triple Entente:
i. A Franco Russian naval convention was signed in July 1912 in which both navies agreed to work out joint tactics in the event of war
ii. The French and Russian military chiefs of staff also met and decided that should war break out with Germany both armies would immediately attack
iii. At the same time talks between the British and French naval staff also took place about the part each navy would play in the event of war with Germany in the Mediterranean and the English Channel
b. In November the French and British governments exchanged letters defining the entente
c. In essence they stated that the naval and military agreements between the two countries did not constitute a proper alliance, but if either state were attacked by a third power, they would immediately meet to discuss whether they would take any joint measures
d. This was as far as the British cabinet was willing to go
e. By the end of 1912 both the Dual Alliance and the Anglo French Entente had been greatly strengthened
f. Germany, facing isolation was consequently all the more determined to cling to its alliance with Austria
g. It was this that was to make the Balkan crises of 1908-14 so dangerous

Question 21

Outline the Balkans and the Great Powers 1906-1914

Answer 21

a. Between 1890 and 1905 the Balkans remained relatively quiet
b. Britain was no longer concerned by the Russian threat to the Straits as it could now protect its interests in the eastern Mediterranean from bases in Egypt
c. As Russia wished to concentrate on the Far East, it signed with Austria in May 1897 an agreement whereby both states would od as little as possible to disturb the existing situation in the Balkans and the Near East
d. In 1905, weakened by defeat in the Far East and the subsequent turmoil at home, the Russian government hoped to maintain this agreement, but its very weakness upset the balance of power in the Balkans and tempted Austria to take advantage of it to defend its interests against an increasingly aggressive Serbia
e. In 1903 the pro-Austrian Serbian King, Alexander Obrenovich, had been assassinated by Serbian nationalists and replaced by Peter, of the rival Karageorgevich dynasty
f. Peter followed a fiercely anti Austrian and strongly nationalist policy, which he hoped would attract Russian support
g. Ultimately his aim was to free the South Slavs, who increasingly resented being part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
h. Austria’s main aim in the Balkans was now at all costs to weaken Serbia

Question 22

Explain the Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909

Answer 22

a. In 1908 a group of army officers seized power in Turkey
b. This temporarily revived Austro-Russian cooperation as both powers feared that this would lead to the strengthening of the Turkish Empire
c. In September 1908 the Russian and Austrian Foreign Ministers approved an agreement whereby Russian warships would be able to pass through the Straits, while this right would still be denied to the other powers
d. In exchange, Austria would be able formally to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had in fact administered since 1878
e. The Russian Foreign Minister claimed that any Austrian move would have to be confirmed later by a European conference, but this was never put down on paper, a fact that explains much of what was to follow
f. The Austrians went ahead and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, while the Russians found little international support for their plans in the Straits
g. The annexation, however, met with a storm of complaint throughout Europe
h. In Russia and Serbia, which eventually hoped to make these provinces part of a Greater Serb state, there were demonstrations calling for war against Austria
i. Facing strong criticism in the Russian press, Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, demanded the calling of the European conference, to which he insisted the Austrians had in principle agreed
j. The Austrian government immediately vetoed this proposal as it feared a repetition of what had happened at Algeciras where Germany and Austria had been heavily outvoted
k. What made the crisis so dangerous was that Austria, which had the unconditional backing of Germany, was ready to fight Serbia even if supported by Russia
l. However, the Russians received no backing from the French, who were busy negotiating an economic agreement covering Morocco with Germany, and had no option but to accept the annexation
m. The dangerous consequences of this crisis were that it did long term and serious damage to Russia’s relations with Germany and Austria and made cooperation in the Balkans much more difficult, whilst at the same time bringing Russia and Serbia together

Question 23

Explain the First Balkan War 1912

Answer 23

a. In 1912 the Italians invaded Libya, which was legally still part of the Turkish Empire
b. This prompted the Balkan states to overcome their internal rivalries, and declare war against Turkey
c. Within three weeks the Turkish Empire in Europe had collapsed, and Bulgarian troops were advancing on Constantinople
d. The sheer speed and scale of the victory created an acute crisis for the Great Powers
e. What made the situation so tense is that:
i. Austria faced a greatly strengthened Serbia which had occupied part of Albania. Austria, however, was determined to make Albania an independent state so as to deny Serbia access to the Adriatic. At first Russia supported Serbian claims and Austria began to concentrate troops near the Russian frontier.
ii. Russia was equally determined to strop Constantinople falling to Bulgaria as the Straits were becoming increasingly vital for its economic development. Between 1903 and 1912 a growing percentage of Russia exports, particularly of grain, which was the main export were passing through them.
iii. The crisis also threatened to activate ‘the alliance system’. Behind Austria stood Germany and behind Russia stood France. Although neither wanted war in the Balkans, both powers made clear that they would stand by their ally if it was attacked.
iv. The German declaration on 2 December 1912, promising help to Austria if attacked by a ‘third party’, was answered by a statement from London stressing that Britain would not remain neutral in a major conflict.
v. Partly in response to this, on 8 December 1912 the Kaiser called a conference of his service chiefs. Von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, argued for ‘War – sooner, the better’, but on Tirpitz’s insistence it was decided not to wait until the Kiel Canal had been widened to take modern battleships.
f. The immediate danger to Russia passed when Bulgaria failed to take Constantinople and the Balkan states signed an armistice with Turkey on 3 December
g. The Great Powers then agreed to call a peace conference in London to settle the territorial problem in the Balkans
h. By the Treaty of London of 30 May 1913 the Turks gave up all their territory in the Balkans except for a small zone around the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which satisfied Russia, while Austria’s demand that a independent Albania be set up was also agreed

Question 24

Explain the Second Balkan War 1913

Answer 24

a. At the end of June 1913 the Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria, which felt cheated of its just share of territory, attacked Serbia
b. The Greeks, the Romanians and the Turks all supported Serbia and within a month Bulgaria was defeated
c. The Subsequent Treaty of Bucharest increased the territories of Serbia, Greece and Romania, while Turkey, through the Treaty of Constantinople, regained some of the territory it had lost to Bulgaria
d. The clear loser in the second Balkan war was Austria, even though it was not a belligerent, because Serbia had now emerged stronger, and was in a position to resist pressure from Vienna

Question 25

Explain the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

Answer 25

a. On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austria throne, and his wife were assassinated at Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, who had been recruited by the Serb terrorist group, the Black Hand
b. The assassination at last provided Austria with an excuse to eliminate the Serb threat to Bosnia and its South Slav territories
c. To succeed, however, Vienna needed to gain German backing in case of Russian intervention and also to move quickly while the horror of the assassination was still fresh in the minds of European governments
d. The German government agreed with the Austrian analysis of the Serb threat, and the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, gave the Austrians on 5 July their unconditional support: the so called ‘blank cheque’
e. What did they hope this would achieve? Neither was intending to unleash a major European war, but Bethmann Hollweg believed that a brief punitive war against Serbia could be kept localised
f. He gambled that Russia would not in the end intervene both because it was financially not ready for war and because it would see the war as justified retribution for the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne
g. Bethmann Hollweg hoped that the rapid defeat of Serbia would restore the prestige of the Dual Alliance, weaken Pan Slavism and Russia, and subsequently enable Germany to exploit Austria’s success to improve relation with the Entente powers from a position of strength

Question 26

Explain the Austrian Ultimatum

Answer 26

a. Possibly, if Austria had moved quickly, the plan might have worked
b. On 7 July the Austro Hungarian ministerial council met to consider what action to take
c. The Chancellor, Count Leopold von Berchtold, was ready to launch a surprise attack on Serbia but on the advice of the Hungarian Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, he agred first of all to present Serbia with an ultimatum, and then only declare war if this was rejected
d. The crucial part of the ultimatum insisted that Serbia should carry out, under the supervision of Austrian officials, a whole series of anti-terrorist measures
e. The Austrians calculated that Belgrade would reject this demand, as it would give Vienna effective control of Serbia’s security forces, and enable it to intervene in Serbia’s internal affairs
f. It was sent to Belgrade on 23 July

Question 27

Explain Serbia’s Rejection of the Ultimatum

Answer 27

a. The Serb reply to the ultimatum was skilfully drafted
b. It rejected, as Vienna expected, and indeed hoped, the crucial demand that Austrian officials should supervise the anti-terrorist measures, yet its tone was so conciliatory that it cunningly appeared to offer Austria most of what it wanted
c. The Austrians were not fooled by the ‘masterpiece of public relations’
d. They broke off diplomatic relations and then on 28 July declared war on Serbia

Question 28

Explain Russia’s reaction to the Archduke’s assassination and resulting ultimatum

Answer 28

a. The Russians accepted the Austrians’ right to demand an inquiry into the assassination at Sarajevo, but they were not ready to tolerate the destruction of Serbia and Austro-Hungarian domination of the Balkans
b. On 28 July, the day Austria declared war on Serbia, the Russian government ordered the mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Kazan and Moscow
c. Two days later this was changed to full mobilisation despite the initial reservations of the Tsar and personal appeal from the Kaiser
d. This move certainly heightened the tension, although it would take at least six weeks before the Russian army would be ready for war

Question 29

Explain Germany’s reaction to the Archduke’s assassination and resulting ultimatum

Answer 29

a. Russian mobilisation made German mobilisation inevitable given the Schlieffen plan which depended on defeating the French before the Russian army was fully ready
b. By 28 July the German general staff was already urging mobilisation on their government
c. Germany therefore had little option but to act quickly
d. On 31 July it dispatched an ultimatum to Russia warning its government that unless it stopped mobilisation within 12 hours, Germany would fully mobilise its armed forces
e. When the ultimatum expired, Germany declared war on Russia
f. Politically, the fact that the Russians started general mobilisation before the Germans, enabled Bethmann Hollweg to claim that Germany was only acting defensively against the Russian threat
g. This was to prove an important factor in gaining the support of the German working classes for the war

Question 30

Explain France’s reaction to the Archduke’s assassination and resulting ultimatum

Answer 30

a. French reaction to the crisis was confused by the fact that both the French President and Prime Minister were at sea returning from a visit to St Petersburg and did not reach Paris until 29 July
b. However, the war minister had taken the precaution of discreetly recalling soldiers from leave and moving some key units back in from Morocco
c. On 31 July the French cabinet ordered mobilisation to start on the following day
d. The German ambassador was instructed from Berlin to ask what France’s attitude would be to a Russo German war
e. If France chose to remain neutral, it would have to surrender the two fortresses of Toul and Verdun to Germany as a pledge of good faith
f. The Prime Minister merely commented that ‘France will act in accordance with her interests’
g. In reality France had little choice
h. The Dual Alliance bound France to come to the help of Russia
i. The French could not stand back and allow the defeat of Russia, which would immeasurably increase German power
j. The Germans, however, could not afford to wait for France to declare war
k. They had to implement the Schlieffen plan, part of which involved a flanking attack against France through Belgium as soon as possible
l. On 2 August they sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding a free passage for their troops
m. When this was rejected the following day, orders were given to the German army to advance into Belgium and war was declared on France

Question 31

Explain Britain’s reaction to the Archduke’s assassination and resulting ultimatum

Answer 31

a. As the seriousness of the crisis in the Balkans became clear, the British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, on 27 July suggested a conference in London to discuss the crisis
b. The Italians and the French backed it, but the Germans argued that only direct Austro-Russian negotiations could solve the problem
c. That same day the cabinet decided that the British fleet, which had just finished manoeuvres, should not be dispersed to its peacetime bases
d. Ominously, Grey also raised with the Cabinet
e. The possibility that Britain might declare war on Germany, should France be attacked
f. With the announcement of Russian mobilisation and the German declaration of war on Russia, pressure from both France and Russia on Britain to enter the war increased, while Germany attempted to persuade Britain to remain neutral
g. The French argued that Britain was morally committed to back them
h. However, on the vital issue of peace or war the cabinet was divided
i. On 29 July it could only agree that ‘at this stage’ it was ‘unable to pledge ourselves in advance either under all circumstances to stand aside or on any condition go in’
j. It was finally the German violation of Belgium on 4 August that enabled Grey and the ‘war party’ to win over the majority of those in the cabinet, who still clung to the hope that Britain could keep out of the war
k. An ultimatum was sent to Berlin at 2pm that afternoon and when it expired at midnight (German time) Britain was at war with Germany

Question 32

Explain Italy’s reaction to the Archduke’s assassination and resulting ultimatum

Answer 32

a. Throughout the critical days in late July, Italy, despite being a member of the Triple Alliance, refused to align itself with Germany and Austria Hungary
b. There was little public support for Austria, who was still viewed as the ‘traditional enemy’, and was also an awareness of how vulnerable Italy’s coastline would be to British and French naval attacks
c. After the war in Libya the army too, needed to be reequipped and rested
d. However, the Italian Prime Minister did not rule out eventual entry on either side if promised significant territorial reward

Question 33

Explain what was so distinctive about the July crisis

Answer 33

a. If considered a Third Balkan War, the players were the same but this time, there was perceived to be an existential threat and Serbia believed if it gave in, it would cease to exist.
b. Behaviour of allies different. Neither France or Russia would back down and they failed to restrain their allies like they had been doing in previous crises.
c. Finally, the Germans reject the conference offered by Britain though they were willing to negotiate with each other in previous crises
d. Timing and speed also different. The initial assassination was followed by a pause, then a rapid run of events after the ultimatum was rejected. Suggestion that it was too late by the 27th July
e. Finally, technology struggled with this crisis:
f. The French government were on a battleship and couldn’t communicate
g. The Kaiser was on his yacht during the crisis
h. The British cabinet were on their Summer break meaning discussions only began once the ultimatum had been issued
i. Konrad was told to ‘push for the maximum’ by von Molt but asked to calm down by Holvig. He asked who ‘who rules in Berlin’
j. It was odd as the years preceding the July Crisis were perceived to be an era of improving international relations
k. e.g. Britain and Germany had reached agreement over the future of Portuguese colonies and the Berlin-Baghdad railway, there were even hopes of reviving Haldane’s 1912 proposal for a ‘naval holiday’ as Germany’s naval spending fell
l. Even in 1914, the French government was reluctant to encourage Russia with guarantees of military support
m. Was the Kaiser’s behaviour during the July Crisis an attempt to exploit the opportunity for great diplomatic victory rather than war itself. General von Moltke was unusual in saying ‘war should come sooner rather than later’

Question 34

Explain the strengthening of the Triple Entente

Answer 34

a. Franco - Russian naval convention signed in July 1912 in which both navies agreed to work out joint tactics in the event of war
b. Russian and French military chiefs met and decided that should war break out with Germany, both armies would attack
c. Also, talks between British and French naval staff agreed that the British would take responsibility in protecting French shipping of France was at war with Germany, and vice versa.
d. The British and French also agreed the definition of the Entente; in essence they stated the naval and military agreements between the two countries did not constitute a proper alliance, but if either state was attacked by a third power, they would meet to discuss joint measures
e. The German reaction to the British - Russian naval agreement of 1914 was one of fear, though it was not taken particularly seriously by the British
Poincare’s alliance blocs:
a. He argued alliance blocs were good for peace because the alliance blocs cancelled each other out and preserved the peace
b. The flaw in this theory was that it assumes the two blocs are equal in power; there has to be a perception of equilibrium between the blocs

Question 35

Explain Germany’s effect on British foreign policy of the era

Answer 35

1. Not determined by Germany
   a. The Anglo-French Entente was purely colonial, and did not involve gaining France as an ally against Germany. They were geared to resolving disputes in Morocco, Egypt and Africa.
   b. The Anglo-Russian Entente was also colonial, with ‘a better understanding’ with Russia being the main objective of successive British governments. This was geared to resolve tensions in Afghanistan and the Far East.
   c. Lansdowne and Gray regarded Russia as a threat to Britain’s Empire which they did not have the means to withstand. Britain left ‘splendid isolation’ due to a fear of the Franco-Russian alliance presented, not the Triple Alliance
   d. There was even co-operation with Germany e.g. Berlin-Baghdad railway and agreements over Portuguese colonies
2. Determined by Germany
   a. The arms race was a reaction to Germany
   b. The Entente with France was strengthened later by increasing naval cooperation
   c. The commercial rivalry with Germany helped drive the Entente with France and the growth of the German navy undermined Britain’s Empire - the Entente helped reassert the Empire
   d. The Entente with France was certainly seen as anti- German by Germany itself

Question 36

Outline the Key Debate 1871-1914

Answer 36

1. The ‘European System’ 1871-1914
   a. The causes of the First World War are one of the most controversial debates in modern history
   b. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the Allied powers had little doubt that ‘this responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria’, but in the 1920s 30s this view was rejected by historians not only in Germany, but in the US, Britain and even France
   c. They insisted that the real causes of the war were far more complex and were a result of the ‘European System’ that came into existence in 1871. In their opinion the key causes were:
   i. The Alliance System
   ii. Nationalism
   iii. Militarism
   iv. Imperialism
   v. The Arms Race
   vi. Economic rivalry
   d. Nationalism, militarism and imperialism certainly helped to create the atmosphere which made war acceptable and exciting
   e. These ideologies radicalised large section of public opinion in the European states, but by themselves they did not cause the war
   f. In Germany, for instance, in July 1914 Bethmann Hollweg was worried that the German Socialist Part, the SPD, would not support war unless it was seen to be a defensive struggle against autocratic Russia
   g. Neither did economic rivalry, despite Marx’s and Lenin’s teaching to the contrary, make the war inevitable
   h. The German ‘economic miracle’ during the period 1890-1914 certainly challenged Britain’s former economic supremacy, but both countries became each other’s major trading partners, and British and German banks worked closely together
   i. The arms race and the alliance system both contributed towards the outbreak of war
   j. The arms race fuelled political tension and insecurity, as did the Anglo German naval race, for example
   k. In Germany the generals, faced by the growing strength of the Russian French armies, positively welcomed the chance to go to war in 1914 before the strength of their potential enemies became overwhelming
   l. The alliance system with its secret diplomacy and treaties was much criticised after the war
   m. The fact that the web of treaties which covered Europe in 1914 contained, or – equally as important – was thought to contain, secret clauses, contributed to the atmosphere of suspicion between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente
   n. The Alliance system also divided Europe up into potential friends and enemies and influenced military and strategic planning
   o. The danger of this was that the general staffs had to take planning decisions which in a time of acute crisis could deprive their governments of both time and the freedom of action
   p. The existence of the Schlieffen Plan, for instance, made it much more difficult for Bethmann Hollweg to avoid war in July 1914

Question 37

Explain Germany’s role 1871-1914

Answer 37

a. From the 1920s to the 60s it was generally agreed that all the Great Powers were responsible for the war, but the this consensus was challenged by a new generation of German historian led by Fritz Fischer, who argued in two key books that the German leadership by 1912 was more ready to risk war both to make Germany into a world power and to consolidate its position at home
b. Fischer certainly focused the spotlight back on Germany’s role in the causes of the war
c. The difficulty with Germany was that it was often difficult to know ‘who ruled in Berlin’
d. The Kaiser was no constitutional monarch and was notoriously indiscreet in what he said, while both the army and navy were not ultimately subjected to civilian politicians, as in Britain and France
e. Many army officers and conservatives urged a quick, victorious war both to break out of isolation and to crush the socialists and the critics of the Bismarckian constitution
f. In many ways Germany was an economic giant in the charge of a divided, chaotic government pursuing contradictory policies
g. Germany’s position in Europe and its great power made this very dangerous

Question 38

Why did war break out in 1914?

Answer 38

a. Why did war break out in 1914 when previous crises in the Balkans and Morocco had not led to conflict between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente?
b. Arguably each crisis increased the likelihood of war
c. The two Moroccan crises did much to bring together Britain and France, while France’s failure to back Russia in the Bosnian crisis of 1908, and Russia’s subsequent humiliation at the hands of Austria and Germany, strengthened both Poincare’s resolve to support Russia next time and Russia’s determination to stop the destruction of Serbia in July 1914
d. The Great Powers did cooperate in containing the fallout from the two Balkan wars, but nevertheless the emergence of a greatly strengthened Serbia in 1913 with its claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina was deadly threat to the Habsburg Empire, and the following year Austria went to war to crush it
e. The constant international tension had created a mood throughout Europe that war was sooner or later inevitable, and that the main thing was to choose the right moment for the struggle to start
f. For differing reasons and at different stages that moment seemed to have been reached in July 1914
g. The Sarajevo assassinations had brought together all the explosive tensions in Europe
h. Germany could not allow its only reliable ally to be humiliated by Serbia and Russia
i. Once Germany declared war on Russia, France could not stand back and see Russia defeated, while Britain, despite initial hesitations, could not afford to run the risk of a German victory
j. The decisions of the statesmen were backed for the most part by their people, who saw the war as a struggle and a matter of honour and principle to preserve their nations’ independence, greatness and future development