Reconciliation and Disarmament 1924-1930: The era of Locarno Flashcards
Explain the impact of the Dawes plan
• Dawes plan played a crucial part in ending the bitter conflict over reparations which had nearly ended in war during the Ruhr occupation
- The Recommendations of the Dawes Plan
a. The plan didn’t alter the reparations total fixed in 1921, it recommended a loan of 800 million gold marks to be raised mainly in the USA to assist the restoration of the German economy, opened US investment in Germany
b. Annual reparations to start gradually and rise at the end of five years to their maximum, these payments were to be guaranteed but the revenues of German railways and key industries
c. A committee of foreign experts sitting in Berlin under the chairmanship of a US official was to ensure actual payments were transferred to Britain, France and Belgium so that the German economy was not damaged, the plan was provision and to be renegotiated over the next 10 years
Explain reactions to the Dawes plan
- British
a. Welcomed in April 1924 by the Treasury as ‘the only constructive suggestion for escape from the present situation, which if left must inevitably lead to war, open or concealed, between Germany and France’
b. Involved the USA in extracting reparations from Germany - French
a. Widely disliked the plan
b. Not clear how Germans could be compelled to pay if they again defaulted and refused as in 1922
c. However, with Poincare’s defeat in the June 1924 elections, their willingness to cooperate markedly increased
d. If the French were to receive any reparations payments and to avoid isolation, they needed to go along with the Dawes Plan - Germans
a. Disliked as it placed key industries under international control and did nothing about scaling down reparations debts
b. Stresemann was now Foreign Minister and realised that Germany had no alternative but to accept if France were to be persuaded to leave the Ruhr
Explain the London Conference
- Agreement to implement Dawes and withdraw French and Belgian forces from the Ruhr within 12 months was achieved at the London Conference in August 1924
- New European power balance was revealed when Britain and the USA devised a formula for blocking France’s ability to act alone against Germany in the event of default
- If Germany refused payment, Britain as a member of the Reparation Commission would have the right to appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, and that a US representative would immediately join the Reparation Commission
- Join Anglo-American pressure would then be more than enough to restrain French occupation of the Ruhr
- Deprived of much of their influence on the Reparations Commission, France suffered a major diplomatic defeat at London
Explain France’s need for security
- France’s need for security
a. The Dawes plan by ending the Ruhr crisis had with German measure to stabilise the mark, made Germany attractive for US investment
b. To some extent, one of the precursors for European economic recovery was in place, but investment was by individuals and banks, not guaranteed by the US government
c. Nor did it come with offers of military security to the French, should an economic crisis blow up France could be left facing a strong Germany
d. Initially the French had little option but to continue to insist as far as they could on the literal implementation of Versailles
e. They refused for instance, to agree the evacuation of the Cologne zone due in 1925 on the grounds that Germany had not yet carried out the military clauses of the Treaty in ‘either spirit or the letter’
Explain the negotiations of the Locarno Treaties
a. The urgent need to reassure the French of Germany’s peaceful intentions, and secure the evacuation of Cologne, prompted Stresemann on the British ambassador in Berlin’s unofficial advice to forward a complex scheme for an international guarantee by the European great powers of the Rhineland and of the status quo in western Europe
b. Austin Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary, first suspected the proposals were an attempt to divide Britain and France, he then realised it was potentially an opportunity to achieve both French security and the evacuation of Cologne without committing Britain to a military pact with France, which the Cabinet wouldn’t tolerate
c. Aristide Briand, now back in power knew that only within the framework of an international agreement on the lines put forward by Stresemann could he commit Britain to coming to France’s assistance if attacked by Germany
d. Briand persuaded Chamberlain and Stresemann to widen the international guarantee to cover the Belgian-German frontier
e. He also attempted to extend it to Germany’s eastern frontiers but this was rejected by both Stresemann and Chamberlain
f. However, Stresemann did refer disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia to arbitration, but refused to recognise their frontiers with Germany as permanent
g. to refer disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia to arbitration, although he refused to recognise their frontiers with Germany were permanent
h. Chamberlain was specific that it was in Britain’s interests only to guarantee the European status quo, told the commons in November 1925 in words that would haunt the government, that extending the guarantee to the Polish corridor would not be worth the ‘bones of a British grenadier’
i. Negotiations at the Locarno Conference resulted in a number of treaties signed in December, most importantly confirming the inviolability of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers and the Rhineland’s demilitarisation
j. The Treaties were underwritten by an Anglo-Italian guarantee to assist the victims of aggression, if a minor incident on one of the Locarno frontiers occurred, the injured part would appeal to the League’s Council, if upheld the guarantors would assist the injured state to secure compensation from the aggressor
k. In a serious violation the guarantors could act immediately, although the issue would eventually be referred to the council
Assess the Locarno Agreements
a. USA and Western Europe had great enthusiasm for Locarno, appeared as real peace had finally come, suggested France had finally achieved security
b. France gained least from Locarno, her eastern frontier was now secure, but under Locarno it couldn’t threaten to occupy the Ruhr to pacify German aggression
c. Britain had given France the illusion of security, the provision for referring all but major violations of Locarno to the League before acting ensured Britain a say on any action through its council representative
d. Britain gained two major advantages from Locarno:
i. It tied France down and prevented re-occupation of the Ruhr
ii. Improving relations between Germany and the West by holding out the prospect of German League membership, discouraged close cooperation between Moscow and Berlin
e. Locarno unpopular with German nationalists, but Stresemann’s key to gradual revision of the Treaty
f. Assuring Germany of western peace, and not placing its eastern Polish frontier under international guarantee, Locarno left open the possibility of revision of the German-Polish frontier
g. Stresemann’s aims were thus diametrically opposite to Briand’s, but both desired peace, therein lay Locarno’s real importance, a symbol of cooperation – Ramsay McDonald (Labour) ‘a miraculous change’ of psychology on the continent
Outline the ‘Locarno Spirit’ and Germany’s re-emergence as a great powers
- Locarno spirit interpreted differently in London, Paris and Berlin, all three agreed it involved goodwill and concessions, yet the scope and timing were often of bitter debate
- Stresemann and Briand had to convince their country that Locarno was working, Briand had to show he was not giving too much away, Stresemann had to satisfy public opinion that his policy of ‘fulfilment’ was resulting in real concessions from the ex-allies
- Survival of the German republic depended on diplomatic successes
Outline Stresemann’s initial successes and failures 1925-27
a. Atmosphere of détente created by Locarno led to the evacuation of Cologne in January 1926, in September Germany joined the League and a permanent Council seat
b. Stresemann exploited every opportunity to revise Versailles, 1926 he proposed a 1.5 billion gold mark loan to France to ease French economic troubles, in return France would leave the Rhineland and return the Saar and its coalmines to Germany, the plan was rejected in December as the French economy improved and the USA would not approve the sale of German bonds to US investors
c. In January 1927 the allied disarmament Commission was withdraw from Germany, in August Britain, France and Belgium withdrew 10,000 troops from their Rhineland garrisons
Outline the Young Plan and the evacuation of the Rhineland
a. Stresemann’s greatest success was negotiating a permanent reduction in reparations with an Anglo-French evacuation of the Rhineland five years before Versailles required
b. At the Hague 1929 Conference the reparation sum was reduced from 132 billion gold marks to 112 billion, to be paid over 59 years (Young Plan), the Rhineland was to be evacuated in 1930
c. This agreement helped to make the Young plan acceptable to Germany, but in December the Nazi and Nationalist parties forced a referendum declaring its signature would be high treason – easily defeated and Young went ahead 1930
Explain proposals for a European customs union and common currency
a. With the Rhineland’s evacuation Germany’s great power restoration was almost complete, Briand concluded that Germany could only peacefully be contained through some European federation
b. At the League’s 10th assembly in 1929, he outlined an ambitious but vague scheme of this nature
c. Stresemann’s reacted favourably, urging a European customs union and common currency, Briand entrusted by the 27 European members of the League with formulating his plan more precisely, but when shown to the chancelleries of Europe in May 1930 the economic and political climate had changed
d. Stresemann had died, and the Germany political crisis brought on by the Depression brought Bruning to power, who was more interested in customs union with Austria than a European federation
e. German cabinet rejected the memorandum in July 1930, Britain followed a week later
Explain Russo-German relations in the Locarno era
a. Soviet government following Lenin’s death in 1924 viewed the progress in stabilising western Europe through the Dawes plan and Locarno Agreements with hostility, it feared this would strengthen anti-Bolshevik forces and delay German revolution
b. Russians attempted to deflect Stresemann from Locarno, first with a military alliance against Poland and then with the threat of joining France to guarantee Poland’ western frontiers
c. Stresemann was aware of Russia’s desire for German revolution and upheld Locarno, but was anxious to keep links with Moscow and consolidate Rapallo as an insurance against Anglo-French pressure
d. Thus the Russian negotiated a commercial treaty with Germany in October 1925, in April 1926 when France and Poland were trying to deter German entry into the League council, the persuaded Stresemann to sign the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (Berlin Treaty) – a neutrality pact
Outline Anglo-Russian relations in the Locarno era
a. Anglo-Russian relations deteriorate when the British government refused in October 1024 to ratify the Anglo-Soviet General Treaty
b. In 1927, after a raid on the offices of Soviet trading company Arcos to discover evidence of espionage, the British government severed all official Russian relations
c. This strengthened Stalin’s determination to cut Russian off from the West, thrust of Soviet foreign policy was to exploit anti-West feeling in the Middle East, China and India
Outline developments between France and Eastern Europe in the Locarno era
a. With Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war France began building up a series of alliances in eastern Europe to replace their alliance with Tsarist Russia
b. March 1921, concluded an alliance with Poland, which, as it was hated by Russia and Germany was the most vulnerable European state
c. French attempts to strengthen it failed, Stresemann would not guarantee Poland’s borders or ensure her a permanent council seat
d. 1925-6 it seemed as if Poland would financially collapse, but by 1927 its situation had stabilised
e. France was unsuccessful at organising the other state created by Versailles into a defensive anti-German alliance
f. 1920 Little entente between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, joined by Romania in 1921, primarily directed at Hungary though and designed to prevent Habsburg return and the revision of Trianon
g. Only in 1924 did Paris conclude a treaty with Czechoslovakia but this was not strictly anti-German, would only operate in the event of the restoration of the Austrian or German royal families or Anschluss
h. Italian attempts to challenge French influence in the Balkans was undermined as France exploited suspicions caused by Italian influence in Albania to sign a treaty with Romania guaranteeing her borders in 1926, then a friendship treaty with Yugoslavia in 1927, by the end of the decade French Balkan influence was preponderant
Outline the Geneva protocol 1924
• Major task of the League to work out an acceptable global disarmament programme, disarmament could not be divorced from security, to solve this the League in 1924 drafted an ambitious collective security agreement – Geneva protocol this was rejected by Britain though, fearing it would amount to a commitment to policing the world
Explain the Washington Four Power Treaty and Naval Convention 1924
• With the USA outside the League, growing Anglo-American naval rivalry and deteriorating American-Japanese relations in the pacific required tackling by the powers concerned
• By 1919 the USA had become alarmed by Japanese power in the Pacific, already possessing the world’s third largest navy, Japan had begun a major naval construction programme
• Americans responded by building a pacific fleet and embarking on their own formidable building programme which would make the US navy the largest in the world
• This pushed Britain in 1921 to announcing its own naval programme, but privately told Washington it desired a negotiated settlement as it could not afford a naval race, Harding was anxious to reduce armaments and economise, but would only negotiate with Britain if it terminated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which would theoretically involve Britain as Japan’s ally against the USA
• Due for renewal in July 1921 Britain and Japan agreed under pressure from Washington to replace it with a new four power Treaty of Britain, France, USA and Japan to respect each other’s possessions in the Pacific and refer any dispute arising out of this agreement to a conference of the four signatory powers
• Without the Anglo Japanese Treaty, the first Washington Naval Conference was signed in February 1922 for 14 years, halted the building of capital ships for 10 years, provided for the scrapping of certain battleships and cruisers, and for those capital ships spared the yard established a ratio of three for Japan, 1.67 for Italy and France to every 5 for Britain and the USA
• 1929, Britain, Japan and the USA in the London Naval Treaty agreed to extend the main principle of this agreement to smaller fighting ships
• Limitations/strengths:
o Only 5 powers, not universal
o Didn’t deal with more controversial stuff such as submarines
o Something that was relatively easy to verify
o All 5 were either victors or allies, benefit from legacy of wartime co-operation
o Timing: shared incentive to avoid naval race
