The League of Nations Flashcards

1
Q

Outline the development of the League of Nations

A
  • As part of 1919-20 settlements the League reflected the inherent tensions and divisions of relations, absence of Germany, USSR and USA detracted from its effectiveness
  • League’s golden era coincided with the stability created by Locarno
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2
Q

Briefly assess the League’s Covenant

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a. Retrospectively, the League’s constitution provided too many loopholes for war, supported the status quo favouring the great powers and lacked the machinery for collective action against an aggressor, perhaps this is irrelevant though – British commentary ‘if the nations of the future are in the main selfish, grasping and warlike, no instrument or machinery will restrain them’

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3
Q

Explain the organs of the League

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  • Initial members were the 32 allied states which had signed the peace treaties and 12 neutral states
  • By 1926 all the ex-enemy states had joined, but the USSR not until 1934 and the USA never
  1. Assembly
    a. A deliberative chamber where each state had three representatives
    b. Jealously guarded principle that even the smallest state had a say on international issues
  2. Council
    a. Council in 1920 had four permanent members: Britain, France, Italy and Japan, 1926 Germany joined
    b. Smaller states represented by a changing rota of four temporary members, later increased to seven all selected by the Assembly
    c. As the Council met more frequently and the Assembly was dominated by the Great powers, it gradually developed as an executive committee of the assembly, implementing the policies the Assembly had endorsed in principle
    d. Decisions in both bodies normally taken by unanimous vote, the votes of states involved in a dispute under League discussion were discounted on recommendations for its settlement, prevented from vetoing otherwise unanimous decisions
  3. Permanent Secretariat
    a. Routine administrative work was carried out by the Permanent Secretariat, staffed by a small international civil service
  4. Permanent Court of International Justice
    a. 1921, a fourth organ added at the Hague in the Netherlands, to advise the council on legal matters and judging cases submitted to it by individual states
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4
Q

Explain the powers of the League to solve international disputes

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• Heart of the covenant, articles 8-17 was primarily concerned with the overriding question of the prevention of war, long term strategy outlined in article 8:
o ‘maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations’
• Process for solving disputes defined in Articles 12-17, initially as of A12 disputes would be submitted to a form of arbitration or League enquiry, simultaneously there would be a 3 month cooling off period
• By A13 members committed to carrying out the judgements of the Court or council recommendations, even if not submitted to arbitration, under A15 the Council could set up inquiry into its origins
• Assumption that states would be willing to eliminate war using this arbitration machinery, if a state ignored recommendations though A16:
o Deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members, severance of trade or financial relations
o Council’s duty to recommend to concerned governments what armed forces shall be contributed to protect the covenant
• A17 League’s powers were extended by its right to intervene in disputes between non-members, A11 member states encouraged to refer to the assembly or council any international problem which might threaten the peace
• In theory the League had formidable power, but not a world government in the making with powers to coerce independent nations
• Existence was based A10 on the recognition of the political and territorial interdependence of member states, A15 recognised if a dispute arose from an internal issue, the League had no right to intervene
• Gaps in the Covenant allowing potential aggressors to wage war without sanction, war had to be officially declared before the League could act effectively, had not formula for dealing with guerrilla warfare which instigating states could disown
• Even in the event of formal declaration of war, if the Court or Council could not agree a verdict, League members were free to continue their war

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5
Q

Explain how the League of Nations struggled to find a role in the 1920s

A
  • January 1920 Great Powers viewed the League with cynicism or open hostility, French doubted its ability to outlaw war, Germans saw it as a means for enforcing Versailles, after Republican victory November 1920 he US was openly hostile to the League, its officials instructed to avoid cooperation
  • Under Versailles the League administered the Saar and Danzig, inevitably associated it with allied policy, in the Saar made the mistake of appointing a French chairman to the governing commission, administered for French interests
  • League the guarantor of agreements signed by the allies and successor states created in 1919, aimed at ensuring various racial minorities left isolated behind new frontiers had civil rights
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6
Q

Explain the League’s mandates

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  • A22 marked a potentially revolutionary concept of international affairs, citizens and territories no longer under the sovereignty of states formerly governing them before the war, would have their well-being and development protected by the Covenant
  • When the allies distributed the former German and Turkish territories among themselves, they were divided into three groups according to their development, most advanced were in the Middle East, most backward were the ex-German islands in the Pacific
  • League had to avoid being a façade for colonialism, mandate powers were required to send in annual reports on their territories to the League’s Permanent Mandate Commission, gained a reputation for expertise and authority
  • League’s attitude towards the mandates was paternalistic and condescending, nevertheless F.S. Northedge – ‘helped transform the entire climate of colonialism’, imperialist powers were forced by moral pressure to consider the interests of the native population and contemplate their eventual independence
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7
Q

Explain the League’s welfare, medical and economic work

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a. League was excluded from dealing with reparations and war debts, nevertheless in 1922 allies trusted its Financial Committee with rebuilding Austria’s and then Hungary’s economies
b. Its Economic Committee had the greater task of persuading powers to abolish protectionism and creating world free trade
c. Organised two world economic conferences 1927 and 1933, both Russian and USA attended, due to the strong protectionist climate it failed to make progress towards free trade
2. ILO
a. One of the League’s greatest successes, originally created independently by Versailles, but financed by the League, in some ways a League miniature
b. A permanent office at Geneva staffed by 1000 officials, work discussed annually by a conference of Labour delegates
c. Up to 1939 the ILO turned out an impressive stream of reports, recommendations and statistics providing important information for industries globally
3. Health Organisation
a. League’s HO was a forum for drawing up common policies on the treatment diseases, design of hospitals and health education
b. League set up committees to advise on limiting opium production and other addictive drugs, on the outlawing of the sale of women and children for prostitution and on the effective abolition of slavery

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8
Q

Explain the League as a peacemaker and arbitrator 1920-1925

A
  • Until 1926, when the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany attended Council meetings and turned it into a body in regular discussion of the main problems of the day, the League’s role in post war crises was subordinate to the Allied leaders and Conference of Ambassadors set up to supervise Versailles, therefore mainly dealt with small crises
  • 1920, League’s inability to act effectively without great power backing was demonstrated when it failed to protect Armenia from Russo-Turkish attack, neither Britain, France or Italy was ready to protect it with force, a French delegate caustically observed in the Assembly that he and his colleagues were in the ridiculous position of an Assembly which considers what steps should be taken, though it is aware that it is impossible to carry them out
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9
Q

Explain the Polish-Lithuanian quarrel over Vilna

A

a. October 1920, in response to appeals from the Polish Foreign Minister, the League imitated an armistice between Poland and Lithuania, whose quarrel over borders was escalating into war
b. Ceasefire did not hold, shortly after General Zegilowski with a Polish force, the Warsaw government pretending independent, occupied Vilna and set up the new puppet government of Central Lithuania under his protection
c. League called for a plebiscite, when rejected then attempted in vain to negotiate a compromise settlement, March 1922 Poland annexed Vilna
d. Year later, after it was obvious the League could not impose a solution without the Great Powers, the Conference of Ambassadors recognised Polish sovereignty over Vilna, Britain, France and Italy, by failing to use League machinery to stop Polish aggressions, effectively marginalised it

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10
Q

Explain the Aalands islands dispute

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a. In less stubborn disputes where states involved were willing to accept a verdict, the League worked as a mediator
b. A rare success in a dispute between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands, these had belonged to the Grand Duchy of Finland when part of the Russian Empire, once Finland broke away from the Empire, the ethnically Swedish islanders appealed to Stockholm to take over the island
c. When Sweden began to threaten force, Britain referred the matter to the League, 1921 League supported the status quo leaving the islands under Finnish sovereignty, but itself ensuring the civil rights of the population there, neither government liked the verdict, but both accepted it and it worked

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11
Q

Explain the Corfu incident

A

a. August-September 1923, League efforts to intervene blocked by a great power again
b. crisis triggered by the assassination in Greek territory near the Albanian border of three Italians, part of an Allied team tracing the Albanian frontiers for the Conference of Ambassadors
c. Mussolini seized the chance to issue an unacceptable ultimatum to Athens, when the Greeks rejected three of its demands, Italy occupied Corfu, Greece wanted to refer this to the League, while the Italians insisted the CoA should deal with it
d. The Conference, whilst accepting some League help, seized the case ad insisted Greece should pay 50m lire compensation to Italy
e. Once agreed, Italian forces would withdraw, like the Ruhr crisis, Corfu underlined the continuing ability of Great Powers to ignore the League and take unilateral action as they wished

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12
Q

Explain the League’s success: Mosul and the Greco-Bulgarian dispute

A
  • 1924 League successfully mediated, provided a face-saving means of retreat for Turkey in its dispute with Britain over the future of Mosul which according to Lausanne was to be decided by direct Anglo-Turkish negotiations
  • When these talks broke down, the British issued in October an ultimatum to Turkey to withdraw its forces within 48 hours, League intervened and recommended a temporary demarcation line behind which Turkey withdrew
  • Then sent a commission of inquiry to consult with the local Kurdish population, as total independence was not an option, preferred British to Turkish rule
  • League’s recommendation that Mosul become a mandate of Iraq for 25 years was then accepted, as Iraq was a British mandate, effectively under British control
  • October 1925, League’s handling of the Greco-Bulgarian crisis like in the Alands was a rare example of success, when Bulgaria appealed to the Council, it requested ceasefire and was heeded by both sides, so too was the verdict of its commission of inquiry, finding favour with Bulgaria
  • An example of what the League could do, autumn 1925 this success with the ‘Locarno spirit’ augured well for the future, Briand could claim at the Council meeting October 1925 that ‘a nation which appealed to the League when it felt its existence threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post to undertake conciliation’
  • League was not put to the test again until Manchuria 1931, Briand’s optimism shown to be premature, League could only function with Great Power agreement
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13
Q

Explain the aims of the League of Nations

A

1) Maintain peace through collective security. The main way in which this would be achieved is that if one country was attacked, the League members would join to act against the aggressor. However, it also included the following elements:
● Public debate in the Council and Assembly of actions carried out by states
● Arbitration of disputes organised by the Council of the League
● Economic sanctions against an aggressor state
● Pursuit of disarmament
● Guaranteeing rights of national minorities
● Independent international administration of territories which posed particular security problems

2) Encourage international co-operation in order to solve economic and social problems

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14
Q

Explain the initial problems of the LEague

A

Purpose
There were different views on what the LoN should do:
● Some believed that they should serve to resolve international problems
● Some believed it was a device to enforce the Treaty of Versailles and a ‘victor’s peace’.

However, if the League was to be even-handed in future disputes, could it really be tied to maintaining the post war status quo in Europe.
The unanimity rule meant agreement by all nations required on big decisions,and was therefore slower.
Collective security vs. disarmament
If all members agreed to defend each other from attack, they would all have to automatically declare war against any aggressor named by League.
However, declaring war remained the choice of individual nations and world wide disarmament would not be possible if there was aggression

Sanctions:
If the League was to impose peace on those who illegally declared war, then it would need a League army but no such existed due to problems with command, troops etc.
If the League was to be a forum of negotiation and arbitration, impartiality was needed as well as a more realistic chance that armies would be involved to resolve disputes
Also, why should League membres fight wars to which they have no connection or are affected by?
Lack of USA means economic sanctions ineffective

Germany:
Germany couldn’t be a member if target of LoN activity. As an equal member, it would be able to veto policies to enforce punishment against her.
However, membership of League would encourage Germany to accept the post war status quo, and promote international cooperation.

Enforcement or arbitration?:
French wanted a League able to enforce the peace treaties and preserve the peace - a tool of French policy against Germany.
The Americans wanted a League able to head off potential disputes through negotiation and arbitration. The League would be an honest broker.
Britain wanted the League to keep Europe stable without restricting British imperial policy or dragging Britain into disputes.
The result was a compromise - doomed to fail?

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15
Q

Explain the Covenant of the League of Nations

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Article 5: Unanimity rule
● Explicitly confirmed the sovereignty of member states
● All powers of the Council had a veto on League issues - create inability of the Council to reach decisions in moments of international crisis.
● The Assembly had some power of veto in the event of a dispute being transferred by the Council, though this was rare (though did in Manchuria)
● Only if a member state was party to a dispute would this veto be lost. However, in practice this could be bypassed
Article 10: Territorial
● Driven by the USA, this demanded respect for the territorial integrity of member states, and promised protection by the League membership as a whole in the face of aggression.
● Wilson admitted that his article had moral, not legal, power behind it
● Whether breaking Article 10 should trigger automatic sanctions was controversial, but the ultimate decision of action taken ultimately remained with the member state in order to uphold sovereignty (Article 5)
Article 11
● Article 11 enabled any member to ask the Council for assistance if they feared attack. Members did not even have to be party to attack to do this.
● However, there was no effective machinery to resolve disputes as the unanimity rule meant that parties to the dispute themselves having a vote if they were represented on the Council, for no provision to exclude their veto power
Article 12: War
● There was to be no resort to war until three months after award by arbitrators, judicial decision or report.
● Believed that war occurred due to breakdown in machinery and diplomacy (ie. quick series of events after WW2) and an establishment of permanent negotiations would fill this gap. Also, it was believed that this time period would decrease chance of war as nations would have more cool, rational voices.
● They did not outlaw war due to a question of national sovereignty, and no country would sign this.
Article 16: Sanctions
● If a state broke article 12 and went to an illegal war, then financial sanctions would be automatically incurred.
● Economic and military sanctions were not automatic, and depended upon Council recommendations. Individual states could accept or deny however.
● However, economic sanctions were difficult e.g. France were not willing to alienate Italy by backing a full programme of economic sanctions in the Abyssinian crisis

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16
Q

Outline the Manchuria crisis 1931

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● The Japanese Army seized control of Manchuria due to a number of unresolved problems with China, and so by staging an explosion, they hoped to provoke a crisis and benefit.
● China raised the issue with the League as early as September, leading to the Council invoking Article 11 which said the ‘threat of war’ was a concern for all nations. Council members, in October, demanded that Japanese troops withdraw to the railway zone, but Japan refused and demanded direct negotiation with China. This resolution was odd as the US sat in on deliberations. Withdrawal of troops would have been difficult as Tojyo had limited control of the KMT army.
● In January a committee authorised by the League of Nations rejected claims if self defence and accused Japan of aggression whilst recognising economic interests in Manchuria - League slow
● In March 1933, announced its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations a year after the Japanese zone of occupation declared itself an independent state.

17
Q

Why did the League fail in Manchuria?

A

● The machinery of the League operated quite slowly: the crisis ‘came out of the blue’; Japan was a member of the Council and it was necessary to establish whether ‘aggression’ had occurred especially as Japan key declaring its goodwill. It took nine months for the Lytton Commission to be established and report.
● Realistically, Britain and France were the only nations in position to act as they were ‘great powers’ but were unable to do so:
○ Britain regarded Japan as a longstanding friend who was underpinning capitalism in the Far East. A foreign office memorandum stated that British policy in the region depended on a good relationship with Japan
○ Britain was also experiencing domestic problems; they were forced off the gold standard and there had been a naval mutiny
○ Also, the US did not favour steps which could force Japan into political isolation
● The Depression made military action very difficult and economic sanctions very undesirable
● Fear of Soviet interference in China, particularly as the USSR was not League member. There was a false assumption in 1919 that the League would have the moral authority - ie. the whole world would be in condemnation. This didn’t occur as people preferred a Japanese takeover over a takeover by the USSR
● Nevertheless, a missed opportunity? Could international action not have been concerted? Would Japan have risked war? Didn’t failure undermine the League fatally and encourage Hitler and Mussolini later in the 1930s?

18
Q

Outline the Abyssinian crisis 1934

A

● Italy had territorial ambitions and saw Abyssinia as desirable. Following the Wal Wal incident where there was a skirmish, Mussolini demanded compensation and an apology. Abyssinia responded by asking the League for arbitration.

Lack of will by Britain and France:
● Showed an interest in building a balance of power against Hitler’s Germany which was outside the League and a source of concern - they wanted to be able to count on Italian friendship in the face of German aggression.
● Therefore, enforcing the Covenant of the League was of secondary importance. Indeed, secret negotiations with the French and Italians where Mussolini indicated he wanted Abyssinia and the French guaranteed Italy a strong position in Africa
● Encouraged by this, in January 1935, Mussolini ordered preparations of war. When Britain, France and Italy met at the Stresa Front the focus was Germany. Indeed, Mussolini was encouraged by a leaked British memorandum which stated there were no vital interests in Abyssinia to warrant action

League inaction:
● Abyssinia appealed to the League under Article 11, concerning a situation threatening war. They asked for arbitration. Negotiations, however, stall as Italy don’t agree to the 5th arbitrator, thus holding up their military position.
● Eventually, in September, the arbitration reiterated that neither side was to blame. Even still, Mussolini never took the process seriously
● To make matters worse, throughout this period Britain and France were pursuing diplomatic contacts outside the League:
○ As early as June 1935, Britain tried to buy off Italian ambitions by offering part of British Somaliland as Eden felt League action could lead to Italy seeking German accommodation, but this was rejected
○ Also, Sir Samuel Hoare had already told Mussolini that there was no talk in the League of either closing the Suez Canal or military sanctions - unlikely to deter Mussolini

League action:
● Italy attacks in October, but sanctions took a long time to be imposed. Also, these sanctions were weak and flimsy - e.g. didn’t include oil as the US said they would offer Italy oil if sanctions were put in place. Also, it was believed an oil embargo could spur Mussolini to a ‘mad dog’ atc.
● The League’s commission to establish sanctions was not automatic as 4 nations did not agree
● Problem for Britain and France was that a war with Italy would lead to a loss of ships and halt navy modernisation. Likewise, it would be expensive for the navy to be on alert for a drawn out period.

19
Q

Explain the Hoare-Loval Plan 1935

A

● Proposed to partition Abyssinia , giving Mussolini ⅔ of the land and Salaci ⅓ . Also suggested that the southern half of the country be identified as a zone of economic domination
● Initially confidential, but was leaked to the press with a negative reaction, especially as it appeared so soon after the Peace Ballot
● Hoare forced to resign and this further undermined the credibility of collective opposition in Mussolini’s eyes.

In May, Mussolini declared himself Emperor, and with the conflict so clearly over, League members had little stomach for maintaining sanctions, leaving Italy to enjoy the fruits of victory. Italy then announced its withdrawal from the League.

20
Q

Why did the League fail in Abyssinia?

A

Mechanism and covenant:
● Arbitration took a long time as Italy was able to delay the process
● Sanctions took a long time to be imposed as 4 nations disagreeing (Italy, Albania, Austria and Hungary)

Lack of will by great powers:
● Britain and France didn’t want to drive Italy to Germany, or drive Mussolini to a mad dog act
● France in particular prioritises Europe over Africa - though this could be argued as short sighted as if the League could coerce effectively their security could have been enhanced
● Too much burden on Britain and France, they would have head military action realistically.

Absence of the USA:
● The USA actively works against the League in regards to oil sanctions, even though a report found that oil sanctions could have real impact on Italy even if the US did not participate in these sanctions

Too idealistic:
● France and Britain had higher priorities than upholding the Covenant of the League
● There were other avenues of diplomacy used e.g. secret negotiations like Hoare - Laval plan. This made the League appear weak and did not provide grounds for Mussolini to reconsider territorial ambitions

21
Q

Why did the League Fail? - Machinery and Covenant

A

Machinery and the Covenant of the League
● The League had no machinery to compel member states to come to the aid of other members due to the Unanimity Rule upholding political sovereignty.
● The machinery that did exist was vague or ambiguous e.g. Article 16 mentioned sanctions, but how will these be implemented, who will implement them, how will sanctions be policed? E.g. in Abyssinia there were issues with imposing sanctions
● Likewise, article 16 mentions collective security, in that an attack on one member is an attack on all. But how should each country respond? Which countries should contribute more, or should it be equal?
● Reaction time. By the time a commission finished its investigation, the conflict could be over e.g. Manchuria
● Unanimous decisions meant the veto could be used to further own interests. For example, if a country had close trade ties to an invader, they may veto military or economic sanctions e.g. ny 4 nations in Abyssinia
● Machinery of the League was slow e.g. in Manchuria, it took 9 months for the Lytton Commission to be established and publish its report. E.g. 2 Italy was able to delay the arbitration process by rejecting the fifth arbitrator and the sanctions took a long time to be imposed

22
Q

Why did the League fail? - absence of USA

A

● America could have used economic power to great effect to impose sanctions e.g. oil in Abyssinia
● Her absence made the League more Eurocentric, and therefore led to the South Americans being disinterested in the League. It also distorted the League; for example in 1935 the focus was Hitler announcing conscription, and not Abyssinia
● It increased the burden on Britain and France e.g. in Manchuria it was up to the British and French navy’s

However, there are flaws in this argument:
● Even if the US was in the League, it was just as prone to self interest e.g. Manchuria the US did not want sanctions to prevent the isolation of Japan and economic interests
● Just as Britain and France were unwilling to police the world and carry the military burden, nor was the United States
● The American public were still unwilling to get involved militarily with the outside world, and American politicians were wary of upsetting the public. Undermines the notion that America’s presence in the League would have made it more effective
● The US sat in on deliberations in the Manchuria crisis
● Though not League plans, they were involved in disarmament e.g. WDC, as well as economically in the Dawes and Young Plans, and the Kellogg-Briand pact
● America was present on the Conference of Ambassadors
● During the 1920s, the absence of the USA was not significant, but following the breakdown of consensus in the 1930s, there was an impact

23
Q

Why did the League fail? - lack of political will by the Great Powers

A

● Britain and France the only countries with the military muscle to enforce League decisions. Italy was too weak and Japan unlikely to get involved in conflicts outside East Asia and the Pacific. They were unlikely to get involved in disputes and use military force if it went against their self interests e.g. Abyssinia and Manchuria
● Even still, neither country was in any state to use military force immediately after the war; France suffered more than any other power; Britain and its dominions were greatly weakened. Nor, would the public of these nations take kindly in the event of a war.
● There seemed to be a lack of trust in the League, leading to Britain and France seeking alternative diplomatic routes, evident in Manchuria
● Both countries had other priorities. For example, they were unwilling to act in the Abyssinia crisis to stop Italy being driven to Germany. Likewise, Britain was unwilling to impose sanctions on Japan due to trade links and its view that Japan was underpinning capitalism in the Far East.
● Another notion of this argument is that these countries believed the League had different purposes; France believed the League to be a mechanism to keep Germany weak, upholding the Treaty of Versailles and a ‘victor’s peace’. However, the League did not confront Germany’s foreign policy moves in the 1930s (e.g. Austria, Sudetenland)

24
Q

Why did the League fail? - Great Depresson

A

● Countries more committed to achieving self sufficiency, and therefore the spirit of cooperation was undermined
● Britain did not want to punish Japan with sanctions, as this would have hurt the British economy in turn. Overall, it made Britain and France even less willing to risk a ‘League war’
● Meant sanctions often looked to be the wrong way
● It encouraged Japan (Manchuria) and Italy to challenge the status quo, and aided Hitler’s rise in Germany

25
Q

Why did the League fail? - The defeated powers, Germany and USSR

A

● Moral authority of the League suffered from what was perceived to be the hypocrisy (e.g. League opposing Corfu incident yet French having troops in the Ruhr) and self serving of the ‘satisfied’ powers. This situation made it difficult to resist the claims of other states in the 1930s that wanted to build an empire
● Britain and France faced with states that had little sympathy for an international order constructed in the interests of the major empires. Germany and the USSR harboured very specific ambitions to overturn the post-war territorial arrangements
● It was a tool to enforce the Treaty of Versailles e.g. Article 10 about borders, disarmament are good examples

However, there are issues with this argument
● USSR. Was in no position to contribute to the League in the first half of the 20s due to WW1 and the civil war.
● Germany. During Stresemann’s era, he worked hard to end Germany’s pariah status and be accepted into the League. Many political centrists took the League, and tried to use it to champion rights of Germans outside the Reich. They also took disarmament seriously, and wanted other nations to disarm via the League. Thus, Germany worked with the League until Hitler came into power, and even when he did, his first foreign policy move was in 1935 and 1936 (rearmament and militarisation of the Rhineland) - the League had already shown itself unable to stop aggression numerous timed (e.g. Corfu, Manchuria, Abyssinia) suggesting other reasons