The Changing Nature of Rome's Response to Hannibal Flashcards
Why was Rome undable to defeat Hannibal between 218 and 216 BC
- Hannibal used psychological warfare, geography, and innovative tactics
- The Roman general were very innefficient
Publius Cornelius Scipio at Ticinus
- Popular consul, appeared to know how to attack Hannibal
- Failed to prevent Hannibal leaving Iberia and invading Italy
- Underestimated Hannibal – did not expect him to ally with the Celts, and again when Hannibal crossed the Alps by November 218
- Battle of Ticinus – did not have a full army, too encouraged to fight, and was forced to retreat. The defeat gave the enemy the confidence it needed
Tiberius Sempronius Longus at Trebia
- Arrived shortly after Ticinus
- Sempronius enjoyed a small victory and believed he could easily defeat Hannibal
- Ignored Scipio’s advice to wait until spring, allowing Roman troops to trian to counter Numidian cavalry
- Sempronius’ consulship was nearly up and he wanted to use the victory for his own glory
- Polybius portrays him as arrogant and overconfident. He attacked when Hannibal’s men taunted him, and his unfed army froze in the river. Sempronius’ javelins were ineffective at a significant disadvantage
- Carthagians were prepared
- Livy suggests the army was defeated by Hannibal’s wit and the weather, and not Sempronius’ arrogance
Gaius Flaminius and Gnaeus Servilius at Trasimene
- Roman Senate calm
- New consuls given instructions: Servilius replaces Scipio in the north, and Flaminius defend Rome from attack.
- Sound strategy, but Hannibal marched through Etruria’s marsh
- Servilius was out of the picture and his reinforcements came too late
- Flaminius is blamed by both Polybius and Livy for Trasimene
- Flaminius is presented as a politician who seeks popular support
- Rash man, driven by personal ambition
- Concern for how his actions are seen stops him thinking logically.
- Livy gives him a heroic death
- Hannibal’s destruction of the counrtyside pushed Flaminius into a temper and he ran headlong into a trap, without scouting.
- He was killed in the massacre
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Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro at Cannae
- Characterisation by ancient historians is repetitive: wise consul plus unwise consul
- More plausible to believe Paullus and Varro were ordered to defeat Hannibal
- Livy, Famius Mximus discussed the upcoming war with Paullus, warning him of the two, Varro was the worse: he was made, promising an easy victory – probably a later addition
- Varro is used as a scapegoat for Rome’s defeat
Varro was confident:
- He chose the ground: the broad plain of Cannae: Roman tactics would work there
- Believed he could punch through Hannibal’s line and cause chaos
- These tactics had worked before
- First battle ground not dictated by Hannibal
Hannibal outwitted him:
* Placed his army so the dust would blow in the faces of the Romans
* Used cavalry to surrouned the army
* In this regard, the ancient historians have weight to their arguement
* However, Varro had planned well, taking into acount what factors led to Trebia and Trasimene being defeats
* Not the actions of a madman: he was simply outwitted.
Fabius Maximus
- Fabius knew politics
- Held the consulship 5+ times
- Dictator 2x (221, 217)
- Defeated teh Ligurians in his first consulship (233), cementing his reputation as a general
- Served during the First Punic War?
- After Trasimene the Senate wanted a safe pair of hands to prevent panic
- Fabius Maximus was dictator and Master of the Horse was Marcus Minucius, his political rival
Fabius’ first actions
- Fabius Maximus’ first action as dictator was to calm Rome
- Plutarch and Livy tell us that Flaminius ignored religious customs as consul, and so his defeat was revenge of the gods
- Fabius organised several sacrifices to convince the people the gods’ support was regained
- Ordered each citizen to spend 333 sestertii and 333 denarii
- Used propaganda
Fabian Strategy
- Rome needed to regroup and find a new strategy, so Fabius to win a number of small battle and cut off Hannibal’s trade routes, weakening Hannibal’s allies
- Fabius promoted war of attrition – wear down the number of enemies little by little
- Followed Hannibal wherever he went
- Only attacked raiding parties
- kept his distance to prevent a full-scale battle
- Used ‘scorched earth policy’ destroying the countryside to prevent Hannibal supplying his army
- Rome could always replant, and repair homes, and had more men, but this did not mean they should be sacrificed
- Hannibal was on edge, unsure where the next supplies would be
- Polybius, Plutarch, and Livy all agree that this strategy was a success
Ager Falernus
Summer 217, Hannibal goes to the Ager Falernes. It is fertile and he could find more allies.
Fabius watched him raid the area, appalling the Romans
Fabius had lured Hannibal into a trap: the Ager Falernus was surrounded by fast riversand Fabius controlled all exits: soon Hannibal would starve
Minucius turned the recruits against Fabius, and they believed Minucius was the real general Rome needed
The Two Dictators
