Textbook chapter 2 Flashcards

1
Q

is science a linear enterprise?

A

no

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2
Q

The human mind is a substance really distinct from the body; nevertheless, so long as it is in the body, it is organic in all its actions. Thus, as the disposition of the body varies, so the mind has different thoughts. René Descartes, 1647,
What does this Descartes assertion reveal?

A

It epitomizes the idea that cognition can be studied largely independant of its actual physical substance

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3
Q

The core ideas driving research in cognitive science are on:

A

the nature of the functions - the rules and representations that the physical device runs on

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4
Q

The modern conception of the mind had many of its roots in:

A

Descartes
Plato
Many others, then and now

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5
Q

We want to understand mental functions in terms of :

A

Rules and representations, and how these rules and representations might be implemented in the hardware of the brain –> important to keep these levels separate, as Descartes did, because our focus is primarily on explaining brain functions NOT its physiology

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6
Q

What is one of the reasons for the methodological strategy of focusing on different levels of analysis

A

The vocabulary of our explanations and the scope of our theoretical and empirical approaches are somewhat incompatible with the vocabulary (and object) of the physical sciences

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7
Q

Cognition has been an object of inquiry at least since:

A

The Greek philosophers

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8
Q

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary (and unified) field, what have been the contributions from other fields?

A

Philosophy, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, computer science and neuroscience

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9
Q

In 1978, when researchers representing several disciplines got together to examine the status of cognitive science, it was then conceived as a science concerned with discovering…

A

The representational and computational capacities of the mind and their structural and functional representation in the brain

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10
Q

Can we now conceive of a unified cognitive science even if it was such a general theme?

A

Yes

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11
Q

Does it matter or not that the science is unified ?

A

yes

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12
Q

What are some of the cognitive science contributing disciplines?

A

Philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, neuroscience, computer science, psychology

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13
Q

George Miller:

A

One of the writers of the report of 1978 and a pioneer of the so-called “cognitive revolution” of the 1950’s and beyond

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14
Q

George Miller continued to assume that:

A

There are cognitive sciences, not a unified field

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15
Q

Sigmund Freud is the founder of:

A

Psycoanalysis

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16
Q

Thomas Edison is the inventor of the:

A

Light bulb

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17
Q

Cognitive science has two overarching domains of investigation:

A

Mental representations and mental processes

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18
Q

Representations are realized as nodes or symbols carrying:

A

content or information

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19
Q

Processes are operations over:

A

representations

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20
Q

Cognitive scientists conceive of cognitive processing as:

A

Information processing

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21
Q

Asked some of the most fundamental questions of modern cognitive science:

“How can we know more than what is afforded by our fragmentary experiences?”

“How are we able to possess a seemingly infinite knowledge - say in mathematics and geometry - given the limited knowledge we are exposed to?

A

Plato

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22
Q

Plato’s problem:

A

The fact that our capacities by far outweigh our experiences suggests that what we called in chapter 1 “implicit knowledge” is to a large extent, innate

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23
Q

Plato thought that knowledge had to be :

A

inherited (he thought knowledge would come from “earlier souls”)

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24
Q

Exaptations:

A

characteristics originally adapted for one function are repurposed for another, contributing to human cognitive abilities over time.

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25
Q

changes (cognitive or otherwise) might occur as a function of both:

A

internal mechanism’ exaptations and adaptations

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26
Q

The best way to think about how knowledge has got to be hardwired in the human brain over time is to refer to the idea of :

A

implicit knowledge: by assumption certain properties of the world become part of the natural kinds to which the organism responds

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27
Q

hardwired properties are part of what we call:

A

the architecture of the mind/brain

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28
Q

Plato’s “earlier souls” stand today for:

A

Principles encoded genetically, innate principles underlying cognition - implicit knowledge

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29
Q

A key guiding assumption for cognitive science is that several types of implicit knowledge are:

A

innate

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30
Q

What is innate is:

A

hardwired

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31
Q

We began our brief historical account of the object of cognitive science by appealing to:

A

Plato’s quest for the innate mind

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32
Q

Descartes conceived of the mind as:

A

Possessing knowledge that could not have been acquired by experience
In his system, knowledge had to be put there by go (As we did with plato we can interpret this assertion as suggesting that some knowledge might be part of our biological endowment)

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33
Q

Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious [foreign to me and coming from outside], and others to have been invented by me. My understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature. But my hearing a noise, as I do now, or seeing the sun, or feeling the fire, comes from things which are located outside me, or so I have hitherto judged. Hippogriffs and the like are my own invention. But perhaps all my ideas may be thought of as adventitious, or they may all be innate, or all made up; for as yet I have not clearly perceived their true origin.

This is a passage from:

A

Descartes

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34
Q

In Descartes’ meditations is the idea that his only certainty is :

A

that of a thinking thing, for any other experiences, including that of his own body, may be objects of his delusion

35
Q

We seek to understand brain function (the mind) without

A

Reducing our explanations to the vocabulary of the physical sciences

36
Q

Descartes pointed towards the correct methodological pathway:

A

The proper level of explanation for cognition is one that focuses on brain functions; and functions are material, they are “organic” as he puts it

37
Q

Another point of contact between Descartes and current cognitive science is the idea that we can conceive of:

A

certain faculties as operating autonomously, mechanistically, regardless of our own desires, beliefs or expectations

38
Q

on descartes’ footsteps, we can think about many cognitive systems as operating like

A

a “reflex” or as Descartes put it, “without any mental volition”

39
Q

The modern way of explaining cognitive faculties in terms of its functions owes Descartes:

A

the very idea that the mind can be studies to a large extent independant of the physical device - the brain

40
Q

A full understanding of any given process cannot dispense :

A

with a detailed account of how it is physically implemented, even if we assume that the essence of our beings is in our mental functions

41
Q

The modern development of psychology, from a cognitivist standpoint, can thank philosopher __ for bringing to the fore the idea that mental events are intentional.

A

Franz Brentano

42
Q

In Brentano’s words, “intentional inexistence”

A

“intentional” is not equivalent to the common-sense idea of “purpose”, but to the idea that mental phenomena are about things

by “inexistence” Brentano does not mean “non-existence” (see Simons, 1995) but “existence-in”, internal existence

43
Q

The important contribution by Brentano was:

A

To call attention to the idea that when we deal with mental events we deal with a special class of phenomena, different from actual objects and events, but ABOUT them: that is how things in the world have internal existence

44
Q

According to Brentano, the mental __ to the physical

A

according to Brentano, the mental cannot be reduced to the physical

45
Q

According to Brentano, psychology can/cannot be studied by the natural sciences

A

CAN NOT

46
Q

Contrary to Brentano’s beliefs,

A

cognitive science (our field of psychological investigation) is materialistic and is part of the natural sciences

47
Q

The history of cognitive science is intertwined with:

A

the history of experimental psychology proper

48
Q

Psychology has its roots deep into:

A

philosophical work

49
Q

As noticed by Hatfield:

A

Psychology grew out of philosophy without major discontinuities

50
Q

In Hatfield’s view, psychology is the modern term for what began with :

A

Artistotle’s natural philosophical account of the psych or de anima (more properly translated into “soul”)

51
Q

If we think about the history of psychology as an experimental field:

A

There has been some consensus that it began to take shape towards the end of the 19 th century with experiments conducted by Wilhem Wundt

52
Q

First experimental psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany

A

Wilhem Wundt and his students

53
Q

Regardless of when and where psychology as a natural science really began the modern account of the (re-)birth of cognitive science passes by

A

the rise and fall of behaviourism

54
Q

Early on, introspectionism was:

A

The dominant methodology within the “structuralist” or early functionalist school

55
Q

Introspectionists were concerned with:

A

A science of consciousness relying on subject’s descriptions of their own internal processes during the presentation of particular stimuli

56
Q

Titchener (1912), one of the leading introspectionists regarded this method as:

A

“the most important means of psychological knowledge” (p. 433) but stressed the need for a theory of mental processes which would account for the introspectionist data

57
Q

Why did the introspectionism prove unreliable

A

Mostly due to the variability of its results

idea that mental processes could not be restricted to those related to conscious experience

introspections would have to have direct access to the representations that are manipulated by cognitive processes (Titchener, 1909). Instead, most reports were, as Titchener observed, judgments regarding what was perceived

58
Q

Titchener wanted the vocabulary of introspections to be :

A

pure, free of judgements –> free of the stimulus error

59
Q

Why is it rather difficult to avoid the “stimulus error” when the method is that of introspection?

A

It is important to stress that we do not have access to perceptual properties (no access to “sensation”) and, thus, we can’t report on them other than expressing what seems to be the products of what we are perceiving.

60
Q

Rather than improving on method introspectionism fell in disgrace, supplanted by a supposedly more “objective” way of observing behavior:

A

BEHAVIOURISM

61
Q

The idea of “naturalizing” psychology (i.e., studying it as a natural science) by modeling it after physics was an attractive one. However, behaviorism’s attempt at reducing psychological laws to physical laws was, by no means, the right approach. For one, it neglected

A

internal, mental dispositions involved in S-R pairings

62
Q

“intentional fallacy” (stimulus error)

A

to attribute to mental representations properties that one knows to be true of the world or stimulus

63
Q

“In a system of psychology completely worked out, given the response the stimuli can be predicted” (p. 167) and “This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier from psychology which exists between it and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms.” (p. 177)

A

Watson’s (1913) words

64
Q

Psychology, or cognitive psychology, anyway, as observed by Fodor (1974), is a

A

“special” science, one whose principles or laws cannot be reduced (or correspond directly) to laws of physics or chemistry, not even via “bridge” sciences such as biochemistry.

65
Q

Fodor says this because:

A

most psychological predicates cannot correspond to predicates in physics or chemistry

66
Q

Physics can only tell you

A

what the properties of the object are, not how it is represented nor why it is represented that way.

67
Q

Cognitive scientists like to talk more broadly about a “cognitive revolution”, which occurred in the second half of the last century, and which was the product of theoretical and methodological shifts in diverse disciplines spanning over several decades. The two most prominent cases are:

A

linguistics and psychology

68
Q

Chomsky’s (1957) approach to linguistics in the mid-1950’s led to

A

a mentalistic perspective in understanding language knowledge and language acquisition.12 This theoretical perspective emphasized the need to understand the internal mechanisms that yield the grammatical sentences of a language (implicit knowledge)

69
Q

for Chomsky our linguistic capacities are

A

innate

70
Q

Skinner held the view that:

A

language acquisition was in essence, a matter of children imitating—and abstracting away from—the actual utterances that they heard. For Skinner, language use is contingent on the nature of the stimuli that the child gets in the course of “learning” a language

71
Q

Chomsky demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the behaviorist approach to language acquisition, particularly as proposed by figures like Skinner.

A

Chomsky pointed out that children often produce sentences they have never heard before, which cannot be explained by simple stimulus-response (S-R) mechanisms. This creative use of language suggests that language acquisition involves more than just imitation and reinforcement.

72
Q

Chomsky argued that any attempt by behaviorists to account for this by invoking a process of abstraction from individual utterances would lead to a

A

a methodological dead end

73
Q

By focusing on abstraction, behaviorists were

A

returning to the very “mentalistic” psychology they sought to avoid.

74
Q

Abstraction, in this context, refers to

A

cognitive process of identifying patterns or general principles from specific examples or experiences. When applied to language acquisition, abstraction would involve deriving grammatical rules or structures from individual utterances that a child hears.

75
Q

In psychology, the mentalistic perspective had several waves leading all the way to the “re-birth” of cognitive psychology around the time of;

A

Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s program.

76
Q

A crucial step towards a unified cognitive science was made by the work of

A

George Miller and colleagues

77
Q

the first work in psychology to focus on internal mechanisms in a more systematic way:

A

Miller et al. were interested in what they called “plans”. In their work, “plans” were the kinds of internal representations, a “set of instructions” (p. 32) one must have to guide one’s actions: It is “essentially the same as a program for a computer” (Miller et al., 1960, p. 32)

78
Q

Miller et al. took seriously the idea of combining psychological explanation with what they called:

A

“cybernetic ideas”, i.e., ideas related to how computers work, how they store and process information.

79
Q

Donders (1818-1889)

A

an ophthalmologist and physiologist, was perhaps the first to devise an instrument—and an experimental design—that could help us understand internal, non- observable events by examining response times (RTs) to stimuli.

80
Q

n order to trace the workings of mental phenomena, Donders measured

A

RTs to simple stimuli (such as responding to a spark) and subtracted these RTs from the RTs to when a more complex task was involved (such as making a decision on two sparks presented to either left or right eye). The resulting time was taken to be “the decision in a choice and an action of the will in response to that decision”

81
Q

The shift from behaviorism to cognitive psychology was, thus, fomented mainly by

A

behaviorism’s own failure to account for a fundamental intellectual concern—human mental processes, which had been under scrutiny at least since Plato and Aristotle.

81
Q

greater time to react to a stimulus suggests

A

complexity of that stimulus relative to a baseline control.

82
Q

The rise of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary field was also due to (aside from behaviourism’s failure)

A

many other advances within psychology,14 as well as in other disciplines such as mathematics and computerscience, influenced by Turing (1936, 1950),15 and supported by military grants for studying key cognitive systems such as attention, memory, and human factors (i.e., interaction between humans and machines), in laboratories developed during World War II, in particular in North America and Great Britain)