Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Flashcards
Judicial Power Nine-Headed Hydra
The judicial power shall extend
To all cases
Arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties.
Affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls
Of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
To controversies
To which the United States shall be a party.
Between two or more states.
Between a state and citizens of another state.
Between citizens of different states.
Between citizens of the same state claiming land from different state.
Between a state or its citizens and foreign states/citizens/subjects
Osborn v. Bank of United States (1824)
OH tax auditor raided SBUS, challenged fed jx
Ct has jx; Statute allows for jx; Congress can confer “arising under” jx to the lower courts; this matter “arises under” even though not totally governed by fed law - So long as a question of federal law “forms an ingredient of the original cause,” Congress can confer jurisdiction on lower federal courts to hear the case (even if it involves non-federal things, too). Here, bank is solely a creature of federal law, and all of its powers are a function of fed law.
Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1983)
Dutch corporation filed action in federal court against instrumentality of Nigeria for breach of contract (a non-federal cause of action). Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act clearly provided statutory jurisdiction
Congress may constitutionally confer statutory jurisdiction where the cause of action is non-federal so long as presence of federal law issue is non-speculative. I.e. the decision-making process must turn on some kind of federal standard.
Louisville & Nashville RR v. Mottley (1908)
Mottleys received lifetime passes on RR in exchange for release of damage claims. Congress passed statute barring such passes, and Mottleys sued when RR, citing statute, refused to renew them.
No subject matter jurisdiction. Statute – 28 U.S.C. § 1331 – requires that federal claim arise on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Can’t plead an anticipated defense to get fed jx.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss (1806)
Cases involved incomplete diversity: π from state A and π from state B sued ∆s from states P, Q, and B.
The “words of the act of Congress,” i.e., the Judiciary Act of 1789, require complete diversity: in other words, no party on the π side can be the same sate as of any ∆s.
State Farm F&C v. Tashire (1967)
“Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”
Tidewater (1949)
Citizen of DC sued VA defendant in District Court of Maryland, raising issue of MD law. Chief Justice Marshall had held in Hepburn & Dundas (1805) that a citizen of DC was not a citizen of a “state” within meaning of Diversity Clause – a constitutional holding. Statute authorized federal jurisdiction in actions between citizens of states and citizens of DC.
Fractured Court held the statute is constitutional.
Sheldon v. Sill (1850)
Complete diversity in case attained only because a non-diverse party assigned claim to a diverse party. Judiciary Act squarely precluded that, requiring complete diversity pre-assignment. However, Constitution permits jurisdiction over “controversies between citizens of different States” without this limitation.
Constitution leaves creation of lower federal courts up to Congress. When Congress decides to create inferior courts, it does not have to confer upon them 100% of the jurisdiction the Constitution permits. The Judiciary Act limitation is constitutional. Thus, power to create (or not create) lower federal courts includes power to define, and limit, the contours of their jurisdiction.
Ex parte McCardle (1869)
Editor of Vicksburg Times in MS wrote articles against Union, arrested and filed habeas; Congress repealed the provision of the 1867 Habeas Act authorizing appeal to Supreme Court. QP: Can Congress withdraw appellate jurisdiction once it has conferred it (during the pendency of an appeal) in order to effectuate substantive results?
Yes. This is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to control Supreme Court appellate power under the Exceptions Clause. Leaves intact so-called original habeas of 1789; only affected 1867 habeas
Ex parte Yerger (1869)
MS journalist killed Reconstructionist mayor; feds detained him; Yerger brough habeas under § 14 of Judiciary Act of 1789
We have original habeas jurisdiction and can hear
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner (1938)
An employer sued in federal court to enjoin union activity, ultimately challenging Norris-LaGuardia Act’s limit on federal courts’ jurisdiction to enter injunctions. Act did not affect remedies available in state courts, so employers could seek injunction there, given previous SC precedent.
Restriction on jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief is constitutional. Importantly, employer had other places to sue (state court) and thus did not lack a remedy (cat door).
Felker v. Turpin (1996)
Challenge to AEDPA’s restrictions on SC appellate jx to review denials of successive habeas petitions in district court
Unanimous Court upheld restrictions on Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review appeals of district court’s habeas determinations because the restrictions did not in any way affect the Court’s authority to entertain “so-called original habeas petitions.”
Battaglia v. General Motors (2d Cir. 1948)
Congress enacts Portal-to-Portal Act redefining “work week” as previously understood under FLSA before SCOTUS interpreted it in an earlier case to include travel time, and providing no federal OR state jurisdiction to impose liability for failure to pay time-and-a-half under old rule.
Congress can deprive state/federal courts of jurisdiction only if it doesn’t violate DP in doing so. To make this determination requires a peek at the merits to see whether Congress can or cannot extinguish the right or remedy at issue. If there is a colorable Constitutional claim, Cong cannot restrict jx. Here, no underlying DPC violation.
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
If Congress is acting intra vires, that is within the circle (if its “end be legitimate”), then it can choose various ways to achieve that end, so long as it doesn’t violate constitutional side constraints (like 1A, equal protection), even total jurisdiction stripping.
INS v. St. Cyr (2001)
AEDPA and IIRIRA precluded judicial review; St. Cyr, a Haitian immigrant facing deportation, brought federal habeas petition challenging AG’s interpretation that he lacked discretion to waive deportation
SC can hear the case. IIRIRA and AEDPA withdraw some specific jurisdiction but not general habeas jurisdiction under § 2241; Court needs a clear statement (“magic words”) to repeal habeas jx; Statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional problems; Removal of habeas remedy altogether would raise a serious Suspension Clause issue
Boumediene v. Bush (2008)
Group of detainees classified as enemy combatants filed petitions for habeas. As case proceeds, Congress enacts the Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act eliminating habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 for any alien that the U.S. had deemed an enemy combatant. Instead, these guys go to Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which are subject to very limited judicial review.
The DTA/MCA violates the Suspension Clause, which applies to inmates in Guantanamo and guarantees right to habeas corpus or an acceptable substitute. This is not a good substitute.
Crowell v. Benson (1932)
Agency determined that Knudsen was injured while working and thus entitled to compensation under LHWCA. Employer claimed agency could not review; Act provided that all legal questions were reviewable de novo by Article III courts. Agency’s compensation orders could only be enforced by order of a district court.
In cases involving “public rights” – that is, disputes between a person and the government – an Article III court does not need to hear the case. Also, Art. III court can review de novo, and agency decisions not self-executing.
Northern Pipeline (1982)
N. Pipeline files bankruptcy under 1978 act, and in same action (private) claims against Marathon for breach of K. Marathon moved to dismiss on Art. III grounds
violates Art. III; (1) This is not a “legislative court.” That category only includes cases involving territorial courts, military courts martial, and “public rights.” Public rights have to involve the government. (2) The Bankruptcy Court is not “merely an adjunct” - judgements are self-executing and Art III courts have limited appellate role.
Thomas v. Union Carbide (1985)
Challenge to FIFRA provision sending certain indemnification disputes amongst pesticide registrants to a non-Article III arbitrator. Arbitrator’s decision reviewable only for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.
We need “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories” in determining application of Article III. Here, administrative scheme is a pragmatic solution to difficult cost-spreading problem. This is not a purely private right. Smells like a public(ish) right. Little danger to the republic given that “no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement.” There is some judicial review.
CFTC v. Schor (1986)
Commodity Exchange Act prohibited fraudulent trading of futures contracts, set up new agency called Commodities Future Trading Commission, and provided mechanism for agency adjudication of customers’ claims against brokers. Act permitted agency to consider non-compulsory counterclaims.
This is fine. Consent is key. Customer waives right to Art. III consideration by filing initial claim. Moreover, order is not self-executing.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg (1989)
Whether a fraudulent conveyance action filed on behalf of bankruptcy estate against creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding is within the “public rights” exception.
Only a public right can be adjudicated by a non-Article III court. This is a private right.
Stern v. Marshall (2011)
Vickie Marshall filed petition for bankruptcy. Pierce, her step-son, sought declaration in that proceeding that his defamation claim against her was not dischargeable. This filing was not voluntary; he had to do it. Bankruptcy trustee, on behalf of Vickie’s estate, responded with tortious interference (with inheritance) counterclaim.
This cannot fit within any conceivable stretch of the “public rights” category. Her claim is an ordinary state law claim that will not necessarily be resolved in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. This is not a right dependent on the will of Congress for its very existence. This isn’t an area where Bankruptcy Court has special expertise. Bankruptcy Court is not a mere “adjunct.” Same reasoning as Northern Pipeline. Can enter final judgments, only regular appellate review. No consent here.
Wellness International (2015)
Creditor voluntarily brought private “Stern” claim to bankruptcy court to challenge debtor’s claimed assets.
This is fine. As in Schor, parties can consent to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over a traditional private claim.
Oil States (2018)
Challenge to a procedure called “inter partes review,” (IPR) which permits a third party to initiate a review proceeding with the Patent Trademark Appeals Board (PTAB) to review validity of (and sometimes cancel) someone else’s patent.
Patents are initially creatures of statute – like franchises – and thus are public rights.
Hayburn’s Case (1792)
Invalid Pensions Act - Sec of War could refuse to follow recommendations of judges
Decisions have to be final and cannot be subject to revision after we issue them. Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the executive branch.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (1855)
The Court entered an ongoing decree barring the structure. Lobbied by WV, Congress passed new statute: “The Wheeling Bridge is now part of a post office route; it is a lawful structure and can stay.” Then, the bridge blew down in a huge wind storm in 1854. PA sued, citing the SCOTUS decision and challenging the new Act, to prevent reconstruction.
The Act is valid. Congress can change the rules of decision on a going-forward basis in a way that negatively affects an ongoing decree.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm (1995)
Congress passed statute allowing courts to reopen cases dismissed as time-barred under previous SC case. P’s case had become final, wanted it reopened per the new statute.
Statute offends the principle of separation of powers and is unconstitutional. Not totally governed by Hayburn’s Case; this is not vesting final review in another branch. However, as in Hayburn, this is Congress taking our final decisions and demanding that they be reopened. This they cannot do.
Miller v. French (2000)
Litigation over prison conditions in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in an injunction to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment. Injunctive decree still ongoing. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which required that existing injunctions be dissolved on defendant’s motion.
Plaut carefully distinguished money damages from ongoing injunctions. Congress can alter the prospective effect of previously-entered injunctions. These are new standards that govern prospective relief. Here, Congress has altered the underlying relevant law.
United States v. Klein (1871)
Federal government seized and sold a Southerner’s abandoned cotton plantation. Act provided that he could recover proceeds if he could prove he was loyal –> hadn’t aided or abetted the rebellion. During pendency of this appeal, Congress passed new act saying, “nope, pardon ≠ loyalty
unC; in Smith v. Jones, Congress can’t pass a statute that says, “in the case of Smith v. Jones, the trial court must find for Smith.” [1] This isn’t a valid exercise of the “exceptions” power. [2] Congress can’t prescribe the “rules of decision” in a pending case. [3] This dictates consequences of, and thus impairs, the presidential pardon. That infringes on the power of the Executive. [4] Jurisdiction-stripping legislation that is a “means to an end” is not okay.
Robertson (1992)
Lawsuits challenged Forest Service plan to allow timber harvest in Pacific Northwest habitat of endangered Spotted Owl as violation of Endangered Species Act. While suits pending, Congress enacted Northwest Timber Compromise that hammered out accommodations between loggers and environmentalists. Section 318 specified that in pending litigation, courts should see compromise as compliant with ESA requirements.
Section 318 did not instruct a court in how to apply pre-existing legal standards to a pending case but rather amended the pre-existing standards. Ok to amend the underlying law, even if with respect to a pending case and identified piece of property.
