Federal Common Law, Implied Remedies Flashcards
Swift v. Tyson (1842)
A federal court is not obliged to apply state law when sitting in diversity unless there is a state statute on point. Decisions of state courts are not laws because they are frequently revised. Law regarding negotiable instruments is the law “of the commercial world” and federal courts can create it.
Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab (1928)
Under Swift v. Tyson, we apply general common law, a better rule, and uphold B&Y’s right to contract with the RR.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins (1938)
Tompkins (a Pennsylvanian) was injured by a passing freight train as he walked on a right of way. He filed a negligence claim against the railroad (a NY company) in SDNY.
Swift v. Tyson is overruled. There is no “general” federal common law.
Clearfield Trust (1943)
U.S. Treasury sent Barner a check for services rendered. Someone else intercepted the check, forged a signature, and cashed it at J.C. Penney, which transferred it to Clearfield, which cashed it and gave proceeds to J.C. Penney. Would have been time-barred under PA law.
Erie does not require application of PA law here. Rights and duties of United States regarding its commercial paper are a matter of federal law. In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards. Binding everywhere due to the Supremacy Clause.
D’oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC (1942)
Missouri company executed a $5000 note to an Illinois bank in 1933 with the specific (written) understanding it would not be redeemed. FDIC acquired note as collateral for loan but received no notice of this original understanding. FDIC sought to collect and filed suit in federal district court in Missouri.
We should fashion federal common law here. Enabling statute manifests federal policy to protect FDIC from misrepresentations of this kind, and there are big benefits to uniformity here.
Concurrence (Jackson): Codification of law inevitably creates too many gaps. Provided we stay within confines of our legal boundaries, we can and should fill those gaps
Cort v. Ash (1975)
QP: Should a private right of action against corporate directors be implied in a statute that bars corporations from donating to presidential campaigns?
No. We apply 4 factors relevant to inquiry: (1) Was statute enacted to benefit plaintiff? In other words, does statute confer a federal right on plaintiff? (2) Is there any indication of intent, express or implied, to create a private right of action or to deny one? (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the scheme to find such a right by implication? (4) Is this an area best left to state regulation into which federal law should not intrude?
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago (1979)
A private right of action exists as a matter of federal common law. Applies Cort v. Ash factors.
Alexander v. Sandoval (2001)
Alabama constitutional amendment declared English the “official” language. QP: Can private citizens sue to enforce disparate impact regulations under Title VI?
No private right of action. § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination. Permits disparate impact discrimination. § 602 lacks rights-creating language. Doesn’t matter that regulations create rights-creating language. Test: (1) Did Congress intend to create a personal right? (2) Did Congress intend to create a private remedy? answer to both must be yes for implied private right of action
Wisniewski v. Rodale (3d Cir. 2005)
Applying Sandoval test - see outline for statute.
Congress clearly intended to create a right, using explicit rights-creating language. However, there is no reason to believe Congress intended to create a remedy. So no private right of action.
Ward v. Love County (1920)
OK county illegally collected taxes from Choctaw Tribe
Because County illegally forced Tribe to pay, “no statutory authority was essential to enable or require the county to refund the money.” Thus, right to refund of coercively collected taxes is not dependent on state remedial mechanisms.
Bacchus (1984)
State of Hawaii imposed a 20% excise tax on liquor but granted a tax exemption for alcoholic beverages made of state-grown pineapple. Non-pineapple wine manufacturers sued, claiming violation of the commerce clause.
Yes, this is a dormant commerce clause violation; Hawaii clearly prefers in-state products.
McKesson (1990)
Florida had same scheme as Hawaii. Taxpayer who paid extra taxes because it didn’t produce alcohol using Florida fruit sought refund of state taxes paid under (now-invalidated) discriminatory state tax scheme. State: We won’t collect these taxes going forward . . . but you don’t get a refund.
If a state requires taxpayers to pay first and challenge later, the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires some meaningful backward-looking relief. States have some remedial flexibility: State can either give you a refund or force the other guys to pay back taxes so everyone’s equal.
Bivens (1971)
Thanksgiving weekend–Brooklyn, 1965: (Federal) DEA agents charged into the apartment of Webster Bivens without a warrant and arrested him on narcotics charges. They manacled him in front of his wife and kids and threatened to arrest the entire family. At the station, an officer strip-searched him. Bivens was never prosecuted for any offense.
Right of action against federal officers is permissible.
Davis v. Passman (1979)
Extends Bivens to 5th Amendment. Davis, a congressional staffer, can bring Bivens action alleging Equal Protection violation when fired from job (by a member of Congress) due to her sex.
Carlson v. Green (1980)
Extends Bivens to 8th Amendment. Parents can bring Bivens action against prison officials who failed to provide medical attention to their son.
