Foundational Principles/Justiciability

Question 1

Hayburn’s Case (1792)

Answer 1

Invalid Pensions Act case

(1) Congress cannot vest review of final decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch. (2) Congress does not have the authority to order courts to perform extra-judicial duties

Question 2

Cohens v. Virginia (1821)

Answer 2

If Cong gives jurisdiction to the Court and it is consistent with the Const, Court must adjudicate; cannot “duck” a case

Question 3

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Answer 3

Midnight judges case

Marbury has right to commission, there is a remedy, mandamus is appropriate, BUT Judiciary Act cannot add to SC’s OJ because Const says so and thus cannot grant the writ

Question 4

Fairchild v. Hughes (1922)

Answer 4

Attempt to invalidate 19A

A private citizen does not have a right to bring suit against a constitutional amendment. P only has the general right of every citizen to engage in the electoral/political process to achieve their political ends; cannot take to the courts for that purpose.

Question 5

Sierra Club v. Morton (1972)

Answer 5

Ski resort on protected lands

No injury in fact. You haven’t alleged that you or any of your 78,000 members use or visit the area or would in any way be actually affected by decision. A membership organization’s mere interest in a problem, without a showing that its members would suffer actual injury, is not sufficient to show that the entity has standing to seek judicial review of an action by a federal agency.

Question 6

U.S. v. Richardson (1974)

Answer 6

CIA expenditures in bombing Cambodia

This is just a generalized grievance. Impact on him is plainly shared by all members of the public. Generalized grievance = no injury/standing.

Question 7

Linda R.S. v. Richard D. (1973)

Answer 7

Deadbeat dad case – Mother of children born out-of-wedlock claimed Equal Protection violation in state’s refusal to pursue father for criminal non-support.

Too speculative. No causation/standing. To have standing to bring an action before a court, an individual must have sufficiently alleged a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.

Question 8

Allen v. Wright (1984)

Answer 8

Black parents suing IRS for lack of enforcement of tax status; two alleged injuries: (1) financial aid to discriminatory schools and (2) diminished opportunity for desegregated schools.

Injury 1 = no injury; person in Hawaii could challenge tax exemption in Maine;
Injury 2 = there’s a cognizable injury, but still no standing. Diminished ability to go to desegregated public schools = concrete harm. However, no fair traceability (causation). Line of causation between tax-exempt status and desegregation is too attenuated.

Question 9

LA v. Lyons (1983)

Answer 9

Man seeking damages and injunction for LAPD’s future use of chokeholds; not a class action

Totally speculative that this guy will again face an illegal chokehold (probabilistic injury). Granting requested injunctive relief requires showing that he will face likely future harm. Having not shown this, he has asked for something that may or may not help him.

Question 10

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’L (2013)

Answer 10

Plaintiffs (attorneys) alleged that their work required communication by phone/email with individuals suspected of terrorist affiliations. FISA might capture comms and they would have to money to travel.

Chain of possibilities here is too speculative. No injury is certainly impending. Need, at a minimum, a substantial risk, not present here. Fear of hypothetical harm that gives rise to expenditure of $ can’t create standing. Don’t often find standing when asked to review actions of political branches in fields of intelligence/foreign affairs.

Question 11

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014)

Answer 11

SBA List made a statement about a candidate, and the candidate challenged under Ohio election law criminalizing such statements. When the candidate withdrew his complaint after losing election, SBA List sought injunctive relief against future enforcement of law on First Amendment grounds, claiming it intended to keep making statements.

Standing because a substantial risk of administrative proceedings against advocacy group plus the additional threat of criminal prosecution sufficed to establish standing. May be a walk-back of the “certainly impending” standard from Clapper – at minimum, substantial risk + criminal sanctions = standing

Question 12

Frothingham v. Mellon (1923)

Answer 12

Maternity Act increased tax liability, P challenged as violation of 10A

This is just a generalized grievance, and P is not asking us to resolve a judicial controversy; money interest was minute, indeterminable; otherwise, all taxpayers would have standing

Question 13

Flast v. Cohen (1968)

Answer 13

T/P claimed federal statute providing funding for religious schools violated the Establishment Clause

Standing, there is a nexus between T/P status and violation of Cong’s spending authority and Establishment Clause violations

Question 14

Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation (2007)

Answer 14

Explicitly rejected a broad reading of Flast, which is confined to its facts

Question 15

Coleman v. Miller (1939)

Answer 15

20 KS senators claiming that lieutenant gov. unC broke a tie, thus ratifying the Child Labor Amendment they had voted against

There is standing - stands for proposition that at least where you have sufficient vote for a particular thing, and your votes would have led to a particular result, there can be standing where all of those votes that would have been outcome determinative file the claim.

Question 16

Raines v. Bird (1997)

Answer 16

6 Senators challenged line item veto

No standing; had chance to vote but lost in political process; not determinative

Question 17

Ariz. State Legislature v. AIRC (2015)

Answer 17

Arizona legislature has standing to challenge state ballot initiative that moves redistricting to independent commission. Here, (1) whole legislature is suing as an institutional plaintiff. Moreover, (2) as in Coleman, their votes on redistricting are being “completely nullified.”

Question 18

Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill (2019)

Answer 18

One house of Va. Legislature lacks standing to appeal decision invalidating districting plan passed by legislature; AIRC is distinguishable – here, not the whole legislative body; Coleman also distinguishable – there they got to vote and the outcome of the political process was thwarted

Question 19

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)

Answer 19

Environmental group challenged revised FWS interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, claiming that FWS was failing to require agency consultation regarding effects of projects on endangered species abroad

No standing; Scalia Plurality: no injury-in-fact or redressability; (1) injury – just because P visited once proves nothing. Intent without specific plans does not establish “actual or imminent injury.” Affidavits claiming intent to return insufficient to meet this standard (no plane tickets!). (2) redressability – attack against only the rules regarding consultation, and even if the Secretary has to rewrite these rules to require consultation if funding projects will affect endangered species abroad, it’s not clear that funding agencies will comply. Kennedy Concurrence (+Souter): ok with injury-in-fact argument (though the plane ticket thing is goofy); however, Cong. definitely can create new classes of rights and litigants beyond what existed at common law, but it must at least identify a concrete injury.

Question 20

FEC v. Akins (1998)

Answer 20

Voters have standing to challenge FEC determination that AIPAC was not a political action committee; FECA includes broad citizen suit provision. Injury in fact = voters’ inability to get information that would help them evaluate candidates for office. No problem that injury is widely shared because it is concrete. This is a distinct harm, not a harm of “an abstract and indefinite nature.” Richardson distinguishable (no statute there).

Question 21

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)

Answer 21

State challenged EPA refusal to issue greenhouse gas regulations for new motor vehicles

State AG standing –> there is standing, statute confers “procedural right” to challenge EPA inaction which, combined with Massachusetts’ “special stake” in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests

Question 22

Spokeo v. Robins (2016)

Answer 22

Plaintiff sued Spokeo, a people-search engine that compiles info on the internet, claiming its practices violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

No standing, Ct reaffirmed framework from Lujan –> can’t look only at particularized harm – must also be concrete

Question 23

Craig v. Boren (1976)

Answer 23

OK law allowed sale of low-alcohol beer to men under 21 and women under 18. Vendor sued on Equal Protection grounds.

There is standing, vendor has suffered concrete injury in fact: if she doesn’t adhere to rules could suffer sanctions or lose license. Because she already has standing to sue on her own behalf, can raise rights of third parties who will be adversely affected if her challenge fails. Vendor is in best position to sue because law expressly regulates sale.

Question 24

June Med. Servs. V. Russo (2020)

Answer 24

Challenge to LA statute that abortion providers need to have doctors with admitting privileges at hospital within 30 miles; QP: whether abortion providers can be presumed to have third-party standing to challenge health and safety regulation on behalf of their patients absent a “close” relationship with their patients and a “hinderance” to their patients’ ability to sue on their own behalf

Upholding third-party standing in abortion context

Question 25

Defunis v. OdeGaard (1974)

Answer 25

White law student challenged UW Law School admissions procedures, claiming racial discrimination in violation of Equal Protection Clause. By time case argued at Supreme Court, he was in spring of 3L year, and school said he could graduate.

This is MOOT, as UW has said he will graduate. No exceptions to mootness doctrine apply. UW did not “voluntarily stop allegedly illegal conduct” to make suit go away. This is not a situation that is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”

Question 26

Vitek (1980)

Answer 26

Voluntary cessation exception –> If there’s any likelihood they can start up again, Not moot.

Case not moot where convicted felon challenging transfer to a mental hospital is actually paroled. Not “absolutely clear” that it won’t happen again. He could violate parole and be sent right back.

Question 27

City of Erie (2000)

Answer 27

State anti-nude ordinance ruled unconstitutional; strip club that challenged closed after Court granted cert. Not moot –> City still can’t enforce its ordinance and plaintiff could open up another nude establishment.

Question 28

United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell (1947)

Answer 28

Federal employees sought declaratory/injunctive relief against Hatch Act, which forbade them from political activity. Only one employee had violated the act.

employees who have not violated the act have only alleged a hypothetical threat of enforcement. Even though they may be able to allege a concrete, particularized (as opposed to generalized) issue down the line, they have not done so yet. As to the one employee who has violated the act, the issue is ripe (but he loses).

Question 29

Abbott Labs (1967)

Answer 29

Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require prescription drug manufacturers to print the common or “established” name of their drugs in large letters along with the “proprietary” or trade name of the drug on all packaging.

Case is ripe; Drug companies have to immediately spend a fortune changing labels. If they do not, they will certainly face prosecution and a devastating PR backlash.

Question 30

Toilet Goods (1967)

Answer 30

Regulation authorized the Commissioner of the FDA (Commissioner) to suspend statutorily mandated FDA services to the TGA if the TGA refused to grant the FDA free access to TGA facilities.

Not ripe; Just have to give “free access” for inspection that may or may not come. Company doesn’t have to change its behavior in any way. No $$. No threat of criminal sanction – just an immediately appealable admin label.

Question 31

Luther v. Borden (1849)

Answer 31

Dorr Rebellion broke out, with two rival RI governments and the imminent threat of civil war, and dispute reached Supreme Court

Not going to touch this; no way of developing standards; no one will listen to us if we choose; we read “The United States” here as Congress and punt

Question 32

Baker v. Carr (1962)

Answer 32

Redistricting imbalance bw city and country in TN; urban districts had 10x as many residents as rural (mostly white) districts, thus substantially diluting urban votes

This is justiciable; the Equal Protection Clause gives us standards that are well-developed and familiar to us. no demonstrable commitment to another branch (classical view).

Baker Standards (don’t need all): Textually committed to another entity OR Lack of judicially discoverable, manageable standards OR Impossibility of deciding w/o choosing among policies non-judicial way OR Impossibility of deciding without disrespect to another branch OR Unusual need for adherence OR Potential for embarrassment

Question 33

Powell v. McCormack (1969)

Answer 33

House refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Congressman from NY, on basis of alleged misuse of public funds.

This is justiciable. The Constitution only gives House authority to judge qualifications set forth in Constitution itself, not other stuff (classical view)

Question 34

Nixon v. United States (1993)

Answer 34

Fed judge lied to GJ during corruption investigation, went to prison

Non-justiciable; Lack of judicially manageable standards; there is an important textual commitment we have to the legislative branch (classical view); Bad idea: send country into chaos (Prudential View)

Question 35

Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012)

Answer 35

Congress passed law saying person born in Israel can say Israel or Jerusalem on passport

This is justiciable; Even though Constitution assigns recognition power to executive (e.g. textual commitment), we have conflict between Congress and President here over this power, and the judiciary is the appropriate body to resolve whether statute is constitutional. The Court is not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision; instead, Zivotovsky asks the Court to enforce a specific statutory right, and whether the statute is constitutional. This is a familiar judicial exercise (Classical View).

Question 36

Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)

Answer 36

Voters in NC and MD brought Equal Protection challenges to partisan gerrymanders.

This is a nonjusticiable political question. “To hold that legislators cannot take their partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.” We lack standards for deciding how much partisan gerrymandering is “too much.”

Question 37

El-Shifa Pharm. V. United States (D.C. Cir. en banc 2010)

Answer 37

Owners of Sudanese pharmaceutical plant sued United States for bombing it and for stating, falsely in their view, that they had ties to bin Laden.

This is a nonjusticiable political question. Disputes involving foreign relations aren’t always nonjusticiable, just most of the time. They typically present issues of discretion (Marbury box one), and we generally lack judicially manageable standards to assess the exercise of that discretion. Even though this looks like a defamation/tort case, to decide it we have to second-guess the administration’s stated purpose for the strike.