Habeas Corpus Flashcards
Ex parte Bollman (1807)
Bollman and Swartwout were linked to Aaron Burr’s expedition in the Louisiana Territory and detained by federal authorities in Washington DC in anticipation of trial for treason. They sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court.
You’re free! Judiciary Act authorizes independent action in habeas. When petitioner applies directly in the Supreme Court, the Court can review the legality of commitment ordered by lower federal court. This is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus is not an inherent power; must be statutorily conferred.
Brown v. Allen (1953)
Black defendants sentenced to death in NC for interracial rape/murder. Petitions alleged unconstitutional racial discrimination in selection of petit and grand juries. Should federal courts be permitted to relitigate (and decide de novo) constitutional questions that were fully and fairly litigated in state court? (This, despite our general understanding of principles of res judicata?)
Yes. A federal court can relitigate an issue even if the state court had a fair opportunity to pass on it. Petitioner must make [1] prima facie case, [2] exhaust available state remedies, and [3] (ordinarily) file the record with the federal court.
Stone v. Powell (1976)
Can a state prisoner seek habeas relief on the basis that evidence seized in violation of the 4A was introduced at trial?
No. The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right but a specific deterrent against police misconduct. So long as there is a full & fair opportunity to litigate question, you are fine.
Rose v. Mitchell (1979)
Confined Stone to 4A exclusionary rule facts and stating that habeas petitioners can raise racially discriminatory grand jury selection claim.
Withrow v. Williams
Permitted petitioner to advance habeas petition alleging violation of Miranda, which protects a “fundamental trial right” that is not “necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt.”
Herrera v. Collins (1993)
Capital defendant claimed newly-discovered evidence (affidavit claiming now-dead brother actually committed murder) showed his actual innocence.
Freestanding innocence claim was not cognizable in habeas absent a showing of a constitutional violation in initial proceeding. Habeas isn’t about error correction; it’s about making sure people aren’t incarcerated in violation of the Constitution.
Notes (adding up 6 justices in dissents/concurrences): In a CAPITAL case, a truly persuasive demonstration of “actual innocence” would warrant habeas relief if there were no state avenue to process a claim
Linkletter v. Walker (1965)
Should Mapp v. Ohio, which applied the exclusionary rule to the states, be applicable to state convictions that have already become final?
No. Court will decide whether to apply Case A to other cases in the pipeline (whether pending on direct or on habeas) on an ad hoc basis.
Post-Linkletter, Court ultimately adopts a three-factor balancing test, considering [1] the purpose of new rule; [2] the extent of reliance on old rule; and [3] the effect on the justice system if we were to retroactively apply the rule.
Griffith v. Kentucky (1987)
Ct gets rid of squishy balancing test for cases pending on direct, mandating full retroactivity
Teague v. Lane (1989)
Court generally will not make or apply “new” constitutional rules in habeas actions. To do so undermines finality and is too disruptive for states that provided perfectly fair trials under old rules. A “new” rule is a rule that breaks new ground and was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.
Exception 1:
We will apply a new rule retroactively in habeas where new rule places primary conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe. I.e. if it becomes unconstitutional to criminalize underlying primary conduct, a defendant incarcerated for these actions can claim benefit of new rule on habeas. (e.g. Loving v. Va, Lawrence v. Tx, Roper v. Simmons – can’t execute person who committed crime under 18) (focuses on substantive rule).
Exception 2:
Where new rule sets forth a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that implicates fundamental fairness and without which there’s a high risk of inaccurate conviction. (E.g. Gideon v. Wainwright); Court has never found new rule to fit this exception – null set (focuses on procedural rule).
Schriro v. Summerlin (2004)
New substantive rules apply retroactively; new procedural rules do not. Scalia referred to a case deciding that “use” of a firearm under 924(c) required “active employment of a firearm” rather than passively holding it. Defendant convicted for passive “use” would be able to raise claim on habeas.
Butler v. McKellar (1990)
a rule is new even where it is a logical outgrowth of an existing opinion.
Chaidez v. United States (2013)
“[G]arden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new rules.” Where question instead contemplates extension of rule to new or different contexts, that is a new rule.
AEDPA – 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D) (habeas jx)
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding
Terry Williams v. Taylor (2000)
After conviction final, Williams claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. On appeal, state SC misstated the standard in Strickland.
A run-of-the-mill case that applies the correct Strickland standard and simply comes down differently from how we might come down is not “contrary to” Strickland. It must either contradict the standard in Strickland (by, for example, getting the legal standard wrong) or reach a different result on facts indistinguishable from those in one of our prior cases. “Unreasonable application” inquiry asks whether the state court’s application of the correctly-stated standard was objectively unreasonable. This, too, doesn’t mean just wrong.
Greene v. Fisher (2011)
“clearly established law” does not include Supreme Court decisions announced after last decision on merits at state level (even if announced BEFORE conviction final on direct).
Harrington v. Richter (2011)
We will presume that a state court has adjudicated “on the merits” even when it denies a federal claim without any explanation.
Johnson v. Williams (2013)
Richter presumption applies even when state seems to be addressing totally different claims and ignoring federal claim.
Wilson v. Sellers (2018)
“A federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should ‘look through’ that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. The State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below.”
Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016)
Seventeen-year old Montgomery was convicted of murdering a sheriff in 1963 and sentenced to life without possibility of parole. He had no opportunity to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Miller v. Alabama (2012) held that a juvenile could not be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole absent special consideration of juvenile status.
This new rule applies, per Teague #1 (#2 re watershed rules not addressed).
Daniels v. Allen (1953)
Capital petitioners’ counsel served statement of case one day late, so state court refused to consider claims of jury discrimination and coerced confessions.
This defect precludes federal habeas review. “A failure to use a state’s available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity bars federal habeas corpus.”
Fay v. Noia (1963)
Noia was convicted of murder on the basis of a “confession” obtained after numerous officers slapped, punched, kicked, and threatened him and deprived him of food over an unrelenting period of 27 hours. Noia did not appeal his conviction or sentence. State denied his collateral attack because of failure to appeal.
We reject Daniels. A federal habeas petition is not an appeal, and thus the adequate state ground rule is not implicated. That said, if petitioner has “deliberately bypassed” state procedures, district court has discretion to deny relief.
Wainwright v. Sykes (1977)
State court (on habeas) refused to consider defendant’s claim challenging admission of a confession obtained without administration of Miranda warnings because his lawyer had not contemporaneously objected at trial. He also failed to press it on direct appeal.
Review is precluded. Petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedure requiring contemporaneous objection is an adequate and independent state ground. From here on, petitioner is only excused from procedural default if s/he can show cause for the failure to object and actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s error. We reject Fay v. Noia’s more lenient “deliberate bypass standard.”
Lee v. Kemna
Petitioner objected, but not in writing.
Putting it in writing wouldn’t have changed anything, so no procedural default. If a state procedural default conclusion is inadequate, it will not preclude habeas.
Reed v. Ross (1984)
Where rule did not exist at time of defendant’s trial or appeal (that is, new rule representing a “clear break” announced post-trial), default is excused.
Notes: After Teague, this exception can only excuse trial-level procedural default when the subject falls within a Teague exception (for example, a substantive rule).
