Habeas Corpus

Question 1

Ex parte Bollman (1807)

Answer 1

Bollman and Swartwout were linked to Aaron Burr’s expedition in the Louisiana Territory and detained by federal authorities in Washington DC in anticipation of trial for treason. They sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court.

You’re free! Judiciary Act authorizes independent action in habeas. When petitioner applies directly in the Supreme Court, the Court can review the legality of commitment ordered by lower federal court. This is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus is not an inherent power; must be statutorily conferred.

Question 2

Brown v. Allen (1953)

Answer 2

Black defendants sentenced to death in NC for interracial rape/murder. Petitions alleged unconstitutional racial discrimination in selection of petit and grand juries. Should federal courts be permitted to relitigate (and decide de novo) constitutional questions that were fully and fairly litigated in state court? (This, despite our general understanding of principles of res judicata?)

Yes. A federal court can relitigate an issue even if the state court had a fair opportunity to pass on it. Petitioner must make [1] prima facie case, [2] exhaust available state remedies, and [3] (ordinarily) file the record with the federal court.

Question 3

Stone v. Powell (1976)

Answer 3

Can a state prisoner seek habeas relief on the basis that evidence seized in violation of the 4A was introduced at trial?

No. The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right but a specific deterrent against police misconduct. So long as there is a full & fair opportunity to litigate question, you are fine.

Question 4

Rose v. Mitchell (1979)

Answer 4

Confined Stone to 4A exclusionary rule facts and stating that habeas petitioners can raise racially discriminatory grand jury selection claim.

Question 5

Withrow v. Williams

Answer 5

Permitted petitioner to advance habeas petition alleging violation of Miranda, which protects a “fundamental trial right” that is not “necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt.”

Question 6

Herrera v. Collins (1993)

Answer 6

Capital defendant claimed newly-discovered evidence (affidavit claiming now-dead brother actually committed murder) showed his actual innocence.

Freestanding innocence claim was not cognizable in habeas absent a showing of a constitutional violation in initial proceeding. Habeas isn’t about error correction; it’s about making sure people aren’t incarcerated in violation of the Constitution.
Notes (adding up 6 justices in dissents/concurrences): In a CAPITAL case, a truly persuasive demonstration of “actual innocence” would warrant habeas relief if there were no state avenue to process a claim

Question 7

Linkletter v. Walker (1965)

Answer 7

Should Mapp v. Ohio, which applied the exclusionary rule to the states, be applicable to state convictions that have already become final?

No. Court will decide whether to apply Case A to other cases in the pipeline (whether pending on direct or on habeas) on an ad hoc basis.
Post-Linkletter, Court ultimately adopts a three-factor balancing test, considering [1] the purpose of new rule; [2] the extent of reliance on old rule; and [3] the effect on the justice system if we were to retroactively apply the rule.

Question 8

Griffith v. Kentucky (1987)

Answer 8

Ct gets rid of squishy balancing test for cases pending on direct, mandating full retroactivity

Question 9

Teague v. Lane (1989)

Answer 9

Court generally will not make or apply “new” constitutional rules in habeas actions. To do so undermines finality and is too disruptive for states that provided perfectly fair trials under old rules. A “new” rule is a rule that breaks new ground and was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.

Exception 1:
We will apply a new rule retroactively in habeas where new rule places primary conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe. I.e. if it becomes unconstitutional to criminalize underlying primary conduct, a defendant incarcerated for these actions can claim benefit of new rule on habeas. (e.g. Loving v. Va, Lawrence v. Tx, Roper v. Simmons – can’t execute person who committed crime under 18) (focuses on substantive rule).
Exception 2:
Where new rule sets forth a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that implicates fundamental fairness and without which there’s a high risk of inaccurate conviction. (E.g. Gideon v. Wainwright); Court has never found new rule to fit this exception – null set (focuses on procedural rule).

Question 10

Schriro v. Summerlin (2004)

Answer 10

New substantive rules apply retroactively; new procedural rules do not. Scalia referred to a case deciding that “use” of a firearm under 924(c) required “active employment of a firearm” rather than passively holding it. Defendant convicted for passive “use” would be able to raise claim on habeas.

Question 11

Butler v. McKellar (1990)

Answer 11

a rule is new even where it is a logical outgrowth of an existing opinion.

Question 12

Chaidez v. United States (2013)

Answer 12

“[G]arden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new rules.” Where question instead contemplates extension of rule to new or different contexts, that is a new rule.

Question 13

AEDPA – 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D) (habeas jx)

Answer 13

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding

Question 14

Terry Williams v. Taylor (2000)

Answer 14

After conviction final, Williams claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. On appeal, state SC misstated the standard in Strickland.

A run-of-the-mill case that applies the correct Strickland standard and simply comes down differently from how we might come down is not “contrary to” Strickland. It must either contradict the standard in Strickland (by, for example, getting the legal standard wrong) or reach a different result on facts indistinguishable from those in one of our prior cases. “Unreasonable application” inquiry asks whether the state court’s application of the correctly-stated standard was objectively unreasonable. This, too, doesn’t mean just wrong.

Question 15

Greene v. Fisher (2011)

Answer 15

“clearly established law” does not include Supreme Court decisions announced after last decision on merits at state level (even if announced BEFORE conviction final on direct).

Question 16

Harrington v. Richter (2011)

Answer 16

We will presume that a state court has adjudicated “on the merits” even when it denies a federal claim without any explanation.

Question 17

Johnson v. Williams (2013)

Answer 17

Richter presumption applies even when state seems to be addressing totally different claims and ignoring federal claim.

Question 18

Wilson v. Sellers (2018)

Answer 18

“A federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should ‘look through’ that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. The State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below.”

Question 19

Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016)

Answer 19

Seventeen-year old Montgomery was convicted of murdering a sheriff in 1963 and sentenced to life without possibility of parole. He had no opportunity to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Miller v. Alabama (2012) held that a juvenile could not be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole absent special consideration of juvenile status.

This new rule applies, per Teague #1 (#2 re watershed rules not addressed).

Question 20

Daniels v. Allen (1953)

Answer 20

Capital petitioners’ counsel served statement of case one day late, so state court refused to consider claims of jury discrimination and coerced confessions.

This defect precludes federal habeas review. “A failure to use a state’s available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity bars federal habeas corpus.”

Question 21

Fay v. Noia (1963)

Answer 21

Noia was convicted of murder on the basis of a “confession” obtained after numerous officers slapped, punched, kicked, and threatened him and deprived him of food over an unrelenting period of 27 hours. Noia did not appeal his conviction or sentence. State denied his collateral attack because of failure to appeal.

We reject Daniels. A federal habeas petition is not an appeal, and thus the adequate state ground rule is not implicated. That said, if petitioner has “deliberately bypassed” state procedures, district court has discretion to deny relief.

Question 22

Wainwright v. Sykes (1977)

Answer 22

State court (on habeas) refused to consider defendant’s claim challenging admission of a confession obtained without administration of Miranda warnings because his lawyer had not contemporaneously objected at trial. He also failed to press it on direct appeal.

Review is precluded. Petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedure requiring contemporaneous objection is an adequate and independent state ground. From here on, petitioner is only excused from procedural default if s/he can show cause for the failure to object and actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s error. We reject Fay v. Noia’s more lenient “deliberate bypass standard.”

Question 23

Lee v. Kemna

Answer 23

Petitioner objected, but not in writing.

Putting it in writing wouldn’t have changed anything, so no procedural default. If a state procedural default conclusion is inadequate, it will not preclude habeas.

Question 24

Reed v. Ross (1984)

Answer 24

Where rule did not exist at time of defendant’s trial or appeal (that is, new rule representing a “clear break” announced post-trial), default is excused.
Notes: After Teague, this exception can only excuse trial-level procedural default when the subject falls within a Teague exception (for example, a substantive rule).

Question 25

Murray v. Carrier (1986)

Answer 25

Counsel mistakenly failed to include one claim in brief (even though he had listed it in the notice of appeal).

1. Strickland –> Procedural default, even when it’s lawyer’s fault, generally precludes review. Even when we know the lawyer isn’t actually sandbagging, there are costs associated with excusing procedural default. However, if default is caused by lawyer who is constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington (1984) will we excuse it.
2. Gateway innocence –> A petitioner who cannot demonstrate “cause and prejudice” may nonetheless have excusable default “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”

Question 26

Amadeo v. Zant (1988)

Answer 26

Memo reflecting major racial discrimination in creation of the jury pool unearthed in independent voting rights lawsuit. Court held that defendant’s failure to raise was excused because of officials’ interference.

Question 27

Strickler v. Greene (1999) & Banks v. Dretke (2004)

Answer 27

Cause for excuse from procedural default where officials suggested they had handed over all exculpatory evidence when they in fact had not

Question 28

Schlup v. Delo (1994)

Answer 28

Schlup alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady issues. The lower court found he couldn’t satisfy “cause and prejudice” standard, and he didn’t press it before the Supreme Court, urging actual innocence as gateway instead (not as freestanding claim, as in Herrera).

To prove “actual innocence” as a “gateway” claim, must show that constitutional violation “probably resulted” (51% confidence) in conviction of one who is actually innocent.

Question 29

House v. Bell (2006)

Answer 29

House showed DNA evidence demonstrating that the state’s primary physical evidence of rape implicated the victim’s husband and that victim’s blood on his jeans was spilled by investigators after treated with preservative during autopsy.

It is more likely than not (51%) that a reasonable juror would have entertained reasonable doubt. (Schlup). This meets “gateway” innocence standard, but not freestanding innocence.

Question 30

AEDPA: § 2254(e)(2) (federal evidentiary hearings)

Answer 30

No hearing if petitioner failed to develop facts in state proceedings unless

Claim relies on new constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has made retroactive or a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through due diligence AND

Facts sufficiently show by clear and convincing evidence that but for the error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the defendant guilty.

Question 31

Michael Williams v. Taylor (2000)

Answer 31

Petitioner sought evidentiary hearing on three claims not raised/developed in trial: Brady violation, undisclosed juror bias, and prosecution knowledge of undisclosed juror bias.

§ 2254(e)(2) is not triggered where prisoner/lawyer were diligent in trying to unearth info (but thwarted). In that case, they didn’t “fail” to develop facts. If the prisoner was diligent, § 2254(e)(2) does not apply, and federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate or required under pre-AEDPA standards.

Question 32

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes (1992) (pre-AEDPA)

Answer 32

No hearing unless petitioner demonstrates “cause and prejudice” for failure to present evidence in state court OR failure to relitigate would cause “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Question 33

Cullen v. Pinholster (2011)

Answer 33

Evidence adduced at a new hearing under § 2254(e)(2) cannot be used to establish entitlement to relief under § 2254(d)(1) (e.g. Terry Williams dead fish standard). When we assess whether state court decision is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law, we look at record actually before state court. So new hearing only helpful if claim was not adjudicated on merits below and procedural default is excusable (e.g., because of egregious Brady violation, etc.).

Question 34

§ 2244(b)(2) (successive petitions)

Answer 34

a court of appeals will not grant permission for a successive federal habeas petition raising new claims unless
(A) Claim based on new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to habeas cases by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable. (Teague/Schriro “substantive rule”). OR
(B)(i) factual predicate could not have been discovered previously through exercise of due diligence AND (ii) the facts underlying the claim, when combined with all the evidence, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the error, all reasonable jurors would acquit.

Question 35

Felker v. Turpin (1996)

Answer 35

This jurisdiction-stripping is constitutional because Supreme Court review not completely foreclosed; petitioner can file [so-called] “original” habeas challenging denial of permission to file successive petition with the Supreme Court. Of course, when we look at the petition, we’ll be “informed” by AEDPA standards set forth in § 2244(b)(2) in deciding whether to grant relief.

Question 36

Panetti v. Quarterman (2007)

Answer 36

There is no requirement that petitioner present an unripe incompetence claim in a first petition. Statutory bar on successive petitions does not apply to claims that cannot be brought in first petition.

Question 37

Slack v. McDaniel (2000)

Answer 37

District court dismissed petitioner’s first petition because he had not completed exhaustion of state remedies. After exhaustion, petitioner filed another. Supreme Court held that § 2244(b)(2) did not apply; second petition was not successive because first petition wasn’t ripe.

Question 38

Rose v. Lundy (1982)

Answer 38

We adopt “total exhaustion” requirement; if petitioner’s habeas petition includes any unexhausted claims, district court should dismiss it outright. Get case back once exhaustion is complete.

Question 39

2254(c) (exhaustion)

Answer 39

Generally must invoke one complete round of the state’s established appellate review process, including petitioning for review in state court of last resort that has a discretionary docket.

But petitioner does not have to ask the state for collateral relief based on same evidence/issues already decided by direct review.

Question 40

§ 2244(d) (SoL)

Answer 40

Created a one-year SOL for filing federal habeas:

One year from date judgment became final OR
One year from date impediment to filing is removed OR
One year from date new constitutional right made retroactive by SCOTUS is recognized OR
One year from date that factual predicate could have been discovered through exercise of due diligence.

Question 41

Rhines v. Weber (2005)

Answer 41

When there is “good cause” to avert problems AEDPA creates with successive petitions and the statute of limitation, district courts can stay federal habeas pending exhaustion.

Question 42

McQuiggin v. Perkins (2013

Answer 42

Any petitioner who can make a credible showing of actual innocence can also get around the SOL.