Russia

Question 1

the case + democratization

Answer 1

personalistic rule but formal rules and institutions similar to democracies

bump 1905 = creation Duma (nothing much changed: Tsar kept power)

90s fallout SU -> more democracy, but also isntability -> not much democratic support in Russia

“corruption as reward, but also as a threat”

Question 2

cultural diversity and the nation

Answer 2

biggest chunk of territory from Europe to the entire East
- Siberia in the east = cold, mainly for prisoners

large territory -> diversity (still Russian majority) + center-periphery cleavage

assymetric federalism to accomodate center-periphery cleavage
(federalism in this case does not contribute to democacy)

fear external agression: e.g. Mongol invasions, Napoleon in C19

sense of foreloin glory + ehnic Russians outside of Russia (irredentism)

Question 3

history until SU

Answer 3

Kiev Center C10, C15 Moscow reasserts itself among regional powers
C13 Mongol invasion

Ivan the Terrible = 1547-1584 = authoritarian unifier

Peter the Great (1682-1725) and Catherine the Great (1762-96) = enlightened despots = closer to the West: enlightenment, modernization
after them a more eastern focus

last tsars = Romanovs

3 Russian revolutions 1905-17
1904/5 defeat against Japan (Russia lagged behind in industry)

• 1905 failed revolution and reforms (Tsar Nicholas 2 starts bypassing the Duma)
• 1917 February Revolution = Republican elites remove tsar, did not remove Russia from ww2
• 1917 October “Revolution” against participation in ww1
  *no real “revolution”: no mass protests, large scale movement civil society, more a coup by a small vanguard with Lenin as leader

civil war reds/communists and whites/republicans
- different than in France: reds/republicans, whites/

Question 4

different explanations for why gradual democratization in Russia is absent

Answer 4

1. orthodox christianity (linkage church-state closer than in other states)
2. mongol legacy
3. Ivan the Terrible put more authoritarian regime legacy in place

Question 5

SU after civil war

Answer 5

1922-1991 Soviet Union
= single-party authoritarian/totalitarian regime

Nomenklatura rule

1940s emergence as superpower
- Stalin pushed industrialization + created personalistic cult + genocide (Holomodor)

60s-80s eco decline (bc nomenkaltura: rulers don’t want to change the system bc their legitimacy depends on it)

1985-1991 Gorbachev: glasnost (political opening) and perestroika (economic liberalization)

1990s: transition and turbulence

• 1991 failed coup against Gorbachev, Yeltsen becomes more dominant and replaces Gorbachov
• 1991 collapse SU -> Russia as biggest successor state
  conflicts with e.g. Georgia: Russian speaking minority (irredentism)

= most democratic years: hybrid regimes
oligarchs become powerful

move towards capitalism: letting go of price controls (-> higher prices without increase production) + privatization (selling of state assets to friends of te regime, became oligarchs)

collapse SU and republican system -> re-emergence Duma, tries to impeach Yeltsin (to quick changes, not seeing who gets the money, where it is coming from),, army intervenes on the side of Yeltsin -> new constitution with stronger president

loan for shares programs: please lent us cash, you’ll get more shares in gov

Question 6

Nomenklatura rule

Answer 6

lecture:
strong rule through the party system (top-down): bureaucrats at the lower level get clear instructions from higher levels

• power through loyalty: by portraying loyalty you can move up in the hierarchy
• no room for much new ideas

ai:
“Nomenklatura” refers to a system of political patronage and a list of influential positions within a political or bureaucratic structure, particularly associated with the former Soviet Union and other communist states. The term has several key aspects:

• Definition: Originally, nomenklatura referred to a list of key administrative positions and the individuals who held them, which were appointed by the Communist Party. This system allowed the party to maintain control over important roles in government, industry, and other sectors.
• Political Control: The nomenklatura system was a means for the Communist Party to ensure loyalty and ideological conformity among those in power. Only individuals approved by the party could occupy these significant positions, which helped the party maintain its authority.
• Bureaucratic Structure: The nomenklatura included not just government officials but also leaders in various sectors, such as education, healthcare, and the military. This system created a class of elites who were often well-connected and enjoyed privileges not available to the general populace.
• Legacy: After the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the term nomenklatura has been used to describe similar systems of patronage or elite networks in other political contexts, where a small group holds significant power and influence.

Question 7

cleavages

Answer 7

we don’t expect to seem them in parties, more in civil society

• class cleavage = state centralization, suppression of working class, protest and revolution
  doesn’t seem to play a role rn
• centre-periphery cleavage = visible in conflicts e.g. Chechnya Wars 1994-2000
  e.g. when Putin 2004 attempted to maintain even more control over federalism by changing the rule: no directly elected governors, but appointed governors -> mass protests across the country -> 2012 reversed

democracy/authoritarian cleavage:
visible in protests in favor of Navalny
no strong figure now representing the wish for democracy
democratic potential hard to determine

Question 8

political regime 1990s-2020s

Answer 8

• 1990s = political liberalization
• early 2000s: hybrid regime?
  similar to Nigeria rn: regional elites controlling money, but not a system where one person holds all of the power
• since 2007 elections (Putin) authoritarian state?
• 2020 referendum: more authoritarian: Putin term limit reset: can go for 2 more terms + lifelong immunity
• 2022 Ukraine war even more authoritarian

Question 9

semi-presidential system

Answer 9

1993 new constitution = strong presidency

• directly elected president, since 2012 6y terms (used to be 4)
• term reset + lifelong immunity 2020
• parliament/Duma directly elected
• gov depends on parliamentary majority

strong presidential power:

1. appoints prime minister and ministers -> direct control top ministries
2. parliamentary control nearly absent (regardless of impeachment right)
3. veto power and rule by decree
4. Putin personalism (cfr. prime minister period: prime minister suddenly became more powerful than president)
   powers president tied mainly to Putin, not the position rn

!personalistic rule Putin -> no designated successor -> if he passes away dangerous situation with people trying to get power

Question 10

presidential elections

Answer 10

• two-round majoritarian system
• entry restrictions: Duma representation or 100.000-300.000 signatures
• candidates prohibited from running (e.g. Navalny 2018)
• only once a second round (1996)

march 2024 elections >90% to Putin: repression, fraud
- also for a part legit, hard to determine how much

Question 11

the Duma

Answer 11

• 450 members, 5y terms
• approves the prime minister
• no-confidence-vote (can be ignored by the president the first time, second time leads to new elections)
• can override president veto with 2/3 majority
• lower chamber (Duma) most powerful

appears democratic, role as become weaker over time

Question 12

Duma elections

Answer 12

election rules/types differ over time, it fluctuates according to the calculations of the regime in order to keep the most power
(e.g. SMD with First-past-the-post, mixed, list PR, Mixed Member Majoritarian (parallel voting))

now = mixed member majoritarian -> majoritarian not proportional result

• nationalist proportional vote with 5% threshold
• 225 seats SMD (won by plurality vote)

Question 13

upper chamber

Answer 13

= the Federation Council

• 89 federal subjects (substates), some recognized outside of Russia, some aren’t
• 2 members per federal subject
• 178 members 6y terms

Question 14

constitutional court

Answer 14

19 members nominated by president + approved by Federation Council (upper chamber)

substantial powers on paper: role impeachment procedure, checking federal powers

in practice pretty much asleep, no active role

not much/any power -> are asleep

Question 15

federalism

Answer 15

assymetric: some more powerful than others bc in 1990s period of turbulence some substate units got better bargaining positions and thus more powers than other substate units

theoreticaly federalism is democratizing, stabilizing center-periphery ceavages
in Russia: authoritarian federalism with strong centralization

strategies:

• 8 federal districts with appointed envoy (presidential envoy ensures that federal subjects within the federal district follow the central policy)
• direct election regional governors replaced with appointments 2004-2012 (like prefects in France to make sure that the departments are doing what the center wants)
  *protest and bolstering regime legitimacy -> direct elections return (not everywhere)
• blame-shifting
• electoral law (national-level registration required, candidate barring)
• outsider recruitment (‘school of governors’ to get them in line with the regime)
  = governors aren’t from the region
• competition for federal transfers

Republics have the most authority

Question 16

political parties - United Russia

Answer 16

party of power = political vehicle of Putin, formed when Putin was gaining power

2001 esatblished out of Unity + Fatherland - All Russia

ideology:

1. ‘stability’
2. conservatism
3. law and order
4. nationalism + irredentism (trying to get Russian minorities outside of the state back into the state)

patron-client networks and siloviki
siloviki = bureaucrats within the system of the state, core support group of Putin in the security agency
- they prosecute, get lower retirement age etc.

independent presidential candidacies

state structures (with siloviki bureaucrats) as locus of power

Question 17

political parties - CPRF

Answer 17

successor of CPSU
banned 1991-93

former communist party
ideology:

1. state-led economy
2. rejection capitalism
3. anti-globalization
4. nationalization
5. secular / anti-religious
6. soviet nostalgia

= second largest party in the Duma

‘systemic opposition’ = they are seen as opposition, but mostly a facade, lots of seats have ties to Putin, are awarded by the regime

main competitor against Yeltsin in 1996

Question 18

Political parties - liberal democratic party

Answer 18

= LDPR
= not liberal democratic

founded in 1991, breakthrough in 1993

ideology:

1. ultranationalism
2. xenophobia
3. conservatism
4. militarism & expansionism
5. mixed economy
6. populist / far right

10-25% votes -> 3d party

‘systemic opposition’: are in opposition, but consistent support for Putin

Question 19

political parties - A Just Russia

Answer 19

2006, social democratic party

created by the Kremlin?

2011 Duma elections -> 13% votes, briefly more critical towards Putin

2021 merger with For Truth & Patriots of Russia

ideology:

1. welfare state
2. soft market economy
3. social democracy

‘systemic opposition’

Question 20

political parties - liberal/anti-system

Answer 20

= more actual opposition parties

since 1990s: Yabloko (apple)

ideology:

1. centrism
2. liberalism
3. environmentalism
4. social-democracy
5. pro-European

2012-2018 = Progress Party (Navalny)

2018-21 = Russia of the Future (Navalny)

2021: New People Party : mild liberal opposition (decoy? may be another facade)

Question 21

authoritarian control - mechanisms

Answer 21

strategies:

• cooptation and threats
• elite clientelism
• clientelism
• output legitimacy

Question 22

cooptation and threats 1990s

Answer 22

1990s: perestroika and privatization -> rise of oligarchs and criminalization of the state
= elite support in exchange for continued access to state resources

• state increasingly undressed in favor of the oligarchs
• Yeltsin became dependent on oligarchs for 2nd round (rather than that elites/oligarchs were dependent on him)

Question 23

cooptation and threats now

Answer 23

Putin retakes control over oligarchs (e.g. by renationalization + prosecuting oligarchs)

power base in security sector: siloviki

regime continues to support on ‘elite clientelism’, but firmer grasp Putin

ruling party and opposition access to state resources, supports acquiescence with regime, once compromised -> threat of sanction

Question 24

elite clientelism

Answer 24

= regime offers something to elite (e.g. contracts in state company) in exchange for continued loyalty

• contract inflation = it costs 10 thousand, let’s say it costs 20, you can keep the difference
• other type = it costs 10 million, let’s not build it and you get the oney

friends of the regime are protected, but if you turn your back on the system, they will turn on you and have a lot of info
-> authoritarian regimes also genuine anti-corruption campaigns that are typically succesfull (leads to legitimacy and removes enemies)

Question 25

clientelism

Answer 25

with ordinary civilians

• vote buying (not that common in Russia bc it’s not that poor)
• coercive threat of taking jobs
• subsidies, import tariffs as rewards
• collective punishment: if Putin sees a lot of people voting against him -> punish the entire region

!handouts are not necessarily clientelism: bc everyone gets a reward, it doesn’t depend on who you vote for
- handouts also visible in established democracies, e.g. investing infrastructure before elections

Question 26

legitimacy - concept Huntington

Answer 26

strategies of legitimation

• Democracy = input legitimacy (elections)
  e.g. Russia 1990s: more democratic legitimation strategies in the face of crisis
• authoritarian = output legitimacy (performance)
  e.g. SU: ideological legitimation, then eco performance

Question 27

legitimacy Putin’s Russia

Answer 27

1. order and stability (poryadok & stabil’nost)
2. personal leadership and charisma
3. nationalism in the face of external threats

no one can rule by threat and coercion alone, is way to costly -> you need legitimacy

does it work in Russia?
Levada position polls (tricky; who dares to respond)

• 1990s: relative democracy -> Russia seen as on the right track (instability)
• as Putin gets more authoritarian, people increasingly think Russia is on the right track
  e.g. approval ratings go up with Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine external regression 2008-14
  e.g. didn’t lose support now with war on Ukraine (+ worst eco circumstances have passed

Question 28

Russia’s special path ()

Answer 28

osobyy put
term used by political elites to legitimize political system and foreign policy

emphasis on Russian exceptionalism and morality

rejection of Western values

restoration of superpower status

re-orientation towards (Central) Asia

Question 29

war on Ukraine

Answer 29

why?
Putin regime : denazification + prevent further NATO expansion
analysts:

• Putin personal ambitions to restore SU borders
• declining eco and political performance of the regime (output legitimacy)
• antidemocratic regime change in Ukraine (regime more democratic -> Putin afraid also Russians will want it)
• weakness and divisions in the West (facilitating factor)

Ukraine war
-> inflation and GDP decline (later slower growth) = initial phases of eco hardship have passed
-> 1 million emigrants, but has slowed down
- why? oppression: media censorship, restriction NGOs, assasinations, police brutality and arrests

Question 30

social change?

Answer 30

regional protests
pro-democracy protests

no united protests, there are regional protests but they don’t allign them

divided civil society, not organized enough to bring social change

BUT: it’s always possible that something happens: observers have frequently been surprised at the outbreak of mass protest

Question 31

(article) “kompromat deputies”

Answer 31

deputies with hidden income or assets (1/4 legislators in the Russian Duma)
- hidden income: failing to disclose luxury cars + to disclose additional income (e.g. when car is registered but no way they could pay for it)

are:

1. less active and more absent members of parliament = shirking deputy responsibilities
   - miss roll-call votes + less involved in sponsorship of legislation + propose fewer bills
2. kompromat deputies from the opposition support the regime’s political agenda more eagerly (bc regime has compromising info on them)
3. less likely to win reelection (bc reputational risk party + risk of being caught)
   = 20% more likely to leave office after single convocation

autocrats permit and then monitor corruption in order to co-opt potential challegners, who in turn trade loyalty to the regime in exchange for opportunities to self-enrich

Question 32

(article) concern about anti-corruption campaigns

Answer 32

several anti-corruption reforms in authoritarian regimes are suspected as providing cover for regime efforts to enforce strict loyalty among elites

• e.g. Tiger and Flies in China: allows CCP to weaponize corruption charges and purge certain factions

politicians wanting to exploit their positions face a trade-off: more corruption -> more risky to oppose the regime

= gov strategy of enabling corruption + threatening investigation (with anti-corruption campaigns) to more efficiently control it

Question 33

(article) what are deputies doing to earn illicit income?/

Answer 33

1. side payments (from firms) in exchange for proposing legislation and amendments
2. siloviki (indiviuals connected to the security services) = dominate the private sector + exert sway on Duma members to ensure little gov oversight
3. sell deputy requests (now measures to publicize them, which Kompromat deputies don’t do)