REISS & SPRENGER, 2020: SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY Flashcards

1
Q

What is meant by the term scientific objectivity?

A

Scientific objectivity is that scientific claims, methods, results are not, or should not be, influenced by particular perspectives, value judgements, community bias, or personal interests.

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2
Q

Why objectivity good?

A

. It is often stated as a good reason for valuing scientific knowledge and is the basis of authority that science has on society.

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3
Q

How is the role of objectivity discussed within science

A

Understanding the role that objectivity plays in science is integral to fully understanding and appreciating debates in the philosophy of science. Mainly, objectivity is discussed in how desirable it is and whether or not it can be achieved.

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4
Q

Science gained is admiration from the general public because it is considered objective or at least more objective than other mode of inquiry. Has science attained that objectivity?

A

Though objectivity is heavily desired by science, several conceptions of the ideal of objectivity are either questionable or unattainable.

The philosophical reasoning behind the conception of objectivity is the view that there are facts in the world which the scientists are tasked with discovering, analysing and systematising. Thus, science is objective to the degree that it succeeds at discovering and generalising facts, excluding the perspective of the individual scientist.

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5
Q

What are meant by objective qualities?

A

Objective qualities are qualities that remain constant through changes of perspective e.g actual temperature vs subjective feelings of hot or cold

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6
Q

Nagel (1986) states that we arrive at the idea of objective qualities in three steps. Name these three steps

A
  1. Realize (or postulate) that our perceptions are caused by the actions of things around us, through their effects on our body.
  2. Realize (or postulate) that since the same qualities that cause perceptions in us also have effects on other things and can exist without causing any perceptions at all, their true nature must be detachable from their perspectival appearance and need not resemble.
  3. From a conception of that “true nature” independent of any perspective (i.e. the view from nowhere, absolute conception). This concept represented the world as it is and is unmediated by human minds or other “distortions”.
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7
Q

This absolute conception lies at the basis of scientific realism and it is attractive for a number of different reasons. Describe four of these

A
  1. Settling disagreements
    Provides a basis for judging between conflicting viewpoints.
  2. Explaining the world
    It provides a simple and unified account of the world. One of the goals is science is to provide explanations for natural phenomena, one way to realize this goal is by casting them in terms of absolute conception. The absolute conception explains how itself, and other perspectives of it, are possible. In other words, this conception explains reality itself (e.g. actual height of a tree) and how others perceive that reality differently (e.g. two different observations of the height of the tree).
  3. Predicting phenomena
    If the world is made up of structures characterized by absolute conception and we did have access to it, we could use our knowledge of it to ground predictions.
  4. Manipulation and control
    Similarly, our knowledge of these structure can be used find attempts to manipulate and control phenomena.
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8
Q

Is the concept of absolute conception necessary and sufficient for attaining the previous four purposes? What consequence does this have?

A

The absolute conception is sufficient in attaining the above four purposes, but not necessary. However, our ability to use science to represent facts about the world depend on whether these claims can explicitly be established on the basis of evidence. There are challenges in this idea that science can produce claims that describe an absolute conception.

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9
Q

Who (mentioned first) criticised how objectivity is viewed in science and what was the criticism based on?

A

Kuhn (1962) criticized how objectivity was viewed in science. His criticism was based on the assumption that scientists always view research problems through the lens of a paradigm, defined by a set of relevant problems, axioms, methodological presuppositions, etc

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10
Q

What did Kuhn stress about observations?

A

Kuhn stressed that observations are “theory-laden”, in other words, they depend on a body of theoretical assumptions through which they are perceived and conceptualized.

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11
Q

Kuhn’s hypothesis was made up of two important aspects. Describe these

A
  1. Meaning
    The meaning of observation concepts is influenced by theoretical assumptions and presuppositions. Kuhn denies that there is a theory-independent observation language. “Faithfulness to reality” of an observation report is always mediated by a theoretical superstructure, which disables the role of observation reports as an impartial, fact-dependent arbiter between different theories.
  2. Perception
    The perception of a scientist depends on the paradigm she is working in. Our own sense data are shaped and structure by a theoretical framework and could be completely different from the sense data other scientists work from. Thus, it is hard to assess which theory or paradigm is more objective
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12
Q

Furthermore, the thesis of theory-ladenness has been expanded to include what regarding different paradigms?

A

Furthermore, the thesis of theory-ladenness has been expanded to include the incommensurability of different paradigms or scientific theories. Incommensurability means having no measure in common and is used in arguments against a linear and standpoint-independent picture of scientific progress.

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13
Q

What is meant by Kuhn loss?

A

The phenomenon of Kuhn loss is when not all puzzles that can be solved in the old paradigm will be solved by the new one

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14
Q

How are theories tested in science?

A

Theories in science are tested by comparing their implications with the results of observations and experiments.

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15
Q

What is meant by the undetermination of theory by evidence?

A

The undertermination of theory by evidence is the idea that evidence may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it. Any body of empirical data is compatible with an infinite number of possible incompatible theories. Results, both positive and negative, do not allow for unambiguous inferences about the theory. A positive result can be obtained even though the theory is false due to some alternative theory that makes the same predictions. A negative result might also be obtained because one or more assumptions are needed to derive a prediction from the theory.

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16
Q

What claim did Duhem (1906) make on this topic?

A

Duhem (1906) concluded that there was no “crucial experiment”, an experiment that conclusively decides between two alternative theories was best, and that scientists had to use their expert judgement to determine what the results would mean for the truth or falsehood of a theory. In essence, there is currently a gap between the evidence and theory supported by it.

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17
Q

If Duhem’s theory is correct then the idea to remain faithful to facts is untenable, give three points to support this

A
  1. If the scientific image of the world is a product of facts and scientists’ value judgements, then that image cannot be without human perspective.
  2. The relation between evidence and scientific theories is problematic. Scientific theories contain abstract claims that describe states of affairs far removed from the immediacy of sense experience. Whether they faithfully represent the world or not is up to debate.
  3. Scientific theories are tested against experimental facts or phenomena which are also unobservable without to the unaided senses. Experimental facts or phenomena are instead established using intricate procedures of measurement and experimentation.
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18
Q

What is meant by experimenters regress?

A

Experimenter’s regress is a loop of dependence between theory and evidence. According to Collins, in order to judge whether evidence is incorrect scientists must rely on theory-based expectations (e.g to know whether the apparatus producing the result is reliable) and to judge the value of competing theories we rely on evidence.

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19
Q

How does Collins claim this cycle is broken?

A

He argues that this cycle is broken not by the “facts” themselves but by factors concerning scientists’ career, social and cognitive interests of his community, and expected fruitfulness for future work. Additionally this does not mean he thinks scientific results are arbitrary, he argues that experimental results do not represent absolute conceptions but that facts and phenomena of science are necessarily perspectival.

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20
Q

How did Franklin (1994) contribute to this debate on scientific objectivity?

A

Franklin (1994) has attempted to demonstrate that disagreements can be settled with reasoned judgement based on epistemological criteria (e.g. experimental checks and calibration). He does not address whether reasoned judgement would guarantee an absolute conception and would guarantee that experimental results are aperspectival.

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21
Q

How else may objectivity be defined? WHat implications does this have for science?

A

Objectivity can also be defined as the extent to which science is value-free. If science’s goal is to produce empirical knowledge, and if differences about value judgements can’t be settled through empirical means, then values should have no place in science.

22
Q

Name the four stages proposed at which values can affect science

A
  1. The choice of a scientific research problem.
  2. The gathering of evidence in relation to the problem.
  3. The acceptance of a scientific hypothesis or theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the basis of the evidence.
  4. The proliferation and application of scientific research results.
23
Q

To what extent do values play a role in each of these four stages?

A

Most philosophers of science agree that values play a role in dimensions 2 & 3. It is almost universally accepted that the choice of a research problem is often influenced by interests of individual scientists, funding parties, and society as a whole. Similarly, the proliferation and application of scientific research results is evidently affected by the personal values of journal editors and end users, and little can be done about this. The real debate is whether the core of scientific reasoning (dimensions 2 & 3) is, and should be, value-free.

for reference:

  1. The choice of a scientific research problem.
  2. The gathering of evidence in relation to the problem.
  3. The acceptance of a scientific hypothesis or theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the basis of the evidence.
  4. The proliferation and application of scientific research results.
24
Q

What relation do values have with the gap between theory and evidence? What problem arises with this?

A

While values could be considered a requirement for filling the gap between theory and evidence, values tend to conflict with each other. For example, a researcher often has to choose between using a simple function or a more accurate less simple function. Trading off these two cognitive values required a careful value judgement.

25
Q

Contrast cognitive and contextual values

A

Cognitive values (e.g. predictive accuracy, scope, unification, explanatory power, etc) are taken to be indicative of the truth of a theory and provide reasons for preferring one theory over another.

Contextual values are moral, personal, social, political, and cultural values

26
Q

Contrast the effects of cognitive and contextual values on the objectivity of science

A

Cognitive values are often seen as benign and Kuhn even claims that cognitive values define the standards of theory assessment that characterise the scientific approach as a whole. In the eyes of most philosophers of science, the objectivity of science is not threatened by these value but by non-cognitive or contextual values.

The intrusion of contextual values has previously led to an intolerant and oppressive scientific agenda with devastating epistemic and social consequences. More frequent cases are cases where research is biased towards the interests of those who sponsor the research.

27
Q

What bias is associated with contextual values?

A

Preference bias is the infringement of conventions standards of the research community with the aim of arriving at a particular results and is epistemically harmful

28
Q

What is meant by the VFI?

A

The core idea of the value-free ideal (VFI) is that scientists should strive to minimise the influence of contextual values on scientific reasoning (e.g. in gathering evidence and assessing scientific theories).

29
Q

According to the VFI, how is scientific objectivity characterised?

A

According to the VFI, scientific objectivity is characterised by the absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to cognitive values in states 2 & 3 of the scientific process.

30
Q

What is meant by VNT?

A

The value-neutrality thesis (VNT) expresses the claim that VFI is a reasonable ideal that is not beyond reach. It states that scientists can gather evidence and assess theories without making contextual value judgements.

31
Q

What does it mean to say that VNT is not normative?

A

The VNT is not normative, unlike the VFI, its subject is whether scientists could be free of contextual values not whether they should

32
Q

Lacey (1999) distinguishes three principal components or aspects of value-free science. Name these

A
  1. Impartiality
    Theories are solely accepted or appraised in virtue of their contribution to the cognitive values of science (e.g. truth, accuracy, or explanatory power).
  2. Neutrality
    Scientific theories make no value statements about the world, they are concerned with what there is not what should be.
  3. Autonomy
    The scientific agenda is shaped by the desire to increase scientific knowledge and that contextual values have no place in the scientific method.
33
Q

What implications are there with denying VNT or Lacey’s three criteria?

A

Denying the VNT or Lacey’s three criteria poses a challenge for scientific objectivity. It leads to either the conclusion that the ideal of objectivity should be rejected or to the development of a conception of objectivity that differs from VFI.

34
Q

According to Reichenbach (1938), what distinction should be made in regards to contextual values?

A

According to Reichenbach (1938), contextual values may contribute to the discovery of a theory but remain irrelevant in justifying the acceptance of a theory and assessing how evidence bears on a theory. This Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.

35
Q

What does the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification require and how well does this generalise across sciences?

A

This distinction require a clear-cut differentiation between cognitive value and contextual values. This may be plausible for sciences such as physics but there are many contextual values in the social sciences.

36
Q

What are the three major lines of criticisms on the possibility of value-free science?

A
  1. Traditional cognitive values are not purely one or the other
  2. Fact and value
  3. Acceptance & rejection of hypotheses
37
Q

How has it been argued that traditional cognitive values are not purely one or the other?

A

Longino (1996) argues that traditional cognitive values (e.g. consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness) are not purely cognitive or epistemic and their use takes from political and social values into context of scientific judgement. In short, the use of cognitive values in scientific judgement is not always politically neutral.

38
Q

What does Longino argue the use of traditional values can lead to?

A

She argues that the use of traditional values can lead to biases and adverse research results. This casts the distinction between cognitive and contextual values into doubt.

39
Q

What does the fact and value criticism on the possibility of value free science entail?

A

Fact and value are frequently entangled because of ethical concepts in science that mixed descriptive and normative content. Dupré argues that scientific hypotheses and results are relevant because they are relevant to human interests and will use thick ethical terms. If the use of such terms, where facts and values are inextricably entangled, is inevitable in scientific reasoning, it is impossible to describe hypotheses and results in a value-free manner, undermining the value-neutrality thesis.

40
Q

Where is the line of criticism in the possibility of value-free science in the acceptance & rejection of hypotheses?

A

Rudner (1953) entirely disputed the core of the VNT and the idea that scientific theory and its acceptance can be value-free. He believes that no method of science would be satisfactory if there was not assertion by the scientists that they reject or accept a hypothesis. When a hypothesis is accepted or rejected, there is always a chance that that decision is mistaken. Thus, the decision to accept or reject a hypothesis involved a value judgement because scientists must judge the consequences of an erroneous decision.

41
Q

Exemplify Rudner’s position in the context of medicine

A

The decision to accept or reject a hypothesis involves a value judgment (at least implicitly) because scientists have to judge which of the consequences of an erroneous decision they deem more palatable: (1) some individuals die of the side effects of a drug erroneously judged to be safe; or (2) other individuals die of a condition because they did not have access to a treatment that was erroneously judged to be unsafe.

42
Q

What two major lines of rebuttal have been made to Rudner’s research?

A

Rudner’s objections do not necessarily hold true for fundamental research. Jeffrey (1956) notes that lawlike hypotheses in theoretical sciences (e.g. gravitational law) are characterised by their general scope and do not have a particular application. Because of its broadness, a scientists can’t fine-turn their decision for possible consequences.

Levi (1960) further adds that scientists have community standards that eliminate room for contextual ethical judgement on whether a hypothesis should be accepted or rejected (e.g. Cronbach’s alpha).

43
Q

What do these two rebuttals to Rudner’s objections have in common and why is this relevant?

A

Both of these arguments focus on the impact values have on theory choice. However, as Douglas (2000) points out, the acceptance of theories is just one of the several place in which values can enter scientific reasoning. Many decisions in the process of scientific inquiry may conceal implicit value judgements such as in methodological decision that could not be made without consideration of possible consequences. The entire process of conceptualisation is so entangled with contextual values that no neat division can be made.

44
Q

What does Kitcher (2011) argue regarding the process of scientific investigation?

A

Kitcher (2011) argues that the process of scientific investigation can’t be neatly divided into stages. Each stage is repeated and at each stage the researcher must use contextual values to decide whether previous results warrant the pursuit of the current line of research. Additionally, there are simply too many truths that are of no interest whatsoever, science aims at truths worth pursuing from the point of view of our cognitive, practical, and social goals. Thus, it is value judgements that help us decide whether or not a given truth is significant.

45
Q

In conclusion, why can’t science be value free?

A

In conclusion, science can’t be value-free because there are no scientists that can work exclusively in the value-free zone of assessing and accepting hypothesis. Cognitive and contextual values guide methodological choices and are themselves influenced by their results.

46
Q

The argument on VFI and VNT does not only lie on whether it is possible. What else does it concern?

A

The argument on VFI and VNT does not only lie on whether it is possible, but also whether a value-free science is desirable. While the VFI can be applied to science as a whole, where science and public policy meet is where the intrusion of values is most prominent.

47
Q

There are several philosophers who criticize the desirability of VFI and the conceptual (un)clarity of VFI. What are their two main criticisms?

A
  • VFI is not desirable at all
  • The autonomy of science often fails in practice due to the presence of external stakeholders, such as funding agencies and industry lobbies.
48
Q

How is it argued that VFI isn’t desirable?

A

Feminist philosophers have argued that science often carries a heavy androcentric values, for instance in biological theories about sex, gender and rape. The charge against these values is not so much that they are contextual rather than cognitive, but that they are unjustified. Moreover, if scientists did follow the VFI rigidly, policy-makers would pay even less attention to them, with a detrimental effect on the decisions they take

49
Q

What does Douglas (2009) propose in order to save the epistemic authority of science in regards to the criticism of autonomy?

A

He proposes to detach it from its autonomy by reformulating the VFI and distinguishing between direct and indirect roles of values in science. Contextual values may legitimately affect the assessment of evidence by indicating the appropriate standard of evidence, the representation of complex processes, the severity of consequences of a decision, the interpretation of noisy datasets, and so on (e.g in climate sciences).

Values should, however, not be “reasons in themselves”, that is, evidence or defeaters for evidence (direct role, illegitimate) and as “helping to decide what should count as a sufficient reason for a choice” (indirect role, legitimate).

50
Q

What name is given to Douglas’ viewpoint on objectivity in science?

A

This prohibition for values to replace or dismiss scientific evidence is called detached objectivity by Douglas, but it is complemented by various other aspects that relate to a reflective balancing of various perspectives and the procedural, social aspects of science.

51
Q

What criticisms have been made to Douglas’ approach?

A

Douglas’ proposal is not very concrete when it comes to implementation, e.g., regarding the way diverse values should be balanced. Compromising in the middle cannot be the solution. First, no standpoint is, just in virtue of being in the middle, evidentially supported vis-à-vis more extreme positions. Second, these middle positions are also, from a practical point of view, the least functional when it comes to advising policy-makers.

Moreover, the distinction between direct and indirect roles of values in science may not be sufficiently clear-cut to police the legitimate use of values in science, and to draw the necessary borderlines.