Michell (2008): Is Psychometrics a pathological science? Flashcards
When is a cognitive system (A person or social movement (such as science) engaged in cognitive enterprises) pathological?
A cognitive system is pathological when it prevents rather than promotes acquisition of relevant knowledge. e.g prejudice
In the case of individual people, why may their thinking become pathological?
In the case of individual people, the causes are complex, but it may come about because, as Freud (1957) suggested, we are motivated by
diverse and conflicting interests, and sometimes our need to believe something in the absence of relevant evidence exceeds our commitment to finding the truth.
How may sicience, as a social movement become pathological?
As a social movement, science is complex and its character has changed considerably, as it has become increasingly important to other social endeavors, particularly industrial and government organizations, and has become increasingly dependent on them for support. As a result, conflicting social interests motivate science and there is potential for pathologies to arise. There are many famous cases, such as the domination of Soviet genetics by the politically motivated theories of Lysenko (Soyfer, 1994).
What is the prejudice described in psychometrics?
In psychometrics, the prejudice involved is the conviction that psychological attributes—such as cognitive abilities, personality traits, and social attitudes—are quantitative.
The literature reveals a body of theories, methods, and applications premised upon the proposition that psychological attributes are quantitative but is devoid of serious attempts to consider relevant evidence for that premise.
What may prevent psychometricians from from raising the issue of the quantitative structure of psychological attributes? (2)
Within psychometrics, certain established ideological structures have the effect of discouraging psychometricians from raising the issue of the quantitative structure of psychological attributes.
Hölder’s (1901) paper on the axioms of quantity and the theory of measurement provided a clear characterisation of quantitative structure and its relation to the real number system, which is
the conceptual foundation of measurement. This paper and the discipline it spawned, measurement theory, are excluded from consideration in mainstream psychometrics and are missing from the curriculum of psychometrics as typically taught. This denies psychometricians the conceptual resources necessary for raising the issue of whether psychological attributes are
quantitative.
This exclusion was compounded when psychometricians accepted a definition
of measurement implying that their procedures achieve measurement without needing to investigate the issue of whether psychological attributes are quantitative. This was Stevens’s famous definition of measurement as “the assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rules”
Why may Stevens have utilised this definition?
The issue of whether sensation intensities differ quantitatively had long been raised and Stevens’s own scale, the so-called sone scale, putatively for the measurement of loudness, had recently been criticised on just these grounds in a report on
psychophysical measurement for the British Association for the Advancement of Science. This meant that Stevens had an interest in deflecting attention from the issue of whether psychological attributes are quantitative.
How are psychometricians being contradictory by using Stevens definition?
In accepting Stevens’s definition, psychometricians were being inconsistent because this definition is incompatible with the traditional concept of measurement. Claiming that a psychological attribute, such as general ability, is related to test scores in the manner supposed in, say, factor analytic theories of ability presumes that general ability is quantitative in structure and quantitative structure entails the traditional view of measurement, that it is the assessment of quantity. The concept of a quantitative attribute and the traditional view of measurement are
part of the same conceptual package
What did psychometricians endorse as a substitute?
As a substitute, psychometricians endorsed Stevens’s (1946, 1951) theory of scales of measurement (nominal to ratio)
What interpretation of Steven’s theory makes the most sense according to Michell?
Efforts to determine scale type would seem necessary to require addressing the issue of whether the relevant attribute is quantitative. Stevens’s theory makes most sense when interpreted like this.
How, instead, did psychometricians interpret steven’s definition?
Because linear transformations are routinely applied to test scores, it was argued that test scores must sustain measurement on an interval scale. A more coherent interpretation of Stevens’s theory says that the class of admissible scale transformations is determined by the structure of the attribute to which numerical assignments are made. Turning this on its head, in the way that psychometricians did, meant that the hypothesis that psychological attributes are quantitative need never be raised.
