Radical materialism Flashcards
Talk about semantic physicalism:
- we only need physical language to describe mental states (behavioral dispositions) and we won’t lose any meaning. and if we do reverse this a category mistake.
- dualism is conceptual confusion
- doesn’t deny first-person privilege but says its vague and by using BDs we will have access to it.
The 2 basic concepts of physicalism:
- Causal Closure
• Explanations for physical events have to refer to
other physical events, not to events related to
angels, UFOs, or miracles - Physical Determination:
• Positive Facts determined by physical facts
• No change of positive facts without change of
physical facts
radical physicalism with it’s two domains (semantic P and eliminativeM) has 2 main features
- Consciousness „nothing but“ physical process
- Only physical processes scientifically relevant
- Consciousness not a subject in its own right
Consequences of eliminative materialism
- Elimination of Folk-psychology
* Elimination of mental states
objections to eliminative materialism
The immediate experiential access to MS – not a postulate
• Emergence of folk-psychology unclear
• How to learn about our neural processes?
• Proponent of Eliminative Materialism must believe in own theory, but theory denies belief-states.
• Even if neurobiology will turn out to be more successful, this does not mean that Folk-psychology will be eliminated.
Achievements and problems of sematic physicalism:
Achievements
• No confusion with respect to mental predicates
• Mind-Body problem “dissolved” – the only problem
with respect to behavioral dispositions
• Mentalistic questions solvable with the behaviorist
methods
Problems
1. Questions regarding intelligent behavior can
refer to mental causes (how can you explain fear without referring to another mental state)?
• Category-mistake (these are changes in meaning due to context change) unclear – the distinction between the permissible and flawed change of contexts unclear (metaphors are change of context but permissible)
- Dispositional analyses
• We “mean” mental experiences (pain)
• Mentalistic expressions cannot be captured in dispositional analyses only
“I think that it’s raining outside” - Semantic physicalism
• Not a plausible interpretation of empirical results (also EM).