Public Officer Cases

Question 1

1. w/n an ad interim appointments a permanent appointment
2. w/n renewal of ad interim appointments of COMELEC Chairman violate the contitutional prohibition on reappointments under Art IX of the Constitution.

Answer 1

Angelina Matibag vs Benipayo 2002

Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as Chairman of Comelec violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.

RULING

1, Yes. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.

2. No. As rule, An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be reapppointed.

As an exception, A President can renew a bypassed appointee whose appointment has not been acted upon by the Commission on Appointments, as in this case.

Note: The same ad interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. (less than 7 years)

Question 2

1. Is CES eligibility the only requisite to acquire security of tenure?
2. Is an appointment of Heneral without ces eligibility is valid?

Answer 2

Heneral vs roco 2001

FACTS:

petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by respondent.

RULING:

1. No. CES Board Rules provide 2 requisites for security of tenure: a) CES eligibility; and b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.

Security of tenure of employees in the career executive service pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position.Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another.

2. Yes.

Under Integrated Reorganization Plan –

“…the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination

Question 3

whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in Art VII on the President’s Appointing Power.

Answer 3

CALDERON v. BARTOLOME CARALE

Facts:

This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

RULING:

No. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president

The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically “those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint”, thus requires no confirmation.

Question 4

A law that provides “ the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials

Is the law valid?

Answer 4

Roberto Flores v. Franklin Drilon, Richard Gordon

Facts:

By virtue of Bases Conversion and Development Act (BCDA), Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA),

Ruling:

No.

When Congress clothes the President with the (discretionary) power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.

Question 5

Does respondent Villarosa, as local chief executive, have the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and the Office of the Vice-Governor?

Answer 5

Attienza v Villarosa

Facts:

The petitioner Vice-Governor reiterated his request for the respondent to make a “deeper study” on the matter before implementing his memoranda. The request, however, went unheeded as the respondent Governor insisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial government to comply with the memoranda.

RULING:

No.

The LGC provides that while the Governor has the authority to appoint employees whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor.

NOTE:

However, in this case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job order employees, whose appointments were terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said memorandum cannot be upheld because it absolutely prohibited the respondent Vice-Governor from exercising his authority to appoint the employees.

[Atty G’s NOTE: Sec. 77 of 7160: The local chief executive may employ casual employees or job orders (not exceeding 6 months) for local projects authorized by the Sangunnian, without need of approval by the Civil Service Commission.]

Question 6

Will the disapproval of the comelec invalidate the appointment despite the filing of motion for reconsideration?

Will the withdrawal of the certification of sufficiency of funds void Marco’s appointment?

Is Marco’s appointment void on the ground that he was a midnight appointee?

Answer 6

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA v. HILARIO M. MARCO

Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative Development Specialist II five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province. Newly elected Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo assumed office. Provincial Budget Officer Clemente manifested that the Province had no funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong’s appointees.The Province advised Marco to refrain from reporting for work. Marco wrote the CSC, moving for the reconsideration of the disapproval of his appointment. CSC ruled in favor of Marco. Province filed for Rule 43 in the CA and for the first time, argued that Marco was a midnight appointee since Governor Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her tenure. Therefore, Marco’s appointment was void.

RULING:

1. No. Under Civil Service Rules, an appointment takes effect immediately upon issuance by the appointing authority.

If the appointment is disapproved, it still remains effective provided that a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.

Although his appointment was initially disapproved by the Field Office, Marco seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission.

2. No. Marco’s appointment was accompanied by a certification of funds from the Province as required by Civil Service Rules.

The subsequent withdrawal of such funds does not invalidate the appointment.

3. No. The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments not to appointments made by local chief executives as there is no law that prohibits local elective officials to appoint midnight employees.

Question 7

The CSC have authority to disapprove/recall mass appointments as the proscription against midnight appointments applies to president appointees.

Is the contention correct?

Answer 7

Leah Nazareno vs City of Dumaguete

Facts: Outgoing Mayor Remollo issued the 89 appointments. CSC invalidated the appointments as the same were done in violation of CSC Rules which prohibits mass appointments.

RULING:

Yes. The law authorizes the CSC, as the Central Personnel Agency, to “prescribe, amend, and enforce” rules to cover the civil service.

As such, CSC Rules provides that it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the

1. regular screening process,
2. that the appointee is qualified
3. the appointments are not in bulk.

Otherwise, the CSC may disapprove such appointments.

Question 8

Has Congress re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position?

Does Gonzales have security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte?

Answer 8

HE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., vs.BEATRIZ O. GONZALES,

FACTS: Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte on 1991.

• (RA 9160 took effect on January 1, 1992)*
• In 2000,* The CSC found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months. She was eventually terminated her services for lack of confidence citing Civil Services Rules which provide that a provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature.

RULING:

1. Yes. The LGC made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential.
2. No. Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause.

As a provincial administrator is now confidential employee, the loss of trust and confidence in Gonzales is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the termination of a confidential employee.

Question 9

Does Monsod have the qualification of “engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years” for him to be appointed as Chairman of Comelec?

Can the SC reverse the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?

Answer 9

Cayetano v Monsod

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC which was confirmed by Commission on Appointments. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RULING:

1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
2. No. The rule is that the Court shall only interfere with the Commission Appointments judgment if there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Question 10

w/n a lawyer employed in register of deeds can open a notary after written consent from his superior (the register of deeds)

Answer 10

Abella vs Cruzabra

FACTS: Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent (lawyer) notarized 3000 documents without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent stated that she was authorized by her superior, the Register of Deeds, to act as a notary public.

RULING:

No. Civil Services Rules provide that No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession without a written permission from the head of Department.

The head of Register of Deeds is the Secretary of Justice, not the Register of Deeds.

(NOTE: LRA, is an agency of the Philippine government under the Department of Justice)

Question 11

Is a punong barangay prohibited to practice law?

Answer 11

WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA

FACTS:

complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

RULING:

No. Under the LGC, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession while sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice even without written consent.

Since a punong barangay is not mentioned, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession because they are not mandated to serve full time.

However, they are still required to procuree prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department (Secretary of Interior and Local Government), as required by civil service rules.

Question 12

1. Whether an impeachable officer can be ousted through a actoon for Quo Warranto
2. Whether the petition can be dismissed on the ground of prescription;
3. Whether sereno is eligible for Chief Justice:

Answer 12

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner
vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

FACTS:

Initially, Atty. Larry Gadon filed an impeachment complaint. During the hearings, it was revealed that Sereno failed to file her SALNs while she teaching in the U.P. College of Law. As such, (the recently suspended) Atty. Eligio Mallari, President of Vanguard of the Philippine Constitution, requested that the OSG to initiate quo warranto proceedings.

RULING:

1. Under Estrada and the PET Rules, impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions.

Under Estrada, where the Court took cognizance of an action for quo warranto against the President, it was held that the authority to hear quo warranto petitions assailing the qualifications of the President and Vice-President is simply a component of the Court’s quo warranto jurisdiction.

Citing Bernabe, the Court held that Qualification should precede authority.

There is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immune from quo warranto proceedings.

2. Under Rule 66, petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

The Court ruled that prescription period under Rule 66 is limited to private individuals (complainants).

As an exception, an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at its own instance. (as in the instant case)

3. Her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was a UP College of Law Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in 2010 as Associate Justice of this Court constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution.
   * [MY CONCURRING OPINION: Absent a constitutional proscription against the application of quo warranto petitions to impeachable officers and flowing from the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure, it likewise has the implied authority to fill the details of the Constitution in so far as it involves matters of procedure as in the case of Quo warranto.]*

Question 13

whether prior approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was required before Gov. Garcia could have validly entered into the questioned contracts

Answer 13

HON. GABRIEL LUIS QUISUMBING et al (Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu)
vs.
HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA (In her capacity as Governor of the Province of Cebu)

Facts:

COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu which found Several contracts in the total amount of 102 Million Pesos were not authorized by Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160.

RULING:

Under the LGC, before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required.

As an exception, in case of a reenacted budget, contracts not included in the previous year’s budget can be disbursed without prior approval from Sangguiniang.

Here, the Province of Cebu operated under a reenacted budget. The case was remanded (presumably to determine w/n the subject contracts are included in the previous years budget)

Question 14

1. w/n Petitioners have locus standi for an action of Quo warranto
2. w/n the President committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing the qualified nominees not in accordance with the clustering in the JBC list.

Answer 14

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, et al., and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO II

FACTS: Petitioners who were not chosen in the list of nominees for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.

RULING:

1. No. Under Rule 66, an action for Quo warranto is commenced by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor.

As an exception, a private individual may commence such action only if he claims entitlement to a public office.

Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., did not have a clear right to said position, and therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding.

Being included in the list of nominees had merely given them the possibility, but not the certainty of appointment.

2. No. Under the Constitution, the President is required to appoint from a list submitted by the JBC of at least three nominees for every vacancy.

President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees as he merely maintained the well-established practice to appoint the qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.

Question 15

w/n the CA can issue WPI despite the Ombudsman Act which provided No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman.

w/n the condonation doctrine can serve as basis for the WPI

Answer 15

Conchita Carpio Morales X Junjun Binay Love Team

Facts:
A complaint/affidavit accused Binay, Jr. with the commission of Plunder and a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the five phases of procurement and construction of the Parking Building. Consequently, the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and issued a preventive suspension order against him after which he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for: (1) The nullification of the preventive suspension order; and (2) A TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.

According to Binay, he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five phases of the construction of the Makati Parking Building since Phases I and II were completed before he was elected Mayor of Makati. Citing the condonation doctrine, he argued that his landslide re-election for a second term condoned any administrative liability from his previous term, i.e., that he could no longer be removed from his position on those grounds.

1st Paragraph: prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation

2nd Paragraph: No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

RULING:

1. Yes.

The first paragraph encroached constitutional rule waking authority of the SC.

Under the Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs comes from its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

The second paragraph increased the appellate jurisdiciton of the SC without its consent.

Fabian should squarely apply since the assailed provision cover the same subject matter which is the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Under Fabian, Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 increased the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence and is also inconsistent with Rules of Court.

a petition for review shall only apply to judgments of the CA, the SB, CTA, RTC, or other courts authorized by law.

Appeals from decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule 43.

2. No. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was simply no legal obstacle for the application of the condonation doctrine. However, with the advent of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the primacy of the integrity of public service was cemented. As such, the SC held that the condonation doctrine is “bereft of legal bases.”

The condonation doctrine applies prospectively from April 12, 2016 which is date when the decision of Court abandonment of such doctrine became final in Carpio Morales v CA.

It means if you are re elected before said date, you can still avail of the condonation doctrine

Question 16

Cordero questioned the jurisdiction of the Board of Norsing arguing the Formal Charge has

• no complainant,
• was not filed in the proper office in the PRC
• was not under oath
• has no basis for the finding of a prima facie case against him as it was not accompanied by affidavits of witnesses.
• Cordero also argued that the Board is acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time.

Rule on his Arguments

Answer 16

Cordero v Board of Nursing 2016

Re: Controversial June 2006 Nursing Licensure Exams leakage. INRESS Review Center headed by petitioner George C. Cordero (Cordero) held a final coaching review session at a cinema in SM Manila. The power point presentation showed test questions prepared by the Examiners.

RULING:

Under PRC Rules,The Board is not precluded from filing a case motu proprio. As such, there is no more need to wait for a complainant.

There is also no need to file the same at the offices mentioned in the PRC Rules as technical rules of procedure are liberally applied in administrative proceedings.

There is also No need for it to be under oath since the Board itself initiated the charge and its Chairperson signed under her oath of office.

Even the failure to furnish to furnish Cordero affidavits of witnesses is not fatal to the administrative case as he is entitled only to the administrative decision.

Cordero’s argument that the Board is acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time is also baseless. The Board decides motu proprio cases based on the presence or absence of evidence and the prosecution of the case is left to the special prosecutors.

Question 17

whether or not the Civil Service Commission has disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court personnel.

Answer 17

Respondent Herminigildo L. Andal, a Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan, passed the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test. Upon comparison of the pictures in the Seat Plan and the ID of respondent, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features. On the alleged “impersonation” of respondent the CSC charged respondent with dishonesty.

Ruling:

No. Under the Constitution, The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. In case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint to the Supreme Court.

Question 18

whether the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.

Answer 18

FACTS: Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with the position of PO1 with temporary status. He passed both the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) he was subsequently conferred permanent status. The CSC conducted an investigation because of irregularities regarding Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. Petitioner avers that the CSC does not have the authority to conduct an initiatory investigation of the case, but it only has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the Head of the PNP.

RULING:

Yes. While it is true that Under Sec.47 of the Civil Service Law, the heads of government offices have original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own subordinates, it must be remembered that, this pertains to instances in connection with their duties and functions of the office. Here, since the acts complained of arose from cheating in the Civil Service Exam, the CSC can conduct the preliminary investigation under Sec. 12 of the same law in accordance of its duty to protect the civil service.

Question 19

w/n not the chief executive has authority to dismiss an officer of the Sangganuian.

Answer 19

ARCE, Ramir CSC Resolution N0. 000952 (2000)

RULING:

While according to jurispurdence, Mayor Lavin does not have disciplinary authority over Arce, the Secretary to the Sanggunian, however, since Arce voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Local Chief Executive all throughout the proceedings and never questioned or challenged his authority, Mayor Lavin has acquired jurisdiction.

Question 20

1. Who is the disciplining authority of elective officials? Is the Office of the President the Disciplining Authority of the Governor?
2. Is hearing necessary before an elective official can be preventively suspended?

Answer 20

Joson v Torres 1998

RULING:

1. Yes. Under the LGC, An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office as follows:

provincial or city official -Office of the President.

municipal official - Sangguniang Panlalawigan

barangay official - Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.

Petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.

2. Yes. Under the LGC, position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected.

right to cross examine, akin to criminal case

Question 21

whether suspensions ranging from twelve months to twenty months or for the entire duration of their unexpired term(7 months), violated the LGC provision on the 6 month suspension rule.

Answer 21

Salalima v Guingona 1996

Under Section 66 of the LGC, The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense.

Here, although the aggregate penalty of suspension exceeded six months and exceeded the unexpired portion of the petitioners’ term of office, the fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners.

we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60

Question 22

1. w/n the administrative case became moot because of respondent’s retirement
2. w/n the act of respondent constitutes grave misconduct punishable by fine equivalent to 1 year salary

Answer 22

Largo v CA 2007

Facts:

Petitioner and Olandesca attended a birthday party where petitioner was humiliated by Olandesca. Petitioner went to the quarters of Olandesca shouting invectives, threatening to kill Olandesca, fired 2 shots in the dirty kitchen. Thenafter, petitioner retired. The NPC ordered in lieau of suspension, deduction of an amount equivalent to one year suspension without pay, from his retirement benefits.

RULING:

1. No. Settled is the rule that cessation from office by reason of resignation, death, or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case filed against a public officer while he was still in the service.
2. To constitute misconduct, the act must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties. Nevertheless, the complained acts of petitioner constitute the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under CSC rules, which need not be related or connected to the public officer’s official functions. In lieu of suspension, the penalty of f_ine equivalent to his salary for a period of six (6) months may be imposed in accordance with the Administrative Code_.

Question 23

w/n the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work negates her claim of constructive dismissal as the reassignment was mmediately executory

Answer 23

Republic v Pacheo 2012

The BIR ordered the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from QC to San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis.

Pacheo questioned the reassignment as amounting to a constructive dismissal and refused to report for work.

RULING:

No. Under the Administrative Code, a detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, an order to detail is immediately executory pending appeal, whereas a reassignment order is not.

The movement of Pacheo within the same agency is undeniably a reassignment. Clearly, Pacheo does not have the duty to first report to the new place of assignment before appeal to the CSC.

Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, she is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries limited only to a maximum period of 5 years.

BIR is authorized to reassign employees as the exigencies of service may require. However, this should be excercised in accordance with civil service rules.

Question 24

w/n Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who had already resigned.

Answer 24

Ombudsman vs Andutan Jr. 2011

FACTS:

Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF. On September 1, 1999, Andutan,was criminally charged and likewise administratively charged.The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.

RULING:

The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.

The rule that resignation is not a bar to administrative action applies if the respondent resigned, either:

• to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or
• to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.

Andutan’s force resignation more than a year before the administrative case was filed against him negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.

Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases.

Answer 25

Delima vs Judge Guerrero 2017

Question 26

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Answer 26

Pablico vs Villaplando 2002

FACTS: The SB of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the SP an administrative complaint against respondent Mayor Villapando alleging that respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. The SP found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. Respondent appealed to the OP which affirmed the decision of the SP. Pending respondent’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor.

RULING:

No. Section 60 of the LGC clearly provides that the penalty of dismissal upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.

Question 27

IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?

Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom?

Answer 27

CSC v Henry Sojor 2002

1.No. Under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, All members of the civil service, whether Career or Non-Career are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law.

Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

2. a school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom. The administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules..

Question 28

w/n PCG are covered by Civil Service Rules on Removal of Officers

Answer 28

Caballero v PCG 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Captain Ernesto S. Caballero, a Commander of the PCG, became the subject of a sexual harassment complaint filed by Dr. Jennifer Liwanag. Philippine Coast Guard Efficiency and Separation Board (PCG-ESB) ruled that he abused his authority and moral ascendancy over a female Civilian Employee.

petitioner argued that the PCG-ESB has no jurisdiction as disciplinary measures against PCG personnel should be governed by civil service rules.

RULING:

No. Although the PCG is civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the ESB as they are not covered by Civil Service Rules. This is because like the PNP, the PCG are not similarly situated with ordinary civil service employees. It has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism different from those of other government employees.