Admin Cases Flashcards
w/n the President have authority to abolish an office of the executive branch
MEWAP vs Executive Secretary 2007
- E.O. No. 102 issued by Estrada directed the reorganization of the DOH
- Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP). sought to nullify EO 102
RULING:
Yes.The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health by virtue of his Power of Control Under Art VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution and his residual powers under the Administrative Code.
The authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch may include the authority to abolish.
- w/n the President is authorized abolish PAGC and transfer its functions to IAD-ODESLA
- w/n the IAD-ODESLA encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman
Pichay vs Executive Secretary 2012
FACTS:
- President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
- Respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay
- Pichay sought to nullify E.O. 13, arguing that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create an office.
Ruling:
- The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under the Administrative Code.
The President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President and his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper must be distinguished.
In the Office of the President Proper, such power includes abolishing, merging units, or transferring functions.
In contrast, offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions.
Since both PAGC and ODESLA belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable.
- The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach the Ombudsman as the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases.
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
- w/n the President can create ad hoc commitees
- w/n EO 1 establishing the Truth Commission is violative of equal protection clause
Biraogo vs PTC 2010
FACTS:
- At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy, signed EO 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
- Petitioners sought to nullify EO 1.
RULING:
- Yes. Under the Constitution, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials faithfully comply with the law. One of the recognized powers of the President pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
- Yes. Executive Order No. 1 is violative of the equal protection clause as the Truth Commission limits its investigation of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness.
Interesting Note:
the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
The SC said that although EO 13 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future.
Such expansion will still depend on the discretion the President and can opt to not to include other investigations.
w/n the CA has jurisdiction over termination of government employees due to reorganization
Cabungcal vs Lorenzo 2009
FACTS:
- The SB of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued Resolution declaring the reorganization of ALL offices of the municipal government.
- Respondent Municipal Mayor issued a memorandum informing all employees that all positions were deemed vacant and must file their applications for the newly created positions. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.
- Petitioner Employees filed with the CA seeking to nullify the Memorandum
RULING:
No. CSC has primary jurisdiction as it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to civil service.
The case does not fall under the exceptions to rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petition is premature.
w/n the ombudsman have discretionary authority to conduct investigation of any administrative act beyond the prescriptive period of 1 year
Ombudsman vs Raidis Bassig 2008
FACTS:
- Respondent Raidis J. Bassig, Chief of the Research and Publications of Intramuros Administration recommended that Brand Asia be commissioned to produce a video documentary for Intramuros.
- It was found out that the contracts were entered into without the required public bidding.
- An anonymous complaint was filed with the Ombudsman.
- The CA held that respondents may no longer be prosecuted since the complaint was filed more than 7 years after the cause of action
RULING:
Yes. Under the Ombudsman Act, The Ombudsman may not conduct investigation of any administrative act if the complaint was filed after one year from the cause of action.
The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
w/n Philippine Gamefowl Commission have authority to order the municipality to issue or cancel mayor’s permit to operate a cockpit
Phil Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 1986
Facts:
- Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit license and the cancellation of his competitor Sevilla.
- The Philippine Gamefowl Commission ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan “to issue the necessary mayor’s permit in favor of Hee Acusar” and “to cancel and/or revoke the mayor’s permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla.
RULING:
No. Under PGC Rules, the authority of the Mayor to license and regulate cockpits is subject to review and supervision of the Commission.
Supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties.
Control connotes “the power of the officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. “
Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction.
As the Commission merely has the power of supervision not of control, the choice of the municipal authorities (of whom to grant a license to operate a cockpit) should be respected.
- w/n the reckoning period for the redemption of a real property should be from the date of sale or from date of declaration of forfeiture
- w/n the government liable for the City Treasurer’s belated issuance of the disputed Declarations of Forfeiture
Davao vs Dalisay 2015
Facts:
- The properties of Repondents Estate was scheduled for public auction on July 19, 2004.
- No bidders appeared, thus, the properties were forfeited by the Petitioner City of Davao.
- On September 13, 2005, or more than a year after the public auction, the Declarations of Forfeiture were issued by the City Treasurer.
- On September 13, 2006, the Estate delivered a written tender of payment which the City refused to accept.
Ruling:
- The LGC now mandates that the right to redeem the property is within one (1) year from the date of sale
In this case, the period to redeem had long expired on July 19, 2005.
- The Government is not estopped by the mistakes of its agents.
- w/n there is violation of of the right to speedy disposition of cases as the case
- w/n coco levy funds are for public purpose, thus cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks
- w/n PD 755 involve a valid delegation of legistlative power to distribuate coco levy funds to the farmers
CocoFed vs Republic 2012
FACTS:
- The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by the PCGG of shares of stock of UCPB allegedly owned by over a million coconut farmers and 6 Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) corporations for alleged misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out the majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation (SMC).
- COCOFED seek the reversal of the judgments
RULING:
- Under the Tello Doctrine, the right to speedy disposition of cases is waived unless seasonably invoked:
Since there was no motion to dismiss on the ground of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, petitioners are deemed to have waived such right.
- The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose since they were collected to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. As such, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
- P.D. No. 755 involves an invalid delegation of legislative power as it did not provide for any guideline by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers.
w/n the Executive Secretary acting in behalf of the president can remove officers who are not presidential appointees
Angco v Castillo 1963
FACTS:
- Collector Ang-Angco unlawfully authorized the release of the Pepsi Cola concentrates.
- Commissioner of Customs filed an administrative complaint against him.
- Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, found Ang-Angco “guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service”
RULING:
No. The President can remove a presidential employee under the principle, the power to appoint includes the power to remove. This does not extend to those officers whose appointments are not vested in him, such as those in Career Service.
w/n CHR is a quasi-judicial agency?
Carino vs commission 1991
FACTS:
- 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents undertook “mass concerted actions”
- The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, the CHR merely have the power to “investigate,”. The fundamental law did not meant it to be another court or quasi-judicial agency.
- whether or not RA 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power because it does not provide a standard
- w/n the EO is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.
- w/n RA 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
Senator Tatad v. Sec of DOE 1997
FACTS:
- Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.”
- Petitioners seek to nullify RA 8180 arguing that it is an undue delagation of legislative power and violative of the prohibition of monopolies
- They also seek to annul EO 372 arguing that it is arbirary and unreasonable because it was enacted for a reason not mentioned in RA 8180
RULING:
- No. Under the Completeness Test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority.
The law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
- Yes. RA 8180 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be considered before ordering full deregulation. Hence, the enactment of the EO is arbitrary and unreasonable.
- Yes. The 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to enter the market.
whether Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level is invalid and ineffective as it was not published by the Department of Education;
Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education, 784 SCRA 505 (2016)
FACTS:
- Petitioner seeks to nullify the Department Order oF DepEd as it undermines the independence of PTAs and PTCAs
RULING:
No. Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power.
Under the Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules is the filing of 3 certified copies with the UP Law Center.
w/n Article 82 of E.O. 226 (appeal directly to SC) cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 (appeal to CA) because the former grants a substantive right.
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, Mariwasa Manufacturing, 237 SCRA 519 (1994)
Facts:
- Petitioner argues that Circular 1-91, cannot be the basis of Mariwasa’s appeal to respondent CA as E.O. 226 provides that appeals from decisions of the BOI shall be filed directly to the SC.
Ruling:
No. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
While the right to appeal under E.O. 226 is a substantive right and remains to be respected, the procedural aspect may be modified by the Court by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 merely transferred the venue and provided a different period of appeal.
w/n Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 can validly authorize an appeal to Supreme Court without its advise and concurrence?
Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742 (1998)
- Teresita G. Fabian, president of PROMAT Construction. Nestor V. Agustin, the incumbent District Engineer engaged into an amorous relationship.
- When petitioner wanted to break up, private respondent refused, employing acts of harassment
- She eventually filed an administrative case but the Ombudsman exonerated private respondent.
- She appelaed directly to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45.
RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to Supreme Court as it violates the Constitutional prohibition against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advise and concurrence.
Under the Rules of Court, appeals from decisions of Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
w/n a WPI can be issued on the basis of condonation doctrine?
Omb. Morales v. CA, Binay et al, GR. 85815 (Nov. 10, 2015)
Facts:
- A complaint was filed against Binay, Jr. for Plunder and Corruption in connection with the construction of the Parking Building.
- Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against him
- Binay sought to nullify the preventive suspension order in the CA arguing that since the initial construction of the Parking Building occured during his previous term and under the condonation doctrine, his landslide re-election for a second term condoned any administrative liability from his previous term.
RULING:
No. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no legal obstacle for the application of the condonation doctrine However, with the advent of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the integrity of public service was cemented. Hence, the SC held that the condonation doctrine is “bereft of legal bases.”
w/n the RTC has jurisdiction to review by certiorari a resolution of the PRC
Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
Facts:
- Respondent PRC issued Resolution No. 105 which provides that: No examinee shall attend any review class 3 days immediately proceeding every examination day
- Petitioner reviewees sought to nullify the Resolution.
- Respondent PRC argues that RTC cannot interfere with PRC as a co-equal body.
RULING:
Yes. The Court is duty bound to take cognizance of cases if a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action.
The RTC has jurisdiction since there is an allegation that the constitutional right to liberty was violated.
w/n the EO imposing an absolute ban in the transportation of carabaos is an valid excercise of police power
Ynot v. IAC 1986
FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A.
RULING:
No. It is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed of imposing an absolute ban on the transportation of carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law which to prevent the the slaughter of the same and is unduly oppressive.
The carabao owner was denied the right to be heard because of the outright confiscation.
w/n the SEC has jurisdiction over the lease-back arrangements?
Herbosa v. CJH Development Corporation, 810 SCRA 532 (2016)
FACTS:
- Herein respondent CJH Development Corporation (CJHDC) is a real estate company
- The residential units of “The Manor” and “The Suites” were offered for sale to the general public
- The buyers who opt for the “leaseback” arrangement will receive either 70% share of the annual income of the pooled rooms or an 8% guaranteed return on their investment.
- Department (CFD) issued a Memorandum indicating its opinion that the “leaseback” arrangements offered by respondents to the public are investment contracts.
RULING:
Yes. The sale of “The Manor” or “The Suites” units to the general public under the “leaseback” or “money-back” scheme is a form of investment contract or sale of securities, which is not a pure question of law but a question of fact that falls under the primary jurisdiction of the SEC.
