Election Law Cases

Question 1

Albania v Comelec 2017

1. w/n the violation of 3 term limit is not a ground for Disqualification under Rule 25 but a ground a petition to deny due course under Rule 23.
2. w/n such petition has already prescribed.
3. w/n suspension from office is a ground for a petition for disqualification.
4. w/n the 3 term limit rule is violated

Answer 1

Albania v Comelec 2017

FACTS:

1. Respondent Tallado was governor in 2007, 2010 and in 2013.
2. The facts in issue is that in 2007, his opponent Typoco was initially proclaimed as the winner but respondent questioned the proclamation by filing a petition for correction of a manifest error which was decided in his favor, thus he served the unexpired portion of the term which was only 3 months.
3. Respondent filed his COC on October 16, 2015.
4. On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter filed a petition under Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated the 33R and (2) respondent was suspended by the Ombudsman
5. In his Answer, respondent argued that the proper remedy should be Rule 23 and has already prescribed. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for disqualification. He also denied violating the three-term limit rule as there is an involunary interruption his term in 2007-2010.

RULING:

1. Yes. A violation of the 33R is not a grounds under Rule 25, but a ground under Rule 23 as it pertains to elegibility.
2. Yes. Under the Election Code, such petition must be filed within 25 days from filing.

As Respondent filed his COC on October 16, 2015, a petition to cancel the same shall prescribe after 25 days, on November 10, 2015. Since it was filed only on November 13, 2015, the action has already prescribed.

3. Suspension is not a ground for a petition for DQ as Section 40 (b) clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of an administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate from running for election.

In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy under the Local Government Code.

4. No. Under Abunto v Comelec, The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants him the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Since his term is reduced, there is an involuntary interruption of term. Hence, there is no violation of 3 term limit rule.

Applying the foregoing, since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot be considered as one term. Hence, Respondent cannot be said to have continuously served for three consecutive terms.

Question 2

Tallado vs Comelec 2019

w/n the Tallado’s dimissal constitutes an interruption which exempts him from the 3 term limit rule.

Answer 2

Tallado vs Comelec 2019

• Petitioner Tallado was duly elected as Governor in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections.
• 1st OMB Case: While he was serving his 2nd term, the OMB imposed a suspension of 1 year.
  
  • On appeal, CA initially reduced the suspension from one year to six months. He immediately re-assumed his position after the lapse of six months. However, the CA eventually restored the one-year suspension.
• 2nd OMB Case: OMB ordered his dismissal.
  
  • On appeal, the CA issued a TRO in the implementation of the DILG of such dismissal. Thus, the petitioner was able to re-assume his post as Governor.
• 3rd OMB case: OMB ordered his dismissal because he violated the 1st OMB decision by re-assuming office without having fully served his suspension
  
  • On appeal, CA modified the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension.
• The petitioner filed CoC for Governor of for the May 2019 elections.
• This prompted respondents to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a CoC

RULING:

Yes. An interruption of a term involves involuntary loss of title to office.

The DILG’s execution of the OMB decisions for dismissal constituted loss of title to the office.

As such, the dismissals interrupted his service of term.

Question 3

Chua v Comelec 2016

1. whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a petition for disqualification or a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy;
2. whether the petition has prescribed
3. wether Petitioner chua has satisfied the requirement of renunciation of foreign citizenship by filing a CoC, thus qualified to run for election
4. whether the rule on succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code applies to this case.

Answer 3

Chua v Comelec 2016

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Arlene Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes for the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod/
2. On the date of proclamation, Respondent Fragata as registered voter filed a petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate” and “to deny due course on two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent resident of USA.

RULING:

1. Disqualification. In her Petition, she did not argue that petitioner made a false material representation in her CoC; she asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor. As such, Respondent filed for a petition for disqualification.
2. No, Under Comelec Rules, a Petition to deny due shall be filed within 25 days from filing the CoC.

In contrast, a petition for disqualification shall be filed not later that the date of proclamation.

Since Respodent filed a petition for disqualification on the date of petitioner’s proclamation, the action has not yet prescribed.

3. No. For a dual citizen seeking to be qualified to run for elective office, 2 requirements must concur: oath of allegiance and renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The oath of allegiance contained in the CoC does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation.

Since petitioner failed to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she was a dual citizen at the time she filed her CoC and disqualified to run for election.

2. No. As a general rule, succession applies if the official was removed from office after the proclomation.

As an exception, if the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes is entitled to the position.

A CoC filed by a dual citizen is void ab initio as there is disqualifying circumtance prior to the filing.

The votes casted for them should be considered stray and should not be counted.

Question 4

Quinto v Comelec 2009-2010

w/n the right to run rule is constitutional

Answer 4

Quinto v Comelec 2009-2010

FACTS:

• COMELEC issued Resolution which provides appointive officials shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his CoC
• Alarmed that they will be ipso facto resigned, Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions seek to nullify the Resolution contending that the advance filing does not automatically make the person a candidate. The law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. As such, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned when they file their CoCs in the upcoming election

RULING:

The original decision, penned by J. Nachura held that the resign to run rule is unconstitutional on the following reasons:

• This restriction was overbroad since it applied to all appointive officials indiscriminately.
• There is no valid justification in applying the rule exclusively to appointive officials and not to elected ones.
• Candidacy is a fundamental right.

In contrast, in the reversed ruling, penned by J. Puno held that the resign to run rule is constitutional on the following reasons:

• There was substantial distinction between appointive and elective official because unlike elected politicians, “appointive officials are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity.
• The right run for election must give way to the substantial public interest —to maintain a civil service that is impartial and free from the evils of partisan politics.
• Candidacy is not a fundamental right.

Question 5

FPJ v Arroyo 2005

May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?

Answer 5

FPJ v Arroyo 2005

1. GMA was proclaimed President
2. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004.
3. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died
4. He was substituted by his wife , Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the contest praying that if subsequently determined that the protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in office

RULING:

No. The Rules of Court allows substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest.

As such, she is not allowed to substitute because she is not a real party in interest. Public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. It is the Vice President who is the real party in interest by virtue of succession.

Neither can she be allowed to intervene because the interest which allows a person to intervene must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit even it it is determined that FPJ won the election.

Question 7

Penera v. COMELEC 2009

whether or not petitioner Penera’s act of campaigning for votes immediately preceding the filing of her CoC constitutes premature campaigning

Answer 7

Penera v. COMELEC 2009

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Rosalinda Penera and respondent Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
2. Andanar filed a Petition for Disqualification against Penera and her political party for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the campaign period.
3. In her Answer, Although Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice
4. While the case was pending, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor
5. On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC disqualified Penera

RULING:

No. Under Section 15 of R.A. 8436, a person is considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. The same law provides that a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period.

Since the motorcade occured before the campaign period, Penera is not liable as a “candidate” for premature campaigning.

Note: This decision basically said premature campaigning is no longer prohibited making section 80 useless.

Question 8

Whether or not Respondent Comelec has jurisdiction over Petitioner who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

Answer 8

Reyes v. COMELEC 2013

• Respondent Tan, a registered voter filed Petition to Deny Due Course of petitioner Regina Reyes on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations
• Comelec found her ineligible
• petitioner was proclaimed winner
• On 5 June 2013 petitioner took her oath of office
• Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of June 30.

RULING:

1. No. Under the Constitution, the HRET has juridiction over Members of the House of Representatives

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there following requisites must concur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because she has not yet assumed office which officially starts at noon of June 30 following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

Question 9

w/n Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo

Answer 9

Risos-Vidal v. Estrada 2015

FACTS:

1. On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada of Plunder.
2. On October 25, 2007, Arroyo extended executive clemencyto Estrada which provides: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office. xxx He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
3. On November 30, 2009, Estrada filed a CoC for the position of President but only placed 2nd.
4. On October 2, 2012, Estrada filed a CoC for the position of Mayor of Manila.
5. Petitioner Atty Alicia Risos-Vidal,, filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada on the ground of his Conviction for Plunder, Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the Election Code.

RULING:

Yes. While Plunder can be ground for disqualification under Sec 40 of the LGC, Sec 12 of the OEC provides an exception – a plenary pardon or amnesty.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon, not a conditional one on the following reasons:

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not make the pardon conditional. Whereas clauses are not part of the operative language of the statute.

The statement “He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”clearly provides that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute,not conditional.

As such, he is qualified to run for election.

Question 10

whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160

Answer 10

Jalosjos v Comelec 2013

1. In a criminal case, the Court convicted petitioner of 2 counts of statutory rape and six 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC
2. After serving of his sentence, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied, prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion before the MTC.
3. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC for the position of mayor for Zamboanga City
4. the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion which was affirmed by the RTC
5. the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution to deny due course to his CoC

RULING:

No. while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence,it should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.

Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years service, he remains to suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, thereby disqualifying him to run as mayor.

the Penalty of Perpetual special disqualification deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.

Question 11

can separate cause of action of annulment of elections prosper after determining the results of recount and revision of ballots?

Answer 11

In Abayon, the Court never truly hinged on the possibility of entertaining a separate cause of action of annulment of elections after determining the results of revision of ballots. The prayer for revision and reappreciation of votes was withdrawn, and the protest was anchored on the allegations of terrorism. Moreover, the case was decided on the extent of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s jurisdiction on election protests. Abayon set no binding precedent on whether a separate cause of action may be entertained after revision and appreciation of ballots in pilot provmces. Thus, in this Protest, protestant is incorrect to invoke Abayon that his third cause of action survives despite an unfavorable resolution of his second cause of action. Bongbong v Leni

Question 12

What are the requirements for a dual citizen to run for election?

Answer 12

R.A. 9225 requires Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to (1) take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to (2) explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.

The oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. (Jacot vs. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008)