Political law Cases Flashcards

Question

Continuity of Senate Neri v Senate Commitee "ChitoNeri Published Scandal" w/n the Senate as a continuing body is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.

Answer 1

No, they are required. While it is true that the Senate is a continuing body, However, in the conduct of its business, the present Senate is separate and independent from that of the previous Senate. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

Answer 2

Under the Constitution, No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines Under Frivaldo, The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility However, the question of citizenship must be resolved in the proper proceeding. It may not be raised by private persons in an election case.

Answer 3

No. Under the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives However, In Reyes, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of the House of Representatives. In the present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were satisfied.

Answer 4

FACTS: 1. Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized American, but then filed Repatriation. 2. Respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition for disqualication for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on the ground that he is not a resident and that he is a foreigner as he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. 3. Petitioner Casan Maquiling who garnered the second highest number of votes intervened and claiming he should be proclaimed winner. 1. Yes. The use of a foreign passport amounts to recantation of the oath of renunciation because what is required is absolute and perpetual renunciation of foreign citizenship. While the use of foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation, however, by representing himself as an American, he reverted back to a dual citizen. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. Since he reverted back to a dual citizen, he is disqualified to run for election under Sec 40 of the LGC. His CoC is void ab initio. 2. Yes. Since Arnado is a disqualified candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted pursuant to the Electoral Reforms Law. Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes. As such, the rule on succession under the LGC will not apply.

Answer 5

No. In Maquiling. his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. Also, while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.

Answer 6

Poe-Llamanzares v Comelec 2016 FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC. 1. Under Rule 25, Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution. The Court ruled that The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. 2. the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Answer 7

Yes. the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Under the Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding, he is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

Answer 8

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections; While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

Answer 9

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship 1. to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and 2. for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections

Answer 10

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte 2. Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" on the ground that she did not meet the residency requirement. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. 3. petitioner amended her CoC, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. RULING IRM is qualified to run for election, because of the following: 1. A minor follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became IRM’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is lost only when: a. there is actual removal or change of domicile b. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one c. acts which correspond with the purpose In the absence of which, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. The wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when IRM married Marcos, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home. 4. Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage, her acts of returning to the country clearly indicates that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Answer 11

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. Under the Family Code, it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband and that she failed to establish Pantar as her domicile of choice by satisfactory evidence, she is disqualified to run for mayor in Pantar, for failure to satisfy the residency requirement.

Answer 12

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (1) actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose. There is no change of domicile because of the following: First, the alleged residence of respondent is a mere beach house which was held to be a temporary residence. Second, respondent has failed to show actual presence at his domicile of choice. Third, respondent failed to show that he intends to abandon Coron as he acquired a CTC from Coron.

Answer 13

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that placebut also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, tofulfill the residency requirement. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, tofulfill the residency requirement. We cannot accord credence either to the petitioners’ contention that the dilapidated house in Ibo, Toledo City, could not serve as Osmeña’s residence in view of the latter’s stature as the use of non-legal standards is condemned. Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavitsof various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and political activities.

Answer 14

To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it one’s residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay,

Answer 15

to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.17 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention.

Answer 16

Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not automatically make him regain his residence. He must still prove that after regaining his Philippine citizenship, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice.

Answer 17

FACTS: 1. In 2001, 2004, 2007, Abundo was proclaimed municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. 2. However, in 2004 Jose Torres was initially proclaimed mayor but Abundo was eventually declared the winner and served the unexpired portion of the term for a period of a little over one year and one month. 3. In 2010, When Abundo filed his coC, Torres filed for disqualification in the Comelec. 4. Pending Resolution, respondent Ernesto R. Vega filed a quo warranto action before the RTC 5. The RTC declared Abundo ineligible for having served 3 three consecutive terms, under Aldovino. RULING: No. For an elective official to be disqualified under the 3 term limit rule, 2 requisites must concur:(1) he has been elected for three consecutive terms; and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms. Here, Abundo's full term has been substantially reduced by service rendered by Torres. The election contest interrupted his term because pending its favorable resolution, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary citizen. Aldovino does not apply as he was not even proclaimed mayor, thus cannot be said to have temporarily lost title thereto.

Answer 18

recall election is not a voluntary renunciation. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

Answer 19

1. A recall election was initiated to oust Victorino Socrates as Mayor of Puerto Prinsesa 2. Edward M. Hagedorn filed his CoC for mayor in the recall election. 3. to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. 4. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. RULING: Yes. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. Such immediate reelection pertains to the regular elections. Hence, Hagedorn can run in the recall election.

Answer 20

Latasa v. Comelec 2003 FACTS: * Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. * During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city. * Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. * Respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate , filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due and Disqualification on the ground of false representation in his CoC that he is eligible to run as mayor. * In his Answer, Petitioner argues this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor RULING: No. For an official to be barred from running for a 4th term under the 3 term limit rule, two conditions must concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Both requisites have been met. First, The inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. Second, Involuntary interruption contemplates a rest period or break of service. Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit during the conversion of the municipality to a city. Hence, he is not elegibile to run for the 4th term.

Answer 21

Aldovino v Comelec 2009 Aldovino v. COMELEC 2009 FACTS: 1. The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive term 2. The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the the same hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office. 3. Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. 4. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino et al. filed a petition to deny due course on the ground that respondent violated the 3 term limit rule 5. The Comelec ruled in favor of Asilo. RULING: 1. No. A preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term because the suspended official continues to stay in office and is just barred from exercising his functions. Since there is no interruption, the 3 term limit rule is not violated. Note: The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent vacancy.

Answer 22

Lonzanida v Comelec 1999 1. Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the 1995 elections. 2. In the 1995 elections he was initially proclaimed winner but his opponent Juan Alvez was declared mayor in an election contest. 3. In the1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his CoC. 4. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had served 3 consecutive terms. 5. Comelec disqualified Lonzanida on the ground that although he was later unseated in 1995, it is still considered one full term. RULING: No. For an official to be disqualified under the 3 term limit rule, 2 conditions must concur: 1) he has been elected for three consecutive terms 2) he has fully served three consecutive terms. Both requisites are absent. First, since his proclamation was declaired void, the petitioner has not been duly elected. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

Answer 23

1. Respondent Marino P. Morales was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. 2. Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 2007. 3. Petitioner Roberto L. Dizon, as taxpayer, alleges argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run in 2007. 4. The Rivera Case promulgated on 9 May 2007, unseated Morales during his fourth term in 2004. RULING: Considering that the Rivera Case declared that Morales was not duly elected Mayor in 2004 and that he was ordered to vacate his office before the expiration of his term, he is elgible to run in 2007, there being no violation of the 3 term limit rule. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the 3 term limit rule.

Answer 24

FACTS: 1. On 2004, Alegre filed a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis on the ground that Francis was proclaimed Mayor in 1995,1998, and 2001 2. In 1998, Francis was proclaimed mayor and served full term. 3. However, in a decision dated in July 4, 2001, Allegre was proclaimed the true winner in 1998. Such decision was promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Yes. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question. Since the decision in the election contest was promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired, Francis can no longer be ordered to vacate his office. Since, his term in 1998-2001 was not interrupted, he is barred to run for a 4th term under the 3 term limit rule.

Answer 25

RULING: No. Since the territorial jurisdiction and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same, they are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms.

Answer 26

Naval v Comelec 2014 FACTS: * Petitioner Angel Naval had been elected as a Member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur for 3 consecutive terms. * the President approved RA 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. * In the 4th election, he was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. * Julia, also candidate filed a Petition to Deny Due Course on the ground that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. RULING: No. The drafters of the Consitution intended that only three consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. Naval's ineligibility to run for election did not undermine equal representation?????????

Answer 27

Recall Election should not be counted

Answer 28

No. Under the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Answer 29

Atong Paglaum Inc laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening organizations seeking registration and/or accreditation 1. The following may partincipate: (1) national parties , (2) regional parties and (3) sectoral parties 2. National parties do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. A political party can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing. 4. Sectoral parties may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. 5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors 6. organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. The Court interpreted the words “marginalized and underrepresented” primarily in their electoral sense, that is, to benefit those who cannot win district elections for any reason, and only secondarily in their social justice sense.

Answer 30

1. Ang Ladlad is an organization(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 2. the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, RULING: we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks: Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Answer 31

First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees

Answer 32

1. petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed her CoC for SK elections 2. COMELEC motu propio denied due course on her CoC on the ground that she is not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run. RULING: The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt under Sec. 76 of OEC. Also, The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, notice and hearing is required.

Answer 33

1. Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration as a regional political party based in the NCR 2. Comelec denied the petition on the ground that party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in Oakwood Mutinee. RULING: To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation." In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence that was established by judicial notice and substantial evidence.

Answer 34

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint cancel the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes in the two (2) preceding elections The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

Answer 35

1. The individual petitioners are dealers of LPG while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country. 2. Respondent LPGMA, who advocates access to reasonably priced LPGs seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization 3. Petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration on the ground that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants 4. In their Answer, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. 5. the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with finality on January 5, 2010. RULING: There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’s registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization. The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the registration of any other organization desirous of party-list accreditation, did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to participate in the party- list elections, i.e. file a manifestation of its intent to participate and have the same given due course by the COMELEC, the right to field its nominees, the right to exercise all that is bestowed by our election laws to election candidates (hold campaigns, question the canvass of election returns, etc.), and the right to assume office should it obtain the required number of votes. With respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already final. LPGMA’s right to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list elections is already beyond challenge. However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code.

Answer 36

The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented.

Answer 37

1. Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First Legislative District of Northern Samar 2. the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Abayon winner. 3. Daza filed his Election Protest on the ground that there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon and that terrorism 4. The HRET found that Daza had adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear was instilled in the minds of hundreds of resident-voters RULING: there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions (such as to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the votes in an election contest) Here, the decision of the HRET was clearly unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, Abayon should be reinstated.

Answer 38

Not every misrepresentation would merit the denial or cancellation of registration. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer required pursuant to ruling in Atong Paglaum.

Answer 39

As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections. ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941

Answer 40

FACTS: 1. The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) , through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees. 2. The list of nominees include were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. 3. CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of substitution. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. 4. CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. 5. The Comelec approved the substitution 6. Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC and challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination. RULING: Under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, a party may only change the list of nominees when (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. Since Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 which allows the party to withdraw its nomination was invalid, it follows that the substition is also invalid.

Answer 41

1. There was a failure of election in the municipality of Lumbatan necessitating the holding of special elections in Lumbatan 2. Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alexander Menor 3. respondent Shalimar H. Tamano filed a petition to declare a failure of election on the ground of massive substitute voting in these 5 municipalities and claimed in almost all of the precincts , either petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. or respondent Usman T. Sarangani obtained 100% of the votes. Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates 4. The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded showed Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate followed by Sarangani in the No. 2 spot and Alauya in the No. 3 5. COMELEC r directing "the Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the winners FACTS:

Answer 42

as long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then such are treated as internal matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections.

Answer 43

1. the President approved into law R.A. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). 2. Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC. 3. petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, et. al former political leaders of Surigao del Norte sought to nullify R.A. No. 9355 on the ground that Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC RULING: Yes. Section 461 of the LGC does not provide that the exemption from the land area requirement (*when the lgu to be created consists of one (1) or more islands*) shall apply to the creation of a province. However, when the exemption was expressly provided in LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent.

Answer 44

FACTS: 1. RA 9591 created a separate legislative district for Malolos city. 2. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 3. Petitioners, taxpayersfiled this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. RULING: The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." Under Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately following election." There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos will attain a population of 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Answer 45

RULING: Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province Under Mariano, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786; 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.

Answer 46

Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for the following reasons: First, Under the constitution, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts. Second, the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction

Answer 47

he law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. o ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.

Answer 48

nder Section 9 of RA No. 7941, In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Under Section 15 of RA No. 7941, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.

Answer 49

FACTS: 1. This is a petition for mandamus filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot as a representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not interim Batasan Pambansa.

Answer 50

Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not interim Batasan Pambansa.

Answer 51

According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Answer 52

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen. Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require adjudication by this Court.

Answer 53

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

Answer 54

Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Answer 55

LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. The phrase "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" means GOCCs created under special laws and not under the general incorporation law. There is no difference between the term "original charters" and "special charters.

Answer 56

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Answer 57

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Answer 58

When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

Answer 59

f the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35 Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.

Answer 60

RULING: No. First, Ang Tibay applies in trials and investigations in administrative cases (judicial determination). It does not apply in preliminary investigations in criminal cases (executive determination). The purpose of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation is to conduct a fact-finding investigation to determine probable cause for filing information, and not to adjudicate, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. Second, even without preliminary investigation, there is no violation of constitutional due process because PI is merely a statutory right. Third, Ang Tibay requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case. In preliminary investigations, only probability of guilt (reasonable belief, more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify conviction’) is required. To apply Ang Tibay to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. Note: Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Answer 61

RULING: petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated when he **was not furnished a copy** of the complaint affidavit and its attachments during the preliminary investigation. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of every person to due process before they are deprived of their life, liberty, or property. Due process in criminal prosecutions is further emphasized under Section 14, Article III which provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. The same provision also states that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation again the filing of the mr did not cure, were never available to the party Dissenting Opinion Leonen There are two (2) stages in the determination of probable cause. The first stage is the executive determination of probable cause, which is done by the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation. The second stage is the judicial determination of probable cause. Once information has been submitted to the court, the court acquires full jurisdiction over the case. the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. In this case, Informations were already filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan. In its July 10, 2017 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan found the existence of probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest against him.22The Sandiganbayan, independent of the findings of the Ombudsman in the preliminary investigation, found that based on the records, there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. Thus, any question on the conduct of the preliminary investigation was already rendered moot.

Answer 62

Motion for Reconsideration Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information, she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In petitioners' motion for reconsideration47 of the February 25, 2003 Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration was held to be consistent with the principle of due process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,48 she cannot complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation. Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, “[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.

Answer 63

Graft and Corruption Ombudsman probable cause MR without resoliving, OMB filed a case before SB. w/n OMB is correct in filing criminal case RULING: No. Administrative Order No. 07 reads The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. Here, counter-affidavit was filed as opposed to sales

Answer 64

There is violation of administrative due process. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not cure due process defects, especially if the said motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits. Though petitioner raised this due process violation issue before the COA Proper, the latter never addressed his concern. It simply ruled that the very pleading which raised due process violation was the very pleading which afforded him due process. But this cannot be the case. For a perusal of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[1] before the COA Proper reveals that he never had the opportunity to thoroughly argue the merits of his case precisely because he was not properly informed of what he was supposed to argue against Note: Ang Tibay v. Court e requisites of due process in administrative proceedings 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; 2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. The decision must have something to support itself; 4. The evidence must be substantial; 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; 6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate ![]() in arriving at a decision; and 7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision * * * [[1]](#_ftnref1) see 69 Phil. 635, 642-644 (1940).

Answer 65

1. This Court resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and its IRR for allegedly violating petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to privacy. 2. The IRR requires the signing of Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection Form which provides the phrase: "I voluntarily give my consent and authorize the PNP to inspect my firearm/s described above at my residence" RULING: 1. Yes. There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the government's terms for its use. 2. No. The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures remains paramount, and the government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10591 and its corresponding provision in the Implementing Rules are unconstitutional for being violative of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Section 9 authorizes warrantless inspections of houses which are unreasonable and, therefore, require a search warrant. Considering that the inspection is done before a license is issued, there is no compelling urgency to immediately conduct the inspection. A search warrant must first be obtained from a judge to determine probable cause for its issuance.

Answer 66

FACTS: * In 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165. * At around 11:30 in the morning, an officer received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed him that a certain male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. * At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the subject male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post. * The vehicle was flagged down. The police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested accused-appellant Sapla. RULING: The accused must be acquitted based on the following grounds: First, There is no probable cause. law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. Second, Other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures does not apply here. * The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest did not precede the search. * It was not proven that there was a seizure of evidence in plain view, that it was a customs search, and that there were exigent and emergency circumstances that warranted a warrantless search. Third, The search cannot considered a valid stop and frisk search. The allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons." The search conducted by the authorities on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a protective search of outer clothing. 4th, the search is not a valid consented search. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto." Here such consent by the accused was not unequivocal. The opening the blue sack was mere passive conformity to a warrantless search conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, the prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of the accused. Hence, the accused is acquitted.

Answer 67

FACTS: 1. Valeroso was charged with unlawful possession of firearm. 2. The Court gave more credence to the version of the defense which is as follows: Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. RULING: No. First, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. There was no justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested. Second, The "plain view doctrine." cannot apply. While the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion, the search was illegal because they did not just accidentally discover the subject's firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso. Note: _{1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;} _{2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;} _{3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;} _{4. Consented warrantless search;} _{5. Customs search;} _{6. Stop and Frisk;} _{7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.} _{8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]} _{9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.}

Answer 68

FACTS: 1. Policarpio was indicted for possession of a .45 caliber pistol without authority from the Commission on Election during the COMELEC Gun Ban. Policarpio was also charged for unlawful possession of 21.07 grams of shabu and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia 2. When he opened the door, two (2) police officers pointed their guns at him. The police officers then ordered him, his wife and children to go out of the house. And thereafter, the police officers asked him if he is Junior Policarpio, to which query he answered in the negative because his name is Ely Policarpio. They asked him to sign a search warrant and then they entered his house. The contents of the search warrant were not explained to him. When the police officers were done searching his house, they showed him something, but he had no idea what it was and where it came from. After a while, Barangay Chairman Tangonan arrived and signed a document. Thereafter, he was brought to the police station and later on, to the court. He denied having signed a confiscation receipt. He alleged that her mother, Perla Policarpio, was not a resident of his house at the time the search was conducted. 1. Yes. It appears that PSI De Vera knew the exact address of the appellant even prior to April 12, 2007 and he actually led the raiding team in the implementation of the search warrant. These, in the Court's view, are sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. 2. No. Under the chain of custody rule, real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides, the four persons who need to be present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the drugs are: (1) the accused or his representative ; (2) a representative from the media; (3) a representative from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official. They shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and shall be given a copy thereof. The presence of these persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up." Here, there was no showing that the photographs were taken after their confiscation in the presence of the above-mentioned four persons. Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the IRR, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render the search void only when: (l) such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Here, no justifiable reason for the non-compliance was proffered. Policarpio must be acquitted.

Answer 69

RULING: test buy Yes. The SC speaking through Justice Lazaro-Javier ruled that these admissions are already sufficient to establish that he indeed illegally possessed the prohibited drugs. In Regalado v. People, The Court held that Regalado's damning admission warranted his conviction even though the apprehending officers did not fully comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. Also, It is immaterial that appellant's counter-affidavit did not specify the amount of drugs found in his possession. There was no piecemeal admission here. It was either appellant owned the entire quantity or none at all. ??? The large amount of the confiscated drugs involved here and appellant's own inculpatory judicial admissions go against the possibility of planting or substitution by the police. CAGUIOA DISSENTING: He voted to acquit the appellant on the following grounds: First, while Sundaram's admissions may be taken as evidence against him, his statements are not an unequivocal declaration that he possessed "a large quantity of marijuana."and that "the seized drugs were marked and inventoried at the time and place of the search." Second, even if the sworn statements can be considered as an extrajudicial confession, this only forms a prima facie case against the appellant. Also, Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the extra-judicial confession of an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.The evidence must comply with the chain of custody rule. Here, it does not appear that the confiscatedted marijuana were immediately marked in Sundaram's residence. Third, the apprehending team failed to comply with the witness requirements under the law, i.e., that the photographing and inventory of the seized items be witnessed by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials were present to witness the operation, as observed by the RTC I also respectfully disagree with the ponencia's conclusion that since the present case involves a large volume of dangerous drugs, this "[goes] against the possibility of planting or substitution by the police."The amount of drugs involved should not dictate the manner by which the Court must evaluate the guilt of the accused.

Answer 70

RULING **The prosecution failed to establish the buy-bust operation through the objective test. ![]()** Here, the prosecution failed to establish the details of the purported sale. No witness who had personal knowledge of the alleged transaction between the poseur buyer and Jasper was presented. The police officers could not hear or see what was happening between the poseur buyer and Jasper, considering the distance of their position from the location of the transaction along with the size of the subject of this transaction. In several cases, this Court took into account the distance of the officers from the location where the transaction occurred in acquitting the accused. In these cases, we found that the police officers had no personal knowledge, and the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer proved fatal. The poseur buyer would have established what transaction took place, but he was not presented. While it is true that there can be a conviction despite the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, such non-presentation is excusable only when the poseur buyer's testimony is merely corroborative.Such cannot be said in this case. Even if coming from a police officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity, P02 Jose's testimony is insufficient to induce moral certainty. **The presumption of regularity of performance of duty cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.** While we recognize a need to hide the informant's identity, since the poseur buyer and the confidential informants were the same, without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State cannot incriminate Jasper. The "objective test" requires that the prosecution paint a clear picture of how the initial contact between the buyer and the pusher was made. It is not enough to show that there was an exchange of money and illegal drugs. The details that led to such exchange must be shoindicated**he prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.** In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drugs are the corpus delicti, and their existence is necessary to sustain a judgment of conviction. The identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty. In other words, a conviction cannot be sustained if there is doubt about the identity of the seized drugs. It must be shown that the dangerous drugs presented in Court were the very same substance recovered from the accused. The identity of the seized drugs is established by showing the duly recorded movement custody of seized drugs. In Criminal Case No. 1 1265, it is unclear how the item subject of the buy-bust operation was turned over to the police officers. There is a gap in the chain of custody. As to Criminal Case No. 1 1266, After the items were weighed, it was likewise unclear how these were delivered to the forensic chemist. The prosecution failed to establish the circumstances of the markings of the drugs seized. P02 Jose also did not testify as to the marking of the items seized. Nowhere did P02 Jose narrate who did the marking and when and where the items seized were marked. ![]() The prosecution failed to prove that the substance recovered from the accused was the same substance presented in Court. In P02 Jose's testimony, he did not identify the shabu as evidence in both Criminal Case Nos. 11265 and 1 1266. ⁵⁹P02 Jose testified as follows: Not only must the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti be shown to have been preserved, but the evidence must also definitively clariö' that the illegal drugs presented in Court are the same illegal drugs recovered from the accused. The prosecution failed to account for this lapse in this case. In P02 Jose's testimony, Nowhere did he identify the seized items as the same ones presented in Court as he did not identify the confiscated items. In Criminal Case No. 11265, the Information states that the shabu weighs 0.10 grams. However, according to PSI Susan, the net weight of the shabu is 0.0628 grams, and its gross weight is 0.1629 grams.[^{^[1]}](#_ftn1)Concerning Criminal Case No. 11266, the Information states the shabu weighs 2.74 grams, but PSI Susan noted that the net weight of the shabu was 2.0946, and its gross weight is 2.7643 grams. [^{^[2]}](#_ftn2) **The Court cannot gloss over these discrepancies in the weight of the seized drugs.** The People, however, insist that Jasper did not raise these issues and the inadmissibility of the evidence during the trial.[^{^[3]}](#_ftn3) This argument is untenable. It is a well-established rule that in criminal proceedings, an appeal throws the whole case open for review. The Search Conducted and the Admissibility of the Seized Items A reading of P02 Jose's testimony reveals that Jasper did not witness the search conducted. The evidence points to only the barangay captain witnessing the search. Such a procedure violates Section 8 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which specifically provides that "no search of a house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereofor any member of his family or in the absence offhe la.tter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." Only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any family member can the search be observed by two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search warrant makes the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. Violation of this rule is, in fact, punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code,⁷⁴ Without the confiscated shabu, no evidence is left to convict Jasper. An acquittal for both charges is warranted.

Answer 71

1. In 2008, 12 pastors and preachers filed a complaint against the officers and publishers of FHM Magazine on the ground that it contained material which were "clearly scandalous, obscene, and pornographic within the meaning and in violation of Articles 200 and 201 of the Revised Penal Code and Ordinance No. 7780 of the City of Manila. RULING The proper recourse for petitioners would have been to go to trial to allow the RTC, as the trier of fact, to judicially determine whether the materials complained of as obscene were indeed proscribed under the language of Ordinance No. 7780. As part of their defense, petitioners can probably argue for the adoption of the Miller standards, which requires the trier of fact to ascertain: (a) whether "the average person would find that the work appeals to the prurient/lustful interest; (b) whether the work is considered offensive sexual conduct under the law; and (c) whether the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Answer 72

In sustaining a conviction for libel, the prosecution must prove the existence of four elements: "(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Here, petitioners do not question the Court of Appeals' findings that the first three elements exist." They only raise as issue the falsity or fruthfulness of the imputations, and whether these imputations are connected to Atty. So's official functions. ⁹⁸Incidentally, these issues both pertain to the fourth element of libel, which is malice. journalists and members of the press may at times write inaccurate articles. Nonetheless, liability should attach only if it is proven that the article was written and published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth That petitioner Tulfo has never bothered obtaining Atty. So's side, cannot amount to malice. A reporter may rely on a lone source's information, even if such information only shows one side of the story, for as long as the reporter "does not have knowledge that it was false. Privileged communication "should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection over privileged communications. No law requires the sources of a columnist to execute an affidavit putting their testimonies in writing.

Answer 73

FACTS: This case is an offshoot of the "Manila Pen Standoff" 2007 involving oakwood mutinee case 2003. t (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo Puno stated that "[j]ournalists who ignore police orders to leave a crime scene will be arrested and charged with obstruction of justice and willful disobedience of authority." (AFP) Chief of Staff Major General Hermogenes Esperon made a statement that the military is one with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in investigating the journalists who disobeyed the lawful orders and/or hindered the enforcement thereof. (DND) Secretary Gilbert Teodoro (Secretary Teodoro) also defended the police authorities' actions in arresting the members of the press who ignored the above-cited orders. (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales) issued an Advisory addressed to all (CEO) of media: Please be reminded that your respective companies, networks or organizations may incur criminal liabilities under the law RULING. Generally, thus, prior restraint is understood to be any form of governmental restriction on, or interference to any form of expression in advance of actual expression, or exercise of the right. there is prior restraint when the government totally prohibits and/or in some way, restricts the expression of one's view or the manner of expressing oneself. There is none in this case. no media network or personnel is prohibited nor restricted from reporting or writing on any subject matter or from being present and covering newsworthy events. respondents' questioned acts never hindered the members of the press from freely exercising their profession to cover any newsworthy events such as the Manila Pen standoff. no form of threat can be deduced from the subject advisory. No other interpretation can be had of respondents' pronouncements except that for being a reminder of prevailing provisions of the law and jurisprudence, applicable to all and not only to media personalities, that resistance or disobedience to lawful orders of authorities may result to criminal, and even administrative, liabilities. The advisory does not have any statements, expressly nor impliedly, preventing the media to cover police operations and events relating to the Manila Pen standoff and to any future newsworthy events. issuance of the advisory, as well as respondents' actions in ordering the dispersal of the media when the warrant of arrest was served, especially when Trillanes' group refused to receive the same, were valid exercises of respondents' authorities.

Answer 74

1. Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody." 2. Among those local governments were respondents: (a) Navotas City, (b) City of Manila (c) Quezon City, 3. Petitioners, filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth 4. More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators. 5. While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons 6. Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community. 7. Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, RULING: 1. No. While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, however,[i]n cases in which the physical or mental health of the child involved, legitimate state interests may override the parents' right to control the upbringing of their children. Under parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children ^{it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not accompanied by their parents.} 2. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall **the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.** to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights or (ii) burdens suspect classes. Under the strict scrutiny test, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit. For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid. ^{the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others}

Answer 75

FACTS: 1. Petitioner DFA awarded the Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project to respondent BCA. 2. During the implementation, DFA sought to terminate the Agreement. However, BCA opposed the termination and filed for Arbitration, according to the provision in the Agreement. 3. BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence seeking the issuance of a subpoena to the witnesses and documents in their custody. 4. DFA filed its comment, alleging that the presentation of the witnesses and documents was prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative process privilege. 5. the RTC ruled in favor of BCA and held that the evidence sought to be produced was no longer covered by the deliberative process privilege. According to the RTC, the Court held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that acts, transactions or decisions are privileged only before a definite proposition is reached by the agency and since DFA already made a definite proposition and entered into a contract, DFA's acts, transactions or decisions were no longer privileged. RULING: The case should be remanded. 1. Contrary to the RTC's ruling, there is nothing in our Chavez ruling which states that once a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency, the privileged character of a document no longer exists. Chavez v. PEA expressly mandates that "privileged information" should be outside the scope of the constitutional right to information. Thus, even the occurrence of a "definite proposition" will not give rise to the public's right to information. Under the deliberative process privilege, "advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations used in the formulation of government policies cannot be disclosed. For the deliberative process privilege to be invoked, two requirements must be met, It must be predecisional and deliberative. The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in arbitration proceedings under RA 9285. As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency to prove that the information in question satisfies both requirements - predecisional and deliberative.

Answer 76

1. On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. 2. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas. 3. Acting on the allegation that the JVA is "the mother of all scams", the senate investigated and reported that: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain 4. On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus prays that PEA publicly discloses the terms of the JVA, invoking the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and that the JVA be declared null and void. RULING: We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process. Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.