Political law Cases Flashcards
LAMBINO V. COMELEC 2006
- Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
- Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution;
Section 2, Article XVII
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
logrolling - incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
- In 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative on the ground that that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
- These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
- COMELEC denied the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, invoking the Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Comelec declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
RULING:
- No. The SC, speaking through J. Carpio, declared that
First, The Initiative Petition is not a Direct Proposal by the People
the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal.
The essence of amendments “through initiative” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
Also, the Lambino proposal is gigantic fraud. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
The subject matter is totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
Second, The Initiative is a Revision, not an Amendment
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment. <em>(Sec. 2)</em>.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution.On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
two-part test: The quantitative test determines whether the proposed change is “so extensive as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.
105 provisions needs to be changed in the Constitution.
The qualitative test determines whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”
The proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision.
Note: Under Mandanas, there is Revision if it changes the principle regardless of number of provisions.
According to Nachura, 6735 Peoples initiative Act - effective na daw (lambino is controversial 8/7, the sG who defended the gov, changed is position(he should be espousing the comelec but espounsed Lambino-Nachura) it is already complete/to overturn Santiago which provides its effective to amend a law but no to amend Constitution. On Motion for Reconsideration, 6735 is complete in implementing Article 17 on the ground that (minute resolution) 10/15 separate opinion,
Javellana v Comelec 1973
W/n the proposed Constitution has been validly ratified
Article 17.4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
FACTS:
- In 1973, Josue Javellana filed a petition for mandamus against the Executive Secretary to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed 1973 Constitution not found in the 1935 Constitution, on the ground that “that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are without power to ratify the proposed Constitution …”;
RULING:
The 1973 Constitution proposed was not validly ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters”.
However, While it is true that the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies falls short of the requirements thereof, the fact that there is voting and that the majority voted for the approval of the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite, it can be deemed that the people have casted their votes in the belief that in doing so they have complied with the constitutional requirement.
Hence, it can be said that the law has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been ratified.”
<em>Note: The Court could not decide if there was acquiescence, in view of the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate during Martial Law.</em>
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
FACTS:
- In 1970, Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales filed separate petitions for declaratory relief assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132 on the ground that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
- It turns out that in 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments
- Before elections, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2
- Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2
- Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
RULING
sustain the constitutionality of R.A. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because-
- Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, has full and plenary authority to propose amendments or to call constitutional convention by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session but voting separately.
- The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, the power to fix implementing details.
- While the authority to call a constitutional convention is exclusively vested in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the legislative power of Congress, so long as it is not contrary to the Constitution
- Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps.
- The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument because Congress can either override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.
NATURE OF HRET
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
FACTS:
- Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questions the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution on the ground that it has budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees and that considering it is quasi-judicial agency, the members of the SC cannot be designated to it.
As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions, it is an obiter dictum
the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
Legislative Veto
Macalintal v Comelec 2003 “Absentee si Rom”
May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR of the Commission on Elections without violating the independence of the COMELEC
RULING:
No. Once a law is enacted, the legislative function is deemed complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress only if it deems it proper to review, amend and revise the same law, not the IRR.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR, Congress violated the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
FACTS:
Romulo B. Macalintal, as a taxpayer and as a lawyer., sought to nullify certain provisions The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
w/n Act No. 4221 is an undue delegation of legislative power in so far as it grants the provincial boards the discretion to determine whether or not the Probation Law shall apply to them
People v. Judge Vera 1937
Facts:
- Respodent Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges.
- The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging that Act No. 4221 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces
Yes. Act No. 4221 constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards in so far as it grants the provincial boards the discretion to determine whether or not the Probation Law shall apply to them
Regarding Standing:
the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Who can exercise legislative power?
David v Arroyo 2006
- Whether the issuance of PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist renders the petitions moot and academic.
2 Whether petitioners have Locus standing
- Facial Challenge
- Constitutional Basis
FACTS:
- In 2006, 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition was filed against President Arroyo for grave abuse of discretion in issuing PP1017 and GO 5 on the ground that respondent officials, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
- It turns out that on 20th Anniversary of the Edsa, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, cancelled all programs of the event and the police arrested (without warrant) petitioner UP professor Randolf S. David.
- The next day, PNP raided the Daily Tribune to arrest persons suspected of inciting rebellion.
- President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
RULING:
- No. a “moot” case may still be decided “provided the party raising it has been prejudiced by its issuance.”
Here, During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts in implementing it, which prejudiced the rights of the petitioner.
- Yes. For a person to have legal standing, the following requirements must be met:
- the cases involve constitutional issues;
- for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
- for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
- for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and they must satisfy the direct injury test.
- for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
- No. As a rule, a party can question the validity of a law only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called ‘facial challenge”. But the only time a facial challenge to a law is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the “overbreadth doctrine” permits a party to challenge the validity of a law “on its face” even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Court.
* Void-for-Vagueness.* Like “overbreadth” this also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” laws in free speech cases, this doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
PP 1017 is not directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.
- ✔️calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
❌ommanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence❌decrees promulgated by the President
✔️ declaring national emergency by the President
❌but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
✔️G.O. No. 5 in sofar as it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017
❌considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined by the Legislature, such portion is unconstitutional
❌The warrantless arrests and seizures (in the absence of proof lawless violence)
❌and the imposition prior restraint on the press
Knights of Rizal vs DMCI 2017
Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project
FACTS:
- On 2014, the KOR, a non-profit organization filed a Petition for Injunction with the SC against the construction of DMCI’s Torre de Manila condominium project on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument
- the Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus
RULING:
No. The SC thru J. Carpio declared that
First, There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on sightline of the Rizal Monument..
Ordinance No. 8119 regulates the “development of historic sites and facilities”.There is nothing in Ordinance that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility. Likewise, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is classified as private property.
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution is not self-executory. The “Physical Integrity” Rule in RA 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project.
Second, Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila as there is no clear legal duty.
Variance
Guidelines were not complied. Mandamus will lie –Jardeleza
The Ordinance does not apply to Torre de Manila being outside the boundaries of Rizal Park and is built on private land. Also, the determination of failure to comply with the ordinance is a question of fact.
Under The Venice Charter, there is no legal duty because it is not a treaty but mere guidelines.
Thus mandamus will not lie absent any clear finding that said act amounted to “grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
Third, The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the Torre de Manila Construction.
One who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. Thus, the KOR, having earlier proposed a national theater a mere 286 meters in distance from the back of the Rizal Monument that would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument, comes to this Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from “seeking any equitable refuge”from the Court. The KOR’s petition should be dismissed on this ground alone.
Note: Torre de Manila is 870 meters from the Rizal Monument
Fourth, Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.
The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances.
- nuisance per se, is a nuisance under all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and may be abated summarily
- nuisance per accidens, is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, is a question of fact and cannot be abated without hearing.
It is not a nuissance per se because a condominium project is common in Manila and Torre de manila was granted the necessary permits by the City.
The question of whether the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact.
Fifth, Rizal never wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations. (obiter ata)
Jardeleza Dissenting Opinion:
The Court should not have, ruled with finality that there was no abuse of discretion.
The majority ruling only took into consideration the “traditional” definition of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare in allowing the construction of Torre de Manila.
According to jurisprudence, aesthetics can be considered as a public safety and welfare concern.
There is an existing legislation implementing the constitutional mandate of heritage conservation.”
“Ordinance No. 8119 provides a clear duty on the part of the City of Manila to regulate development projects insofar as these may adversely affect the sightline of the cultural property.
It is a missed opportunity to determine what is heritage preservation.
First Philippine Holdings vs Sec 2020
1) whether the SEC is authorized to prescribe the rates for incorporation and other fees, and
2) whether the fee for the extension of a corporation’s term in the amount of P24,000,000.0038 is unreasonable, patently oppressive, and confiscatory.
FACTS:
RULING:
- Yes. The SC thru J. Caguioa declared that Section 139 of the Corporation Code authorized the SEC to “collect and receive fees as authorized by law or by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
- Yes. It is an unreasonable excercise of police power.
It is settled that to be valid, IRRs must be reasonable.
A filing fee should be proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected. Likewise, a license fee must bear a reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation.
Indeed, the amount (of 24 Million) appears exorbitant and confiscatory for the mere filing, “processing, examination, and verification” of a single paragraph of petitioner’s articles of incorporation
Section 11 Article XII “Capital”
Narra Nickel Mining v Redmont 2014
“Old Narra”
w/n Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on the “Grandfather Rule”, thus are prohibited to mine in the Philippines
TS:
FACTS:
- Respondent Redmont Redmont, a domestic corporation, wanted to mine the areas already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
- Redmont sought the denial of petitioners’ applications on the ground that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Constitution, The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. As such, the State may enter into agreements with Foreign-owned corporations provided that 60% of the capital is owned by Filipinos.
To determine the nationality of the corporation, the Grandfather Rule is proper in this case since the question of ownership is in doubt.
Petitioners not Filipino National since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners‘ corporate owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Hence, they are not entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines.
NOTE:
Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the Investing Corporation.
In contrast, Under Grandfather Rule, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (grandfathered) to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership and is applicable only when the 60-40 Filipino-Foreign equity ownership is in doubt.
Section 11 Article XII “Capital”
Hontiveros vs TRB 2015 “Hontiveros’ Recitation”
- Whether Hontiveros has legal standing;
- Whether the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid;
- Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid; and
Hontiveros vs TRB 2015
RULING:
- No. for legislator to have legal standing, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
A franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate.Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise, the executive department may issue LTOs.
Here, there is no law that requires legilative franchise. Hence, the grant of TOC did not infringe on her prerogative as legislator.
2.Yes. Impliedly written into every TOC are the conditions prescribed therein.
No public bidding was necessary because PNCC merely exercised its management prerogative when it decided to undertake joint venture agreements with other companies.
Petitioners have not shown how SOMCO fails to meet the nationality requirement for a public utility operator. (TAGILID!)
3. The approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary is valid pursuant to the Alter Ego Doctrine.
FACTS:
- The Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the agreement (ASTOA) replaced PSC (Filipino owned corporation) with SOMCO (which is alleged to have not met the nationality requirement)
- DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA.
- Under the MOA, on the assumption of SOMCO, PSC received the amount of ₱320 million to be used as a settlement of its liabilities due to retrenchment.
- The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) to SOM CO
- Petitioners Union (employees of the replaced PSC) sought to annul the ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government. They also argue that:
- conditions were not imposed on SOMCO, because these do not appear on the face of the TOC.
- there was no public bidding
- SOMCO does not meet the nationality requirement
Repeal
Kida v Comelec 2012 “Super Kid”
w.n the supermajority vote in RA 9054 is valid
KIDA V COMELEC 2012
RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote.
The super majority vote or the 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills.
Legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal.
FACTS:
- Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had already accepted CoCs.
- However, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
- Petitioners sought to annul RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 on the ground that they did not comply with Sections 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law which provide:
This Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Amendment
League of Cities v Comelec 2011
“League of Amendments”
- Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
RULING:
No. Under the Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, No LGU may be created or modified except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.
Congress has the power to amend laws. Here, R.A. 9009 amended the LGC. Since the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein, such Cityhood Laws are also amendments to the LGC itself.
FACTS:
- During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted RA 9009 which amended Section 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city.
- Thenafter, Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws which exempts 16 municipalities from the income requirement.
- Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Grant of Immunity
Mapa v. Sandiganbayan 1994
whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners
RULING:
Yes. Judicial review of the PCGG’s grant of immunity can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain:
- (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information in any investigation conducted by the PCGG;
- (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired the properties in question; and
- (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information is necessary to ascertain the liability of the respondent
Here, it has been shown that the requirements have been met.
the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity.
FACTS:
- On January 20, 1987, Petitioners Placido L. Mapa et. al were charged with corruption with the SB docketed as Case 11960.
- Marcoses were charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) and to insure their conviction, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of petitioners Vergara and Mapa in exchange for immunity from criminal prosectution.
- The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. But the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury.
- Petitioners moved to dismiss Case 11960.
- Despite PCGG’s concurrence, the respondent court denied the Motion to Dismiss.
- Petitioners charged SB with grave abuse of discretion.
Grant of Immunity
Tanchancho v SB 2005
whether the PCGG, in entering into the Cooperation Agreement, acted within the scope of its statutory authority to extend immunity in the first place?
Tanchancho v SB 2005
RULING:
Yes. Under Mapa, Judicial review of the PCGG’s grant of immunity can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain:
- (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information in any investigation conducted by the PCGG;
- (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired the properties in question; and
- (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information is necessary to ascertain the liability of the respondent
FACTS:
- Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson (Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the Administrator.
- Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation Agreement which provided him immunity in exchange for his cooperation in proceedings whether in the Philippines, the United States or elsewhere..
- Tanchanco was called as witnesses for a case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York.
- Several case was filed against Tanchanco with the Sandiganbayan for malversation.
- Tanchanco argued that the case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity by the PCGG.
- The motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that charges of malversatio could not be considered as falling within the immunity as the offenses were not related or connected to the testimony or information furnished by Tanchanco in a proceeding concerning the recovery of the purported ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
Rule on Presentment
Abakada v Purisima 2008 “Abakevin”
w/n The creation of a congressional oversight commitee violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional pe se. After a law takes effect, Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is limited to scrutiny and investigation.
However, when the law takes effect, any provision that empowers Congress to play a role in its implementation or enforcement, violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
NOTE:
A legislative veto is a statutory provision which requires the President to present a proposed IRR to Congress for their approval before such regulation takes effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an administrative agency and is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
FACTS:
- RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation of the BIR and BOC and provides that the IRR be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
- Petitioners, as taxpayers sought to nullify RA 9335 on the ground that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms the employees of the BIR and the BOC into bounty hunters which invites corruption
Post Enactment
Belgica v Ochoa 2013
w/n the pork barrel system is constitutional
No. Under Abakada, After a law takes effect, Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is limited to scrutiny and investigation.
Any provision that empowers Congress to play a role in its implementation or enforcement, violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Here, the Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
Firstly, the post-enactment measures are not related to the functions of congressional oversight (scrutiny or investigation) but belong to budget execution.
Secondly, That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not make it valid since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Usurpation by the Executive
Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative vs La Trinidad Water District 2011
w/n PD No. 198,providing an exclusive franchise, is valid.
RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, No franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative organized to provide water in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respodent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under PD 198 authorized to supply water within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
- TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC).
- LTWD opposed claiming that, under PD No. 198, its franchise is exclusive.
- the NWRB approved TMPC’s application holding that exclusive franchises are unconstitutional.
Section 30 Article VI
Fabian v Desierto 1998
w/n Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act can validly authorize an appeal to Supreme Court without its advise and concurrence?
Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742 (1998)
RULING:
No. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 increased the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence and is also inconsistent with Rule 45 which provides that a petition for review shall only apply to judgments of the CA, the SB, CTA, RTC, or other courts authorized by law.
Appeals from decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule 43.
FACTS:
- Teresita G. Fabian, president of PROMAT Construction and Nestor V. Agustin, District Engineer engaged into an amorous relationship.
- When petitioner wanted to break up, Agustin refused, employing acts of harassment
- She eventually filed an administrative case but Respondent Ombudsman exonerated Agustin.
- She appelaed directly to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 pursuant to Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act.
Section 27 RA 6770, Rule 45 Section 1, Section 6 Rule 135
w/n 1st Paragraph: prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. - is valid
w/n 2nd Paragraph: No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law - is valid
w/n the condonation doctrine can serve as basis for the WPI
RULING:
- No. Under the Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs comes from its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
- No. Under Fabian, Appeals from decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule 43.
* 2.* No. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was simply no legal obstacle for the application of the condonation doctrine. However, with the advent of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the primacy of the integrity of public service was cemented. As such, the SC held that the condonation doctrine is “bereft of legal bases.”
Note: The condonation doctrine applies prospectively from April 12, 2016 which is date when the decision of Court abandonment of such doctrine became final in Carpio Morales v CA.
It means if you are re elected before said date, you can still avail of the condonation doctrine
FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit accused Binay, Jr. with the commission of Plunder and a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the five phases of procurement and construction of the Parking Building. Consequently, the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and issued a preventive suspension order against him after which he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for: (1) The nullification of the preventive suspension order; and (2) A TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.
According to Binay, he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five phases of the construction of the Makati Parking Building since Phases I and II were completed before he was elected Mayor of Makati. Citing the condonation doctrine, he argued that his landslide re-election for a second term condoned any administrative liability from his previous term, i.e., that he could no longer be removed from his position on those grounds.
1st Paragraph: prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation
2nd Paragraph: No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Prospective Application of the law vis a vis Reincorporation
PERT v Vinuya 2012
w/n respondents are entitled to backwages for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano ruling.
- Respondents maintain that the award of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts as enunciated in Serrano is proper since it was held to be curative and remedial in nature and, thus, should be given retroactive application.
- Petitioners argue that the 2009 Serrano ruling cannot be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. 10022 on 2010 which restored the subject clause R.A. 8042 that was declared unconstitutional in Serrano.
RULING:
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The amendment in R.A. 10022 — restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 that was declared unconstitutional — cannot be given retroactive effect on 2 grounds:
First, there is no express declaration of retroactivity.
Second, the retroactive application will will impair an acrrued right by virtue of the Serrano ruling.
Note:Whether or not R.A. 10022 is constitutional must be determined in a separate proceeding as it is not the issue in this case.
Prospective Application of the law vis a vis Reincorporation
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles
- Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., recruited Respondent Joy C. Cabiles for a quality control job in Taiwan but In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency terminated her.
- Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
- CA affirmed the NLRC which declared that Joy was illegally dismissed but awarded only three (3) months worth of salary
RULING:
A void provision of law cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of a similar provision of law . A provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
Continuity of Senate
Garcillano v. HOR 2008 “Hello Garci Published”
w/n the The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form is sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement in order for the Senate to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
FACTS:
RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Continuity of Senate
Neri v Senate Commitee “ChitoNeri Published Scandal”
w/n the Senate as a continuing body is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
No, they are required. While it is true that the Senate is a continuing body, However, in the conduct of its business, the present Senate is separate and independent from that of the previous Senate.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Natural Born Filipinos
Limkaichong v. COMELEC 2009
whether the question of citizenship can be determined by HRET
Under the Constitution, No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
Under Frivaldo, The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility
However, the question of citizenship must be resolved in the proper proceeding. It may not be raised by private persons in an election case.
HRET v. Court(Father)
Lico v. Comelec 2015
w/n the Court can rule on qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives
No. Under the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
However, In Reyes, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of the House of Representatives.
In the present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were satisfied.
Use of Passport
Macquiling v Comelec 2013
- The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
- The third question is whether or not Macquiling as second placer should be proclaimed winner.
FACTS:
- Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized American, but then filed Repatriation.
- Respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition for disqualication for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on the ground that he is not a resident and that he is a foreigner as he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.
- Petitioner Casan Maquiling who garnered the second highest number of votes intervened and claiming he should be proclaimed winner.
- Yes. The use of a foreign passport amounts to recantation of the oath of renunciation because what is required is absolute and perpetual renunciation of foreign citizenship.
While the use of foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation, however, by representing himself as an American, he reverted back to a dual citizen.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. Since he reverted back to a dual citizen, he is disqualified to run for election under Sec 40 of the LGC. His CoC is void ab initio.
- Yes. Since Arnado is a disqualified candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted pursuant to the Electoral Reforms Law.
Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes. As such, the rule on succession under the LGC will not apply.
Use of Passport
w/n Arnado, in running for 2013 elections, complied with the oath of renunciation by submitting affidavit affirming his 2009 oath of rununciation, during the 2009 elections
No. In Maquiling. his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement.
Also, while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
Poe-Llamanzares v Comelec 2016
whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen.
Poe-Llamanzares v Comelec 2016
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
- Under Rule 25, Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
The Court ruled that The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
- the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Bengson v. HRET 2001
whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Yes. the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Under the Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding, he is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Qualifications of Voters
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC 2006
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of “duals”. This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
Jacot v. Dal 2008
Qualifications of Voters
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
- to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
- for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections
Residence v. Domicile
Rule on the validity of the qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romuladez Marcos (IRM) despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only seven (7) months
FACTS:
- Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
- Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” on the ground that she did not meet the residency requirement. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
- petitioner amended her CoC, changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood” and that “she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
RULING
IRM is qualified to run for election, because of the following:
- A minor follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became IRM’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte;
- Domicile of origin is lost only when: a. there is actual removal or change of domicile b. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one c. acts which correspond with the purpose
In the absence of which, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
- The wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when IRM married Marcos, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home.
- Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage, her acts of returning to the country clearly indicates that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Residence v. Domicile
Limbona v Comelec 2008
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Under the Family Code, it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence.
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband and that she failed to establish Pantar as her domicile of choice by satisfactory evidence, she is disqualified to run for mayor in Pantar, for failure to satisfy the residency requirement.
Residence v. Domicile
Mitra v. COMELEC 2010
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (1) actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
There is no change of domicile because of the following:
First, the alleged residence of respondent is a mere beach house which was held to be a temporary residence.
Second, respondent has failed to show actual presence at his domicile of choice.
Third, respondent failed to show that he intends to abandon Coron as he acquired a CTC from Coron.
Residence v. Domicile
Jalover v. Dela Pena 2014
EXCEPTIONAL CASE
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that placebut also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, tofulfill the residency requirement.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, tofulfill the residency requirement.
We cannot accord credence either to the petitioners’ contention that the dilapidated house in Ibo, Toledo City, could not serve as Osmeña’s residence in view of the latter’s stature as the use of non-legal standards is condemned.
Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavitsof various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and political activities.
Residence v. Domicile
Svetlana Jalosjos v. COMELEC 2013
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it one’s residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay,
Residence v. Domicile
Pundaodaya v. COMELEC 2009
to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.17 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention.
Residence v. Domicile
Caballero v. COMELEC 2015
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not automatically make him regain his residence.
He must still prove that after regaining his Philippine citizenship, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice.
TERM LIMIT “INTERRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE”
whether a candidate proclaimed winner in an election protest is considered to have served one full term upon his service of the unexpired portion of term
FACTS:
- In 2001, 2004, 2007, Abundo was proclaimed municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
- However, in 2004 Jose Torres was initially proclaimed mayor but Abundo was eventually declared the winner and served the unexpired portion of the term for a period of a little over one year and one month.
- In 2010, When Abundo filed his coC, Torres filed for disqualification in the Comelec.
- Pending Resolution, respondent Ernesto R. Vega filed a quo warranto action before the RTC
- The RTC declared Abundo ineligible for having served 3 three consecutive terms, under Aldovino.
RULING:
No. For an elective official to be disqualified under the 3 term limit rule, 2 requisites must concur:(1) he has been elected for three consecutive terms; and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Here, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by service rendered by Torres. The election contest interrupted his term because pending its favorable resolution, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary citizen.
Aldovino does not apply as he was not even proclaimed mayor, thus cannot be said to have temporarily lost title thereto.
TERM LIMIT “INTERRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE”
Adormeo v. COMELEC 2002
recall election is not a voluntary renunciation.
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
TERM LIMIT “INTERRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Socrates v. COMELEC 2002
w/n Hagedorn, having served 3 consecutive term can run for a 4th term in a recall election.
- A recall election was initiated to oust Victorino Socrates as Mayor of Puerto Prinsesa
- Edward M. Hagedorn filed his CoC for mayor in the recall election.
- to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
- The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
RULING:
Yes. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. Such immediate reelection pertains to the regular elections.
Hence, Hagedorn can run in the recall election.
Abolition of office
Latasa v. Comelec 2003
whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run for mayor in the City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
Latasa v. Comelec 2003
FACTS:
- Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.
- During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city.
- Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections.
- Respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate , filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due and Disqualification on the ground of false representation in his CoC that he is eligible to run as mayor.
- In his Answer, Petitioner argues this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor
RULING:
No. For an official to be barred from running for a 4th term under the 3 term limit rule, two conditions must concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Both requisites have been met.
First, The inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
Second, Involuntary interruption contemplates a rest period or break of service. Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit during the conversion of the municipality to a city.
Hence, he is not elegibile to run for the 4th term.
Preventive Suspension
Aldovino v. COMELEC 2009
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and
Aldovino v Comelec 2009
Aldovino v. COMELEC 2009
FACTS:
- The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive term
- The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the the same hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office.
- Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
- The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino et al. filed a petition to deny due course on the ground that respondent violated the 3 term limit rule
- The Comelec ruled in favor of Asilo.
RULING:
- No. A preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term because the suspended official continues to stay in office and is just barred from exercising his functions.
Since there is no interruption, the 3 term limit rule is not violated.
Note: The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent vacancy.
Election Protest
whether Lonzanida’s assumption of office before he was disqualified in an election contest may be considered as one full term
Lonzanida v Comelec 1999
- Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the 1995 elections.
- In the 1995 elections he was initially proclaimed winner but his opponent Juan Alvez was declared mayor in an election contest.
- In the1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his CoC.
- His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had served 3 consecutive terms.
- Comelec disqualified Lonzanida on the ground that although he was later unseated in 1995, it is still considered one full term.
RULING:
No. For an official to be disqualified under the 3 term limit rule, 2 conditions must concur: 1) he has been elected for three consecutive terms 2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Both requisites are absent.
First, since his proclamation was declaired void, the petitioner has not been duly elected.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Election Protest
Dizon v. COMELEC 2009
- Respondent Marino P. Morales was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.
- Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 2007.
- Petitioner Roberto L. Dizon, as taxpayer, alleges argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run in 2007.
- The Rivera Case promulgated on 9 May 2007, unseated Morales during his fourth term in 2004.
RULING:
Considering that the Rivera Case declared that Morales was not duly elected Mayor in 2004 and that he was ordered to vacate his office before the expiration of his term, he is elgible to run in 2007, there being no violation of the 3 term limit rule.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the 3 term limit rule.
Defeated in an election protest but has served the full term
Ong v. Alegre 2006
w/n Francis, having lost in an election protest but served full term is barred to run for a 4th term
FACTS:
- On 2004, Alegre filed a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis on the ground that Francis was proclaimed Mayor in 1995,1998, and 2001
- In 1998, Francis was proclaimed mayor and served full term.
- However, in a decision dated in July 4, 2001, Allegre was proclaimed the true winner in 1998. Such decision was promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.
Yes. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question.
Since the decision in the election contest was promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired, Francis can no longer be ordered to vacate his office.
Since, his term in 1998-2001 was not interrupted, he is barred to run for a 4th term under the 3 term limit rule.
Merger of Barangay
Laceda v. COMELEC 2008
w/n Laceda is qualified to run for a 4th term because of the Barangay name is different (merger of barangay)
RULING:
No. Since the territorial jurisdiction and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same, they are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms.
Reapportioned third district from the second district
Naval v Comelec 2014
w/n reapportionment of legislative districts allows an elective official run for the 4th term
Naval v Comelec 2014
FACTS:
- Petitioner Angel Naval had been elected as a Member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur for 3 consecutive terms.
- the President approved RA 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur.
- In the 4th election, he was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
- Julia, also candidate filed a Petition to Deny Due Course on the ground that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from.
RULING:
No. The drafters of the Consitution intended that only three consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election.
Naval’s ineligibility to run for election did not undermine equal representation?????????
Recall election’s effect on the deposed official
Melanio Mendoza v. COMELEC 2002
w/n respondent’s incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
Recall Election should not be counted
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
BANAT v. COMELEC 2009
Is the two percent threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional
No. Under the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC 2013
Atong Paglaum Inc laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening organizations seeking registration and/or accreditation
- The following may partincipate: (1) national parties , (2) regional parties and (3) sectoral parties
- National parties do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
- A political party can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing.
- Sectoral parties may either be “marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector.
- A majority of the members of the sectoral parties must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors
- organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The Court interpreted the words “marginalized and underrepresented” primarily in their electoral sense, that is, to benefit those who cannot win district elections for any reason, and only secondarily in their social justice sense.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC 2010
- Ang Ladlad is an organization(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
- the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds,
RULING:
we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be “a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”24 Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
COCOFED V. COMELEC 2013 2013
First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word “shall” in connection with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
CIPRIANO V. COMELEC 2004
- petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed her CoC for SK elections
- COMELEC motu propio denied due course on her CoC on the ground that she is not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.
RULING:
The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt under Sec. 76 of OEC.
Also, The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, notice and hearing is required.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
MAGDALO V. COMELEC 2012
- Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration as a regional political party based in the NCR
- Comelec denied the petition on the ground that party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in Oakwood Mutinee.
RULING:
To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence that was established by judicial notice and substantial evidence.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS V. COMELEC 2010
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint cancel the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it:
(a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or
(b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes in the two (2) preceding elections
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
- The individual petitioners are dealers of LPG while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.
- Respondent LPGMA, who advocates access to reasonably priced LPGs seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization
- Petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration on the ground that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants
- In their Answer, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society.
- the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with finality on January 5, 2010.
RULING:
There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’s registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization.
The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the registration of any other organization desirous of party-list accreditation, did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to participate in the party- list elections, i.e. file a manifestation of its intent to participate and have the same given due course by the COMELEC, the right to field its nominees, the right to exercise all that is bestowed by our election laws to election candidates (hold campaigns, question the canvass of election returns, etc.), and the right to assume office should it obtain the required number of votes. With respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already final. LPGMA’s right to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list elections is already beyond challenge.
However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code.
RA 7941 (2-percenter) 3 cap rule
disqualifying and cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented.
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION VS. HRET JURISDICTION
ABAYON V. HRET 2016
- Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First Legislative District of Northern Samar
- the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Abayon winner.
- Daza filed his Election Protest on the ground that there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon and that terrorism
- The HRET found that Daza had adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear was instilled in the minds of hundreds of resident-voters
RULING:
there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity.
In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions (such as to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the votes in an election contest)
Here, the decision of the HRET was clearly unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, Abayon should be reinstated.
MISREPRESENTATION
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST V. COMELEC 2013
Not every misrepresentation would merit the denial or cancellation of registration. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group.
In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer required pursuant to ruling in Atong Paglaum.
MISREPRESENTATION
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941
SUBSTITUTION
FACTS:
- The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) , through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees.
- The list of nominees include were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
- CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of substitution. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
- CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.
- The Comelec approved the substitution
- Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC and challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
RULING:
Under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, a party may only change the list of nominees when (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
Since Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 which allows the party to withdraw its nomination was invalid, it follows that the substition is also invalid.
ALAUYA V. COMELEC 2003
hether the suspension of proclamation is void because the results
of the 5 municipalities do not affect Alauya’s election.
*+SUBSTITUTION
- There was a failure of election in the municipality of Lumbatan necessitating the holding of special elections in Lumbatan
- Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alexander Menor
- respondent Shalimar H. Tamano filed a petition to declare a failure of election on the ground of massive substitute voting in these 5 municipalities and claimed in almost all of the precincts , either petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. or respondent Usman T. Sarangani obtained 100% of the votes. Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates
- The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded showed Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate followed by Sarangani in the No. 2 spot and Alauya in the No. 3
- COMELEC r directing “the Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the winners
FACTS:
NOMINATION
as long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then such are treated as internal matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS CREATION
NAVARRO V. ERMITA 2011
w/n the IRR providing for the exemption to the land requirement to provinces ameended the LGC.
- the President approved into law R.A. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
- Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC.
- petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, et. al former political leaders of Surigao del Norte sought to nullify R.A. No. 9355 on the ground that Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC
RULING:
Yes. Section 461 of the LGC does not provide that the exemption from the land area requirement (when the lgu to be created consists of one (1) or more islands) shall apply to the creation of a province.
However, when the exemption was expressly provided in LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS CREATION
ALDABA V. COMELEC 2010
FACTS:
- RA 9591 created a separate legislative district for Malolos city.
- At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010
- Petitioners, taxpayersfiled this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”
Under Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.”
There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos will attain a population of 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.
INHABITANTS
AQUINO V. COMELEC 2010
RULING:
Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province
Under Mariano, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
- The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
- Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
