Property Dualism

Question 1

What is property dualism

Answer 1

The idea that there are some things about our mental, subjective states that cannot be fully explained in physical, objective terms
There is therefore an “explanatory gap” between objective and subjective
They do not want to prove a non physical mind unlike substance dualists

Question 2

How does Chalmers distinguish between hard and soft problems of consciousness

Answer 2

Soft problems
Some elements of the mind can be easily explained through science and physics

Hard problems
These elements of consciousness cannot be explained through the physical world alone
I.e you cannot explain the taste of coffee in physical terms

Question 3

What is a philosophical zombie ?

Answer 3

An exact copy of a human being which does all the same things but is different in the fact that philosophical zombies zombies do not have phenomenal character (hunger pain etc)
These zombies say all of the same things but lack conscious thought

Question 4

What is Chalmers’ philosophical zombies conceivability argument ?

Answer 4

1 philosophical zombies are conceivable
2 whatever is conceivable is possible
3 therefore zombies are possible
4 this creates a problem for reductive physicalists as it suggests that the phenomenal is separate from the physical so they cannot be the same

Question 5

What is quality/ phenomenal character

Answer 5

Any conscious experience we have I.e. Hunger , pain , sadness

They are intrinsic and subjective

Question 6

What does Leibniz say which could support property dualism ?

Answer 6

Says
1 If you could go into someone’s mind and see how their brain worked, you would not be able to see their thoughts or feelings etc …
2 so we cannot see the mind or consciousness
Therefore not everything about the mind can be explained objectively

Question 7

What is the criticism - of the zombie argument - a zombie world is not conceivable

Answer 7

This criticism attacks the first premise
“Philosophical zombies are conceivable”

• consciousness is integral to our understanding of the working brain
  Daniel Dennet says that imagining removing consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems and the working brain in tact is like removing health while leaving all bodily functions in tact. Without consciousness, there is no working brain
• the way we imagine zombies may be confused
  We do not imagine anything different when imagining a zombie compared to a normal person therefore imagining a zombie is not conceivable as you are just imagining a human being
• you can never verify the existence of a zombie with an empirical test
  As zombies are physically identical to human beings, they cannot be explained and differentiated empirically
  They are unverifiable and therefore meaningless

Question 8

What is the criticism of the zombies argument - what is conceivable may not be possible ?

Answer 8

Kripke concludes that if you can conceive of essential properties changing, then conceivability is not a guide to possibility

Contingent properties changing can be a guide to possibility
I.e. You can conceive of water not being salty in a possible world
However some essential properties changing may be conceivable

We can conceive of all even numbers being the sum of 2 primes - however we don’t know if this is possible as maths has not advanced this far yet

We can conceive of H20 not being water although this is not possible if we were not aware of the necessary truth that water is H20

If consciousness is an essential part of the working brain then what is conceivable may not be possible as even if you can conceive of the mind without brain, you cannot separate them. Therefore zombies are not possible despite being conceivable

Question 9

Who presents the Mary’s room argument ?

Answer 9

Frank Jackson

Question 10

What is the Mary’s room example?

What is it used to show ?

Answer 10

1 a woman called Mary knew everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision but had never experienced colour and its qualia
2 she does however learn something new when she experiences colour vision for the first time
3 therefore there is more to know about colour vision than what is given a physical account of
4 therefore physicalism is false

This is used to show physicalism is false as Mary learns something new which is not accountable by physically processes. Therefore physical facts cannot explain everything about the mind

Question 11

What is the criticism and response to the the idea that Mary gains no new propositional knowledge

Response
Counter response

Answer 11

This defence of physicalism relies on the distinction between propositional knowledge (facts expressed in propositions) and acquaintance knowledge
It follows that if Mary knows everything about the physical processes in colour vision then this solely concerns her propositional knowledge.
No new propositional knowledge is however acquired as Mary does not learn any new factual evidence
(As if you met a celebrity who you knew everything about you would not learn anything new and factual)she only becomes acquainted with the phenomenal character of colours with certain qualia.

Response - Mary does gain some propositional knowledge - she knows facts about what it is like for
human beings to see colours
Mary also gains ability knowledge I.e squiring the capacity to remember the colour of ripe tomatoes in the same way that you can know everything about how to ride a bike and then gaining the practical / ability knowledge of riding a bike by physically getting on it

However Mary does not learn any new facts, only gains experience of qualia which is subjective and does provides factual knowledge

Question 12

What is the criticism of Mary’s room about all physical knowledge including knowledge of qualia ?

Answer 12

Dennet argues that our knowledge of colour vision is limited compared to Mary’s ability to ‘know it all’ so we do not have a proper imaginative handle on the matter. Therefore if Mary was presented with a blue banana, her knowledge would enable her to spot the trick.
We may well be guilty of ‘philosopher’s syndrome’ where we mistake a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity. Our reaction that physical knowledge would not include knowledge of qualia is just a reflection of our limited knowledge of colour
Patricia churchland supports this saying Mary’s understanding of colour is radically different to anything we can conceive

Also Jackson changes his mind and endorses this objection. If Mary knew everything about colour she would not learn anything new when she first sees red

Therefore the conclusion that Mary’s knowledge would not include knowledge of qualia is unjustified as science has not evolved far enough for us to know this

Question 13

What is the criticism of Mary’s room about how there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact

Answer 13

It could be argued that Mary does not acquire any new factual/ propositional knowledge but just came to the facts through a different route

Mary upon seeing colour gains phenomenal character / qualia experiences. In this instances she knows colour from a subjective first person perspective. However, gaining this knowledge is not new, just presented in different terms compared to her previous third person experience of colour. Colour is just presented in different phenomenal terms

Support - if Mary learns Bruce Wayne is billionaire not knowing he was batman , then meets batman and learns batman to be a millionaire, Mary does not gain new knowledge but the same knowledge under a different description

Question 14

Which criticism of Mary’s room is the most damaging

Answer 14

Criticism 2 all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia

Question 15

What is the syllabus definition of qualia

Answer 15

Introspectively accessible subjective/phenomenal features of mental states

The property of ‘what it is like’ to experience mental states
The quality of our experience

Intrinsic/ non representational properties or mental states

Question 16

What theory does the criticism qualia does not exist relate to

Answer 16

Eliminative materialism

Question 17

Which philosophers present the criticism about qualia not exist?

Answer 17

Daniel Dennett
Patricia Churchland

Arguably Wittgenstein

Question 18

What is the criticism that qualia doesn’t exist (include the 3 philosophers)

Answer 18

Dennett outlines the typical features of qualia to be - ineffable , intrinsic , private and directly or immediately apprehensive in consciousness

Dennet claimed qualia does not exist as its concept makes the mine seem ‘special’ and ‘mysterious’ when conscious experience has no properties like this at all.
He claimed qualia cannot be destroyed with logical arguments as the term is not well defined. Qualia is analogous to god in this regard as it is difficult to objectively disprove as it’s concept is so ‘mysterious’
Dennett argues that things like the taste of something should be described in physical processes rather than mysterious qualia. We should see our taste buds as simply responding to stimulus

Wittgenstein would argue that these mysterious features of qualia would undermine its existence as these features could not be tested so would be regarded as meaningless

Patricia Churchland argues that the term qualia is misleading as it implies that the mind cannot be explained in physical terms. Her and Paul Churchland are eliminativists and state that we should eliminate talk of mental states and replace them with more accurate terms attributed to reality. She claims that our understanding of the mind in terms of qualia is part of a folk psychology, which is too vague and has been around since Aristotle, it therefore should be refuted and abandoned in favour of modern day neuroscientific terms