Identity Theory Flashcards
What is identity theory?
The materialist theory that the mind is numerically identical to the brain.
This is compared to qualitatively identical where two things share the same properties - this leads to the conclusion according to leibniz’s law that the mind and brain are numerically identical
What is ontological reduction?
Example
Link to IDT’s empirical focus
Compared to analytic reduction, the words used to describe mental states do not mean the same as the words used to describe physical states.
Empirical research is needed to show that the identity of mental states are the same as physical states. This theory can therefore be tested (better than dualism)
An example of this - the feeling attachment to romantic partners can be ontologically reduced to oxytocin
What are the benefits of identity theory
Based on ontological reduction, this theory can be tested scientifically, this may therefore be a better alternative to dualist theories which struggle to empirically test by referring to the mind as non physical.
It is therefore philosophically complete based on empirical testing.
Ockham’s razor would advocate for identity theory over dualist theories as it states that we should stop using unnecessary entities in favour of simpler explanations e.g. Stop saying the mind is non - physical if there is a simpler theory that shows that it can be
It is intuitive that our mind is the brain
What does JJC smart say about identity theory ?
He says that the mind and mental states are “irreducibly psychical” meaning that the mind can be explained physically.
He states that he does not want the mind to become a ‘nomological dangler’ referring to metaphysical entities which cannot be explained physically, he wants to explain the mind in physical terms
He states that the mind are brain are numerically identical e.g. bill Sykes =
Bill Sykes
What is type type identity theory ?
Benefit of this ?
We have similar mental states which can be reduced to the same brain states
E.g. When we think of pineapples , the same neurones fire in all of our heads
This allows for empirical verification
What is the benchmark problem against type type identity theory ?
This criticism of type type identity theory which had an empirical basis, is vulnerable to the issue that these empirical tests could actually show identity theory to be wrong.
We cannot know exactly yet because of scientific limitation that if we both think of ‘red’ that we have the same physical brain state reaction.
IDT is therefore not definitively convincing as it is not yet scientifically proven right
What is a token identity theory ?
Distinguish between type token and token token
Type token identity theory is the theory that similar mental states can be reduced to different brain states
Token token identity theory is the theory that all mental states are unique and can be reduced to totally unique brain states
What are the problems with token Identity theories ?
It is more difficult to explain and hypothesis a relationship between mental states and brain states with these theories as there is no benchmark at all with uniqueness in brain activity.
This implies a lack of similarity in mental and brain activity which is not intuitive
No empirical evidence to support token token as you never have the same brain state twice !
What can our feeling of attachment be ontologically reduced to according to type identity theory
Oxytocin
What is the criticism of type type identity theory about multiple realisability ? Empirical and conceivability issue
A great deal of creatures I.e. Cats dogs and humans, share the mental state of pain.
If type type identity theory is correct then this provides an EMPIRICAL issue. This is that if this mental state of pain is numerically identical to a physical / neural brain state then there must be a physical brain state that these creatures share.
Empirically this in implausible and certainly hasn’t been discovered.
Instead , pain seems multiply realisable with different brain states that realise pain.
This problem is compounded by Putnam who states a conceivability issue. If considering the possibility of aliens, it is unlikely that they share similar physical states to us e.g. Their Brain might be a green blob however we can conceive of aliens sharing a similar mental state to us e.g. Pain, if this is conceivable IDT cannot be the case as an alien’s mental state would be identical to its physical state - which we do not share.
Therefore IDT cannot provide a clear account of the relationship between mental states and brain states
Response to Putnam’s multiple realisability criticism ?
Further reply ?
David Lewis said identity theorists can appeal to domain specificity.
This is the idea that if we talk about c fibres firing as “human pain” and a certain arrangement of blobs as “Martian pain” and a certain physical fibre arrangement as “animal pain” , the multiple realisability objection disappears.
Reply -
This is counter intuitive as we would be denying that we share the same mental state of “pain”
Multiple realisability is therefore still fundamentally damaging
How could token identity theory respond to the idea of multiple realisability?
Response ?
Token identity theory would be in line with mental states being multiply realisable.
This s because type token IDT argues that our similar mental states can be reducible to different brain states
E.g. If we both thought of Stalin, we may have different neurones firing
Multiple realisability is therefore only damaging to type identity theory
Response - however this would result in few empirical tests we can do to verify this - unsatisfactory for a theory resting on ontological reduction / empirical testing
How could Descartes’ dualist indivisibility argument be used to criticise IDT ?
Reply ?
Indivisibility argument
Based on Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles which states that if two substances have different properties then they cannot be the same thing
The mind is indivisible
The body, like all physical things , is divisible
The mind and body therefore cannot be numerically identical as they have different properties
Any criticism of this could undermine it
E.g.
The mind is divisible - functionally not spatially - Freud’s ego and super ego - multiple personality disorder where certain parts of the brain can’t communicate with other parts
Not everything physical is divisible - e.g. Quarks and properties
What is the location problem for IDT ?
Response ?
Further reply
Based on Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles - if two things are they same they must have the same properties
- brain states have specific spatial locations e.g. Brain states on your prefrontal cortex are a few inches higher than your visual cortex
- mental states do not have specific spatial locations, your thoughts are not literally closer to your forehead than other thoughts , hopes not 18 inches over your heart
Mental states and brain states therefore have different properties so by Leibniz’s law, cannot be numerically identical
Reply - smart - mental states do have spatial properties according to empirical research and therefore could be argued to have specific spatial location. Language is limited and we could add these empirical developments to our grammar
However, this is grammatically incorrect ! Our hopes are not 18
Inches over are hearts !
What is putnam’s criticism that the talk of the brain does not mean the same as talk of the mind ?
Response ?
Many philosophers believe that the statement “pain as a brain state” violates certain rules of English and does not make sense. If you had a headache and complained about it, this does not seem to be the same thing as saying that your c fibres were firing. This criticises the identity theorist notion that the mind and brain and numerically identical as how we talk of them ( our vocabulary that we use) is different
HOWEVER
this criticism is unsuccessful.
This is because
An identity theorist could reply to this drawing on the distinction between meaning (the way you identity a thing) and reference.
An identity theorist would raise that terms can have different meanings but refer to the same thing
E.g. Morning and evening stars have different meanings but both refer to Venus - the same thing
In the same way , our vocabularies for mental and physical states have different meanings but refer to the same thing.
Further , an identity theorist would say stress that the theory, based on ontological reduction not analytic refers to how vocabulary used to describe our mind and brain are different but empirical testing can show they relate to the same thing.
This criticism is therefore unsuccessful as the fundamental nature of IDT (ontological reduction) does not seem to be considered
