Functionalism Flashcards
What is functionalism ?
The theory that all mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised
Mental properties can be reduced to functional properties
Explain how functionalism differs from behaviourism
Function claims that mental states are logically linked to behaviour but aren’t reducible to it.
Functionalist argue that mental states are states that exist between input (stimulus) and output (behaviour)
E.g. Stimulus of stepping on a pin - > being in pain-> lifting foot from pin. Our mental state would be the functional property of ‘being in pain’
Explain how with functionalism , all mental states can be multiply realised compared to identity theory ?
As mental states are functional states, if anything fulfilled the function of a mental state , a functionalist could argue that whatever fulfilled this function has similar mental states to us
Gets around criticism of multiple realisability. Animals and aliens could have similar mental states with the same unified mental function of ‘being in pain’
This is compared to type identity theory which fails as species with different kinds of brains to us cannot be said to have similar mental states
What is machine state functionalism ?
Why is it dismissed ?
Theory that mind is analogous to a Turing machine
E.g. The way we respond to stimulus depends what state we are in.
However this analogy is limited as it suggests that when we respond to stimulus , this can be written in an algorithm. This is seen as too robotic and computer- like for our human and arguably unpredictable mind.
Machine state functionalism is often dismissed
What is causal role functionalism ?
Mental states are defined by their causal, functional role
E.g a mouse trap is defined by its causal property - its ability to trap a mouse.
If functionalism is true then what 2 statements must be true
1 we must fully be able to understand mental states in terms of their function
2 anything that fulfills the function of mental states must have mental states
What is the criticism of functionalism about the possibility of a functional duplicate e.g. inverted qualia ?
This criticises functionalism on the basis that we cannot fully understand mental states in terms of their function
If two people looked at grass and tomatoes that have learned to describe tomatoes as ‘red’ and grass as ‘green’, then the way we look at these things would be functionally identical - caused by the same inputs and outputs .
Despite this , we could have different colour experiences with our qualia being inverted. Person A’s red could be the equivalent to person b’s green.this would mean that two people with identical functions can have different phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties therefore cannot be fully understood in terms of their functions.
Therefore functionalism fails as we cannot understand our mental states in terms of function.
What is the response to the criticism of functionalism about the possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia ?
The two people are not functionally identical with very important small differences.
If person A’s green is person b’s red, and green is a cool colour whilst red is regarded as a warm colour, will person A regard grass as a warm colour and person? This seems unlikely. If the functional role of red is specified in enough detail e.g. It’s warmth, then it would seem you cannot have inverted qualia as person A’s green could not be red as it would have to be regarded as warm
How could the Mary’s room argument be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia) ?
If Mary knows all physical facts about colour vision including functional facts without actually experiencing qualia, upon experiencing colour for the first time, she would learn something new. This shows that we cannot fully understand our mental states in terms of physical and functional facts. There must be more beyond these confines to experiencing qualia that can be captured in physical and function terms
Which 4 criticisms of the Mary’s room argument could you use in response to the Mary’s room argument ?
Knowledge of all physical / functional facts would include knowledge of qualia
There is more than one way of knowing the same physical/ functional fact.
Mary gains no new physical or functional knowledge but gains acquaintance knowledge
Qualia doesn’t exist
What is block’s Chinese mind criticism ? The possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia
If functionalism is correct , then anything that fulfills the function of mental states must have mental states.
Block raises the idea of a ‘Chinese mind’ to prove functionalism wrong.
This idea asks you to conceive of a human body is connected to the whole population of china with each Chinese person having the equivalent functional role of a neurone in your brain. The Chinese would be linked up by two way radios recreating the function of your brain. This would in theory, fulfil the function of a mental state and therefore create a functional duplicate of a mind. However it would be difficult to believe that this mind had qualia. It would be difficult to believe in a unified ‘Chinese consciousness’. If I was to feel pain, would something be in pain?
Therefore although the functioning of your mind can be duplicated and the function of mental states can be fulfilled, your mind cannot be fully duplicated as the mental state of qualia / consciousness cannot be duplicated.
Therefore not everything that fulfills the function of mental states must have mental states so functionalism is false.
How might a functionalist respond to block’s Chinese mind criticism ?
Further reply?
The Chinese system is much slower than our brains, manually operated by humans .
Response - even though this is slower, it is still metaphysically possible. The possibility is not touched on in this criticism therefore the criticism still stands
