Property Dualism Flashcards
What is property dualism?
Property dualism is a theory of mind, which claims that some minds have non-physical properties.
“There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.”
Property dualism differs from substance dualism by maintaining that both the mind and body are made from the same physical substance, but the mind has distinct mental properties (like consciousness) that aren’t reducible to physical properties. It also differs from physicalist theories because it doesn’t reduce mental states (such as consciousness or qualia) purely to physical states, acknowledging that mental experiences have unique properties that can’t be fully explained by physical science
Behaviourism < PROPERTY DUALISM > Substance dualism
What are qualia?
Qualia are intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.
“Introspectively accessible” — means you can directly notice and think about these experiences just by looking inside your own mind.
In plain English, qualia are the subjective properties of experience – i.e. what something feels like inside:
— The redness I experience when I look at a ripe tomato
— The rough feeling when I run my hand over some sandpaper
Qualia are not properties of objects like a tomato or sandpaper but properties of our experience of them.
What is supervenience?
“X supervenes on Y if a change in Y is necessary for a change in X”
Supervenience is a relationship between two kinds of thing. If something supervenes on something else, then it is dependent on that thing.
Physicalism says that two physically identical things must be the same in every way: it’s impossible for two physically identical things to be mentally different.
However, property dualism claims that it’s possible for two physically identical things to be different in some way. Property dualism says it’s possible that two physically identical things could have different mental properties – DIFFERENT QUALIA.
So, according to property dualism, qualia are neither physical nor supervene on physical.
What is interactionsit dualism?
Interactionist dualism: the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. In other words, the mental and physical can interact in both directions.
Mental -> physical: The mental state of hunger causes you to go and get food
Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain
What is Epiphenomenalist dualism?
Epiphenomenalist dualism — the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.
Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain
But mental states (i.e. qualia) themselves don’t cause anything: My going to get food is explained by my (physical) brain state, rather than my mental state
What type of property dualism do most philosophers believe in?
Some (most) property dualists are epiphenomenalists – they believe that qualia are caused by physical things but that qualia doesn’t cause anything itself. Epiphenomenalism thus avoids some of the causal interaction issues facing substance dualism because it does not have to explain how the mental can cause changes in the physical.
EXAMPLE — Epiphenomenal dualists see qualia as similar to the smoke coming off a steam train: The smoke doesn’t push the train along – it’s just a by-product of the engine. Similarly, qualia doesn’t cause anything – it’s just a by-product of brain activity.
What is David Chalmers’ zombie argument?
KEY POINT — Qualia are non-physical phenomenal properties. Physicalism (view that everything about the mind can be explained by physical processes) is false.
A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human – except they don’t have any qualia.
A zombie will say “ouch!” when it gets stabbed and its physical brain will even fire in the same way as a normal brain – but there isn’t any pain qualia internally.
Such zombies seem conceivable. We can imagine a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia. In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience.
So, if qualia are conceivable (metaphysically possible), then qualia are non-physical. If qualia are non-physical properties, then property dualism is true
Therefore, property dualism IS TRUE.
What is the 1st objection to Zombie argument? (Zombies aren’t conceivable)
Physicalists argue that zombies only seem conceivable because we misunderstand qualia The reason zombies seem conceivable is because we’re labouring under a false illusion that qualia are these spooky non-physical things.
If we had full physical knowledge, we’d see that qualia are just physical properties. In that case, imagining a physically identical being without qualia would be a contradiction—like a married bachelor or a four-sided triangle.
Once we accept that qualia are physical, the zombie argument collapses, as two physically identical beings must have identical qualia.
So the KEY IDEA is this:
Zombie argument: We can imagine a being that is physically identical to us but has no qualia (no subjective experience). If this is possible, then qualia must be non-physical—something extra beyond the physical world.
Physicalist objection: This is based on a false assumption. If qualia are physical, then a physically identical zombie must have the same qualia as us. So, imagining a zombie without qualia is a contradiction, meaning zombies aren’t truly possible
What is the 2nd objection to Zombie argument?
KEY IDEA — Chalmers’ zombie argument relies on the idea that if we can conceive of something (like a zombie), then it must be metaphysically possible. But this objection says conceivability doesn’t always mean something is truly possible in reality
WATER Example:
It seems conceivable that water could be H₃O instead of H₂O because saying “water is H₃O” isn’t obviously contradictory.
• However, in reality, water is essentially H₂O—it cannot be anything else. If you imagine a world where lakes and rivers contain H₃O, you’re not actually imagining water but some other liquid.
• So, even if “water is H₃O” seems conceivable, it is actually metaphysically impossible because water must be H₂O
APPLYING This to Zombies
• Similarly, even if we think we can conceive of a physically identical being without qualia, that doesn’t prove it’s metaphysically possible.
• If qualia are an essential part of physical brain states, then a physically identical zombie must have qualia—just like water must be H₂O.
• So, the zombie argument fails because IT ASSUMES that conceivability proves metaphysical possibility, which ISN’T always true
What is Franck Jackson’s Knowledge argument?
Mary is a person who lives in a black-and-white room and learns all the physical facts about the world through black-and-white materials. So, in this thought experiment, Mary has learned all the physical facts about our world from within a black and white room. She knows every possible physical fact – including every physical fact about human experience of colour.
Physicalism argues that everything is physical and so there are only physical facts and knowledge of physical things.
However, Jackson uses this thought experiment to show that Mary doesn’t have all knowledge despite having all physical knowledge. It follows from this that there is such thing as non-physical knowledge. Jackson continues:
“It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. […] Hence, physicalism is false”.
Physicalism is taken to be false due to the supposed existence of non-physical facts. These non-physical facts are facts about non-physical properties, i.e. qualia. If such non-physical properties exist, then property dualism is true.
What is 1st the objection to the knowledge argument? (Ability hypothesis)
We can accept that Mary learns something new when she leaves the black and white room but reject Jackson’s claim that this new knowledge is non-physical.
Instead, we might argue, Mary gains new ABILITY KNOWLEDGE.
Let’s say Mary is given a bicycle for the first time she probably won’t be able to ride it – even though she knows all the physical facts about riding bicycles. This is because knowledge of how to ride a bike isn’t the kind of knowledge you can learn from facts in books. It’s ability knowledge. And ability knowledge is a kind of physical knowledge.
Applied to the original Mary case, some argue when Mary sees red for the first time all she does is gain new abilities. She gains the ability to imagine red, for example. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences.
What is 2nd the objection to the knowledge argument? (New knowledge, old fact)
KEY idea — The same fact can be understood via two different concepts.
For example, “I know there is water in that glass” = “I know there is H2O in that glass” — same fact, different expressions.
But it’s possible to know the former and not know the latter. For example, back before the chemical structure of water was discovered, it’s possible that someone could know “there is water in the glass” but not know “there is H2O in the glass”.
In the case of Mary, before she left the black and white room, she only knew about redness in theoretical terms. But when she leaves and sees red she gains a NEW concept: the phenomenal concept. And it’s impossible to know what it’s like to see red without this concept — phenomenal concept just provides a different way of understanding the same fact.
So, Mary doesn’t learn any new, non-physical fact. She just learns a different way of understanding the same fact.
What is 3rd the objection to the knowledge argument? (Mary would already know)
The argument questions why Mary wouldn’t know what it’s like to see red just by knowing all the physical facts about it. It suggests that if she knew everything physical, she might also know what the experience of seeing red is like. (We can’t imagine how Mary could know what it’s like to see red without having seen it herself) — but the intuition that she can’t know this isn’t based on a strong reason, but just a feeling, so we should reconsider whether physical knowledge could include experiences like seeing red.
What is the 4th objection to the knowledge argument? (Acquaintance hypothesis)
For example, you don’t actually know King Charles III personally – even if you know a load of facts about him. Even if you learned every physical fact about King Charles III, you still couldn’t say you know him if you’d never met him.
But King Charles III’s acquaintances and friends do know him personally. But there’s nothing spooky or non-physical about their knowledge.
In case of Mary, she can know all the physical facts about red – what it is, when people see it, how they react to it, etc. – without being acquainted with redness itself.
Mary hasn’t experienced redness before (her brain has never had this property itself). When she sees red, her brain processes it, giving her new knowledge through experience. But this phenomenal concept (of seeing red) just provides a different way of understanding the same underlying fact (That this is color red)
