Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory

Question 1

What is the Type identity theory? What is the key idea of the Type Identity theory?

Answer 1

It is a physicalist theory which states that Mental states are identical to Brain states. Mental properties are reduced to physical properties

Question 2

What is the Ockham’s razor and how does it relate to the theory?

Answer 2

Ockham’s razor — the simplest explanation is usually the best one. Substance dualism also presents an account for relationship between mind and body, however the type identity theory’s explanation requires only one entity (the brain) — it is simpler.

Question 3

Are physical/mental concepts distinct or the same?

Answer 3

Physical and mental concepts can be distinct, but they pick out one and the same property e.g pain is mental, c-fibers firing is physical, but they refer to the same thing.

Question 4

What’s Jack Smart’s phrase about brain processes?

Answer 4

“Nothing over and above brain processes”

Question 5

What does Jack Smart say about mental and brain states?

Answer 5

Mental states and brain states are contingently identical (ontologically reduced)

Contingent Identity — you can rescue something to something else e.g minds to brain processes
Ontological Reduction — mental states can be reduced to brain states e.g pain is c-fibers firing or lighting is electrical discharge

Question 6

What is an analytical reduction?

Answer 6

When the opposite idea is a contradiction e.g triangle is a shape with 3 sides (it can’t be otherwise)

Question 7

What is the Location problem?

Answer 7

It’s pretty easy to understand where c-fibers are firing, under an MRI scanner you can find out the exact location.
But if you locate my c-fibers firing, it doesn’t seem like you’ve located my subjective mental sensation of pain.

So the argument is something like this:

If pain and c-fibres firing are identical then they must share all the same properties
C-fibres have a precise physical location
Pain does not have a precise physical location
Therefore, pain and c-fibres firing are not identical

Question 8

What is the Zombies argument?

Answer 8

Basically, type identity theory says pain is identical to c-fibres firing. But we can imagine a zombie with the brain state (c-fibres firing) but not the mental state (pain).

An identical human being, who will have c-fibers firing in his brain, however a Zombie wouldn’t be experiencing any mental state of pain.

Question 9

What is the argument from Multiple Realisability? (Against type-identity theory)

Answer 9

Hilary Putnam argues that mental states, like pain, cannot be reduced to brain states, such as c-fibres firing, because mental states are multiply realisable — the same mental state can come from many different brain states.

For example, an octopus has a very different brain setup to a human. Let’s say, for example, that octopuses have o-fibres instead of c-fibres.

If you stabbed an octopus and it writhed about, surely you would say that it’s because it’s in pain. But if type identity theory is true, this isn’t possible (because pain = c-fibers). In other words, both the octopus and the human have the mental state of pain, but they have completely different brain states: The octopus’ brain has o-fibres, whereas the human’s brain has c-fibres.

In short:

P1. If type identity theory is true, you cannot have the same mental state without having the same brain state
P2. An octopus and a human do not have the same brains or brain states
P3. But an octopus and a human can both experience the mental state of pain
C1. Therefore, type identity theory is false