Functionalism Flashcards
What is functionalism?
“All mental state can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.”
For example, we might say the functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation that causes the organism to get away from the thing that’s causing it harm. That function is what mental states, such as pain, are.
Part of the function of pain is to cause other mental states – such as a belief that you are in pain, or a desire for the pain to stop — it’s not just to cause behavioral dispositions (as behaviourism claims)
Hilary Putnam: The nature of mental states (also argument against type-identity theory) — in support of functionalism
Think about a knife. A knife can be made from metal, or plastic, or wood – as long as it performs its function (to cut things). Similarly, Putnam would say that mental states like pain can be experienced by a human or an octopus — the key feature of pain is its function.
A mind is like a mouse trap — it doesn’t matter what it’s made of, matters what functions it performs. Functionalism thus avoids the multiple realisability objection to type identity theory.
Arguments against behaviourism— in support of functionalism
For example, being in pain may be analysed as a disposition to say “ouch!” – but this analysis doesn’t work when you also have the mental state of not wanting to look like a wimp. Reducing mental states to behavioural dispositions is either too simplistic or becomes circular when you bring in other mental states that also need to be analysed in terms of behaviours.
Functionalism avoids this problem by recognizing that mental states cause not just behaviors but also other mental states. For example, pain can lead to a belief that one is in pain and a desire for it to stop, even if no behavior follows. Unlike behaviorism, which ties mental states strictly to behavior, functionalism explains how someone can be in pain without showing it, avoiding circular reasoning.
What is the argument form inverted qualia?
What if my experience of green was like your experience of blue and vice versa? For example, if my qualia when I look at the sea are similar to your qualia when you look at grass.
When we both look at the sky, our mental states would be functionally identical. They would both, for example, cause us to believe “the sky is blue”.
And since our mental states are functionally identical, functionalism must say they are the same mental state. But they’re clearly not the same. My qualia are different from yours. This therefore suggests that functionalism can’t fully explain the subjective side of consciousness— qualia.
What is Churchland’s objection to inverted qualia?
- There is no empirical evidence that identical brain activity gives rise to different conscious experience.
- Conscious experience can’t be observed — it is undetectable.
- Even if inverted qualia was possible, it doesn’t entail it is actually possible
- All colors exist in a spectrum, so inverted color qualia would require full spectrum inversion — which is unlikely, as color perception is tied to the brain’s structured processing of contrasts
What is Block’s china brain thought experiment?
- Imagine we have a complete functional description of human mental states
- A human body is hooked up to the entire population of China
- Every person in China is linked to other people (neurons) via two-way radios
- They communicate according to the rules set out in the complete functional description of human mental states described earlier
- Some of these people (neurons) are linked to the outputs of the body
- Imagine the Chinese population recreated the functions of the neurons
- So, the input leads to exactly the same output, and everything in between is functionally identical
The scenario above is designed to replicate a human brain. According to functionalism, the China brain would actually be in pain, say, given the appropriate inputs (like being stabbed). But this is obviously false.
Just because the example of the China brain is functionally identical to human pain, doesn’t mean the China brain really is in pain. So functionalism is false. There’s clearly more to mental states than their function.
What is functionalsit’s response to China brain and an objection to it?
Response — Chinese system wouldn’t be identical to the brain. It can be disrupted by things that a brain can’t. For example, the radios running out of batteries
Objection — this is irrelevant. Disruptions don’t count as inputs/outputs. It is NOT a part of functioning
What is the argument form knowledge against functionalism?
P1. Mary knows all the physical and functional facts about the mental state of seeing red
P2. But when she leaves the black and white room for the first time and sees red she learns something new about the mental state of seeing red
C1. So, there is more to the mental state of seeing red than simply the physical and functional facts
C2. So, functionalism is wrong – there is more to mental states than their function — unique subjective experience — QUALIA
