Behaviourism Flashcards
What is behaviourism?
Behaviourism is a physicalist reductionist theory of mind, which says the meaning of words used to describe mental states – such as ‘pain’, ‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘think’ etc. – is all about what is externally observable.
So, for a behaviourist, the meaning of ‘pain’ is to wince, say “ouch!”, try to get away from the source of the pain, have an elevated heart rate, and so on
Why does Behaviourism NOT focus on inner feelings like qualia?
P1. It claims that what is subjective is not scientifically verifiable since it’s not publicly accessible.
C1. Therefore, to study the mind meaningfully is to study what people do and how they react
C2. Therefore, the mind is nothing beyond physical behavior
What is Hard behaviourism?
Hard behaviourism (e.g. Carl Hempel): All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics.
For Hempel, the meaning of a statement is to know the conditions under which it can be considered true/false. If you can’t verify it, it’s MEANINGLESS — its called a VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE
This means that mental statements about feelings and emotions should be expressed in terms of observable physical behavior, otherwise they are MEANINGLESS
So, “I’m in pain” can be translated into bodily statements, linguistic statements e.g ouch! WHILE it can also be empirically verified
In the language of philosophy, hard behaviourism says mental states can be ANALYTICALLY REDUCED to behaviours (and other externally observable physical facts).
What is Soft Behaviourism?
Hard behaviorism claims mental states are just behaviors, but this fails because you can feel pain without showing it or display pain without feeling it. To address this, soft behaviorism defines mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions—how someone would behave in certain conditions, not just how they actually behave.
A disposition — is how seo thing will or is likely to behave in certain circumstances, it is a tendency.
Gilbert Ryle argues that to talk of mental states and processes is to talk not only of actual behaviors, but also of dispositions to act in certain ways.
Foe example, someone in pain has a tendency to say “ouch!” or admit they’re in pain if asked, even if they don’t always do so. Just like a glass has a tendency to break if dropped, a person in pain has a disposition to show it under the right conditions.
What is Gilbert Ryle’s Concept of Mind (argument against Dualism) ? — in support of behaviourism
if dualism were true and mental states such as pain referred only to a private and non-physical mental state, how could we ever talk about them? I can’t literally show you what is going on in my mind when I am in pain. You can’t point to a mental state such as pain, you can only point to the behaviour.
Gilbert Ryle’s category mistake? — also against dualism and in support of behaviourism
Ryle argues that to think mental states are distinct from their associated behaviours (as dualism claims) is to make a category mistake.
Ryle’s example: Suppose someone were to visit Oxford to see the university. The visitor is shown the library, the lecture theatres, the teachers, and so on. After the tour is complete, he says: “but where is the university?”
Thus, the visitor makes a mistake by thinking the university is a separate object, rather than the collection of buildings and facilities he’s already seen. He expects it to be something distinct that can be pointed to on its own — CATEGORY MISTAKE
KEY IDEA — If an alien asked what pain is, you’d show people wincing, saying “ouch!”, and reacting to injury. But if the alien kept asking, “Yes, but what is pain?” there would be nothing more to show. Just like Oxford University isn’t separate from its buildings and staff, Ryle argues that pain isn’t something beyond these behaviors—it is the behaviors and dispositions themselves.
What is the “Asymmetry between self and other knowledge” problem?
- Knowledge of my own mental states is direct — When I stub my toe, I have direct access to the feeling of pain it produces. But if I see someone else in pain – however bad – it isn’t as direct. I don’t literally feel their pain (even if it does feel painful to watch).
- I cannot be mistaken about my own mental states — when I feel pain, there’s no way I could be mistaken as to what I’m feeling. However, if I see someone else scream “ouch!”, I might mistakenly believe they’re in pain when they’re only acting. When it comes to other people’s mental states, I can be mistaken.
So, basically, there is a big difference between how you experience your own mental states and other people’s.
Behaviourism claims that mental states, like pain, are just behavioral dispositions. However, this doesn’t match our experience. When we’re in pain, we know it from the unpleasant feeling, not because we winced or said “ouch!” Behaviourism can’t explain this internal feeling, as it focuses only on external behavior.
What is the possible response to “Asymmetry between self and other knowledge” problem?
Ryle argues that there’s no real difference between self-knowledge and knowing others’ mental states. Both are gained by paying attention.
The apparent difference comes from having more information about yourself. He compares thinking to internal speech, noting that while thinking is private and speech is public, both are forms of verbal behavior.
Ultimately, whether you know your own thoughts or someone else’s, the process is the same: paying attention.
What is the “Super Spartans” objection?
Philosopher Hilary Putnam develops the asymmetry argument further with his example of ‘super Spartans’.
Super Spartans are an imagined community of people who completely suppress any outward demonstration of pain. They don’t wince, flinch, say “ouch!”, or anything like that. They have no dispositions toward pain behaviour – their heart rate doesn’t even increase.
However, Super Spartans could still feel pain internally without showing it, which challenges behaviorism. According to behaviorism, pain is defined by behavioral dispositions, but in this case, pain exists without those behaviors.
This shows that pain and behavior are separate, so if super Spartans are possible, behaviorism must be false.
What is the possible response to Super Spartans?
The behaviorist could argue that without any outward display of pain, we wouldn’t even have a concept of pain to begin with.
The behaviorist argues that we know what pain is because of the behaviors we see, like saying “ouch!” Without these behaviors, it would be impossible to identify pain in the first place. Therefore, the example of super Spartans who feel pain but don’t show it is incoherent, because the concept of pain relies on observable behavior.
What is a Zombie objection to behaviourism?
A zombie is basically the exact opposite of a super Spartan: where the Spartan has qualia but not behaviour, the zombie has behaviour but no qualia. It might say “ouch!” when it gets stabbed but it doesn’t feel any pain internally.
If zombies are possible, then it’s possible to have the behavioural dispositions associated with pain without actually being in pain. Therefore, the behavioural disposition of pain is separate from the feeling of pain. Therefore, behaviourism is false.
What is an objection from multiple realisability?
Different mental states can lead to different behaviors depending on a person’s other beliefs. For example, if you’re thirsty, you’d likely drink a beverage.
But if you believe the drink is poisoned, you might avoid it. To explain why you avoid it, we need to look at your belief about the poison.
However, someone else might still drink the same poisoned drink if they also have the mental state of being suicidal. The suicidal state could lead to different behaviors depending on other mental states, and this process could continue indefinitely, with each mental state depending on others.
In short, it seems impossible for behaviourism to explain mental state as behaviours without assuming various other mental states. But these other mental states need a behavioural explanation too!
So, the idea is that a single mental state can result in different behaviors depending on a person’s other mental states. Therefore, Behaviourism can’t fully capture the complexity mental states.
What is the Circularity problem for behaviorism?
The multiple realizability objection shows that behaviorism is circular. To explain mental states with behavior, behaviorism relies on other mental states, but those also need to be explained by behavior. If you keep trying to define mental states by behaviors, you’ll just end up back where you started.
Like with the “thirsty’ example form Multiple Realisability.
— To explain being thirsty with behaviorism, we’d say it leads to behaviors like drinking. But if someone is thirsty but doesn’t drink because they believe the drink is poisoned, we need to explain that belief with behaviors, like avoiding the drink. Then, we would need to explain those behaviors with more mental states, creating a CIRCULAR PROBLEM where behaviors keep explaining beliefs, and beliefs keep explaining behaviors, without ever fully explaining either.
