property dualism

Question 1

what is property dualism

Answer 1

• There are at least some mental states that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
• mental states depend on the brain
• mental states are not reducible to brain states
• brains have two types of property; physical and mental
• mental properties are irreducible
• there is one type of substance (physical) but with two distinct sets of properties (mental + physical)

Question 2

explain the philosophical zombie argument for property dualism

Answer 2

• A philosophical zombie is one who is physically and functionally identical to a normal human, but they don’t have any qualia
• A zombie will get stabbed and say ouch and yell, it’s brain will function in the same way but there isn’t any pain qualia there
• this is conceivable, we can imagine a world that is physically identical to this one full of philosophical zombies who experience and act the same as us but don’t have any qualia
• philosophical zombies are conceivable
• what is conceivable is metaphysically possible
• therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible and there must be more to consciousness that what is purely physical and we can reject physicalism
• physicalism would say that zombies are not possible because it implies that any physical duplicate of you would have to be conscious because consciousness is nothing more than the physical, but such zombies are conceivable

Question 3

explain the response to the philosophical zombie world that zombies are not conceivable

Answer 3

• physicalists say that we don’t have enough physical knowledge to understand ‘qualia’ - we have an undeveloped understanding of how the physical properties of our brain might produce consciousness
• if we had a complete neuroscientific understanding of the brain we would recognise the incoherence of a zombie
• we think that qualia are non-physical things, but once we understand that qualia are physical things it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features
• “imagine something physically identical that isn’t physically identical”
• it would be a contradiction
• once we understand that qualia is a physical thing, it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings to not have identical qualia

Question 4

explain the response to the philosophical zombie argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 4

• conceivability does not guarantee metaphysical possibility
• e.g. it seems conceivable that water could be something other than h20 because the statement ‘water is h30’ is not obviously contradictory like the statement ‘a triangle has 4 sides’
• ‘water is h20’ is not an analytic truth so it seems we can imagine water without imagining something with the chemical structure of h20
• the apparent conceivability of ‘water is h30’ suggests such a thing is possible
• however, ‘water is h30’ is impossible because h20 is an essential property of what water is - you can imagine a world where the clear liquid in lakes is h30, but then you wouldn’t be imagining water! it would be something else, ‘water is h30’ is metaphysically impossible
• similarly, if qualia are essential properties of some physical things, then its not metaphysically possible for the same physical thing to have different qualia
• a physical duplicate without qualia (zombie) its metaphysically impossible the same way ‘water is h30’ is metaphysically impossible

Question 5

explain the response to the philosophical zombie argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

Answer 5

• There may be possible worlds containing philosophical zombies, but in the actual world the natural laws make it so that zombies are an impossibility here and this is what matters
• however, If physicalism is true, it must be committed to the claim that consciousness is purely physical not only in this world, but in any possible world
• if consciousness is nothing more than physical, any physical duplicate of a human being is conscious
• e.g water is h20 not just in this world, but any possible world
• likewise, if physicalism is true then it is not possible for something to be a functioning physical duplicate of a human being to not be conscious

Question 6

what is the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism

Answer 6

• A scientist named Mary has been confined to a black and white room her whole life and has never seen colours.
• She learns everything there is to know about the physical processes underlying colours.
• When she leaves the room and sees colours for the first time would she learn something new?
• Property dualists say that Mary would learn something new
• She would gain qualia of colours
• Learning everything there is to know about the physicalities of colours does not tell you what it is like to have qualia
• Therefore because she learns something new after experiencing colour, there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a complete physical account of it
• So there are non-physical properties/knowledge and so physicalism is false

Question 7

explain the ‘ability knowledge’ response to the Mary argument

Answer 7

• ability knowledge is knowledge of how to do things e.g. how to ride a bike
• when Mary leaves the room she acquires new abilities, e.g. how to recognise ripe tomatoes or fresh bananas from sight
• this new ability knowledge doesn’t mean she has learned any new facts about colour vision and so it is still true that she possessed all factual knowledge before leaving the room

Question 8

explain the ‘aquaintance knowledge’ response to the Mary argument

Answer 8

• Propositional knowledge is facts of the world, can be propositions
• Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge of something, comes from experience of something
• Instead of gaining new propositional knowledge when leaving the room, Mary gains acquaintance knowledge
• a complete physical account of colour does include all the propositional knowledge about colour vision and Mary knew all this before leaving the room
• When leaving the room she has become acquainted with the qualia of colour vision

Question 9

explain the ‘new knowledge/old fact’ response to the Mary argument

Answer 9

• Mary does gain new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew presented in a different way
• there is more than one way to know the same fact e.g. “I know that there is water in that glass” is the same as “I know that there is h20” in that glass
• the same fact can be understood via two different concepts
• Before she left the room, Mary only knew about colour in theoretical terms, but when she leaves she gains a new concept; the phenomenal concept
• Mary doesn’t learn new facts, just a different way of understanding the same fact
• what is different is the way that these facts are presented, this time using phenomenal concepts