physicalism Flashcards
what is physicalism?
- the view that everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical
- so mental states supervene upon the physical (they are dependent upon physical properties)
what is philosophical behavioursim?
- the view that mental state concepts, such as beliefs, desires and sensations are identical in meaning to behavioural concepts
- the mind can be analytically reduced to behaviour e.g. happiness is actually just “smiling” and “laughing”
a mental state is all about the external and observable behaviour
explain ‘hard’ behaviourism
- “all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements”
- Hemple said that the mind should be based on empirically observable data rather than introspection (based on behavioural evidence alone)
- we can translate all talk about mental states into observation statements about peoples physical states and behaviour
- e.g. ‘Paul is in pain’ is equivalent to the statements ‘Paul is crying’ and when asked what’s wrong Paul saying that ‘I have a toothache’
explain soft behaviourism
- “propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions”
- Ryle says that mental states don’t need to be reduced to actual behaviour but just to one’s behavioural dispositions
- a mental state does not always have to be manifested into a behaviour e.g. if you have a toothache you might not complain, if you believe it is raining you might not display any associated behaviour, such as putting an umbrella up
- if someone has a toothache, it doesnt mean they would actually be crying, but they would only be doing this if the circumstance was right
- if someone is thirsty, it doesnt mean they are going to get a drink, it just means that they are disposed to get a drink and would do if the opportunity arose
- dispositions can be expressed in hypothetical propositions “if….then….so” “if you were in the right circumstances then you would have a drink”
- mental states can be reduced in terms of potential behaviour
explain the issue for physicalism: dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism
(any dualism arguments can be applied)
- mary’s room
- philosophical zombie argument
explain the issue for behaviourism: the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (super-spartans and perfect actors)
- ‘super-spartans’ are a community of people who suppress any outward demonstration of pain
- they don’t cry, say “ouch!” or wince
- they feel pain internally, and have the subjective experience of pain, but have been trained to show no outward manifestations of pain behaviour
- behaviourism says pain is reducible to it’s behaviours
- but the idea of super-spartans is not contradictory, so it seems that our concept of pain cannot be reduced to behavioural concepts
- pain and the behaviour are two separate things - it’s possible to have the mental state without the behavioural disposition
- pain behaviour is just a symptom of being in pain
explain the issue for physicalism: issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to a) circularity and b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour
a) a complete analysis of mental states would reduce all talk of mental states to talk of behaviour
- but wether a mental state manifests itself in behaviours depends on the other mental states a person has
e.g. if I am thirsty, wether I drink the water or not depends on if I believe the water is poisoned. the belief that the drink is poisoned will also make reference to mental states
- we cannot make a complete analysis without reintroducing mental state terms at each turn
- the analysis is circular because it reintroduces mental state concepts instead of reducing them to behavioural concepts
b) mental states can be realised by different behaviours
- e.g. if I believe it will rain I could take an umbrella or wear a hood
- mental states are multiply realisable in behaviour
- there seems to be no limit in how many ways a mental state could manifest itself in behaviour
- a complete analysis would have to include all the possible ways a mental state could be manifested in behaviour, this list would be indefinitely long and impossible to complete
- e.g. if I believe a drink is poisoned I won’t drink it, but another person who also believes the drink is poisoned might drink it because they are suicidal
- their mental state relies on another mental state, the mental state of believing the drink is poisoned can be multiply realised in different behaviours
what is the issue for physicalism: the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other peoples mental states
- there is a big difference in the way that I know my own mental states and the way I know the mental states of others
- I know the mental states of others because I observe their physical behaviour, e.g. I know Paul has a toothache because he is clutching his jaw and yelling that he has a toothache
- but I don’t need behavioural evidence to know what mental state I am in e.g. if I have a toothache, I can tell I have a toothache because I am directly acquainted with the pain
- behaviourism does not explain this asymmetry
- it suggests knowledge of my own mental states is obtained in the same way that I gain knowledge of others’ mental states
- the fact that I don’t need to observe my behaviour in order to know what mental state I am in shows that it is false
